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MUTINY 



CRIBNER & WELFORD 



THE 

INDIAN MUTINY 

OF 1857 



COLONEL G. B: MALLESON, C.S.I. 

AUTHOR OF ' THE DECISIVE BATTLES OF INDIA,' ' HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA,' 

' LIFE OF LORD CLIVE,' ' THE BATTLEFIELDS OF GERMANY,' 

'ambushes and surprises,' etc., ETC, 



Wz't/i Portraits and Plans 



SCRIBNER & WELFORD 

NEW YORK 

1891 




\ 



^ 






^^Wjui^B '-^S" 



PREFA CE, 



In writing this short History of the Indian Mutiny 
of 1857 I have aimed at the compilation of a 
work which, complete in itself, should narrate 
the causes as well as the consequences of a 
movement unforeseen, undreamt of, sudden and 
swift in its action, and which taxed to the utmost 
the energies of the British people. Preceding 
writers on the same subject, whilst dealing very 
amply with the consequences, have, with one 
exception, but dimly shadowed forth the causes. 
The very actors in the Mutiny failed to detect 
them. Sir John Lawrence himself, writing with 
the fullest knowledge of events in which he played 
a very conspicuous part, mistook the instrument 
for the chief cause. He stopped at the greased 
cartridge. But the greased cartridge was never 
issued to the great body of the troops, if indeed 
to any. There must have been a latent motive 
power to make of an unissued cartridge a 
grievance so terrible as to rouse into revolt men 
whose fathers and whose fathers' fathers had 



vl Preface. 

contributed to the making of the British Empire 
in India. The greased cartridge, too, did not 
concern those landowners and cultivators of Oudh 
and the North-western Provinces, who rose almost 
to a man. What that latent motive power was 
I have described fully, and I believe truly, in 
this volume. 

My belief in this respect is founded on personal 
knowledge and personal observation. Locally 
chief of the Commissariat Department at Kanhpur 
when, in January 1856, Sir James Outram crossed 
the Ganges to depose the King of Oudh, I had 
witnessed the indignation which the very rumour 
of his purpose caused among the sipahis of my 
own guard. I reported their excited state to my 
superiors, and was laughed at for my pains. But, 
impressed with the accuracy of my forecast, viz., 
that the annexation of Oudh would rouse indigna- 
tion and anger in the sipahi army, I continued 
then, and after my transfer, two months later, to 
an appointment in the Military Audit Department 
in Calcutta, to keep a careful record of the several 
occurrences, all apparently of minor import, v/hich 
supervened when the effects of the annexation of 
Oudh had been thoroughly realised by the sipahis. 
My observations led to the conclusion that they 
were thoroughly angered, and, a little later, that 
their minds were being mysteriously worked upon. 
I kept copious notes of the matters I observed, 
and I discussed them with mv brother officers, 



Preface. vii 

without, however, finding that my views were 
shared by any one of them. It would seem, 
however, that the officer who held the responsible 
post of Town Major, Major Orfeur Cavenagh, 
had, from his own observation, arrived at con- 
clusions not dissimilar. He has narrated in his 
admirable work ^ the observations forced upon 
him by the changed demeanour of the natives of 
the North-western Provinces in 1856. But he, 
too, stood, amongst high-placed Europeans, almost 
alone in his convictions. The fact is that, up to 
the very outbreak of the Mutiny at Mirath, no one, 
from highest to lowest, believed in the possibility 
of a general combination. Those, and they 
could be counted on the fingers of one hand, 
who endeavoured to hint at an opposite conclusion 
were ridiculed as alarmists. j]Sa ingrained was 
the belief in the loyalty of the sipahis, and so 
profound w^as the ignorance as to the manner 
in which their minds were affected, that neither 
the outbreak of Mirath nor the seizure of Dehli 
entirely removed itT^ The tone of the governing 
classes was displayed when the Home Secretary 
prated about 'a passing and groundless panic,' 
and when the acting Commander-in-Chief, an old 
officer of sipahis, babbled, in June 1857, of 
reorganisation. But the fact, nevertheless, re- 



1 



Reminiscences of an Indian Official. By Sir Orfeur Cavenagh. 
On the subject of the services rendered by this officer, in 1857, 
I have entered fully in the sixth volume of my larger history. 



viii Preface. 

mained. Circumstances had proved to me that 
extraneous causes were at work to promote an 
ill-feeHng, a hatred not personal but national, in 
the minds of men who for a century had been 
our truest and most loyal servants. When the 
Mutiny had been quelled I renewed my researches 
regarding the origin of this feeling, and, thanks 
to the confidences of my native friends in various 
parts of the country, I arrived at a very definite 
conclusion. That conclusion I placed on record, 
in 1880, when I published the then concluding 
volume of a History of the Mutiny, begun by 
Sir John Kaye, but left unfinished by that 
distinguished writer. After the publication of 
that volume I again visited India, and renewed 
my inquiries among those of my native friends 
best qualified to arrive at a sound opinion as to 
the real origin of the Mutiny. The lapse of 
time had removed any restraints which might 
have fettered their freedom of speech, and they 
no longer hesitated to declare that, whilst the 
action of the Government of India, in Oudh 
and elsewhere, had undermined the loyalty of 
the sipahis, and prepared their minds for the 
conspirators, the conspirators themselves had 
used all the means in their power to foment 
the excitement. tThose conspirators, they de- 
clared, were the Maulavi of Faizabad, the 
mouthpiece and agent of the discontented in 
Oudh ; Nana Sahib ; one or two great personages 



Preface. ix 

in Lakhnao ; the Rani of Jhansi ; and Kunwar 
Singh. The action of the land system introduced 
into the North-west Provinces by Mr Thomason, 
had predisposed the population of those provinces 
to revolt^ There remained only to the con- 
spirators to find a grievance which should so 
touch the strong religious susceptibilities of 
the sipahis as to incite them to overt action. 
Such a grievance they found in the greased 
cartridge. By the circulation of chapatis they 
then intimated to the rural population that the 
time for action was approaching. This version 
of the immediate causes of the Mutiny is known 
to be true by some at least who will read these 
pages ; it is known to be true by all who have 
taken the trouble to dive below the surface. 
I have accordingly given it a prominent place 
in this volume. 

The task of compressing within about four 
hundred pages the story of a Mutiny which 
abounded in scenes of action, so many, so varied, 
so distinct from each other ; of a Mutiny in which 
every station occupied by English men and 
English women was either a camp or a battle- 
ground ; in the outset of which our countrymen, 
in the several sub-divisions of India, were in the 
position of detached parties of a garrison, unable 
to communicate with headquarters or with one 
another, suddenly surprised and set upon by men 
whom they had implicitly trusted ; has been one 



X Preface. 

the difficulty of which I never reaHsed until I had 
taken it in hand. When a writer has at his 
command unlimited space, his task is compara- 
tively easy. He can then do justice to all the 
actors in the drama. But I have found it most 
difficult to mention the names of all who have 
deserved in a volume every page of which must 
be devoted to the relation of events. And 
although my publishers, with a generosity I can- 
not sufficiently acknowledge, permitted me to 
increase, by an additional fourth, the number of 
pages allotted to the series of which this volume 
is the second issue, I am conscious that I have 
not sufficiently dwelt upon the splendid individual 
achievements of many of those who contributed 
to the final victory. The fact is that* there are so 
many of them. There never has been an event 
in History to which the principle of the Order of 
the Day, published by Napoleon on the morrow of 
Austerlitz, applies more thoroughly than to the 
Mutiny of 1857. ' " It will be enough for one of 
you to say," said the Emperor, in his famous 
bulletin, '' I was at the Battle of Austerlitz," for all 
your fellow-citizens to exclaim, " There is a brave 
man ! " ' Substitute the words ' Indian Mutiny ' for 
the ' Battle of Austerlitz ' and the phrase applies 
to that band of heroes whose constancy, whose 
courage, and whose devotion saved India in 1857. 
One word as to the spelling I have adopted. 
It is similar to the spelling which appears in the 



Preface, xi 

cabinet edition of Kaye s and Malleson s History^ 
to the spelling adopted by Captain Eastwick in 
Murray's admirable guide-books for India, and 
it is the correct spelling. Some critics have igno- 
rantly remarked that the natives of India employ 
no definite spelling for their proper names. But 
this remark betrays the prejudice of the traveller 
who disdains to learn. The natives use not only 
a well-defined spelling for their proper names, 
but every name has a distinct meaning. The bar- 
baric method adopted by our forefathers a century 
and a half since, when they were ignorant of the 
native languages, and wrote simply according to 
the sound which reached ears unaccustomed to the 
precise methods of an Oriental people, totally alters 
and disfigures that meaning. Take, for example, 
the word ' Kanhpur,' written, in accordance with 
barbaric custom, * Cawnpore.' Now, ^Kanhpur' 
has a definite meaning. ' Kanh/ or ' husband,' 
is one of the favourite names of ' Krishna.' 
' Pur' means ' a city.' The combination of the two 
words signifies ' Krishna's city.' But what is the 
meaning of ' Cawnpore' ? It does not even corre- 
spond to the pronunciation as the name of the place 
is pronounced by the natives. It serves to remind 
us of a period of ignorance and indifference to 
native methods over which it is surely kind 
to draw the veil. The same reasoning applies 
to every proper name in India. It is true I have 
spelt ' Calcutta,' ' Bombay,' and the ' Ganges ' ac- 



xii Preface. 

cording to the conventional method ; but the two 
places and the river have a long European record, 
and their names thus spelt are so ingrafted in 
the connection between India and Europe that 
it would be pedantry to alter them. But Kanhpur 
and the places to the north-west and north of it 
were but little known before the Mutiny, and it 
seems becoming that the events which brought 
them into European prominence should introduce 
them under the names which properly belong 
to them, and which no European prejudice can 
permanently alter. 

It remains for me now only to acknowledge 
gratefully the courteous manner in which Messrs 
W. H. Allen & Co. granted me permission to use, 
in a reduced form, the plans they had prepared 
for their larger history of the Indian Mutiny. 

G. B. MALLESON. 



27 West Cromwell Road, 
October 10, icSgo. 



CONTENTS. 



PREFACE. _ ^ 

PACK 

I. INTRODUCTORY, .... I 

II. THE CONSPIRATORS, . . . .21 

III. THE FIRST MUTTERINGS OF THE STORM, . 34 

IV. THE SPREAD OF THE EPIDEMIC, . . 43 

V. BARRACKPUR, CALCUTTA, AND THE NORTH- 
WEST TO THE 9TH OF MAY, . . 5 1 

VI. THE REVOLT AT MIRATH AND THE SEIZURE OF 

DEHLf, . . . . .64 

Vn. THE EFFECT, THROUGHOUT INDIA, OF THE 

SEIZURE OF DEHLI, . . .87 

VIII. THE PROGRESS OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE 

NORTH-WEST IN MAY AND JUNE, . . 99 

IX. THE MARCH TO DEHLI, . . . .112 

X. kAnhpur, lakhnao, AND allahAbad, . 128 

XL CALCUTTA IN JUNE AND JULY, . . . 151 

XII. THE LEAGUER OF KANHPUR, . . . T59 

XIII. NEILL AT BANARAS AND ALLAHAbAd HAVE- 

LOCK's RECOVERY OF kAnHPUR, . . 178 

XIV. THE RESIDENCY OF LAKHNAO AFTER CHINHAT 

HAVELOCK's FIRST ATTEMPTS TO RE- 
LIEVE IT, . . , . , 203 



XIV 



Contents. 



XV. CALCUTTA AND WESTERN BIHAR IN JULY AND 

AUGUST, . . . . .213 

XVI. THE FIRST RELIEF OF THE LAKHNAO RESIDENCY, 23 1 

XVII. THE LEAGUER OF AGRA, . . . 246 

XVIII. EVENTS IN THE SAGAR AND NARBADA TERRI- 
TORIES, CENTRAL INDIA, RAJPUTANA, THE 
MIRATH DISTRICTS, ROHILKHAND, AND 
THE PAN JAB, . . . .254 

XIX. THE SIEGE AND STORMING OF DEHLI, . . 278 

XX. FROM DEHLI TO AGRA AND KANHPUR SIR 

COLIN CAMPBELL AT KANHPUR, . . 3T3 

XXI. THE SECOND RELIEF OF THE LAKHNAO RESI- 
DENCY — WINDHAM AND THE GWALIAR CON- 
TINGENT, ..... 323 

XXII. SIR COLIN CAMPBELL RECOVERS THE DUAB, . 340 

XXIII. EASTERN BENGAL, EASTERN BIHAR, AZAMGARH, 

ALLAHABAD, AND EASTERN OUDH, . 345 

XXIV. THE STORMING OF LAKHNAO, . . -355 

XXV. AZAMGARH — RECONQUEST OF ROHILKHAND, OF 
OUDH, OF THE AZAMGARH AND WESTERN 
BIhAr DISTRICTS, .... 370 

XXVL WESTERN AND CENTRAL INDIA, . . . 381 

XXVII. THE LAST EMBERS OF THE REVOLT, . . 398 

XXVIII. CONCLUSION, ..... 403 

INDEX, . . , , , ,413 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



PORTRAIT OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, AFTERWARDS LORD 

CLYDE, ....... Frontispiece 

PORTRAIT OF SIR HENRY LAWRENCE, . . . . 6o 

PORTRAIT OF SIR HENRY HAVELOCK, . . . , 1 88 

PORTRAIT OF SIR JAMES OUTRAM, .... 236 

PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS C F THE BRITISH ARMY 

BEFORE DEHLI IN 1857, ..... 278 

SKETCH OF OPERATIONS FOR THE RELIEF AND WITHDRAWAL 

OF THE LAKHNAO GARRISON, ..... 328 

PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS BEFORE LAKHNAO IN 

MARCH 1858, ....... 358 



V* The Portraits of Lord Ct;) de, Sir H. Laiircnce and Sir H. Hazelock are ergiavcfl 
by perifiission 0/ Messrs Henry Graves ^ Co. 



The Indian Mutiny of 1857 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

In the history of the world there is no more wonderful 
story than that of the making of the British Empire in 
India. It was not the result of deliberate design. The 
early English settlers on the coasts of India thought only 
of protecting the small tracts of territory conceded to 
them against aggression from native princes and Euro- 
pean rivals. For a long time they never dreamt even 
of questioning the sovereign rights of the native princes 
who exercised authority in the territories nearest to their 
possessions. The instructions which the agents on the 
spot received from the directors of the parent Company at 
home indicated, in the plainest language, that their busi- 
ness was to trade ; that to trade advantageously, it was 
necessary to humour the native princes, to display 
courtesy and civility, to put away from them all thoughts 
of aggression. The object of the Company was to pay 
good dividends. Such a result could only be obtained by 
the development of peaceful enterprise. 

Suddenly there came a change in the action of the 
English agents on the Coromandel coast. The English 

A 



2 The Early European Settlements, 

had been the third European nation which had sought to 
open a profitable trade with India, and which, for that 
purpose, had secured lodgments on her coasts. Of the 
two nations which had preceded them, the Portuguese had 
declined ; the Dutch were declining. The vigour and 
energy of the race which inhabits England was producing, 
in the rapid increase of the trade, the results which in- 
variably follow the development of those qualities, when a 
fourth power, France, the hereditary rival of England in 
Europe, began, under the influence of MM. Dumas and 
Dupleix, to develop, in an extraordinary manner, the 
resources of a settlement which one of her children, 
Francois Martin, had made, under very difficult circum- 
stances, on the same coast. This settlement, called from 
the town of which Martin had obtained possession Pondi- 
chery, had reached a high state of prosperity under the 
careful nursing of the immediate predecessor of Dupleix, 
M. Benoit Dumas. This able man had known how to 
conciliate the friendship of the native princes on the 
coast. In return for many civilities and good offices, he 
had been granted permission to enlist sipahis and to 
erect fortifications. Between Pondichery and the English 
settlement of Madras there had been in his time no 
thought of hostility. Peace between the rival powers 
reigned in Europe, and no temptation arose in India to 
disturb the happy relations of friendship. 

In October 1741 M. Dupleix succeeded Dumas at 
Pondichery. A man remarkably gifted, endowed with a 
genius which could conceive the largest schemes, he con- 
tinued that system of ingratiating himself with the native 
princes, which had been attended with such favourable 
results in the time of his predecessor. The policy was 
soon to bear the most brilliant fruits. In 1743 the 
English and French had taken opposite sides in the war 



Rivalry between the French and English. 3 

of the Austrian succession. The battle of Dettingen had 
been fought (June 16, 1743) before war had actually been 
declared. But the declaration soon followed, and it was 
not long before warlike operations, begun in Europe, ex- 
tended to India. 

Both nations despatched squadrons to the Indian seas. 
The English squadron, preceded by instructions from the 
directors of the East India Company to its agent at 
Madras, Mr Morse, to use it to destroy the French settle- 
ment at Pondichery, arrived first. But before Morse 
could carry out his instructions he was compelled to ask 
the sanction to the undertaking of the ruler of the country 
of which Madras formed a part, the Nuwab of the Karnatik. 
But that prince was under the spell exercised by Dumas 
and Dupleix. He refused the permission, and Pondichery 
was saved. 

Two years later the position of the two principal 
European powers on the Coromandel coast was inverted. 
The English squadron was absent : the French squadron 
was on the spot. Dupleix then prepared for his rivals the 
fate with which they had threatened him. In vain did 
the English appeal to the Nuwab of the Karnatik. That 
prince, gained by Dupleix, declined to interfere in the 
quarrel between the settlers. The result was that, on 
September 21, 1746, Madras surrendered to the French, 
and was promptly occupied by a garrison composed of 
French troops and of sipahis trained by French officers. 

The capture of Madras by the French is an im- 
portant event in the history of the connection of France 
and England with India ; for it was indirectly the cause 
of the development of that sipahi army, the great out- 
break of which, against its masters, it is my object to 
describe in this volume. It would seem that Dupleix, 
when pleading to the Nuwab for permission to attack 



4 The First Sipdhi Army. 

Madras, had promised that prince that he would transfer 
it, after he had captured it, to the Nuwab for disposal. 
But when the Nuwab called upon him to fulfil his pro- 
mise, he displayed great unwillingness to comply. He 
wished, at least, to level its fortifications, to dismantle 
it before making it over. The Nuwab, however, had 
despatched his son with a force to take possession. To 
dismantle the place in the presence of that force was 
impossible. Dupleix determined then to use every diplo- 
matic means at his disposal to persuade the Nuwab to 
allow him to retain it. But the young prince who re- 
presented the Nuwab was impatient, and precipitated a 
contest by cutting off the water supply of the town and 
fort. The French governor, Despremesnil, despatched 
then 400 men and two guns to recover the water springs. 
It was the first contest on the Coromandel coast between 
the settlers of either nation and the indigenous popula- 
tion. Up to that time French and English had carefully 
refrained from all acts of hostility towards the children 
of the soil. In the princes of the coast they had recog- 
nised their landlords, their masters, to whose complaisance 
they owed the permission to maintain trading stations on 
the coast. They were to be courted, persuaded, won over, 
but never opposed. The sortie from Madras of the 2d 
November 1746 was, then, a rude infringement of a custom 
till then religiously observed. Its consequences were 
momentous. The fire of the two French field-pieces, well 
directed and continuous, put to flight the cavalry of the 
Nuwab. The water springs were regained without the 
loss by the French of a single man, whilst about seventy 
Mughal horsemen bit the dust. 

The son of the Nuwab, Maphuz Khan by name, was 
not present on this occasion. When he heard of it he 
attributed the result to accident, to bad leading, to any 



First Victory of the Ettropeans, 5 

cause but the right one. He would show himself, he said, 
how these Europeans should be met. He had heard, the 
very day of the defeat of his cavalry, that a small force, 
composed of 230 Frenchmen and 700 trained sipahis, was 
approaching Madras from Pondichery, and would attempt 
to cross the little river Adyar, near St Thome, on the 4th 
(November). Maphuz Khan had at his disposal 10,000 
men. He took at once a resolution worthy of a great 
commander. He marched with his whole army to St 
Thome, occupied a position on the northern bank of the 
Adyar, so strong and so commanding that he could not 
fail, if the combatants were at all equal in military 
qualities, to crush the little force marching on Madras. 

Maphuz Khan was on the chosen spot, eager for 
combat, when the small French force appeared in sight. 
Paradis, who commanded it, was an engineer, a man who 
knew not fear, and who was not easily moved from his 
purpose. He saw the serried masses in front of him, 
barring his way. To attack them he must wade through 
the river, exposed to their fire. Had he hesitated an 
instant the story of the Europeans in India might have 
been different. But Paradis recognised, as many English 
commanders after him have recognised, that the one way 
for the European to pursue when combating Asiatics is to 
go forward. He did not hesitate a moment. Without 
waiting even to reconnoitre, he dashed into the river, 
scrambled up the bank, formed on it in line, delivered 
a volley, and charged. The effect was momentous. Never 
was there fought a more decisive battle, a battle more 
pregnant with consequences. The army of the Nuwab 
was completely defeated. Vigorously pursued, it vanished, 
never again to appear in line against a European enemy, 
unless supported by the presence of that enemy's European 
rival. 



6 Consequences of the Victory. 

It is impossible to over-estimate the effects on the 
minds of the native princes and native soldiers of Southern 
India of the victory gained by the French at St Thome. 
The famous historian, Mr Orme, who was almost a con- 
temporary, wrote of it that it broke the charm which had 
invested the Indian soldiers with the character of being 
' a brave and formidable enemy.' Another writer^ has 
recorded of it that, ' of all the decisive battles fought in 
India, there is not one more memorable than this. The 
action at St Thome completely reversed the positions of 
the Nuwab and the French governor. Not only that, but 
it inaugurated a new era, it introduced a fresh order of 
things, it was the first decided step to the conquest of 
Hindustan by a European power.' 

There can be no doubt but that the result of the battle 
gave birth in the mind of Dupleix to ideas of conquest, of 
supremacy, even of empire, in Southern India. It is no 
part of this work to follow the course he adopted to secure 
the triumph of those ideas; but this at least has to be 
admitted, that the scheme of forming a regular force of 
trained native soldiers, if it did not actually date from the 
victory of St Thome, acquired from it a tremendous im- 
petus. Thereafter the spectacle was witnessed of the re- 
presentatives of two European nations, longtime enemies 
in Europe, taking opposite sides in the quarrels of native 
princes in Southern India, and for that purpose employing 
not only their own countrymen but natives armed and 
drilled on the European system, led by European officers, 
vying with their European comrades in deeds of daring 
and devotion, and becoming by degrees the main supports 
of their European masters. After the lapse of a few years 
the European nation which inaugurated the new system 

1 The Decisive Battles of India, from 1746 to 1849 inclusive. New Edition. 
Page 16. 



A H^uldred Years Later. h 

was completely vanquished by its rival. But before that 
could be accomplished the system had taken a firm hold 
of that rival. When, in 1756, Clive set out from Madras 
to recover Calcutta from the hands of Suraju-daulah, he 
took with him, in addition to his 900 Europeans, 1200 
sipdhfs, natives of Southern India, armed and drilled on 
the European system. These men formed the nucleus of 
that glorious native army which, led by European officers 
helped their English masters to win Bengal and Bihar 
from the satraps of the Mughals ; to wrest Bandras and 
the delta of the Ganges from the Nuwab Wazir of Oudh • 
to expel the Marathas from the North-west Provinces ; to 
establish a frontier on the Satlaj ; to invade Afghanistan ; 
and, finally, to acquire the Panjab. 

In another work^ I have told in detail the principal 
achievements of that army up to the time when Lord 
Dalhousie annexed the Panjab (1849). During that 
period of a hundred years the organisation of the native 
army had been more than once altered, but the spirit of 
devotion to its European officers had been manifested 
throughout all the changes on many memorable occa- 
sions. In the time of Clive the sipahis had stood firmly 
by their European masters (i;66) when the European 
troops in India, officers and men, had mutinied. They 
had never shrunk from following their European officer 
whithersoever he would lead them. And if, on some rare 
occasions, some few of them had displayed momentary 
disaffection, that disaffection had been, up to 1857, the 
result of feelings in which there was not the smallest 
tinge of patriotism. Speaking broadly, the result in each 
instance was the consequence of an attempt, well meant 
but clumsily carried out, to graft western ideas upon an 

^ The Decisive Battles of India. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1888. 
New Edition. 



8 Forcmp[ Western Ideas 



<b 



oriental people. The secret of the influence of the 
Englishman in India has lain in the fact that he had so 
conducted himself, in all his relations with the children of 
the soil, that his word had come to be regarded as equal 
to his bond. It was only when the sipahi, at Vellor in 
1806, at Barrackpur in 1824 and again in 1852, in the 
North-western Provinces in 1844, in the Panjab in 1849-50, 
deemed that the promises made to him on his enlist- 
ment had been deliberately violated, that he displayed an 
obstinate determination to break with his master rather 
than to continue service on terms which, it seemed to him, 
could be disregarded at that master's pleasure. 

Action of a different character, although based on the 
same principle, so dear to the untravelled Englishman, 
of forcing the ideas in which he has been nurtured upon 
the foreign people with whom he is brought into contact, 
assisted, especially after the first Afghan war, to loosen 
the bonds of discipline, which, up to that period, had 
bound the sipahi to his officer. In the time of Clive the 
sipahi army had been officered on the principle which, 
in India, is known as the irregular system. The men 
were dressed in the oriental fashion, the companies were 
commanded by native officers ; the European officers 
attached to each battalion, few in number, were picked 
men, selected entirely for their fitness to deal with 
and command native troops. The powers of the com- 
manding officer were large. He was, to the sipahi, the 
impersonification of the British power in India. His word 
was law. Beyond him the mind of the sipahi did not care 
to travel. The sipahi did not concern himself with regu- 
lations and appeals to the Commander-in-Chief. The 
system had answered admirably. It was in force through- 
out the reigns of Clive and Warren Hastings, and in no 
single respect had it failed. 



upon an Eastern People. 9 

But in course of time the idea came to the ruh'ng 
authorities in India that great advantage would accrue 
if the sipahi regiments were to be remodelled on the 
system then prevailing in the British army. Just before 
the great Marquess Wellesley, then Lord Mornington, 
a/rived in India, such a scheme was carried into effect 
/1796). The dress of the sipahis was assimilated to that 
of his European comrades. The native officers, though 
maintained, were relegated to an inferior position. The 
English system, with its list of captains, lieutenants, and 
ensigns, supervised by a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, 
and a major, was introduced into the native army, and 
that army was brought more completely than it had ever 
been before into the European centralising system. 

Fortunately for the tranquillity of British India it was 
only gradually, almost imperceptibly, that the great powers 
of the commanding officer were interfered with. Under 
the new system the sipahis fought well against Tipu 
Sahib, against the Marathas, against the Pindaris, and 
against the Peshwa. They conducted themselves with 
their accustomed courage and resolution in the first war 
with Burma, 1825-6. Then came a period of peace, to be 
broken only in 1838 by the first invasion of Afghanistan. 

That the disasters of the first Afghan war had an 
effect on the feelings with which the sipahi had until then 
regarded his English master is undeniable. During that 
war he had behaved with remarkable courage, self-denial, 
and devotion. A distinguished officer who served in it 
declared on a public occasion, after the return of the 
troops, that his personal experience had convinced him 
that, properly led, the sipahi would follow his English 
oflicer anywhere, and would bear uncomplainingly any 
amount of hardships. But the imagination exercises upon 
the mind of an oriental an influence which is often not at 



lo The Fii'st Afghan War. 

all understood by the colder nature of the Englishman. 
Notwithstanding the triumphs of Nott and Pollock in the 
last phases of the war, the sipahi recognised that for the 
first time the enterprise of his English master against a 
native power had failed. There was no disguising the 
fact that the English troops had suffered greatly, and had 
finally retreated ; that the soldiers of the Punjab, a terri- 
tory which they had traversed on sufferance, had scoffed 
and jeered at them whenever they came in contact with 
them. They realised that a heavy blow had been dealt 
to British prestige. Possibly, with that tendency to ex- 
aggeration which characterises imaginative natures, they 
thought the blow greater than it actually had been. 

But the retreat from Afghanistan was but the begin- 
ning of many evils. Within two years of the return of 
the army Lord Ellenborough annexed the province of 
Sind. The annexation was absolutely necessary, and had 
the Government of India been ruled by men of Indian 
experience, that is, by men possessing experience of the 
natives of India north-west of Bengal, the annexation 
might have been made a source of strength, instead of for 
a time weakening the relations of the Government with 
its native army, and in the end impairing its efficiency. 

The first step taken by the Government shook the 
confidence of the sipahis in its promises. Up to that 
time certain extra allowances for food had been granted 
to all sipahi regiments serving beyond the then British 
frontier. Now, service in the hot and arid regions of Sind 
had always been distasteful to the sipahi of the Bengal 
Presidency, but he was reconciled to the discomforts by 
the promise that, whilst employed in that province, he 
should receive a considerable addition to his pay. But 
the Government of India argued that the incorporation of 
Sind within the British territories had cancelled the pre- 



Mistakes of the Indian Government, 1 1 

vailing regulations referring to service beyond the Indus, 
and they notified the fact to the several divisional com- 
manders. The result was to create so great a revulsion 
in the minds of the sipahis that the native regiments 
under orders for Sind refused to march thither. 

Ultimately the difficulty was got over, but in a manner 
not very creditable to the Government. The Bengal troops 
were relieved of the necessity of garrisoning Sind, and 
their place was taken by native troops from Bombay. 
One commanding officer was dismissed the service be- 
cause, to induce his men to march, he had guaranteed 
them the allowances to which they considered them- 
selves entitled, as indeed, upon the principles of abstract 
justice, they were. One regiment was disbanded. 
Sipahis in others were selected for punishment. The 
Government of India believed they had by these and 
kindred measures staj/ed the plague, when in reality they 
had shaken to the core the confidence of the sipahis in 
their justice, and laid the foundation of the evils which 
followed thirteen years later. 

Those evils were precipitated by the conduct of the 
Commanders-in-Chief sent out from England, often without 
the smallest experience of India, to command, that is, to 
administer, an army of sipahfs outnumbering, in the pro- 
portion of five to one, the European garrison — men born 
under a different sky, bred in a religion and in the respect of 
customs regarding which the Commanders-in-Chief knew 
nothing and desired to know nothing, and animated by 
sentiments which prompted them either to be the most 
docile of followers or the most importunate of solicitors. 
These Commanders-in-Chief were, up to the close of the 
Mutiny, men trained in the traditions of the Horse Guards, 
and who, in their narrow view, regarded any deviation 
from those traditions as an evil to be at all cost eradicated. 



1 2 Mistakes of Military A dministration. 

For a long time they had chafed at the largeness of the 
powers exercised by commanding officers of native regi- 
ments. They were eager to introduce into the guiding of 
those regiments the rule of red tape and routine. For 
some time the Adjutants-General, men trained in the native 
army, and placed at their elbow to prevent the too great 
exercise of a mischievous zeal, had restrained their action. 
But after the first Afghan war there arose a series of courtly 
Adjutants-General who, far from checking, even stimulated 
the narrow instincts of their chief. It gradually became 
the fashion at army Headquarters to quote the Horse 
Guards as the model for all that was practical and military. 
When it is recollected that in those days the military in- 
stincts of the Horse Guards had been displayed by devis- 
ing a clothing for the European soldier so tight that if he 
were to drop his bayonet he could scarcely stoop to pick 
it up, that the weapon known as ' Brown Bess ' was lauded 
up, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, as the most 
perfect of weapons, that inventions tending to improve our 
military system were steadily discouraged, that the highest 
authorities of the British army— the great Duke himself— 
deliberately preferred to live in a fool's paradise, declaring 
that because the British army had been able to go any- 
where and do anything in 1814, therefore, without taking 
advantage of the improvements developed in the course 
of thirty years of peace, it could accomplish the same 
results in 1844, it can easily be understood why the Com- 
manders-in-Chief in India, the nominees and adulators of 
one great man, should do their utmost to bring the native 
army within the fold of red tape, the fold which they had 
been taught to regard as the most perfect in the world. 

By degrees, then, after the first return from Afghanistan, 
and when the refusal of the sipahis to march to Sind 
afforded an excuse for the contention that the discipline 



Discipline tmdermined. 13 

of the native army required to be looked to, the Com- 
manders-in-Chief in India reduced that army to the Horse 
Guards' standard. They restricted the powers of the com- 
manding officers ; they encouraged appeals to army Head- 
quarters ; they insisted that promotion to the rank of 
native officer should be regulated, not by merit, but by 
seniority. They issued order after order the tendency of 
which was to impress upon the mind of the imaginative 
oriental the conviction that the Government desired to 
pet the sipahi at the expense of his actual commandant. 
In this way they undermined the discipline of the army, 
and made their European regimental officers contempti- 
ble in the eyes of their men. 

The sipahis have always obeyed a master who knows 
how to command. But they will not obey a lay figure. Nor, 
equally, will they transfer their respect to an unseen 
authority residing in the lofty hill ranges which overlook 
the plains of Hindustan. They may use that unseen 
authority, indeed, to vex and annoy and baffle their own 
commandant. And that was the manner in which, for a 
few years immediately prior to the Mutiny, the sipahis 
did use it. By petitions against the rulings of the officers 
appointed to command them, petitions examined and 
acted upon by the authority in the hills who did not 
know them, they in many cases rendered the enforcement 
of a rigid state of discipline impossible. 

Whilst the determination of inexperienced Com- 
manders-in-Chief, that is, of Commanders-in-Chief unac- 
quainted with the oriental mind, but tied hand and foot 
to the traditions of the Horse Guards, was thus under- 
mining the discipline of native regiments, other causes 
were supervening to alarm them as to their personal in- 
terests. The sipahis of the Bengal army were enlisted, 
with the exception of those of six regiments, for service in 



14 Mistakes of the Government. 

India only. They were never to be required to cross the 
sea. It happened, however, in 1852, whilst the second 
Burmese war was being waged, that the Governor-Gen- 
eral, Lord Dalhousie, desired to send a native regiment 
to that country in addition to those then employed there. 
There were many ways of accomplishing this end without 
riding roughshod over the rights and engagements of the 
sipdhis. Lord Dalhousie might have despatched one of 
the six regiments pledged to service across the sea, or he 
might have called for volunteers. He did neither. He 
arbitrarily selected a regiment stationed at Barrackpur, the 
sipahis of which had enlisted on the condition that they 
were to serve in Hindustan, and in Hindustan only. The 
sipahis, whose minds had been emancipated, by the process 
referred to in the preceding page, from all respect for 
their commanding officer, had none for a Governor-Gen- 
eral who trod upon their privileges. They flatly refused 
to embark. Lord Dalhousie was placed by his own act 
in the invidious position of having to succumb. The 
story spread like wildfire all over India. The effect^ of it 
was most disastrous to discipline. In the lines and huts 
of the sipahis the warmest sympathy was expressed for a 
regiment which could thus successfully defy a Governor- 
General. 

Then followed the crowning act : the act which touched 
to the quick nine-tenths of the sipahis in the Bengal army, 
and many of those serving in the Bombay Presidency. The 
sipahis serving in Madras were not affected by it. When 
the storm came, in 1857, the Madras sipahis then took no 
part in the revolt. The case may thus be stated. The 
majority of the sipahis serving in the Bengal Presidency, 
and a proportion of those serving in the Bombay army, 
were recruited from the kingdom of Oudh. The sipahi 

■^ I am writing from my own personal experience. 



The Aii7texatioii of Oiidh. 1 5 

so recruited possessed the right of petitioning the British 
Resident at the Court of Lakhnao (Lucknow) on all matters 
affecting his own interests, and the interests of his family in 
the Oudh dominion. This right of petition was a privilege 
the value of which can be realised by those who have any 
knowledge of the working of courts of justice in a native 
state. The Resident of Lakhnao was, in the eyes of the 
native judge, the advocate of the petitioning sipahi. The 
advantage of possessing so influential an advocate was so 
great that there was scarcely a family in Oudh which was 
not represented in the native army. Service in that army 
was consequently so popular that Oudh became the best 
recruiting ground in India. Events subsequent to the 
Mutiny have shown that the reason why it was so re- 
garded lay in the enormous benefits accruing to the sipahi 
from a system which made the British Resident his advo- 
cate. 

All at once this privilege was swept away. The 
British Government decided to annex Oudh. Oudh was 
annexed. Sir James Outram was sent from Calcutta to 
take possession. I happened, at the time, to be the officer 
at Kanhpur (Cawnpore) upon whom devolved the duty 
of supplying carriage to the force which was to cross the 
Ganges and march upon Lakhnao. Never shall I forget 
the agitation which prevailed in the sipahi guard over my 
official quarters when the object of the expedition oozed 
out. Most of those forming it were Oudh men, and I 
had to use all the influence I possessed to prevent an 
outbreak. My native subordinates in the Commissariat 
department assured me that a similar feeling was being 
manifested in the lines of the sipahis. I reported the 
matter to the general, and I mentioned it to one of the 
highest of the new^ officials who passed through the station 
to take up his post in Oudh. My warnings were dis- 



1 6 The Annexation of Ondh, 

regarded ; but when the crisis at Kanhpur arose, and 
when those regiments displayed against British officers, 
their own included, a truculent hatred not surpassed, and 
scarcely equalled, at any other station, they were re- 
membered. 

The annexation of Oudh was felt as a personal blow 
by every sipahi in the Bengal army, because it deprived 
him of an immemorial privilege exercised by himself and 
his forefathers for years, and which secured to him a posi- 
tion of influence and importance in his own country. 
With the annexation that importance and that influence 
disappeared, never to return. English officials succeeded 
the native judges. The right of petition was abolished. 
The great inducement to enlist disappeared. 

Nor was the measure more palatable to the large land- 
owners. The two officers to whom the Government of 
India confided the administration of the newly annexed 
province, Mr Coverley Jackson and Mr Gubbins, had been 
trained in the school the disciples of which, endeavouring 
to graft western ideas upon an eastern people, had done 
their best in the North-west Provinces to abolish land- 
lordism in the sense in which landlordism had flourished 
in those provinces since the time of Akbar. The result 
of their revolutionary proceedings was shown, in 1857, by 
the complete sympathy displayed by the civil districts in 
the North-west Provinces with the revolted sipahis. It 
was shown in Oudh by the rising of the landowners 
throughout the province. 

The causes I have stated had brought the mind of the 
sipahi, in 1856, to fever heat. He had lost faith in the 
Government he served. The action of army Head- 
quarters had deprived him of all respect for his officers. 
He was ready to be practised upon by any schemer. 
His mind was in the perturbed condition which disposes 



The Conspirators. i^ 

a man to believe any assertion, however improbable in 
itself. 

Conspirators to work upon so promising a soil were not 
wanting to the occasion. There was a large amount of 
seething discontent in many portions of India. In Oudh, 
recently annexed ; in the territories under the rule of the 
Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces, revolu- 
tionised by the introduction of the land-tenure system of 
Mr Thomason ; in the Southern Maratha territory, the 
chiefs of which had been exasperated to the very verge 
of revolt by an inquiry, instituted under the auspices 
of a commission, called the Inam Commission, into the 
titles of estates which they and their forefathers had held 
without question since the beginning of the century, 
men's minds were excited and anxious. Suddenly, shortly 
after the annexation of Oudh, this seething discontent 
found expression. Who all the active conspirators were 
may probably never be known. One of them, there can 
be no question, was he who, during the progress of the 
Mutiny, was known as the Maulavi? The Maulavi was 
a very remarkable man. His name was Ahmad-ullah, 
and his native place was Faizabad in Oudh. In person 
he was tall, lean, and muscular, with large deep-set eyes, 
beetle brows, a high aquiline nose, and lantern jaws. Sir 
Thomas Seaton, who enjoyed, during the suppression of 
the revolt, the best means of judging him, described him 
' as a man of great abilities, of undaunted courage, of stern 
determination, and by far the best soldier among the 
rebels.' Such was the man selected by the discontented 
in Oudh to sow throughout India the seeds which, on 
a given signal, should spring to active growth. Of the 
ascertained facts respecting his action this at least has 
been proved, that very soon after the annexation of Oudh 

1 The word 'Maulavi' signifies 'a learned man/ also 'a doctor of law.' 

B 



1 8 The Conspirators. 

he travelled over the North-west Provinces on a mission 
which was a mystery to the European authorities ; that he 
stayed some time at Agra ; that he visited Dehli, Mirath, 
Patna, and Calcutta; that, in April 1857, shortly after his 
return, he circulated seditious papers throughout Oudh ; 
that the police did not arrest him ; that the executive at 
Lakhnao, alarmed at his progress, despatched a body of 
troops to seize him ; that, taken prisoner, he was tried and 
condemned to death ; that, before the sentence could be 
executed, the Mutiny broke out ; that, escaping, he be- 
came the confidential friend of the Begum of Lakhnao, 
the trusted leader of the rebels. 

That this man was the brain and the hand of the con- 
spiracy there can, I think, be little doubt. During his 
travels he devised the scheme known as the chapati 
scheme. Chapatis are cakes of unleavened bread, the cir- 
culation of which from hand to hand is easy, and causes 
no suspicion. The great hope of the Maulavi was to work 
upon the minds, already prone to discontent, of the 
sipahis. When the means of influencing the armed men 
in the service of the British Government should have been 
so matured that, on a given signal, they would be prepared 
to rise simultaneously, the circulation of chapatis amongst 
the rural population of the North-west Provinces would 
notify to them that a great rising would take place on the 
first favourable opportunity. 

It is probable that, whilst he was at Calcutta, the 
Maulavi, constantly in communication with the sipahis 
stationed in the vicinity of that city, discovered the in- 
strument which should act with certain effect on their 
already excited natures. It happened that, shortly before, 
the Government of India had authorised the introduction 
in the ranks of the native army of a new cartridge, the 
exterior of which was smeared with fat These cartridges 



The Greased Cartridge. 19 

were prepared in the Government factory at Dam-Dam, 
one of the suburbs of Calcutta. The practice with the old 
paper cartridges, used with the old musket, the ' Brown 
Bess,' already referred to, had been to bite off the paper at 
one end previous to ramming it down the barrel. When 
the conspirators suddenly lighted upon the new cartridge, 
not only smeared, but smeared with the fat of the hog 
or the cow, the one hateful to the Muhammadans, the 
other the sacred animal of the Hindus, they recognised 
that they had found a weapon potent enough to rouse 
to action the armed men of the races which professed 
those religions. What could be easier than to persuade 
the sipahis that the greasing of the new cartridges was a 
well-thought-out scheme to deprive the Hindu of his caste, 
to degrade the Muhammadan ? 

If the minds of the sipahis had not been excited and 
rendered suspicious of their foreign masters by the occur- 
rences to which I have adverted, the tale told by the con- 
spirators would have failed to affect them. For, after all, 
they, up to January 1857, had had no experience of the 
greased cartridges. A new musket had been partially issued, 
and a certain number of sipahis from each regiment at Bar- 
rackpur were being instructed in its use at Dam-Dam. But 
up to that period no greased cartridges had been issued. 
The secret of their preparation was, however, disclosed in 
January, by a lascar employed in their manufacture to a 
sipahi, and the story, once set rolling, spread with indescrib- 
able celerity. In the olden days, the days before the confi- 
dence between the sipahi and his officer had been broken, 
the sipahi would at once have asked his officer the reason 
for the change. But, in 1857, they sullenly accepted the 
story. They had been told that the object of their foreign 
masters was to make them all Christians. The first step in 
the course to Christianity was to deprive them of their caste. 



20 The Sipdhi had been tmdermined. 

This end could be accomplished insidiously by the defile- 
ment to be produced by biting the greased cartridge. Ex- 
istence without a religion was in their minds intolerable. 
Deprived of their own, having become outcasts by their 
own act, they must, in despair, accept the religion of their 
masters. 

That such was the reasoning which influenced them 
subsequent events fully proved. In the times of the 
earlier invasions of India by the Muhammadan princes 
who preceded the Mughals the conqueror had employed 
compulsion and persecution as the one mode of converting 
the Hindus. The sipahis, alarmed and suspicious, could 
conceive no other. It was in vain that, in the earlier 
stages of the Mutiny, General Hearsey, an accomplished 
linguist, addressing the sipahis in their own language, 
told them that such ways were essentially foreign to the 
Christian's conception of Christianity ; that the Christian's 
religion was the religion of the Book ; and that conver- 
sion could only be founded on the conviction of the mind. 
They heard, but heeded not. What was this argument 
but a wile to entrap them ? The conspirators had done 
their work too well. Before the hot season of 1857 had 
set in there were but few sipahis in the Bengal Presi- 
dency who were not firmly convinced that the greased 
cartridge was the weapon by means of which their foreign 
masters had resolved to deprive them of their religion. 
No sooner had it become certain that this idea had taken 
a firm root in their minds than chapatis passed from 
village to village in the rural districts of the North-west 
Provinces, announcing to the population that grave events 
were impending for which it became them to be prepared. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE CONSPIRATORS. 

On the 29th of February 1856 Charles John, Viscount 
Canning, succeeded Lord Dalhousie as Governor-General 
of India. Lord Canning possessed many qualities which 
fitted him for the onerous office. The second son of an 
illustrious statesman, he had himself received the educa- 
tion which trains a man to enter upon a Parliamentary 
career. He had sat in both Houses, had filled with credit 
some high offices, and had been a member of the Cabinet 
of Lord Palmerston which had decided to annex Oudh. 
To that annexation Lord Canning, as a member of the 
Cabinet, had given his assent. He was a large-minded 
man, possessing noble and generous instincts, a taking 
presence, was a thorough worker, conscientious, scrupulous, 
and resolute. The only objection which the most captious 
critic could have made to the appointment was an objec- 
tion which would have equally applied to the great 
Marquess Wellesley, and to all the intermediate rulers 
of India — he possessed no practical knowledge of India 
and its people. 

A statesman, however gifted, despatched from England 
to rule a country with a population of two hundred and 
fifty millions, must be for some time after his arrival 
dependent on the councillors bequeathed to him by his 
predecessor. Now, the predecessor of Lord Canning had 
been a very masterful man : a born ruler of men ; a man 



2 2 Lord Canitine' and his CotmciL 



t, 



who required, not councillors with whom to consult, but 
servants to carry out his orders. In one sense it was 
a misfortune for Lord Canning that immediately after 
his arrival he had to depend upon those servants for 
advice. 

Amongst them, doubtless, were some very able men. 
The ablest of all, Mr John Peter Grant, was a member of 
his Council. Mr Grant was, in every sense of the term, 
a statesman. His views were large and liberal. He saw 
at a glance the point of a question. He decided quickly ; 
unravelled, with remarkable clearness, the most knotty 
questions, and spoke out with the fearlessness which 
becomes a real man. If Mr Grant had had a larger 
personal experience of the people, he would have been 
one of the greatest of the civil servants of India. But 
his service had been mainly spent in close connection 
with Calcutta, and he had no personal knowledge 
of the country to the north-west of Patna, or of its 
people. 

The military member of Council, General Low, was 
likewise a man of ability ; but he had passed the greater 
part of his service as Political Agent or as Resident of 
native Courts. His experience of the native army was, 
therefore, somewhat rusty. 

The legal member of Council, Mr Barnes Peacock, was 
remarkable for his sound legal acquirements, but he had 
no experience outside Calcutta. 

Of the others, and of all the principal secretaries, it 
must suffice to state that they were excellent clerks; but 
not having been accustomed to act on their own initiative, 
having been accustomed to take their orders from the 
imperious lips of Lord Dalhousie, they were little fitted 
to act as councillors to a newly arrived master at 
a moment when the country was about to pass through 



Not a Cltrnd on the Horizon. 23 

a crisis — a crisis the more terrible in that there was 
not one of them who would allow himself to regard it 
as possible ; not one of them, with the exception of 
Mr Grant, who believed in its immensity even when it 
was upon them. 

But, at the moment of Lord Canning's arrival, it 
seemed as though clerks would be as useful to him as 
councillors. The surface was calm and unbroken. There 
was not visible on the horizon even the little cloud no 
bigger than a man's hand. On his journey homewards 
Lord Dalhousie had written a minute, in which he had 
painted in roseate hues the condition of India, the con- 
tentment of the sipahis, and the improbability of disturb- 
ance from any cause whatever. He had quitted India 
amid the applause, largely mingled with regret at his 
departure, of multitudes of sorrowing disciples By these 
he was reverenced as the greatest of men. If some 
captious subaltern dared to insinuate that the discipline 
of the army had deteriorated, that the minds of the 
sipahis were inflamed against their masters, he was 
silenced by the contemptuous remark that it was im- 
probable that his knowledge could be more deep-reaching 
than was that of Lord Dalhousie. 

On the 29th of Febuary, then, and for the rest of the 
year 1856, all was calm and smiling on the surface, and 
Lord Canning was well content with his clerks. 

Nor, during the remaining months of 1856, did there 
occur any overt act on the part of the many discontented 
throughout India to weaken the impression that the pic- 
ture painted by Lord Dalhousie in his elaborate minute 
was absolutely correct. As far as appearances went, the 
prevailing impression made on the minds of those residing 
in the great centres of the several provinces was that it 
was a year of more than ordinary humdrum. It was 



24 Sir Henry Lawrence sent to Oudh. 

argued that the strong impression made by Lord Dalhousie 
on the country and its diverse races remained active even 
after his departure. Lord Canning simply administered 
the country on the principles and by means of the men 
bequeathed to him by his predecessor. He had experi- 
enced, indeed, some difficulty with Oudh. Not, indeed, 
that the question, which was recurring with increasing in- 
tensity every day to the minds of the sipahis,^ as to the 
injurious effects which the annexation had produced on 
their prospects, ever presented itself to Lord Canning or 
his councillors. The difficulty was caused by the squabbles, 
amounting to a public scandal, between the two senior 
members of the Commission whose administration had 
supplanted that of the deposed king, Mr Coverley Jackson 
and Mr Martin Gubbins. The scandal lasted throughout 
the year, and was only terminated by the removal of Mr 
Jackson, in January of the year following, and the appoint- 
ment in his place of one of the most illustrious of the men 
who have contributed to the securing on a firm foundation 
of the British rule in India — the wise and virtuous Sir 
Henry Lawrence. The task bequeathed to Sir Henry 
was no light one ; for the principle which had sown dis- 
content throughout the North-west Provinces, the principle 
of grafting western ideas on an eastern people — a principle 
which he had combated all his life — had made every land- 
owner in Oudh a rebel at heart. 

There was another event, outside India indeed, but con- 
nected with India, which occupied the attention of Lord 
Canning during the first year of his incumbency of office, 
and which temporarily somewhat diminished his power of 
grappling with any military difficulty which might arise. 
I refer to the war with Persia. 

Up to the year 1856, certainly, it had been a cardinal 

^ Vide page 15. 



The War with Persia. 25 

principle of British policy that Persia was never to possess 
Herat. Herat and Kandahar were the two points in 
Western Afghanistan which commanded the lines always 
followed, from the time of Alexander to that of Ahmad 
Shah, by the invaders of India, and which, therefore, it was 
necessary should be held by the friends of British India, 
if not by British India herself. During the first war waged 
by Great Britain with Afghanistan, Persia had posed as a 
pawn pushed forwards by Russia to gain a dominant 
position on the Indian frontier. But, in 1838, Russia was 
disinclined to support her pawn. She was more prepared 
for action when the Crimean war broke out. But when 
the Shah of Persia realised the fact that the powerful 
nation which had filched from him some of his most fertile 
provinces was in deadly grip with England and France, he 
suspended his insidious action regarding Herat until he 
should be able to form a definite opinion as to the result 
of the struggle. He resumed that insidious action as soon 
as he recognised that the peace of Paris had given Russia 
a free hand to subdue the barrier of the Caucasus. Re- 
garding Russia as fully occupied, and England as ex- 
hausted, he despatched an army to besiege Herat. The 
ruler of the province of which Herat was the capital, 
who occupied a position of semi-independence, at once 
hoisted British colours, and implored the assistance of the 
Amir Dost Muhammad. Various circumstances, into which 
it is not necessary to enter, gave indications that the 
Persians would be resisted to the last. However, it was 
not so, and before any steps could be taken Herat had 
fallen. 

The clear mind of the then Prime Minister of Great 
Britain, the resolute Lord Palmerston, had already recog- 
nised the importance of the situation, and he resolved to 
compel Persia to retire. The means he adopted were those 



2 6 Close of the Persian War. 

best calculated to obtain the result aimed at with the 
smallest expenditure of blood and money. He directed 
the formation of a mixed force of English and Indian 
troops, to be commanded by Sir James Outram, to attack 
Persia on the side of the Persian Gulf, and he authorised 
the Governor-General of India to come to a cordial un- 
derstanding with the Amir of Afghanistan. 

Before the army could land on the Persian coast, Herat, 
I have said, had fallen. But very soon afterwards the 
Commissioner of the Panjab, Mr John Lawrence, held at 
Peshawar (January 1857) that interview with Dost Muham- 
mad which resulted in a cordial understanding between 
that sagacious prince and the stern and resolute repre- 
sentative of the might of Great Britain. Later still, Out- 
ram, landing at Bushir, gained two victories, which had 
the effect of forcing the Shah to sue for peace. The 
consequence was that, in May 1857, ^e resigned all 
claim to Herat, which he surrendered, and signed, by 
his agents, at Paris, a treaty of peace. The troops 
composing Outram's force were thus available in May 
for any service which Lord Canning might require at 
their hands. 

During the year the circumstances attendant upon the 
refusal of the 38th Regiment N. I. to proceed by sea to 
Burma had caused Lord Canning to look up an Act, 
already drafted, having for its object the so altering of the 
terms of the enlistment of the sipahi as to make, in the 
future, every regiment available for service across the seas. 
The Act did not touch the interests of sipahis already en- 
hsted. It referred simply to those who might enter the 
service thereafter. In July 1856 that Act became law. In 
itself the Act was a just and righteous Act. Issued at any 
other time, it would have caused no feeling whatever. 
The men of the six regiments already enlisting for general 



Other Conspirators. 27 

service were of as high a caste as were the men who engaged 
only to serve locally. But the minds of the sipahis were 
excited. The annexation of Oudh had caused them to 
lose faith in their foreign masters. And it is quite 
possible that the alteration, which did not escape the 
watchful eyes of the men who were fomenting disorder, 
acted as an additional argument to prove that gradual 
steps were to be taken to deprive them of their 
caste. 

I have already referred to the action of the Maulavi of 
Faizabad as being instrumental in creating and increas- 
ing the undercurrent of hostility to British rule through 
Bengal and the North-west Provinces. It is impossible, 
however, to leave this subject without mentioning the 
action of the son of the ex-Peshwa, Baji Rao, and his 
agent, Azim-ullah Khan. It is the more necessary that 
such mention should be made, because, whatever may be 
the opinion of Europeans saturated with the western 
ideas, and with the conceit those ideas often engender, 
there can be no doubt but that, during the Mutiny, on the 
morrow of the Mutiny, and at the present day, the culti- 
vated natives of India attributed and attribute a great 
deal of the bitterness attendant on the uprising to the 
treatment meted out to Nana Sahib by the Government 
of India. I know that it has been contended, and recently 
most ably contended,^ that that treatment was absolutely 
just. It was just according to western ideas. But the 
oriental mind does not admit of the validity of an agree- 
ment which deprives a man of his kingdom and makes 
no provision for his family after his death. Such was the 
grievance of Nana Sahib. He had no title in law. But 
the natives of India believed then, they believe still, that 
he had a moral claim superior to all law. 

^ Sir William Hunter's Dalhoiisie, 162-3. 



2 8 Nana Sahib. 

The case may thus be stated. The Peshwa had been, 
by virtue of his title, the lord of all the Maratha princes. 
Of all the Peshwas, Baji Rao had been the most false to 
his own countrymen, and the worst. But for many years 
he had been loyal to the British. Tempted, however, in 
1 8 17, by the rising of Holkar and the war with the Pindaris, 
and hoping to recover the lost influence of his House, he 
had risen, had been beaten, and, in 1 818, had thrown him- 
self on the mercy of the British. He was deprived of his 
dominions, and granted a pension for life of eight lakhs 
of rupees. He took up his residence at Bithor, near the 
military station of Kanhpur, adopted a son, and lived a 
quiet life till his death in 1851. 

The Government of India permitted his adopted son, 
whose name was Dhundu Pant, but who was generally 
known as Nana Sahib, to inherit the savings of Baji Rao, 
and they presented to him the fee-simple of the property 
at Bithor. But Nana Sahib had to provide for a very large 
body of followers, bequeathed to his care by Baji Rao ; 
and the two British Commissioners who, in succession, 
superintended the administration of the estate supported 
the proposal made from Bithor that a portion of the late 
ex-Peshwa's allowance should be reserved for the support 
of the family. They had some reason for their suggestion, 
for when, some little time before his death, Baji Rao had 
petitioned the Home Government that his adopted son 
might succeed to the title and pension of Peshwa, whilst 
the grant of the title was refused absolutely, the question 
of the pension was reserved for future consideration, that 
is, until the seat of the ex-Peshwa should be vacant. 

It seems to me that high policy should have shown 
some consideration for the heir of one who had been the 
lord of Western India, and whose territories we had taken. 
A slight relaxation of the hard and fast policy character- 



Nana Sahib. 29 

istic of Lord Dalhousie's rule might have saved the British 
from many future troubles. When, in 1844, the House of 
Sindhia, defeated in battle, was at the feet of Lord Ellen- 
borough, that nobleman imposed upon it no penalty. His 
generosity bore splendid fruit in 1857-8. Far different 
was the result of the policy pursued towards Nana Sahib, 
Lord Dalhousie declared the recommendation made by the 
two Commissioners in his favour to be ' uncalled for and 
unreasonable.' He directed that ' the determination of the 
Government of India may be explicitly declared to the 
family without delay.' The determination was conse- 
quently so declared. Ought we to wonder that, in 1857, 
the crab-tree did produce the crab-apple ? 

Nana Sahib appealed to the Court of Directors against 
the decision of the Governor-General of India. His appeal 
was couched in logical, temperate, and convincing lan- 
guage. He asked why the heir to the Peshwa should be 
treated differently from other native princes who had fallen 
before the Company. He instanced the case of Dehli and 
of Maisur ; and with reference to the assumption made in 
argument against him that the savings of his father were 
sufficient to support him, he asked whether it was just 
that the economical foresight of the father should militate 
against the moral claims of the son. The argument, which 
would have been accepted in any native Court in India, 
which was convincing to the two hundred and fifty millions 
who inhabited that country, had no effect whatever on the 
minds of the western rulers who governed the country 
from Leadenhall Street. Their reply emulated in its curt- 
ness and its rudeness the answer given by Lord Dalhousie. 
They directed the Governor- General to inform the memo- 
rialist 'that the pension of his adoptive father was not 
hereditary, that he has no claim whatever to it, and that 
his application is wholly inadmissible.' The date of the 



30 Azini-ullah Khan. 

reply was May 1853. Its bore its fruit at Kanhpur in 
June 1857. 

Nana Sahib accepted it with apparent composure, but 
it rankled in his bosom. To prosecute his claims he had, 
early in the year, despatched to England a young Muham- 
madan in his service, Azim-ullah Khan by name, of a 
pleasant presence and a taking address. Before Azim- 
ullah could reach England judgment had already been 
recorded. Being in the receipt of a sufficient allowance 
from his master, the young man stayed in England, and 
entered freely into the pleasures of English life. But he 
always had an eye to the interests of Nana Sahib. Whilst 
he was yet in England the Crimean war broke out. Shortly 
afterwards there came from the seat of war those stories 
of suffering which, from his place in the House of Commons, 
the late Lord John Russell described as 'horrible and heart- 
rending.' The imaginative mind of the young oriental 
came to the conclusion that some terrible disaster was 
about to bsfall the British army. Were such to occur, 
there might be some hope for Nana Sahib. He pro- 
ceeded, then, to the seat of w^ar, entered into communica- 
tion with foreigners of diverse nations, and from his con- 
versations with them, and from his own personal inspection, 
came to the conclusion that England, the England which 
had asserted herself with so much haughtiness in India, 
was on the brink of destruction, that it would require but 
a united effort on the part of the princes and people of her 
great dependency to ' push her from her stool' With these 
convictions fresh and strongly rooted in his mind he re- 
turned, in 1856, to the Nana at Bithor. Shortly after his 
return the Nana paid a somewhat mysterious visit to 
Lakhnao, accompanied by Azim-ullah and a considerable 
following. I have called his visit ' mysterious,' for it so 
impressed the English authorities in that city that Sir 



The Thoinasonian System. 31 

Henry Lawrence, who was then Chief Commissioner, 
wrote to Sir Hugh Wheeler, commanding at Kanhpur, 
to caution him not to depend upon the loyalty of 
Nana Sahib. It is not to be doubted that Nana Sahib 
took advantage of his visit to enter into negotiations 
with the discontented nobles of the province, and to 
concert with them the outlines, at least, of a general 
plan of action. 

Whilst the province of Oudh and the district of Bithor 
were" thus fast becoming hotbeds of conspiracy, a similar 
process was taking place through the length and breadth 
of the North-west Provinces. That the system known as 
' the village system,' under which the heads of villages 
represented, before the law, the communities of which 
they were the hereditary chiefs, may not have been a 
system which recommended itself theoretically to a ruler 
nurtured in western ideas may be conceded. But that 
system was rooted in the soil. The great Akbar, when 
engaged in the task of consolidating and systematising 
the territories he had conquered, had attempted to intro- 
duce reforms which would have tended to greater central- 
isation. But, after a few months of experiment, he shrunk 
from a task which, he recognised, would rouse against 
him the feelings of his subjects. Where Akbar had feared 
to tread, the English, guided by the rash hand of Mr 
Thomason, had rushed in. The result was that through- 
out the districts over which he had ruled, in Juanpur and 
Azamgarh, in Agra, Kanhpur, and the adjoining districts, 
throughout Bundelkhand, there reigned a discontent 
which lent itself very readily to the schemes of the 
major conspirators. The advocates of Mr Thomason's 
reforms have endeavoured, under the shield of anonymous 
criticism, to controvert this assertion. But facts are stub- 
born things. I have had it from the mouths of many in- 



^ ^ The Rdni of yjidnsi. 



V?- 



fluential native gentlemen, and from English officials con- 
cerned, that the grievance which caused disaffection was 
the harsh introduction, and the still harsher enforcement, 
of the Thomasonian system. And there remains the fact, 
which cannot be controverted, that in India the dis- 
affection was greatest, and the hatred against Europeans 
most pronounced, in the districts to which that system 
had been applied. 

Not very far distant from Agra there was a powerful 
chieftain who, from causes similar to those which had 
influenced Nana Sahib, regarded herself as having been 
grievously wronged, and who therefore hated the English 
with all the bitterness of a woman who had been con- 
temned. This chieftain was the Rani of Jhansi. She 
was largely gifted, possessed great energy, had borne, up 
to the period upon which I am entering, ' a high character,' 
being ' much respected by everyone at Jhansi.^ But the 
hand of the despoiler had lashed her into a fury which 
was not to be governed. Under Hindu law she possessed 
the right to adopt an heir to her husband when he died 
childless in 1854. Lord Dalhousie refused to her the 
exercise of that right, and declared that Jhansi had 
lapsed to the paramount power. In vain did the Rani 
dwell upon the services which in olden days the rulers of 
Jhansi had rendered to the British Government, and quote 
the warm acknowledgments made by that Government. 
Lord Dalhousie was not to be moved. He had faith in 
his legions. With a stroke of his pen he deprived this 
high-spirited woman of the rights which she believed, 
and which all the natives of India believed, to be heredi- 
tary. That stroke of the pen converted the lady, of so 
high a character and so much respected, into a veritable 
tigress so far as the English were concerned. For them, 

1 Report of the Political Agent at Jhansi. 



Action of the Conspirators. 33 

thereafter, she would have no mercy. There is reason 
to believe that she, too, had entered into negotiations 
with the Maulavi and Nana Sahib before the explosion 
of 1857 took place. 

Such, then, were the conspirators. The inhabitants 
of Oudh, directed mainly by the Maulavi and a lady of 
the royal House known as the Begum, the inhabitants of 
the North-west Provinces, goaded into bitter hostility 
by the action of the Thomasonian system, and the Rani 
of Jhansi. The executive council of this conspiracy had 
arranged, in the beginning of 1857, to act upon the 
sipahis by means of the greased cartridge, upon the in- 
habitants of the rural districts by the dissemination of 
chapatis. This dissemination was intended as a warning 
that the rising was imminent. It was further decided 
that the rising of the sipahis should be simultaneous, and 
more than once the actual day was fixed. Providentially 
something always happened to prevent the explosion on 
that day. The splutterings which occurred on such occa- 
sions served to give timely warning to the Government. 
The delays which followed the warning were partially 
utilised. It was not, however, till the rising actually took 
place at Mirath that the Government realised the real 
nature, though not the full extent, of the danger. That 
they never realised it thoroughly until after the massacre 
of Kanhpiir we have the evidence of their own words and 
their own actions to prove. Indeed I may go so far as to 
declare that many of the actors in the drama failed to 
realise to their dying day that the outbreak was not 
merely a mutiny which they had to combat, but a vast 
- conspiracy, the threads of which were widely spread, and 
which owed its origin to the conviction that a Govern- 
ment which had, as the conspirators believed, betrayed its 
trust was no longer entitled to respect or allegiance. 

C 



CHAPTER III. 

THE FIRST MUTTERINGS OF THE STORM. 

The effects of the workings of the conspirators on the 
minds of the population of the North-west Provinces soon 
made themselves manifest by the change of their usually 
respectful demeanour. Major Orfeur Cavenagh, an officer 
of great shrewdness and perspicacity, who filled the im- 
portant office of Town-Major of Fort William in Calcutta, 
visited, in October and November 1856, the districts just 
beyond Agra. He had been struck everywhere by the 
altered demeanour of the sipahis, and loyal natives had 
reported to him the great change which had taken place 
in the feelings of the natives generally towards the English. 
Disaffection, he was assured, was now the rule in all 
classes. To the clear vision of this able officer it was 
evident that, unless precautions were taken, some great 
disaster would ensue. Feelings so evidenced as to be- 
come the common talk of the community could not longer 
be repressed. In the middle of January occurred that 
incident regarding the greasing of the cartridges to which 
I have referred in the first chapter. It happened in this 
wise. A lascar engaged in the factory at Dam-Dam 
asked a Brahman sipahi to let him have a drink of water 
from his lotah, or brass pot. The sipahi indignantly re- 
fused, on the ground that his caste would not permit him 
to use the lotah afterwards if it should be defiled by the 
drinking of a man of a lower position in. the Hindu hier- 



How the Sipdhis were worked tip on. 35 

archy. The lascar, in reply, laughed at him for talking 
of defilement, when he said, * You will all soon be biting 
cartridges smeared with the fat of the cow and the pig.' 
He then told the sipahi the method of the new cartridges. 
The incident occurred when the minds of the sipahis had 
been inflamed, in the manner already recounted, to a high 
state of tension. The story spread like wildfire. Thence- 
forward the sipahis were as soft clay in the hands of the 
chief conspirators. 

Some of these, it cannot be doubted, were to be found 
amongst the numerous followers of the King of Oudh. 
The Government of India had permitted that prince, on 
his removal from the province of which he was still the 
titular king, to take up his residence in a suburb of Cal- 
cutta. He had arrived there in April 1856 with a numer- 
ous following. His quarters had already become notorious 
as the Alsatia of Calcutta. If, as is probable, he was no 
party to the intrigues carried on in his name, or on his 
behalf, there were yet many of those who adhered to him 
who were less scrupulous. These men were the fellow- 
countrymen of the majority of the men who served 
the British, and entirely sympathised with them. Sub- 
sequent events proved that communications between the 
sipahis in Fort William and at Barrackpur and some of 
the King's adherents had been frequent. It was unfor- 
tunate that, at such a period, at a crisis so momentous, 
so large a number of exiles from Oudh, sharing the 
indignation generally felt among the natives at the an- 
nexation of that province, should have been located 
close to a populous city, dependent for its safety on one 
weak European regiment. 

Important consequences speedily followed the dis- 
covery of the fact regarding the greased cartridges. On 
the 26th of January the telegraph house at Barrackpur 



36 Majo7^ Orfeur Cavenagh. 

was fired. The same day one of the sergeants attached 
to Fort William reported to Cavenagh a remarkable con- 
versation, between two sipahis, which he had overheard. 
It was to the effect that the Europeans forming the gar- 
rison were entirely in the power of the sipahis ; that it 
would be easy to master the arsenal and the magazines, 
to slay the Europeans as they slept, then to possess them- 
selves of the fort. They added that the firing of the 
telegraph house was the first incident in the far-reaching 
plot. 

Cavenagh, who, as Town-Major, was responsible to the 
Governor-General for the safety of Fort William, took at 
once measures to baffie the designs of which he had been 
informed, and then drove straight to Lord Canning to 
report the circumstance to him. Lord Canning listened 
to Cavenagh with the deepest interest, and sanctioned 
the measures he proposed. These were to transfer from 
Dam-Dam, where one wing of the regiment which was 
responsible for the safety of the Presidency, the 53d Foot, 
was located, one company to Fort William. For the 
moment the outbreak was deferred. 

Many little circumstances came at this period to in- 
timate to the few who preferred not to live in a fool's 
paradise that something strange was impending. At Bar- 
rackpur, on the left bank of the river Hugli, fifteen miles 
above Calcutta, were stationed four native regiments — the 
2d Grenadiers, the 34th N. I., the 43d Light Infantry, 
and the 70th N. I. At Barhampur, 120 miles above Cal- 
cutta and five below Murshidabad, the capital of the 
Nuwab-Nazims of Bengal, was one native regiment, the 
19th N. I. Between Calcutta and Danapur, in Bihar, 344 
miles from the capital, there was but one English regiment, 
the 53d, already referred to, and that was, as I have said, 
distributed between Dam-Dam and Calcutta. The space 



Insufficiency of the English Garrison, 37 

of 344 miles was thus without European guardianship. 
For, though there was one regiment, the loth Foot, at 
Danapur, there were also stationed there three regiments 
of native infantry, the 7th, the 8th, and the 40th. 

There is reason to suppose that communications had 
passed at least as early as February between the men of 
these several regiments, and even of those stationed fur- 
ther north-westward. Small commands, treasure parties, 
and the post afforded ample opportunities for such ex- 
change of ideas. One of these communications gave to 
the Government the first intimation of the general feeling. 
On the 1 8th and 25th of February two small detachments 
of one of the regiments stationed at Barrackpur, the 34th, 
a regiment peculiarly tainted, arrived at Barhampur. The 
men of the 19th N. I., there located, received their com- 
rades of the 34th with effusion. The evening after the 
arrival of the second detachment the talk between the 
two parties was a talk of more than ordinary significance. 
The men of the 34th poured into the willing ears of their 
hosts all their grievances. They related the antecedent 
causes, of which I have spoken, which had led them to 
distrust their foreign masters. They then dwelt on the 
story of the cartridges, of the alleged mission of Lord 
Canning to force Christianity upon them, and added 
their determination, and that of their brethren at Bar- 
rackpur and elsewhere, to take the first opportunity to 
rise in revolt. 

This tale, told with all the fervour of sincerity — for 
it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that throughout 
these proceedings, and those which followed, the sipahis 
were but the dupes of the able men who had planned the 
conspiracy — produced a remarkable effect on the minds 
of the men of the 19th N. I. They brooded over the 
information all the day following. They had not received 



38 The Emeute at Barhdmpur. 

the new rifle, and the cartridges in their magazine were 
innocent of the sh'ghtest stain of grease. They were the 
common paper cartridges to which they had been accus- 
tomed for years, the only change being that the paper in 
which they were wrapped was of a different colour. Yet 
when, in the course of the day, their commanding officer, 
Colonel Mitchell, ordered a parade with blank cartridges 
for the following morning, a great perturbation was 
visible in the lines. The men seriously believed that they 
were about to be juggled out of their religion by means 
of cartridges. How, they could not at the moment say. 
But the suspicion which had fallen on their minds had 
bred a great fear. Their non-commissioned officers first 
refused to receive the cartridges. The threat that those 
who should continue to refuse would be brought to a 
court-martial had the effect of inducing them to take 
them. But that night the whole regiment sat in delibera- 
tion. They dreaded lest by the use of the cartridges 
they should commit themselves to an act which might 
deprive them of their caste. The reader may ask how 
that was possible, considering that the cartridges were 
similar to those they had used for a century. The answer 
is that fanaticism never reasons. The Hindus are fanatics 
for caste. They had been told that their religion was to 
be attempted by means of the cartridges, and their minds 
being, for the reasons already given, in an excited and 
suspicious condition, they accepted the tale without 
inquiry. They therefore rose in a tumult, resolved to 
defy their officers. That same evening the information 
that the sipahis of his regiment were in a state of great 
excitement and perturbation, on account of the cartridges, 
was conveyed to Colonel Mitchell. The officers of the 
Bengal army, as a body, were distinguished by the trust 
they reposed in their men. In estimating their conduct, 



/ 

The Enieute at Barhampur. 39 

it should be remembered that most of them had been 
associated with the sipahis all their lives ; that they had 
done their duty by them ; that in Afghanistan, in the 
Panjab, in the wars in Central India, these men had 
followed wherever they had led ; that they knew that in 
the matter of proselytism the sipahis had no real reason 
for their fears. Oudh had been annexed but little more 
than a year, and the effect of that annexation on the 
minds of the sipahis had not then been disclosed to them. 
Colonel Mitchell was an officer with a good reputation ; 
he understood the sipahis as the sipahis had been up 
to 1857. But he was not more discerning than his 
fellows ; not more prescient than the Government he 
served. The news that the sipahis were in a state border- 
ing on mutiny was a revelation to him. He could not 
comprehend why they should rise, or why they should 
even be excited. The cartridges, which he was told 
formed the pretext for the sudden ebullition, were, he 
well knew, the cartridges which had been used without 
a murmur throughout the period of his service. But 
what was he to do ? His men — the men of the regiment 
for the good conduct of which he was responsible to the 
Commander-in-Chief and the Government — were gesticu- 
lating in front of the lines, and were in a state of incipient 
mutiny. Mitchell did his duty like the good soldier that 
he was ; he rode down to the lines, accompanied by his 
adjutant, and sending for the native officers to the quarter- 
guard, there addressed them. He told them that there 
was no reason for the fears expressed by the men ; that 
the cartridges were similar to those which had been served 
out and used from time immemorial ; that there was no 
question of asking the sipahis to bite them or to use them 
in any other way but in that to which they were accus- 
tomed. Having thus explained the groundlessness of the 



/ 

40 The Emeute at Barhdmpur, 

fears of the sipahis, he added that they were by their 
conduct placing themselves in a position which the 
Government could not tolerate ; that the men who, after 
his explanation, should persist in refusing to obey his 
orders would be brought to a court-martial, and suffer 
the consequences. He concluded by urging the native 
officers so to influence the men that the name of the 
regiment should not be blackened. 

Colonel Mitchell might as well have spoken to the 
winds. He told his native officers what Sir John Hearsey 
at Barrackpur, and what commanding officers all over the 
country subsequently told theirs, but he told it in vain. 
There is no terror like a religious terror ; and there can 
be no doubt that the astute fomentors of the revolt — the 
men of Oudh, of the North-west Provinces, and of the 
Bundelkhand — had so saturated the minds of the sipahis 
at Barrackpur and elsewhere with a real terror, that not 
all the words of the most gifted men on earth would 
have sufficed to expel it. The Barrackpur sipahis had 
in a moment communicated their fears to those of Bar- 
hampur. The native officers listened silently, and pro- 
mised to do all they could to calm the excitement. 
Mitchell returned to his quarters confident that he had 
done all he was capable of, but that ' all ' was little 
indeed. 

However, there was the parade to be held the follow- 
ing morning. To countermand that now would be an 
act of weakness of which Mitchell was incapable. But 
the thought never occurred to him. Scarcely had he 
reached his home when information reached him that 
the men had risen and were in open revolt. 

It was too true. Whether the native officers had 
correctly interpreted Mitchell's words to their men ; or 
whether, as is more probable, their minds were under the 



The Emeute at Barhdmpur, 41 

influence which swayed them, cannot be certainly known. 
The fact remains that before midnight the regiment 
rose as one man, the sipahis loading their muskets, 
and shouting violently. 

There were at Barhampur a detachment of native 
cavalry and a battery of native artillery. It was pre- 
sumable, at that early stage of the great revolt, that to 
these the contagion had not extended. Mitchell then, as 
soon as he reached his quarters, ordered these to turn 
out The order had been given but a few moments, 
when information reached him that his men had risen. 
Resolved to stop the mischief, he gathered his officers 
around him, and proceeded, accompanied by the guns, 
to the parade ground. The cavalry had preceded him 
thither. 

There he met his men, excited but not violent, and 
there he harangued them. He spoke well and to the 
point, and finally wrung from them a promise that they 
would return to their duty, provided the artillery and 
cavalry were first ordered back to their lines. Mitchell's 
hands were tied. With the 200 men behind him he 
could not, even if they had been loyal, have coerced his 
800 sipahis. After events proved that, had he resorted 
to force, the men behind him would have joined the re- 
volted regiment, and a catastrophe would have been pre- 
cipitated which might, for the moment, have reduced the 
English in India to the greatest extremities. With ad- 
mirable prudence, then, Mitchell sent back the cavalry 
and artillery. The men of the 19th then submitted, and 
returned to their lines. 

The following morning the excitement was apparently 
forgotten by the sipahis. They fell in for parade, and 
obeyed the orders given as in their palmiest days. But 
their suspicions were not lulled. Every night they slept 



42 Blindness of the Government, 

round the bells of arms^ in which their muskets were lodged 
instead of in the huts which formed their lines. Mitchell 
meanwhile reported the matter to his superior authorities. 
A Court of Inquiry was ordered, and after an investigation 
which, under the circumstances, may be styled prolonged, 
the Government, missing the point, choosing to shut 
their eyes to the fact that the conduct of the 19th was 
a premature movement of a plot which had its roots all 
over the country, determined to treat it as a local incident, 
which had attained undue proportions owing to the violent, 
measures taken by Colonel Mitchell.^ The Governor- 
General in Council, therefore, resolved to disband the 19th, 
and to make a scapegoat of Colonel Mitchell. Meanwhile 
events were occuring under the very eyes of the members 
of the Government which should have convinced them 
that the Mutiny they were about to punish was not con- 
fined to the 19th. 

^ The brick buildings in which the muskets of the sipahis were stored 
after parade were called "bells of arms," they being built in the form of a 
bell. 

- Mitchell had committed no violence, nor had he used violent language. 
But his words were misquoted in order to support the then fashionable 
theory that there was no general feeling of mistrust among the sipahis. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE SPREAD OF THE EPIDEMIC. 

The conduct of the men of the 19th N. I. at Barhampur 
was known to the authorities in Calcutta on the 4th of 
March. To them, I have said, it appeared to be rather the 
consequence of the blundering of the commanding officer 
than of a widespread feeling of discontent among the 
sipdhis. But, whatever might be the cause, it was a fact 
which they had to deal with, and to deal with promptly 
and with effect. 

The Commander-in-Chief of the army, General Anson, 
was in the Upper Provinces ; the Adjutant-General was at 
Mirath ; but the Governor-General, Lord Canning, and all 
the Secretaries to Government, were in Calcutta. These 
had, then, all the administrative means at their disposal 
for dealing promptly and effectively with revolt. 

Of the terror which the notion of the greased cartridge 
had spread throughout the minds of the sipahis they had 
had evidence since the 22d of January, the day on which 
the conversation of the lascar at the Dam-Dam factory with 
the Brahman sipahi had been reported to them. The 
general commanding at Barrackpur, General Hearsey, an 
officer who had passed his career in the native army, 
and who understood the character of the sipahis, their 
language, and their idiosyncracies, had, when reporting 
the circumstance, recommended that the difficulty might 
be met by allowing the sipahis at the depot to grease their 



44 Ignorance in High Places^ 

own cartridges. The Government had caught at the idea, 
and on the 27th January the official sanction had been 
given to the suggestion. It was ascertained at the same 
time that, although many cartridges had been greased 
at Dam-Dam, not one had been issued. The Govern- 
ment then, whilst according their sanction to General 
Hearsey's suggestion, transmitted orders by telegraph to 
the Adjutant-General to issue to the several musketry- 
depots only cartridges free from grease, and to permit the 
sipahis to do the greasing themselves. But the concession 
of the Government of India had the effect of bringing into 
prominence the ignorance of the executive branch of the 
army. The Adjutant-General, a man who had served the 
greater part of his career with the sipahis, wired back that 
the concessions of the Government would rouse the very 
suspicion they were intended to allay ; that for years past 
the sipahis had been using greased cartridges, the grease 
being mutton fat and wax ; and that he begged that the 
system might be continued. The Government, the Mili- 
tary Secretary of which was likewise an officer who had 
served with sipahis, raised no objection to this proposal, 
but replied that the greased cartridges might be issued, 
provided the materials were only those mentioned by the 
Adjutant-General. 

How the Adjutant-General managed to mislead the 
Government, and how the Government permitted them- 
selves to be misled on this occasion, seems extraordinary. 
The Government had the fact before them that up to that 
moment no greased cartridges had ever been issued to the 
native army. That army still used the old ' Brown Bess ' 
musket, and for that weapon unsmeared paper cartridges 
were invariably employed. It is true that a {(tw regiments 
had rifle companies, or one company armed with rifles, 
and that, for facilitating the driving home of the bullet 



And, conseqtiently, Defective Action. 45 

used with these, patches smeared with wax had been 
served out No suspicion had ever attached to these 
patches. But for the Adjutant-General, the right-hand 
man of the Commander-in-Chief, seriously to argue that 
the issue of these patches warranted him in remonstrating 
with the Government against their order forbidding the 
issue of greased cartridges, and for the Government to 
accept his statement that for some years greased cart- 
ridges had been issued, argued an ignorance and an 
absence of common sense sufficient to account for the 
many grave blunders which followed. 

Such had been the condition of matters at the end 
of January. There had been sufficient displays of dis- 
satisfaction to cause grave suspicions, and that was all. 
In those displays the Government had recognised no sign 
of wide-spread disaffection. There were but two men 
holding prominent positions in or near Calcutta who saw 
in the action of the sipahis something more than a passing 
wave of discontent, and one of these saw it but dimly. 
The more prescient of these two men was Major Cavenagh, 
the Town-Major of Fort William, and the representative 
in that fortress of the Governor-General. The other was 
the Commander of the Presidency Division, General 
Hearsey. I have already recorded the action of the 
former in January, and I shall have to write of his action 
in March and April. For the moment I must narrate the 
proceedings of General Hearsey at Barrackpur. 

The revelations of the lascar at Dam-Dam, in January, 
had deeply impressed that officer. He recognised that 
the minds of the sipahis were in a state of great ex- 
citement. The real cause, the basis of that excitement, 
was not apparent to him. His intelligence was limited 
to the matters which came under his eyes, and it was 
not in his nature to probe the situation more deeply. 



46 General Hearsey at Barrackpur. 

He really believed that the whole offence of the Govern- 
ment had been the greasing of the cartridges for use 
by the sipahis, and that the latter were under the 
influence of terror lest their religion should be tampered 
with. He did not ask how it was that, before a single 
cartridge had been issued, before one sipahi had been 
asked to defile himself by applying his teeth to the 
greased paper, the demeanour of the men of the four 
native regiments at Barrackpur had displayed unmistak- 
able signs of the discontent which raged within their 
minds. Believing that the greased cartridge was the 
outward sign and inward cause of the evident discontent, 
he had, with the sanction of Lord Canning, on the 9th of 
February, paraded his brigade, and addressing the sipahis 
of the four regiments in their own language, had endeav- 
oured to dissipate their fears. He had told them that 
the English were Christians of the Book ; that they 
admitted no proselytes except those whom the reading 
of that Book had convinced ; that the notion that any 
other mode of conversion was possible was absurd ; that 
baptism only followed conviction ; and he implored them 
to dismiss from their minds the tale told them by design- 
ing men that the English had any design to convert them 
by a trick. 

General Hearsey meant well, and he thought he had 
succeeded in convincing his men of their delusion. But 
he had missed the point. The conspirators, who had 
fomented the ill-feeling of the sipahis all over India, had 
not told their victims that the English would make them 
Christians by force. They had rather impressed on their 
minds that the object of their masters was to deprive 
them, by the compulsory use of the cartridges, of the caste, 
to which they adhered with the passionate conviction that 
it was the one thing necessary for consideration in this 



He misses the Point. 47 

life, and happiness in the life to come ; and that then, 
scared and miserable by their degradation, they would 
seek for admission into the ranks of a religion which had 
established missions throughout the country for the very 
purpose of converting them. General Hearsey's argument 
that his religion was a religion of the Book was all very 
well when addressed to Brahmans and Rajputs, whose 
position was secure, whose caste was intact. But, when it 
should be applied to men whose caste had been broken, 
who had become pariahs and outcasts, deprived of con- 
sideration in this world, and of all hope in the hereafter, 
it would have a different signification. Then the men 
who had lost the religion of their forefathers would be 
glad to read the Book, and to gain renewed hope in the 
religion of their masters. 

The answer to General Hearsey's declamation was 
given by the 19th N. I. at Barhampur. The news from 
Barrackpur, carried to Barhampur by the sipahis of the 
34th, had produced the fermentation and partial outbreak 
described in the last chapter. And this was the news 
which disturbed the Government of India on the 4th of 
March. 

It found that Government in a state of some perplexity. 
Lord Canning was new to the country, and was perforce, 
on all matters pertaining to the native army, dependent on 
his military advisers. The capacity of his military advisers 
may be judged from the fact that they were the very men 
who had allowed him to be swayed by the shallow reason- 
ing of the Adjutant-General regarding the issue of greased 
cartridges. However, many facts had spoken too loudly 
to be disregarded. There was the one fact that a native 
regiment in the Presidency Division had mutinied ; an- 
other fact that the troops at Barrackpur had displayed a 
sullenness of demeanour difficult to account for ; a third 



48 The Z/^th Foot arrives from Btirina, 

fact in the revelations of Major Cavenagh, described in the 
last chapter ; and a fourth in the fact that between Calcutta 
and Danapur, a distance of 344 miles from Calcutta, there 
was but one weak English regiment. The disaffection at 
Barhampur had, they knew, been produced by the com- 
munications received by the sipahis of that regiment from 
the men of a detachment which had marched thither from 
Barrackpur. Who was to guard the line of 344 miles if 
the sipahis of Barrackpur should emulate the conduct of 
the men whom some of their comrades had perverted ? 
These facts, and this consideration, produced the convic- 
tion that it was necessary to strengthen the central posi- 
tion. They resolved to strengthen it by ordering the 84th 
regiment to proceed with all speed from Rangoon to the 
Presidency. On the 20th of March that regiment arrived 
in the Hugh'. Orders were then transmitted to Colonel 
Mitchell to march the 19th N. I. to Barrackpur. 

But there had been many significant occurrences before 
the 84th reached the Hugh. Maharaja Sindhia had visited 
Calcutta early in March, and, as a return for the civilities 
showered upon him, had invited the elite of the society of 
the Presidency to 2. fete at the Botanical Gardens, situated 
on the opposite bank of the river Hugh', on the loth of the 
month. There can be little doubt but that the leaders of 
the conspiracy had resolved to strike their blow on that 
day. During the absence of the official English across the 
river they had planned to seize the fort and to strike terror 
into the town. A circumstance, slight in itself, frustrated 
their combinations. Rain, most unusual at that time of 
the year in India, fell heavily the day before and on the 
morning of the lOth, and the Maharaja, aware that an out- 
of-door fete could be successful only when the weather 
was propitious, sent out notices to postpone the entertain- 
ment. It happened accidentally that no notice of the 



Mdlidrdjd Sindhid in Calcutta. 49 

postponement reached the Town-Major, Major Cavenagh. 
That ever vigilant officer had quitted the fort to cross the 
river ; but, on arriving at the ghat, he learned for the first 
time that r^o fete would take place that day, so he retraced 
his steps. His sudden return, and the rumour to which 
that return gave weight, that th.Q/ete had been postponed, 
roused in the guilty minds of the conspirators the suspicion 
that their plot had been discovered. Some of them, out- 
side the fort, had indeed begun the part assigned to them 
in the general programme, but, under the mysterious cir- 
cumstances of the return of Cavenagh and the postpone- 
ment of the garden party, the more astute members of the 
conspiracy declined to move. They even assisted in the 
capture of their misled comrades, who were brought at once 
to trial, and suffered fourteen years of penal servitude for 
their premature temerity. 

A week later the 84th entered the Hugli, and landing 
on the 20th, marched to the quarters assigned them at 
Chinsurah, twenty miles north of Calcutta. The Govern- 
ment immediately transmitted orders to Colonel Mitchell 
to march his regiment, the 19th N. I., from Barhampur to 
Barrackpur. 

In the interval the Court of Inquiry, referred to in the 
last chapter, had, as already stated, taken evidence, and 
on its report the Governor-General in Council had re- 
solved to punish the sipahis by disbanding the regiment. 
Previous experience of that punishment had proved that 
it was at best but a clumsy device. It was especially ill- 
adapted to the actual circumstances, for it would dis- 
tribute over areas already partially infected a thousand 
men who regarded themselves, and who would be re- 
garded by others, as martyrs for their religion. But in 
the Council of Lord Canning there was not one man 
upon whom had been bestowed the divine gift of imagina- 

D 



50 Disbaridnient tiseless as a Punishment. 

tion. No other remedy presented itself to their matter- 
of-fact minds. So the order for disbandment was issued. 
It was hoped that the impressive ceremony of disband- 
ment, carried out in the presence of four native regiments, 
and supervised by their English comrades, would produce 
a great effect. But, unhappily for the theories of those in 
high places, an event took place at Barrackpur, before the 
arrival of the 19th there, which proved conclusively that 
the evil, which the disbandment of the 19th was to cure, 
was far more widely spread and deeply rooted than any 
official had conceived. 



CHAPTER V. 

BARRACKPUR, CALCUTTA, AND THE NORTH-WEST 
TO THE 9TH OF MAY. 

Meanwhile, the excitement at Barrackpur was not 
diminishing. Isolated actions on the part of the sipahis, 
indicating a very mutinous spirit, were reported to the 
Governor-General. The incident referred to in the last 
chapter, which had led to the trial and sentence to four- 
teen years' penal servitude of several sipdhis, had produced 
considerable perplexity in the minds of the authorities. 
But they still refused to believe that there was anything 
like a general plot. They preferred to think that the dis- 
affection was confined to some men of one regiment only, 
or to a few men belonging to two regiments. The sus- 
picions of the disaffected men were not, it was hoped, so 
deeply rooted as to be proof against argument. The 
Government was conscious of its own innocence. It 
harboured no evil designs against the sipahis. It had 
no desire to move to the right or to the left out of the 
path it had undeviatingly followed for exactly a century. 
If this could be made clear to the men, all would assuredly 
go well. It was essentially a European argument, an 
argument which proved the most profound ignorance of 
the modes of thoughts of a race which was Asiatic, and 
for the most part Hindu. But it was the argument which 
naturally presented itself to the European mind. Lord 
Canning had authorised General Hearsey to try the ex- 



52 Hearsey again addi^esses the Si pa his. 

perlment once, and General Hearsey believed, as was 
quite natural he should believe, that his arguments had 
produced some effect. He was anxious to try once again 
the powers of his oratory. He therefore persuaded Lord 
Canning to authorise him to address the men of the four 
regiments in language and in terms which he had talked 
over with the Governor-General. 

The parade took place on the Barrackpur plain, on the 
17th of March, three days before the actual arrival of the 
84th from Rangoon. General Hearsey spoke eloquently 
and well. He pointed out to the men the childishness of 
their fears ; he entered into full details regarding the 
necessity to use lubricated cartridges with the new 
muskets ; he told them that the Government were re- 
solved to maintain discipline, and that they would mete 
out stern justice to the 19th by disbanding that regiment. 
He concluded by assuring the sipahis of the brigade that 
they had nothing to fear, that their caste and religious 
convictions were safe, and that their officers would listen 
patiently to any complaint they might make. In the 
abstract, nothing could be more to the point or more 
satisfactory than the General's speech. 

But it failed to touch the inner minds of the sipahis. 
These were inspired by men who had a great object in 
view — a political object of vast importance — the detaching 
of the sipahi army from the foreign Government. But for 
these men the question of the greased cartridge would 
never have arisen. The waxed patches had been used 
without complaint for years, why should the very rumour 
regarding greased cartridges, which, be it always re- 
membered, had not been issued, so excite the sipahi? 
There could be but one reason. The emissaries of the 
Maulavi and his comrades had done their work thoroughly. 
The midnight conferences in the huts of the sipahis, not 



Reaso7t ivhy He failed. 53 

at Barrackpur only but in all the principal stations of the 
North-western Provinces of India, had gone to but one 
point — the implanting of a conviction in the mind of the 
native soldiers that the foreign masters who had annexed 
Oudh would hesitate at nothing to complete their work of 
forcing them to become Christians. They had discounted 
beforehand the arguments of General Hearsey, for they 
had pointed out that a Government which, in defiance of 
treaties, had entered Oudh like ' a thief in the night,' and 
deposed the native sovereign at the point of the bayonet, 
would shrink from no means, however fraudulent, to 
complete the scheme of which the annexation had been 
the first move. It was not a logical argument, and the 
European mind would have found it full of flaws ; but the 
emissaries knew the men they were addressing. Senti- 
ment goes much further than logic with Asiatics, and they 
appealed to the sentiments which touched the sipahis to 
the quick. It is not surprising, then, that the logical argu- 
ments of General Hearsey produced no effect whatever. 

Evidence of this was very speedily given. On the 
29th of March, a Sunday afternoon, it was reported to 
Lieutenant Baugh, Adjutant of the 34th N. I., that several 
men of his regiment were in a very excited condition ; 
that one of them, Manghal Pandi by name, was striding 
up and down in front of the lines of his regiment, armed 
with a loaded musket, calling upon the men to rise, and 
threatening to shoot the first European he should see. 
Baugh at once buckled on his sword, and putting loaded 
pistols in his holsters, mounted his horse, and galloped 
down to the lines. Manghal Pandi heard the sound of 
the galloping horse, and taking post behind the station 
gun, which was in front of the quarter-guard of the 34th, 
took a deliberate aim at Baugh, and fired. He missed 
Baugh, but the bullet struck his horse in the flank, and 



54 Maitghal Pdiidi and the 34M N. I. 

horse and rider were brought to the ground. Baugh 
quickly disentangled himself, and, seizing one of his pistols, 
advanced towards the mutinous sipahi and fired. He 
missed. Before he could draw his sword Manghal Pandi, 
armed with a talwar with which he had provided himself, 
closed with his adjutant, and, being the stronger man, 
brought him to the ground. He would probably have 
despatched him but for the timely intervention of a 
Muhammadan sipahi, Shaikh Paltu by name. 

The scene I have described had taken place in front 
of the quarter-guard of the 34th N. L, and but thirty 
paces from it. The sipahis composing that guard had 
not made the smallest attempt to interfere between the 
combatants, although one of them was their own adjutant 
and the other a mutinous soldier. The sound of the firingf 
had brought other men from the lines, but these, too, 
remained passive spectators of the scene. At the con- 
juncture I have described, just, that is, as Shaikh Paltu 
had warded from Baugh the fatal stroke of the talwar, and 
as Manghal Pandi, to make assurance doubly sure, was 
attempting to reload his musket, there arrived on the 
ground, breathless from running, the English serjeant- 
major, one of the two English non-commissioned officers 
attached in those days to each native regiment. The new 
arrival rushed at the mutineer, but he was, as I have said, 
breathless, whilst the sipahi was fresh and on the alert. 
In the conflict between the two men Manghal Pandi had 
no difficulty in gaining the mastery, and in throwing his 
adversary. Still the sipahis of the regiment looked on. 
Shaikh Paltu, faithful among the faithless, continued to 
defend the two officers, calling upon the other sipahis to 
come to his aid. Then these, on the order of the 
Jamadar of guard, advanced. Instead, however, of en- 
deavouring to seize Manghal Pandi, they struck at the 



Manghal Pdndi and the '^/^th N, I. 55 

two prostrate officers with the butt-ends of their muskets. 
They even threatened Shaikh Paltu, and ordered him to 
let go his hold on Manghal Pandi. That faithful sipahi, 
however, continued to cling to him until Baugh and the 
sergeant-major had had time to rise. 

Meanwhile rumour, as quick as lightning on such 
occasions, had brought to General Hearsey an account of 
the proceedings at the lines. That gallant officer, writing 
hurried notes to the officers commanding at Dam- Dam 
and Chinsurah, where were a wing of the 53d Foot and 
the newly arrived 84th, to be despatched should occasion 
demand it, galloped to the ground, accompanied by his 
two sons. The scene that met his gaze was unpre- 
cedented even in his long experience. He saw Manghal 
Pandi, musket in hand, striding up and down in front of 
the quarter-guard, calling upon his comrades to follow 
his example. He saw the sipahis crowding about the 
guard, waiting apparently for a leader to respond to their 
comrade's call. He saw the wounded Baugh, and the 
bruised sergeant-major, the commanding officer of the 
34th, who had arrived just before him, and other English 
officers who had hastened or were hastening to the spot. 
The moment was a critical one. It depended upon his 
action whether the Barrackpur sipahi brigade would then 
and there break out in open mutiny. But Hearsey was 
equal to the critical conjuncture. Riding straight to the 
guard, he drew his pistol, and ordered them to do their 
duty by seizing Manghal Pandi, theatening to shoot the 
first man who should display the smallest symptom of 
disobedience. For a second only was there hesitation. 
But a glance at Hearsey's stern face, and at his two sons 
by his side, dissipated it. The men of the guard fell in, 
and followed Hearsey in the direction where Manghal 
Pandi was still upbraiding them for their cowardice in 



56 Hearsey represses the Movejnent. 

leaving him unsupported. Then the mutinous sipahi 
recognised that with him the game was up. Turning 
then the muzzle of the musket to his breast, he discharged 
it by the pressure of his foot, and fell burned and bleeding 
to the ground. 

Hearsey then addressed the men, and reproached 
them with their passive demeanour. The excuses they 
made, that Manghal Pandi was mad, that he was intoxi- 
cated, that he had a loaded musket, ought to have con- 
vinced Hearsey that the hearts of the men were no longer 
with their British officers. He felt, indeed, that the situa- 
tion was becoming greatly strained. The 19th N. I. were 
actually marching from Barhampur to be disbanded at 
Barrackpur, and now the sipahis of the four regiments 
of the Barrackpur brigade had displayed an indiscipline 
at least equal to that for which the 19th were to be 
punished in their presence. Rumours of all kinds filled 
the air — the rumour that the outbreak of Manghal Pandi 
had been preconcerted, but had broken out too soon ; 
another that the arrival of the 19th would be the signal 
for a general rising ; a third, a day or two later, that a 
conference between emissaries from the 34th and the 19th 
had taken place, on the 30th, at Barsat, one march from 
Barrackpur. It is probable that these rumours were true. 
But the mutinous army had no leader at Barrackpur, and 
for want of a leader, and in the presence of divided counsels, 
action collapsed. 

On the 30th of March the Government concentrated in 
Barrackpur the newly arrived 84th Foot, a wing of the 
53d, two batteries of European artillery, and the Governor- 
General's Bodyguard, which, though composed of natives 
was then believed to be loyal. The next morning the 
19th N. I. marched into Barrackpur. There, in presence of 
the English regiments and the English-manned guns, and 



The igtk N. I. disbanded. 57 

of the native brigade, the order of the Governor-General, 
stating their crime, and declaring absurd their fears for their 
religion, was read out to them. They were then ordered 
to pile their arms, and to hang their belts upon the piled 
bayonets. They obeyed without a murmur. They were 
then marched to a distance from their arms, and the pay 
due to them was distributed. They were allowed, mis- 
takenly as it turned out, to retain their uniforms, and the 
complaisance of the Government went so far as to provide 
them with carriage to convey them to their homes. The 
Government, despite all that had occurred, was still in a fog. 
They could not see an inch beyond their own hands. 

One or two circumstances showed the temper of the 
Government at this conjuncture. The gallant conduct of 
Shaikh Paltu, on the morning of the 29th of March, had 
presented so great a contrast to that of his comrades that 
Hearsey, with a true soldier's instinct, had then and there 
promoted him to be a Hawaldar, or native sergeant. For 
this act, which, though 'ultra vires', was justified by the 
special circumstances of the case, he was reprimanded by 
the Government. The general impression prevailed that 
the disbandment of the 19th would produce so salutary 
an effect throughout India that it was announced to the 
whole army in terms which, to say the least, displayed 
an absolute ignorance of the real feelings of the sipahis. 
The Government thought that that disbandment had 
closed the chapter of the Mutiny, when in reality it was 
only the first page of the preface. 

The wound of the mutinous sipahi Manghal Pandihad 
not proved mortal. He recovered, was brought to trial, and 
hanged. The Jamadar who had incited the sipahis of the 
quarter-guard to refrain from assisting their officer met 
the same fate a little later (April 22). Meanwhile, the 
Government had made a searching inquiry into the con- 



58 The '^^tJi N. I. are disbanded. 

duct of the men of the 34th N. I. generally, and after 
much hesitation, moved also by events at Lakhnao, to be 
presently referred to, Lord Canning came to the deter- 
mination to disband that regiment also (May 4). Two 
days later the seven companies of that regiment which 
were at Barrackpur ^ were paraded in the presence of the 
84th Foot, a wing of the 53d, and two batteries of Euro- 
pean artillery, and were disbanded. They were not allowed 
to keep their uniforms, but were marched out of the 
station with every show of disgrace. Thus five hundred 
conspirators, embittered against the Government, were 
turned loose on the country at a very critical period. 

The Government had, towards the end of April, been so 
satisfied that the disturbances were purely local, and that 
the disaffection displayed in Bengal had not penetrated to 
the North-west, that they had resolved, as soon as the 
34th N. I. should have been dealt with, to send back the 
84th Foot to Rangoon, and they had actually engaged 
transports for that purpose. Nor did the advices they re- 
ceived from Oudh and the upper provinces, just before 
the disbandment of the 34th, induce them to reconsider 
the position and to change their plans. It required the 
outbreak of the loth of May at Mirath to impress upon 
them the reality of the danger. 

The disbandment of the 19th N. I., on the 31st of 
March, had sent back to Oudh nearly a thousand men to 
preach disaffection and treason. The seeds of distrust 
had already been sown there by the chief conspirators. 
It wanted, then, but practical proof of the determination of 
the Government to carry out their designs at all costs to 
apply the spark to the material collected. The presence 
of the disbanded men of the 19th supplied that spark. No 
overt action had taken place in Oudh before their arrival 

^ The remaining three companies were on duty in Eastern Bengal. 



Sir Henry Lawrence in Oudh. 59 

in that province. After their advent, Oudh became the 
chief focus of the rebellion. 

At Lakhnao, the capital of Oudh, ruled the chivalrous 
and capable Sir Henry Lawrence. No man more than 
he had lamented the tendencies of the time to introduce 
a western system of local government among an oriental 
people. No man had been more desirous to stand on the 
ancient ways, the ways familiarised to the natives of India 
by centuries of use : to employ the utmost care and dis- 
cretion in introducing changes, however meritorious those 
changes might appear to men of western race and western 
training. Hence Sir Henry Lawrence was popular with 
all classes of natives. He possessed a greater influence over 
them than any man then living ; and, could the rill, then 
breaking into a torrent, have been stemmed, he was the 
one man to stem it. But Sir Henry Lawrence had come 
to Oudh after the evil seeds sown by his immediate pre- 
decessor had begun to bear fruit— when the native land- 
owners had been alienated, the supporters of the native 
rule had begun to conspire, and when the effects of the 
annexation were being realised by the numerous families 
which had sent a son or a brother into the sipahi army, 
in order that he might procure for them the support of 
the English Resident in their local Courts. When Sir 
Henry arrived, then, the mischief had been done, and he 
had had no power to repair it. 

The events at Barhampur and Barrackpur had been 
watched by Sir Henry Lawrence with the deepest interest. 
Naturally, he had taken particular pains to satisfy himself 
whether the causes which had produced the outbreaks I have 
recorded at those stations had affected the three regular 
native regiments, the 13th, the 48th, and the 71st N. I., 
which garrisoned Lakhnao. But it was not till the end of 
April, just about the time when the disbanded men of the 



6o Disaffection at Lakhnao, 

19th N. I. were stealing into the province, that he detected, 
or thought he detected, suspicious symptoms in the 48th 
N. I. He reported the circumstance to Lord Canning, 
and at once received permission to write to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to have the regiment removed to Mirath. 
But to Sir Henry's mind the proposed remedy was no 
remedy at all. He wrote in that sense, on May ist, to the 
Governor-General. 

Two days later he discovered that treasonable com- 
munications were passing between the men of a local 
regiment and the 48th, that the men of the 7th Irregular 
Cavalry, stationed seven miles from Lakhnao, had pro- 
ceeded to overt acts against their officers, and that 
the greased cartridges were in both cases the alleged 
cause of the ill-feeling. The act of the 7th Irregulars, in 
the opinion of Sir Henry, required prompt repression. 
Accordingly, he marched that night, with the three native 
regiments I have enumerated, the 32d Foot, and a bat- 
tery of eight guns, against the peccant regiment. The 
men of that regiment, terrified by this demonstration, sub- 
mitted without a blow. They laid down their arms at the 
given order, and allowed their ringleaders to be arrested, 
with every sign of penitence and submission. 

On the 4th of May the electric wire flashed to Lord 
Canning an account of this mutiny and its repression. It 
was the receipt of this news which decided his vacillating 
council to disband the 34th, a measure which, we have 
seen, was carried out on the 6th. The effect which the 
simple disbanding of a mutinous regiment produced on 
the other native regiments of the same brigade was illus- 
trated a few days later. A Jamadar of the 70th N. I. 
was arrested at Barrackpur in the act of urging his men 
to rise in revolt. Brought to trial before a court com- 
posed of native officers of his own caste, he was sentenced 




9'- 7/". 9^ 



Effect of the disbanding of the ^/[th. 6i 

merely to dismissal. Unfortunately this lenient punish- 
ment for mutiny was approved and confirmed by the 
Commander-in-Chief. The publication of this approval 
produced the worst effects. 

Unfortunately for Lord Canning, himself one of the 
noblest of men, there was no one about him to tell him 
that the punishment of disbandment in such times as 
he was entering upon was no punishment at all. There 
was not a native regiment in the Bengal Presidency 
which was not at this period not only ready to disband 
itself, but to turn with all the fury of men excited by 
fancied wrongs against the masters they had served. But 
the truth is there was not a man about him who had 
penetrated below the surface, who had the wit to see that 
this disaffection was no ephemeral feeling, to disappear 
at the bidding of a few hard words. In the language of 
the Home Secretary, employed when the discontent had 
become infinitely more pronounced than it was at the be- 
ginning of May, it was, in the eyes of his councillors, ' a 
passing and groundless panic ' which required no excep- 
tional action on the part of the Government. When, then. 
Lord Canning punished a mutinous regiment by dis- 
banding it, when the Commander-in-Chief announced to 
the army that he considered simple dismissal as a fitting 
punishment for a native officer caught red-handed in 
preaching mutiny to his own men, and when, finally, 
the Governor-General, notifying to the army the doom 
of the 34th N. L, declared to the sipahis that similar 
conduct on their part would subject them to punishment 
' sharp and certain,' the plotters in high places must have 
smiled contemptuously at the conception of sharp and 
certain punishment entertained by their rulers. 

Notwithstanding the belief of the Government that the 
discontent was local, almost every post brought informa- 



62 The First Move at Mirath. 

tion that it was not confined to Bengal, that it had shown 
itself in other places than Lakhnao, that regiments, widely 
separated from one another, were equally infected. In 
the important station of Mirath, situated nearly midway 
between the Ganges and the Jamnah, thirty-six miles 
from the imperial city of Dehli, the sipahis had become 
impregnated with the idea that the flour sold in the 
bazaars had been purposely mixed with the bones of 
bullocks, ground to a fine powder. The conspirators who 
had fabricated this story were the men who had invented 
the tale of the greased cartridges, and they had fabricated 
it with a like object. Nothing tended more to prove the 
proneness of the minds of the sipahis to accept any story 
against the masters they had served for a century than the 
readiness with which they accepted this impossible rumour. 
They were not to be persuaded that it was untrue. They 
displayed more than ordinary care in the purchase of the 
meal for their daily consumption, and, still unsatisfied, 
vented their discontent by the burning of houses and by 
the omission of the ordinary salute to their officers. They 
soon took a very much more decided step in the path of 
mutiny. A parade of the 3d Native Light Cavalry had 
been ordered for the morning of the 6th of May. When, on 
the preceding evening, the ordinary cartridges were issued 
to the men, eighty-five troopers of that regiment declined 
to receive them. In vain did their commanding officer ex- 
postulate ; in vain did the Brigadier attempt to persuade 
them. Such a breach of discipline could not be passed 
over. The men were confined, were then brought with 
all speed to a court-martial, composed entirely of native 
officers, and were sentenced by the members of that 
court to periods of imprisonment, with hard labour, vary- 
ing from six to ten years. Under the orders of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, to whom the question had been specially 



The Mtttineers punished. 63 

referred, the General commanding the Mirath division, 
General Hewitt, prepared to put into execution the find- 
ing of the court-martial on the mutineers of the 3d N. L. C. 
He ordered a general parade for the morning of the 9th. 
There were present at that parade at daybreak, a regi- 
ment of Carabineers, the 60th Rifles, the 3d Light 
Cavalry (native), the nth and 20th regiments N. I., a 
troop of horse-artillery, and a light field-battery. The 
condemned mutineers were marched to the ground, were 
stripped of their accoutrements, then every man was 
shackled and ironed, and they were all marched to the 
gaol, a building about two miles distant from the canton- 
ment, and guarded solely by natives. There were sullen 
looks among the armed troopers of the 3d, and an acute 
observer might have detected sympathetic glances from 
the sipahis. But there was no open demonstration. Like 
Lord Canning and his advisers after the disarming of the 
34th N. L, only three days earlier, General Hewitt and 
the officers at Mirath congratulated one another on the 
promptitude and success with which a sharp punishment 
had been dealt out to men who had defied the authority 
they had sworn to obey. 

But the acts of the 19th N. I. at Barhampur, of the 
34th at Barrackpur, of the men whom Major Cavenagh 
was carefully watching in Fort William, of the deluded 
sipahis near Lakhnao, and of the 7th N. L. C. at Mirath, 
were but the precursors to a more terrible tragedy. The 
great movement, of which those acts were only the pre- 
monitory symptoms, was, on that 9th day of May, on the 
eve of its outbreak, 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE REVOLT AT MIRATII AND THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. 

The parade at Mirath, the particulars of which are told in 
the last chapter, took place on a Saturday morning. The 
sipahis who assisted at it had then the remainder of that 
day, the following night, and the early part of Sunday, 
in which to mature the plans rising in their minds. 

In their opinion the eighty-five men who had refused 
to take the cartridges, and of whose degradation they had 
been witnesses on that Saturday morning, were simply 
martyrs for their faith. They had been a little bolder 
than their comrades : that was all. The idea which had 
prompted their refusal was common to all the sipahis at 
Mirath. They, too, had lost faith in their masters, and 
their minds had been equally ready to believe the stories 
regarding bone dust and greased cartridges which design- 
ing men were daily pouring into their ears. They had 
not been insensible to the reproaches which their ironed 
and shackled comrades had cast upon them as they 
marched off, prisoners, to the gaol. They felt that they 
should deserve these reproaches if they were to con- 
tinue silent witnesses of their degradation. They knew, 
though the Government wilfully shut their eyes to the 
fact, that the feelings under which their comrades had acted 
were wide-spread among the sipahis of the Bengal army. 
That night's post would convey to every station in India 
the story of the punishment of their comrades, and of 



Preparations for Revolt at Mirath. e^ 

their own passive acquiescence. Such a disgrace was not 
to be borne. They must, before the world was forty-eight 
hours older, atone for their apparent acquiescence in the 
punishment of the men whose views they shared by action 
which should rouse all India. 

In the consultations of that Saturday afternoon and 
evening the sipahis of the three regiments called to mind 
that it was the custom of the English to hold Church 
parade on Sunday, morning and evening, and that on 
such occasions the men wore only their side-arms. 
The evening seemed to them more suitable for their 
enterprise than the morning, for in India there is no 
twilight, and the darkness which would rapidly super- 
vene on the setting of the sun would greatly increase 
the confusion which the surprise of the sudden rising 
would produce. 

But little occurred in Mirath on that eventful Sunday 
to warn the English of the coming danger. It was re- 
collected afterwards that the native servants, alike in the 
barracks and in private houses, had strangely absented 
themselves from their customary duties ; but no suspicions 
were aroused. It was the very height of the blasting 
season which scorches up vegetation, and renders the 
outer air scarcely endurable until the time of sunset 
approaches. The Sunday, then, passed like other Sundays, 
and when the bells began to toll for the evening service 
nothing had occurred to give any warning of the storm 
which was ready to burst. 

But as the residents and the troops marched to the 
sacred edifice it became evident that some great event was 
pending. The native nurse of the chaplain had warned 
him, as he was setting out with his wife, that they would 
have a fight with the sipahis. On their way the church- 
goers heard the unwonted sounds of bugling and musket 

E 



66 The Mirath Si pa his rise in Revolt. 

firing. They saw bodies of armed men hurrying on their 
way as if to a rendezvous. Then there succeeded columns 
of smoke, as if many bungalows had been set on fire. In 
a moment more the whole truth burst upon them. The 
native troops at Mirath had revolted. 

Far differently had that day been passed in the lines 
of the native troops. There the utmost excitement 
had prevailed. Conspiring makes conspirers suspicious. 
Conscious of their own meditated treason, the sipahis 
attributed to their masters designs not dissimilar to their 
own. It is very doubtful whether there were at Mirath, at 
this crisis, any of those who were deep in the conspiracy : 
who had fostered the movement from its very birth ; 
who were in the confidence of the Maulavi and his col- 
leagues. Their place was occupied by the committees 
they had caused to be formed in each regiment. But the 
sipahis, excited, suspicious, ready to believe the idlest tale 
as they were, required leading. On this occasion the men 
of the nth N. I. seemed inclined to hang back. To 
bring them to the right pitch, and to confirm possible 
wavering on the part of any of the others, the regi- 
mental committees took care that the most telling 
rumours should be circulated. Nowhere in the world 
does rumour rise so easily or take such exaggerated 
forms as in India. It appeals to a people singularly 
simple, and yet singularly superstitious. The fables of 
their religion teach them to believe in the super- 
natural, and for them the improbable is an ever-living 
power. When, then, rumour told them that the Euro- 
pean troops at the station were preparing for them 
the fate of their manacled comrades, they believed the 
rumour. Hence they determined to rise and rescue those 
comrades whilst the Europeans should be unarmed and 
unsuspicious. 



The First Phases of the Revolt. 6j 

They waited, then, impatiently, how impatiently only 
those can know who are waiting for a given signal to 
launch themselves on an enterprise which shall ensure 
glory or death, until the church bells should give intima- 
tion that the coast was comparatively clear. Then, when 
they heard the tolling, their impatience could not be re- 
strained. Armed with sabre and pistol, the men of the 
3d Cavalry galloped to the gaol to rescue their imprisoned 
comrades, whilst the sipahis of the nth and 20th hurried 
from their lines in tumultuous disorder. The troopers, on 
reaching the gaol, loosened the gratings of the cells in 
which their comrades were confined, the native guard 
fraternising with and assisting them. It took but a short 
time to drag out the manacled prisoners. A smith was 
handy. In a few minutes the fetters were removed, and 
the eighty-five rode back, mounted behind their deliverers, 
to the regimental lines. 

When they arrived there they found that matters had 
progressed to a point from which there was no receding. 
Some of the European officers of the 20th N. I. had been 
shot, and Colonel Finnis of the nth had been riddled to 
death by the sipahis of the 20th whilst endeavouring to 
persuade the men of his own regiment to remain true to 
their salt. Not for the moment only, but throughout that 
long night, first the mutinous soldiery, then the scum of 
the population and the prisoners whom They had released, 
were absolute masters of the situation. The English 
authorities, civil and military, taken by surprise, had ap- 
parently lost their heads. Those in the highest places, the 
General, the Brigadier, the officers of the staff, were 
paralysed by the suddenness and tremendous character of 
the shock. Colonel Custance, commanding the Cara- 
bineers, on the first sound of the tumult, had ordered out 
his men, and had sent to ask for instructions. After a 



68 The Authorities lose Their Heads, 

long delay the General sent to order him to proceed, not 
to the parade grounds of the mutinous regiments, which 
were close by, but to a gaol at a distance of some miles. 
The services of this gallant regiment were thus rendered 
unavailable at the time and at the place when and where 
they were most required. The night had well set in when 
General Hewitt, Brigadier Wilson, the 6oth Rifles, the 
artillery, and the officers of the mutinous regiments 
reached the general parade ground. Across that ground 
the troops deployed into line, and joined by the Cara- 
bineers, who fortunately had lost their way and had re- 
turned, marched in the full expectation of meeting the 
revolted sipahis. But these had disappeared, and no one 
knew whither they had gone. Believing that they had 
moved round to attack the quarters of the Europeans, the 
Brigadier, Archdale Wilson, advised the General to return 
for the protection of the women, the children, and the 
barracks. The General assented, and gave the necessary 
orders.. On their way back the soldiers had some evi- 
dence of the damage already done by the mutineers. 
Lurid shoots of flame showed that many of the European 
bungalows were blazing. Some unarmed plunderers were 
seen, but no sipahis. Where were they ? Captain Rosser 
of the Carabineers offered, if he were permitted, to lead a 
squadron of his regiment and some H. A. guns along the 
Dehli road, to ascertain if they had taken that route. 
The suggestion was not accepted, and subsequently the 
authorities denied that it had ever been made. It 
would seem that the officers in high places were sadly 
wanting in that spirit of enterprise and audacity which 
constitute the essential element of a good soldier. 
They would hazard nothing, not even the lives of a 
reconnoitring party. Contenting himself with establish- 
ing a few pickets, the General bivouacked his force 



Terrors of the Night at Mirath. 69 

for the remainder of the night on the European parade 
ground. 

For the residents at Mirath, for the women, the children 
the civil section of the Europeans and Eurasians, that night 
was full of horror. The scum of the native population and 
the unchained gaol-birds had the field to themselves. Most 
thoroughly did they do their congenial work. The Com- 
missioner, Mr Greathed, warned first by an officer of the 
3d Native Cavalry, and afterwards by an Afghan pensioner, 
had, with his wife and other English women, taken refuge 
on the terraced roof of his house. Against a foe whose 
weapon was fire that terrace was no sure hiding-place. 
But for the fidelity — I am happy to add, the by no means 
rare fidelity — of his native servants he and those with him 
must have perished in the flames. One servant in par- 
ticular distinguished himself He persuaded the rabble to 
move off to search for his master in an outhouse some 
distance off, and during their sudden absence Greathed, 
his friends and family, had time to descend from their 
perilous position and crouch in the empty garden. Others 
were less fortunate. Wives, left without protection during 
the enforced absence of their husbands, were butchered 
without mercy, and children were slaughtered under the 
very eyes of their mothers. Many instances of the devo- 
tion and presence of mind of English women could be 
given if space permitted. Those who did escape owed 
their safety to the possession of these qualities, but the 
roll of those who suffered was a long one. When day at 
length dawned, it dawned over a dismantled Mirath. The 
English men and women who had been saved crept from 
their hiding-places to see, in the mangled corpses which 
lay by the wayside, in the blackened ruins of houses, in 
the furniture of European make thrown out of the dwelling- 
houses, smashed and destroyed, abundant evidence of the 



Jo Feebleness of Action at Miratk. 

thoroughness with which the ' scum ' and the gaol-birds had 
done their work.^ But of those destroyers not one was to 
be seen. They had done their deeds in darkness, and had 
slunk away to their homes when light came. Nor was a 
single sipahi visible. The quiet prevailing in the places 
so recently the scenes of terrible outrage and disorder was 
the quiet of the charnel house. 

I left the English troops bivouacked on the European 
parade ground. On that parade ground they slept whilst 
the enormities, of which I have given an indication, were 
being perpetrated in the civil lines. Nor, when day broke, 
did the morning light give greater energy to the councils 
of their commander. The General, it is true, speedily 
recognised that the sipahis had quitted Mirath. He 
presumed, also, that they had made for Dehli, thirty-six 
miles distant. There was not now time for the most 
energetic soldier to have followed and caught them, for 
it was clear that, with a start of eight hours, the 
3d Cavalry, at all events, would be there before them. 
But the idea of pursuit never occurred to anyone. The 
prevailing idea was how to secure the unthreatened Mirath. 
There were some good men at Mirath, but on this morning 
of the nth of May not one of those in high authority 
was in the full possession of his faculties. The brains of 
all were paralysed by the blow of the previous evening. 
The General contented himself, then, with making a recon- 
naisance to the right of the Dehli road. It was deemed 
to be too late, and it was then certainly too late to send 
a warning to the Dehli authorities of the danger awaiting 
them. But the strangest thing of all was that no effort 

^ It deserves to be recorded that all the natives of Mirath did not join in 
the outrages, an outline of which I have given. For instance, a Muhammadan 
in the city sheltered two families at great danger to himself. The servants, 
as a rule, showed the greatest devotion to their foreign masters. 



Inaction the Order of the Day, 7 1 

was made to punish the marauders and murderers of the 
previous night. ' It is a marvellous thing/ wrote, some 
time later, the Commissioner, to whom the Government 
entrusted the drawing up of a report of the proceedings 
of that terrible night and of that shameful morning, * that 
with the dreadful proof of the night's work in every direc- 
tion, though groups of savages were actually seen gloating 
over the mangled and mutilated remains of the victims, 
the column did not take immediate vengeance on the 
Sadr bazaar and its environs, crowded as the whole place 
was with wTetches hardly concealing their fiendish satis- 
faction.' But so it was. Inaction w^as the order of the 
day. The authorities contented themselves with collecting 
and placing in the theatre the bodies of the murdered 
men and women, and left their murderers, unpunished, to 
the full enjoyment of their ill-gotten gains. Civil and 
military authorities vied with one another to attain per- 
fection in the art of ' how not to do it' 

Meanwhile the sipahis, having released their imprisoned 
comrades, and set on the populace and the gaol-birds to 
keep their late masters v/ell occupied during the night, 
had taken the road to Dehli. It is due to some of them 
to state that they did not quit Mirath before they had 
seen to a place of safety those officers whom they most 
respected. This remark applies specially to the men of 
the nth N. I., who had gone most reluctantly into the 
movement. Before they left, two sipahis of that regiment 
had escorted two ladies with their children to the Cara- 
bineer barracks. They had then rejoined their comrades. 
Of these the troopers of the 3d Cavalry took the lead, 
anxious to gain the bridge across the Jamnah before 
tidings of the outbreak should reach the English authori- 
ties. Knowing the English as they did, how, when en- 
gaged with them on service, they had ever displayed a 



72 The MtUinccrs enter Dehli. 

daring and an energy which had inspired their native 
comrades, they listened for some time anxiously for the 
sound of the galloping of the horses of the Carabineers. 
But when hour succeeded hour, and silence still reigned 
on all sides, they lost all apprehension, and galloping on 
with a light heart, caught sight of the minarets of the 
Jami Masjid glittering in the morning sun. Spurring 
their horses, they reached the waters of the Jamnah, 
crossed by the bridge of boats which spanned it, cut down 
the toll-keeper on the other side, fired the toll-house, slew 
a solitary Englishman whom they met ; then hastening 
to the palace of the King, clamoured for admittance, 
declaring that they had killed the English at Mirath, 
and had come to fight for the Faith. We must leave 
them there whilst we examine the relative positions 
of the English and the Mughal Court at the Imperial 
city. 

The city of Dehlf had and has still a circumference 
of five and a half miles. That of the King's palace, 
within its walls, is nearly one and a half The city 
itself I shall describe when I come to the operations 
undertaken by the handful of soldiers who laid siege to 
it. For the moment our attention must be riveted to the 
palace. 

The palace, more correctly called the inner fort or 
citadel, was built by the Emperor Shah Jahan (1638-58). 
It is a magnificent series of structures, reached by a flight 
of 1 13 steps, and covered on its eastern face by the Jamnah. 
It contained some magnificent buildings : the Diwani Am, 
or public Hall of Audience, built of red sandstone ; the 
Diwani Khass, or Privy Council Chamber, of white marble 
ornamented with gold, and inlaid ; the King's Baths, the 
Moti Masjid, or Pearl Mosque, a real architectural gem. 
Above the entrance gate was a turret twenty feet high, 



The Palace — and the Kin^. 73 

commanding, to the left, a magnificent view of the Jami 
Masjid, of a white Jain temple, and of the town. Straight 
in front of the entrance gate was the Chandni Chauk, or 
Silver Market ; to the right, outside the walls of the city, 
were the Jamnah, Hindu Rao's house, and the ridge, so 
famous during the siege, at the moment indicating the 
direction of the lines of the native infantry regiments 
which constituted the British garrison. Within the fort 
were gardens laid out in the formal style of the east, 
and along the river front were a number of marble pavi- 
lions, generally octagonal, covered with gilded domes, 
some of them of great beauty. 

The principal occupant of this inner citadel was 
Bahadur Shah, titular King of Dehli, the twentieth suc- 
cessor of the illustrious Akbar. He was King of Dehli 
in name, and in name only. The empire had departed 
from the feeble hands of his predecessors before the 
English had become a power in India. The Khorasani 
adventurer Nadir Shah had plundered the palace in 1739. 
Less than ten years later, the Afghan Ahmad Shah 
Durani had repeated the infliction. In 1788 the rebel 
Ghulam Kadir had blinded, within the palace, the reign- 
ing Emperor Shah Alam. For fifteen years the city had, 
then, been occupied by the Marathas. The English had 
made their first acquaintance with it in 1803, when Lord 
Lake rescued the blinded representative of the Mughals 
from the tyranny of the Central Indian conquerors. From 
that date the English had maintained the representative 
of the Mughal in splendour and comfort in the halls and 
palace of his ancestors. There, in the citadel within 
Dehli, his will was supreme. It did not extend an inch 
beyond it. Wisely, then, the English—when, under the 
able guidance of Marquess Wellesley, they assumed the 
responsibilities of empire — did not restore to the Mughal 



74 Sentiments of the Kino^ tozuaj^ds the English 

the power which he had ah-eady lost. Less wisely, per- 
haps, they had permitted him to enjoy the shadow after 
he had lost the substance. 

At the moment, and for some time previously, the 
feelings of the King and his family had been considerably 
excited against the English ruler, in consequence of corre- 
spondence which had taken place with reference to the 
succession. Bahadur Shah was an old man. A rumour 
had reached him, so far back as 1849-50, that Lord 
Dalhousie had not been indisposed to deprive the House 
of Taimur of the shadow of splendour still remaining to 
it. Rumour had told the truth. The acknowledged heir 
to Bahadur Shah, Prince Dara Bakht, had died in 1849. 
The next in the strict line of succession. Prince Fakir-ud- 
din, had been born a pensioner. Lord Dalhousie was 
inclined to admit his accession to the chiefship of the 
family upon less favourable conditions than those which 
had been recognised in the case of his father. In plain 
language, Lord Dalhousie believed that the natives of 
India, the princes as well as the people, had become 
' entirely indifferent to the condition of the King of Dehli 
or his position,' and, considering the danger of retaining 
an ' imperiuni in imperio ' in the very heart of the ancient 
capital of India, he had desired to take the opportunity of 
the death of the immediate representative of the Llouse 
of Taimur to sweep away all the privileges and preroga- 
tives which had kept alive a pretentious mock royalty in 
the heart of the empire. 

The Court of Directors gave Lord Dalhousie full 
power to act according to the views he had imbibed on 
this subject, but there was much difference of opinion in 
the India House, and Lord Dalhousie wisely deferred 
action. Meanwhile, rumours of the impending change 
had reached the palace, and had roused the most furious 



Warranted by Facts. 7 5 

opposition, especially on the part of the favourite wife of 
the old King. This lady, in the manner of favourite 
wives generally, desired to secure the succession, with all 
its privileges, for her son, Jawan Bakht, then (1850) a boy 
of eleven. There existed at that time a strange ignorance 
of native feeling and native habits of thought in the 
Council of the Governor-General, and, notwithstanding 
the passionate entreaties from Dehli, Lord Dalhousie and 
his advisers wrote a despatch to the Home Government 
recommending them to acknowledge the succession of 
the eldest surviving son, Fakir-ud-din ; and urging that, 
on the death of Bahadur Shah, the opportunity should 
be taken to utilise the claims of the youngest son by 
obtaining from the eldest the desired concessions. Prince 
Fakir-ud-dm was induced to consent to this ignoble ar- 
rangement, though he hated himself for his weakness. 
But his death, in 1856, threw back matters into the 
channel in which they were before his consent had been 
obtained. 

Lord Canning was then Governor-General, and at 
that time Lord Canning could see only with the eyes of 
the Councillors whom I have described. In reply to the 
urgent solicitations of the Queen to nominate her son, he 
determined not only to refuse her request, but to recog- 
nise as heir-apparent the eldest surviving son of the King. 
He determined likewise to exhort terms less favourable 
to native ideas than those which had been wrung from 
his deceased brother, for, in addition to the renuncia- 
tions to which that brother had agreed, he stipulated 
that the succeeding prince should renounce the title of 
King. 

It is right that the reader should bear in mind these 
transactions when recollecting the conduct of the repre- 
sentatives of the House of Taimur when, on that eventful 



Td The Mutmeers demand a?i Audience, 

May morning (May ii, 1857) the troopers of the 3d 
Cavalry stood under the windows of the King demanding 
admittance and support. The King was an old man, 
ruled to a great extent by a favourite wife, whose hopes 
had been dashed to the ground by the British Govern- 
ment. He himself, his courtiers, his sons, his depen- 
dents, kne.v that the fiat had gone forth from Calcutta 
which, on his death, would humble to the dust the House 
of Taimur. We cannot wonder that their feelings should 
have prompted them to seize any opportunity which 
might present itself We cannot wonder that, with the 
shadow of the despoiler before them, his threats ringing 
in their ears, they should have decided to strike a blow 
for the restoration of the family honours : to court death 
rather than submit to disgrace. Neither in the past nor in 
the present has a single man of the two hundred and fifty 
millions of natives of India condemned them for their 
action on that memorable morning. The reverse was 
the case. The sympathy of India was with them, and 
it was the conviction that it would be so which decided 
them. 

Attached to the citadel, and representing British 
interests at the palace, were the Commissioner of Dehli, 
Mr Fraser, and the Commandant of the Palace Guards, 
Captain Douglas. No sooner did the aged King hear 
the voices of the troopers under his windows than he 
sent to summon Captain Douglas to inquire the mean- 
ing of their presence. Captain Douglas pleaded ignor- 
ance, but, confident in the magic of the appearance of 
a British officer, declared he would go down to speak to 
them, and send them away. The King, apparently ignor- 
ant of their purpose, and yet dreading the reason of 
their presence, begged the young Englishman not to 
expose his life. The King's physician added his en- 



The British Residents are Massacred. 7 7 

treaties to those of his master. Douglas contented him- 
self, then, with entering the verandah and ordering the 
troopers to depart, as their presence was an annoyance 
to the King. The men scornfully defied him. It hap- 
pened that the sipahis on duty at the palace belonged to 
the 38th N. I., the regiment which had successfully defied 
Lord Dalhousie's order to proceed to Burma but five 
years before. They were disloyal to the core. When, 
therefore, the troopers of the 3d Cavalry, maddened by 
the sight of Douglas, attempted to force an entrance into 
the palace, they admitted them as comrades. 

The troopers, once admitted, made short work of every 
Englishman they found there. They cut down to the death 
Mr Fraser, Captain Douglas, the chaplain, Mr Jennings, his 
daughter, and a young lady staying with them. Miss 
Clifford. The collector, Mr Hutchinson, fell a victim also 
to their barbarity. They were not alone in their thirst 
for blood. Not only had the guards of the 38th N. I. 
fraternised with them, but the orderlies of the King and 
the rabble vied with them in their savage fury. There 
is no reason to believe that the King gave any sanction 
to their proceedings. For the moment the old man 
was absolutely without authority. The soldiery had 
forced their way into his splendid Diwani Am, and had 
turned it into a barrack. At that crisis they were the 
masters. 

Outside the palace, especially in the quarter inhabited 
by the European residents engaged in mercantile pursuits, 
the carnage was even greater. The Dehli Bank, supposed 
to contain treasure, was one of the buildings first attacked. 
Defended with gallantry by the manager, Mr Beresford, 
and his family, it was stormed and gutted, and the de- 
fenders were slain. The Dehli Gazette press and its 
inmates met the same fate. The English church was 



yS The Amative Regiments at DeJili 

stormed and rifled. Every house, in fact, occupied by 
European or Eurasian was attacked, and every Christian 
upon whom hands could be laid was killed. There was 
no mercy and there was no quarter. 

Meanwhile, in the cantonments, matters were not going 
much better. The cantonments for the native brigade at 
Dehli was situated on the famous ridge, about two miles 
from the city. There were quartered the 38th, the 54thj 
and the 74th N. I., and a battery of native artillery. The 
commanding officer was Brigadier Graves. On that event- 
ful morning Graves had ordered a parade of the native 
troops, to have read to them the proceedings of the court- 
martial on Isri Pandi, the mutinous Jamadar of Barrackpur. 
Some of those Vv'ho were present thought they detected in 
the manner of the sipahis, whilst the proceedings were being 
read, signs of sympathy with the condemned man. But 
there was no overt act, and the sipahis were dismissed to 
their lines in the usual manner. It subsequently transpired 
that sipahis from Mirath had arrived in the Hues the 
previous day, and had communicated to the regiments 
located there the intentions of the Mirath native brigade- 
But for the moment all was quiet. The officers had re- 
turned to their quarters, and had eaten their breakfasts, 
when they were suddenly startled by the intimation that 
the native troops at Mirath had mutinied, and that the 
advanced guard of them, the 3d Cavalry, had galloped 
across the bridge. So great was the faith of the officers 
in their own men, and in British superiority, that those at 
Dehli never for a moment believed that the outbreak was 
aught but an isolated mutiny, which would be speedily 
quelled. The European force at Mirath must be, they 
thought, on the heels of the mutinied sipahis, and whilst 
their own native brigade would show them a bold front 
the Carabineers and 60th Rifles would assail them from 



Gradually join the Revolt. 79 

behind. With a h'ght heart, then, the officers of the 54ih 
N. L, and of the battery of native artillery, accompanied 
their men, to whom the sacred duty of defence had been 
committed, towards the city gates. 

Their dream of confidence was not of long duration. 
Some men of the 38th, at the main-guard, set the example 
of revolt. Ordered to fire on the approaching troopers, 
they replied with insult. The 54th then fired, some in 
the air, some on their own officers. Colonel Ripley was 
w^ounded ; Smith, Burrowes, Edwards, and Waterfield were 
shot dead. The 74th N. I. was then ordered to the front. 
Their colonel addressed them, reminded them of their 
past good conduct, and called upon volunteers to accom- 
pany him to the Kashmir Gate, adding that now was the 
time for the regiment to prove its loyalty. The sipahis 
stepped forward to a man, and with the same hope which 
had characterised the officers of the 54th, those of the 74th 
led on their men. At the main-guard they found some 
men of the 54th N. I. who had returned from the city. 
The din within the walls of the city was now overwhelming. 
The sipahis themselves evidently dreaded lest the strong 
English force stationed at Mirath should have arrived As 
deeply imbued as their comrades with the spirit of revolt, 
they resolved, then, before they cast their lot with those 
who had ' pronounced,' to wait the turn of events. They 
remained halted, silent and thoughtful, at the main-guard. 
They were still there when a terrible explosion within the 
city shook that building to its foundations. 

In the heart of the city, at no great distance from the 
palace, was the great magazine, full of munitions of war. 
On that morning there were in the magazine Lieutenant 
George Willoughby, in charge of it. Lieutenants Forrest 
and Raynor, of the Ordnance Commissariat department, 
Conductors Buckley, Shaw, Scully, and Crow, and Ser- 



So Willoughby and the Dehli Magazine. 

geants Edwards and Stewart. It would seem that at 
about eight o'clock the magistrate of Dehli, Sir Theophilus 
Metcalfe, came down to the magazine with the informa- 
tion that mutineers were crossing the river, and asking 
for two guns to defend the bridge. But it was soon 
realised that the bridge was already in possession of the 
mutineers. Metcalfe then proceeded with Willoughby to 
ascertain whether the city gate had been closed to the 
rebels. When it became known that not only had it not 
been closed, but that the mutineers had been admitted 
to the palace, Willoughby at once realised the situation. 
Confident that his turn would soon come, he set to work 
with his subordinates to render the magazine as defen- 
sible as possible. The gates were closed and barricaded, 
guns were placed at salient points, double charged with 
grape, and a central position was established, from which 
the guns could bear upon any point which might be forced. 
Then came the crucial point. All the subordinate workers 
in the magazine were natives. Willoughby and his com- 
rades hoped for a short time that these men, associated 
with their officers for so many years, would be faithful, 
and directed that arms should be served out to them. 
The manner in which these were received revealed to the 
few Europeans the fact that they would have to de- 
pend solely on their own energies. The natives, wrote 
Lieutenant Forrest/ accepted the arms most reluctantly, 
' and appeared to be not only in a state of excitement, 
but also of insubordination, as they refused to obey any 
orders issued by the Europeans.' Knowing it to be quite 
impossible to resist for long a serious attack, and re- 
solved that so much valuable munitions of war should 
not, if they could help it, fall into the hands of the Queen's 
enemies, these gallant Englishmen then caused a train to 

^Lieutenant Forrest's Report, dated May 27, 1857. 



The Magazine partially exploded. 8 1 

be laid, communicating with the powder magazine, to be 
fired only when every other resource should be exhausted. 
These arrangements had just been made when sipahis 
from the palace came to demand the surrender of the 
magazine in the name of the King of Dehli. No answer 
having been returned to this summons, the King, or some- 
one acting on his behalf, sent down scaling ladders. On 
these being erected against the wall, the whole of the 
native establishment, climbing to the top of the wall, 
deserted by means of them, and joined the rebels. These 
consisted chiefly of the sipahis of the nth and 20th N. I. 
from Mirath. Against these a fire was kept up as long as 
possible, but the superiority of numbers was overwhelm- 
ing. Still, a gallant defence was maintained. Nor was it 
until Forrest and Buckley had been disabled, and defence 
had become hopeless, that Willoughby gave the order to 
fire the train. Not one of the garrison expected to escape 
with his life. But it was otherwise ordered. Scully, who 
fired the train, and four of his comrades, were never seen 
again. They certainly perished ; but Willoughby and 
Forrest succeeded in reaching the Kashmir gate. Raynor 
and Buckley, too, escaped with their lives. The loss of 
the assailants was far more severe. It has never, I believe, 
been mathematically computed, but it may be reckoned 
by hundreds. Nor were the casualties caused by that 
explosion the most important consequence of it. It was 
the first reply to the general revolt ; it was the first warn- 
ing to the King and to the sipahis of the nature of the 
men whose vengeance they had dared ; the first intimation 
to the rebels of the stern and resolute character of the 
Englishman when thoroughly roused. It was the sound 
of this explosion, occurring about four o'clock in the after- 
noon, which startled the English ofificers and sipahis 
assembled at the main-guard. It was the sign for action 

F 



82 Escape of the Officers of the Native Regiments, 

to the latter. To them it plainly indicated that the rebels 
had penetrated to the heart of the city ; that, for the 
moment, mutiny had triumphed. So, at least, thought the 
sipahis of the company of the 38th N. I. which had moved 
up to the main-guard. Raising their muskets to the 
shoulder, the men of that company fired a volley into the 
group of officers near them. Gordon, the field-officer of 
the day, fell dead from his horse without a groan. Smith 
and Reveley of the 74th N. I. shared the same fate. 
There was nothing for it for the survivors but to run. 
There was a way of escape, perilous indeed, but certain 
for the time. This was to dash through the embrasure in 
the bastion skirting the courtyard of the main-guard, to 
drop thirty feet into the ditch, and ascending the opposite 
scarp, to gain the glacis, and thence the jungle beyond it. 
In an instant the conviction took possession of the minds 
of the yet unwounded officers that this way of escape 
must be attempted. Suddenly, however, the despairing 
cries of the women in the upper room of the main-guard 
reminded them that the escape which was easy to men 
might be impossible for the other sex. However, there 
was no other, so, conducting the women to the embrasure, 
the officers fastened their belts together, and whilst some 
of them descended first, the others from above helped 
the women to slide down. The whizzing of a round-shot 
over their heads hastened their movements, and at last, 
in a shorter time than had seemed possible, the descent 
was accomplished. More difficult was the climbing 
to the glacis ; but this came to a fortunate end. 
Then the fugitives pressed on into the jungle, thence 
some to the cantonments, others towards the Metcalfe 
House. 

But in neither of these places was there safety. The 
sipahis were by this time thoroughly roused. There was 



The Flight from Dehli. Z'^ 

nothing for it but flight to some less threatened spot. So 
men, women, and children sallied forth : alike those who 
had remained and those but just arrived from the main- 
guard. Their sufferings were terrible. They had to 
undergo physical tortures, and the still less endurable 
tortures of the mind. Tearing from their persons every- 
thing in the shape of glitter or ornament, crouching in 
by-ways, wading rivers, carrying the children as best 
they could, hiding in hollows, enduring the maltreatment 
of villagers, and the abuse of stray parties of wanderers, 
hungry, thirsty, weary, at times hunted, they at length 
reached shelter. Some found their way to Mirath, some 
to Karnal, others to Ambalah. A few perished on the 
way ; some giving up the struggle from fatigue, others 
succumbing to disease. The behaviour of the women of 
the party was such as to make the men proud of their 
companions. When Captain Wood sank exhausted, un- 
able to proceed, it was his wife, and his wife's friend, Mrs 
Peile, who supported him to the haven of safety. Nor 
was this a solitary instance. When it was found, on 
arriving at the night's bivouac, that one or more were 
missing, the less fatigued of the party went back to search 
for and bring them in. Generally the search was fruit- 
less, for the scum of the population, which would have 
shrunk from attacking a party, had no mercy for a solitary 
invalid. It is due, however, to the natives to add that 
they were not all imbued with the hatred which animated 
a section of them. There were instances of assistance 
given by some of them, men of high and low caste alike, 
\o the suffering and the wounded. There are those alive 
now who owed their safety to the compassion felt for 
them in their terrible straits by the kind-hearted Hindu 
and the loyal Muhammadan. 

Meanwhile, in and immediately around the Imperial 



84 Rebellion triumphant in Dehli, 

city, rebellion was triumphant. And in those early days 
rebellion had absolutely no mercy. Some fifty Christians, 
Europeans and Eurasians, who lived in the Darya-ganj, 
the English quarter of the Imperial city, had at the first 
sound of alarm taken refuge in one of the strongest 
houses of the quarter, and had there barricaded them- 
selves. But a handful of men and women, ill-armed and 
without supplies, was powerless against the roused rabble 
of the revolted capital. The house was speedily stormed, 
and the defenders were dragged to the palace, and lodged 
there in an underground apartment, without windows, and 
with only one door. After a stay there of five days they 
were taken out, led to a courtyard, and there massacred. 
Their bodies were thrown into carts, and were transferred 
thence to the waters of the Jamnah. One woman, terrified 
more for her three children than for herself, escaped, with 
them, the fate of her companions by declaring herself a 
convert to the faith of Islam. After that i6th of May 
there remained not in Dehli a single Christian. 

The King of Dehli, Bahadur Shah, had, meanwhile, 
assumed the responsibilities of the position which had 
been forced upon him. It is more than probable that the 
old man, left to himself, would have shrunk from the posi- 
tion. Outside of the walls of his citadel he had never 
wielded power, nor, up to the morning of May nth, had 
he ever conceived it possible that he should assert himself 
against the western people who had conquered Hindustan. 
Though such a question might have been mooted in his 
harem, he had regarded the conversation as the wild 'chatter 
of irresponsible frivolity.' Yet, on that memorable morn- 
ing, the position had been forced upon him. The mutinied 
sipahis, who had bivouacked in his Hall of Audience, who 
had expelled the English from the city, who boasted their 
determination to drive them into the sea, must have a 



Bahadur Shah is p7^o claimed. 85 

leader. Who so fit for such a post as the representative 
of the Mughal, the descendant of that illustrious Akbar, 
who had accomplished the union of India ? From such 
a position it was impossible that Bahadur Shah should 
recoil. Had he desired ever so much to hang back, and 
there is reason to suppose he was by no means eager to 
assume the foremost post, with its dangers, its responsi- 
bilities, its humiliations, he had a family the members of 
which were resolved that he should bind round his head 
'the golden round.' There was the ambitious Queen, 
whose projects two Governors-General had in succession 
thwarted ; her son, young, handsome, and full of ambi- 
tion ; her step-sons, the eldest of whom knew that, though 
in a certain sense the English would allow him to succeed 
his father, he would be shorn of all that had made succes- 
sion desirable, even of the royal title. In these, and in 
the ambitious nobles by whom they were surrounded, and 
in whose bosoms dwelt the traditions of a past which had 
not been without glory, the 'irresponsible frivolity' of 
which I have spoken loudly asserted its influence. Under 
the pressure of that influence Bahadur Shah agreed to 
assume the responsible position forced upon him. The 
revolted soldiery throughout India were called upon to 
fight for the restoration of the Mughal. The ' cry ' was 
not altogether a happy cry for the revolters. Though it 
might conciliate and bind together many Muhammadans, 
it could scarcely fail to alienate the Maratha princes who 
had contested empire with the Mughal family. The re- 
sult proved that the princes of Central India preferred the 
safe position they held under British suzerainty to aiding 
mutinied soldiers to restore a dynasty which they had 
been the first to trample under foot. Such thoughts did 
not, in those early days, present themselves to the minds 
of the ' irresponsible chatterers.' They believed that the 



86 The Beginning of the Sti^ife. 

expulsion of the English from Dehli, and the proclamation 
of Bahadur Shah as sovereign of India, was the consum- 
mation of the movement prematurely set on foot at Mirath. 
Unfortunately for their hopes it was only the untimely 
beginning. 



CHAPTER VM. 

THE EFFECT, THROUGHOUT INDIA, OF THE SEIZURE 

OF DEHLI. 

The story of the events of the loth of May at Mirath, and 
of the nth at Dehh', came as a surprise alike to the 
revolters all over India and to the Government. It came 
as a surprise to the former because the astute men who 
had fomented the ill-feeling against the British, which by 
this time had become pretty general, had laid down as 
a cardinal principle that there were to be no isolated out- 
breaks ; that the explosion should take place on the same 
day all over the Bengal Presidency ; and they had fixed 
upon Sunday, the 31st of May, as the day of the general 
rising. But the chief conspirators had to employ a large 
number of instruments. The rashness or premature action 
of a single instrument may destroy the best laid plot. 
The heads of the conspiracy had corrupted the 3d Native 
Cavalry and the 20th Regiment N. I., and had formed 
their committees in these regiments. But, at a critical con- 
juncture, these latter had been unable to restrain the rank 
and file of the regiments from premature action. Excited 
to fever pitch, eighty-five men of the 3d L. C. had, with 
the sympathy of their comrades, refused to receive the 
proffered cartridges. Brought to trial for the offence, they 
had been condemned, sentenced, and lodged in gaol. This 
sentence had been too great a stimulus to the passions of 
the troopsrs to allow them to await patiently the day fixed 



88 The Revolt at Mh^ath prematttre. 

upon. They saw that the English were unsuspicious, and 
they bcheved that the plot, so far as Mirath was concerned, 
might, by a prompt rising, be brought to a successful issue. 
In that events proved them to be right. But they had 
lost sight of the fact that, by acting solely for their own 
hand, they were imperilling the great principle which had 
been impressed upon them by their committees, and, with 
it, the general success aimed at by their chiefs. This 
premature action proved ultimately as fortunate for the 
English as disastrous to the cause of revolt. A blow 
which, struck simultaneously all over India, might have 
been irresistible lost more than half its power when 
delivered piecemeal and at intervals.^ 

On the 1 2th of May a telegram from Agra conveyed 
to the Government, in Calcutta, the information that the 
native cavalry at Mirath had risen, had set fire to several 
officers' houses and to their own lines, and had killed or 
wounded all the English officers and soldiers they had 
come across. It is not too much to record that the atti- 

^ This is not mere surmise. Mr Cracroft Wilson, of the Civil wService, 
who was selected by the Government of India, after the repression of the 
Mutiny, to ascertain who were the guilty and who deserving of reward 
among the natives of the North-west, has recorded his conviction, derived 
from oral information, that the 31st of May was the day fixed upon by the 
conspirators for a general rising. Committees had been formed in each 
regiment, and to these alone was intrusted the general scheme of the plot. 
The sipahis were directed to obey only the orders of the regimental com- 
mittees. It is probable that the very severe punishment dealt out to the 
eighty-five men of the 3d L. C. so excited the men that they overrode the 
directions of their committee and insisted upon prompt action. 

From information I have obtained, in conversation with natives of the 
Upper Provinces, I am convinced that the theory broached by Mr Cracroft 
Wilson is true. It is very difficult to induce the natives who lived and took 
a part in the great uprising of 1857 to open their minds regarding it. But 
I have heard from some of them sufficient to produce conviction in my mind 
that a day was fixed, and that the premature action of the loth and nth of 
May was considered to have greatly damaged the chances of success. 



Loi^d Canning hears of the Mir at h Revolt. 89 

tude of the Government on receiving this telegram was 
one of blank dismay. It was so little expected. Only 
two days before, Lord Canning had written a minute 
strongly supporting disbandment as a severe punishment 
to a regiment which should mutiny. Mr Dorin, the senior 
of his colleagues, had recorded an opinion of the same 
character. The military member of Council, General Low, 
little realising the nature of the catastrophe he had to 
face, had suggested that, after all, the conduct of the sipahis 
might be due rather to actual dread of injury to their 
caste than to disaffection. Yet, on the 12th, these rulers 
were told that disaffection had reached its highest point ; 
that a whole regiment, far from fearing disbandment, 
had actually disbanded itself, after slaying its officers. 
Then, indeed, they must have realised that, in their 
dealings with the 19th, with the 34th, with the men 
whose conduct Cavenagh had brought to notice, they 
had been pitiably weak when they had thought they 
had been strong ; that from the first they had misjudged 
and misunderstood the whole business ; that the dis- 
affection, far from being confined to Bengal proper, was 
probably general — in a word, that they had been living 
in a fool's paradise. 

It is due to Lord Canning to state that, within a short 
time of his perusal of the terrible news, he had not only 
recognised the grave character of the crisis, but had taken 
measures to meet it. On the 12th he did not know the 
worst. Then it was the mutiny of the 3d Light Cavalry 
that he had to meet. But two days later he received 
fuller particulars. On the 14th he heard of the seizure of 
Dehli. On the 15th and i6th particulars reached him of 
the massacre of the Europeans, of the flight of the officers, 
of the rallying round the resuscitated flag of the Mughal. 
Then he stood forward as the bold, resolute, daring English- 



90 Projnpt Measures taken by Lord Canning. 

man he really was. He telegraphed to the Governor of 
Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, to hasten, as far as he could, 
the return of the troops due in Bombay from the com- 
pleted campaign against Persia. He telegraphed to the 
Commander-in-Chief to ' make short work of Dehli? He 
transmitted to the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, Sir 
John Lawrence, full powers to act according to the best 
of his judgment. Not only did he countermand the return 
of the 84th to Rangoon, but he sent for a second regiment 
from that place and from Moulmein. He wrote to the 
Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, to send him two 
regiments. More than that, recollecting that a combined 
military and naval expedition was on its way from 
England to China, to support there, by force of arms, the 
pretensions of the British, he took upon himself the 
responsibility of despatching a message to Lord Elgin and 
General Ashburnham to intercept that expedition, and to 
beg them to despatch the troops under their orders with 
all possible speed to India. 

Having summoned those reinforcements. Lord Canning 
took a searching glance at the actual situation. The 
sudden outbreak at Mirath must have brought to his 
mind the conviction that he micfht have to meet a g-eneral 
rising of the Bengal army. What resources had he in 
his hand, not counting the troops he had summoned to 
his aid, to meet such a general rising ? A glance at those 
resources was not calculated to inspire confidence. Be- 
tween Calcutta and Danapur there were no English 
regiments. At Calcutta and in its vicinity were the 53d 
and the 84th. At Danapur was the loth Foot. Stretch- 
ing north-westward from Danapur, the eye rested on 
Banaras, with no English regiment, and but a few English 
gunners. At Allahabad, with its important fortress, the 
same state of things. The same likewise at Kanhpur, 



Resources at His Disposal. 91 

the next military station beyond it. At Lakhnao, indeed, 
there was one English regiment, but that regiment was 
wanted to defend the whole province of Oudh. At Agra 
there was but one English regiment. Beyond Agra and 
Kanhpur came Mirath and Dehli. We know, and Lord 
Canning knew, the condition of both those places. Beyond 
them were the military stations of Ambalah, and the hill 
stations between it and Simla, and Firuzpur, and beyond 
these again, the Panjab, as the Panjab was then computed. 
Here the bulk of the British troops was concentrated, but 
their numbers were none too many for the needs of the 
province. 

If the reader, bearing in mind the allotment of British 
troops I have just given, will study a map of India, he 
will realise that the prospect immediately before Lord 
Canning was far from reassuring. He had, as a statesman 
versed in affairs, to regard the native garrisons in all the 
stations mentioned, and in the smaller stations in their 
neighbourhood, as at least untrustworthy. After the events 
of Mirath and Dehli, he was bound even to class them in the 
list of probable enemies, and to provide for them accord- 
ingly. There were native troops at Barrackpur, in eastern 
Bengal, at Dandpur, at Banaras, at Allahabad, at Kanhpur, 
scattered all over the province of Oudh, at Agra, at Aligarh, 
at Bareli, at Muradabad, and at other minor stations south- 
east of Mirath and west of Agra„ In the districts in which 
those native troops were located Lord Canning could at 
the moment dispose of but four English regiments — the 
53d and 84th at or near Calcutta, the loth at Danapur, 
the 32d at Lakhnao, the 3d Europeans at Agra. Every 
man of these regiments was required for the purposes of 
the city or cantonment in which he happened to be. Lord 
Canning could not fail to recognise, then, that between 
Calcutta and Mirath he was absolutely powerless for ag- 



92 The Recovery of Dehli considered easy. 

gressive purposes ; that it would be marvellous could he 
succeed in maintaining his position until reinforcements 
should arrive. 

On the other hand, he had great faith, and I believe at 
the time every Englishman south-east of Mirath had great 
faith, in the power of the Commander-in-Chief to retake 
the Imperial city. Past history afforded good reason for 
that belief In September 1803 the troops of Sindhia had 
not offered the semblance of a resistance to the small army 
of General Lake. In the wars of the earlier Mughals with 
the representatives of the dynasties which they supplanted, 
Dehli had never offered any but the slightest resistance to 
the army which had been victorious in the field. Even 
amongst soldiers who had been stationed at that city the 
idea that Dehli could present a prolonged resistance was 
laughed at. The conviction prevalent at Calcutta,^ especi- 
ally in military circles, was that the mutineers had played 
the British game by rushing into a walled city, where they 
would be as rats in a trap. It can easily be understood, 
then, how it was that the hopes of Lord Canning that the 
Commander-in-Chief would very soon be able to deal a 
deadly blow to the mutineers, by capturing their strong- 
hold, was shared by every Englishman, or by almost every 
Englishman, at Calcutta. 

As to the Panjab, though Lord Canning naturally felt 
anxiety, it was an anxiety tempered by confidence in the 
resolute man who there represented him, and in that 
resolute man's subordinates. He had precisely the same 
feeling regarding Oudh. If Oudh at this crisis could be 
preserved to the British, Sir Henry Lawrence, who re- 
presented there the Government of India, was the man to 
preserve it. He had, and justly, an equal confidence in the 

^ I write from my own knowledge, having at the time been attached to 
the Government of India, in Calcutta, as Assistant Auditor-General. 



Exterior Policy of Lord Canning admirable. 93 

Governors of the minor Presidencies — in Lord Elphin- 
stone and Lord Harris — a confidence which their splendid 
conduct in all the phases of the rebellion more than 
justified. 

Looking back at the conduct of Lord Canning at this 
period, I cannot withhold my conviction that in all that 
related to his exterior policy, that is, in the efforts he 
made to procure assistance from outside, it was admirable. 
There was only one little thing, suggested to him by Lord 
Elphinstone, which he might with advantage have done, 
but which he did not do. In those days telegraphic com- 
munication with England had not been established. 
With the view, then, to secure the prompt arrrival of re- 
inforcements from England by the overland route, Lord 
Elphinstone suggested to Lord Canning the despatch to 
England of a special steamer, ready to his hand, which, 
steaming at her highest speed, should anticipate the 
regular mail steamer by some days. For some reason 
with which I am not acquainted Lord Canning declined 
the suggestion. 

Having thus, in the manner I have recorded, en- 
deavoured to reassure his lieutenants beyond Mirath, and 
to procure assistance from beyond India, Lord Canning 
set to work to take the measures which might be necessary 
to maintain his position within the country until re- 
inforcements should arrive. In this attempt he was not 
nearly so successful as he was in his measures of exterior 
policy. 

It was unfortunate that, in his measures of internal 
policy, Lord Canning was compelled, from his previous 
inexperience of India, to depend for his information on 
men, for the most part, of the shallowest capacity : men 
who, although they had served in India during periods of 
from fifteen to thirty years, and longer, had served with 



94 His Internal Policy niise^^ible, 

their eyes shut, and with a coil of red tape round their 
minds. Calcutta and its suburbs contained, in 1857, a 
native population exceeding half a million. In one of 
the suburbs lived the deposed King of Oudh, with a large 
following of retainers, not one of whom was disposed to 
love the Government which had made them exiles. To 
guard this large population there was but one weak wing 
of an English regiment, occupying Fort William. But 
there was a large body of Englishmen in Calcutta — 
merchants, lawyers, traders, clerks in public offices — who, 
apprehending the nature of the crisis far more clearly than 
the Government had apprehended it, were ready and 
anxious to place their services at the disposal of the 
Governor-General for the repression of disorder. There 
were also others — Frenchmen, Germans, Americans, — who 
were inspired by a similar sentiment. The feeling which 
animated these men was as simple as it was disinterested. 
They said in so many words to the Government : ' The 
situation is full of peril ; you are short of men, you have 
to control a large population in Calcutta, and you have 
within call but two English regiments ; there are three 
armed native regiments at Barrackpur, ready to emulate 
the conduct of their comrades at Mirath, why not utilise 
our services ? We can furnish a regiment of infantry, a 
regiment of cavalry, and a battery of artillery ; our in- 
terests and your interests are identical : use us.' 

There was not the smallest approach to panic among 
these men. They were sincerely anxious to help the 
Government in the terrible crisis. What panic there was 
was confined entirely to the higher official classes and the 
scum of the Eurasian population. It was in the exercise 
of the purest patriotism, then, that the merchants and 
traders of Calcutta, English and foreign, offered their 
services, between the 20th and the 25th of May, to the 



Mr Beadons Insole ]it Rebuff. 95 

Government. A wise Government would have met these 
offers with sympathy. The Government of Calcutta met 
them with language which was tantamount to insult. 
Whilst the English merchants and traders were told that, 
if they wished to enrol themselves as special constables, 
they might apply to the Commissioner of Police, who, it 
transpired, had been instructed to furnish them with clubs, 
the French community received from the Home Secretary, 
Mr Cecil Beadon, a reply which betrayed either infatua- 
tion or a determined attempt to deceive : ' Everything 
is quiet within six hundred miles of the capital. The 
mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic has 
been already arrested ; and there is every reason to hope 
that in the course of a few days tranquillity and con- 
fidence will be restored throughout the Presidency.' In 
point of fact, the mischief had not been arrested ; every- 
thing was not quiet within 600 miles of the capital ; and, 
far from there being reason to hope that in the course of 
a few days tranquillity and confidence would be restored 
throughout the Presidency, there was the absolute cer- 
tainty that disorder and insurrection would enormously 
increase. 

The reply of the Home Secretary, representing the 
views of the Government, was alike untrue and impolitic. 
At a critical moment it alienated the sympathies of the 
Europeans of Calcutta. And it speaks largely in favour 
of the patriotism and self-abnegation of the members of 
that community that, about three weeks later, when the 
boastings of the Home Secretary had vanished into thin 
air, and the Government saw almost as clearly as the com- 
munity had seen, at the time of their first offer, the danger 
of the situation, they agreed to form volunteer corps 
of the three arms to aid the Government in their dire 
necessity. 



96 Lord Canning realises the Sihtaiion. 

For the Home Secretary's vaunt had scarcely been 
made pubHc when the ineptitude, or the wish to deceive 
which had prompted it, became apparent His reply, 
already quoted, had been written on the 25th of May. 
Between that date and the 30th the native troops at 
Firuzpur, at Aligarh, at Bulandshahr, at Itawah, and at 
Mainpuri rose in revolt. The news from Agra, from 
Lakhnao, from Kanhpur, from Banaras, was of a most 
discouragincT character. It became evident, even to the 
Government, that not only had the mischief not been 
arrested, but that it was yet in its infancy. Under these 
circumstances, Lord Canning could not but feel very 
anxious regarding the movement of the Commander-in- 
Chief against Dehli. The maintenance of the authority 
left to the English, between the Hugh' and the Indus, 
depended, he felt, on the promptitude of the action of 
the gallant soldier who, on the first news of the revolt at 
Mirath, had hastened to Ambalah to organise a force to 
march aeainst the rebels. It was in this view that, on the 
31st of May, he despatched to that officer a telegram 
which clearly shows how, since the Home Secretary 
had triumphantly 'snubbed' the French inhabitants of 
Calcutta on the 25th, the views of the Government had 
changed.^ 

1 ' I have heard to-day that you do not mtend to be before Dehli until 
the 9th. In the meantime Kanhpur and Lakhnao are severely pressed, 
and the country between Dehli and Kanhpur is passing into the hands 
of the rebels. It is of the utmost importance to prevent this, and to 
relieve Kanhpur, but nothing but rapid action will do it. Your force of 
artillery will enable you to dispose of Dehli with certainty. I therefore 
beg that you will detach one European infantry regiment, and a small 
force of European cavalry, to the south of Dehli, without keeping them for 
operations there, so that Aligarh may be recovered and Kanhpur relieved 
immediately. It is impossible to overrate the importance of showing 
European troops between Dehli and Kanhpur. Lakhnao and Allahabad 
depend upon it.' 



The AchLal Position of Lord Canning. 97 

Nothing reveals more clearly than this telegram that, 
at the very end of May, Lord Canning had but feebly 
grasped the situation. He had, it is true, realised the 
intense danger of the position below Dehli, but no soldier 
himself, and having at his elbow men who were soldiers 
only in name, he had realised neither the difficulties which 
General Anson had to overcome before he could march 
from Ambalah, the strength of Dehli, nor the extent of 
the disaffection. A more correct forecast would have 
made it clear to him that he had nothing to hope for 
from the Commander-in-Chief, that he had to depend 
solely upon God and his own right arm. 

There was this advantage in the faultiness of his fore- 
cast that it made him confident. Those about him assured 
him that Dehli could not hold out, and that the capture 
of Dehli would be the turning point of the disturbances ; 
and he believed them. Could he maintain the weak 
middle part, the unguarded country between Banaras and 
Dehli, until succour from the North-west, from Persia, from 
China, from Burma, should arrive, all must go well. He 
had done what he could with the small means at his disposal 
to strengthen that middle part. On the 20th of May he had 
begun, and on following days he continued to despatch 
the 84th by driblets, as many as could be accommodated in 
a series of post-carriages, to Banaras and Kanhpur. On 
the 23d of May the Madras Fusiliers arrived from Madras, 
and were promptly despatched in the same direction. 
The first week of June increased his hopes that the danger 
might be yet averted. That week witnessed the arrival 
in Calcutta of the 64th Foot and 78th Highlanders from 
Persia, of a wing of the 35th Foot from Maulmein, of a 
wing of the 37th and a company of artillery from Ceylon. 
These were pushed forward with all possible celerity. 

It is as certain as can be, judging from his after conduct^ 

G 



98 The Councillors of Lord Canning. 

that if Lord Canning, at this crisis, had been left to act 
upon his own instincts, or even if he had trusted to the ex- 
perienced advice of the one capable counsellor at his elbow, 
Mr J. P. Grant, many of the mishaps which occurred during 
this month and the following would not have happened. 
But at this period he was under the influence of men 
whose knowledge of the country in which they had passed 
their lives was absolutely superficial. It was in deference 
to the advice of these men that, at a period when a plain 
and straightforward declaration, followed by plain and 
straightforward action, would have relieved the situation, 
he acted towards the sipahis in a manner the reverse of 
both. Thus whilst he had three native regiments at 
Barrackpur, in dangerous proximity to Calcutta, he pre- 
ferred to maintain troops to guard them rather than to 
disarm them. The case of Danapur was even worse. The 
garrison of Danapur, consisting of one English and three 
native regiments, was the guardian of the rich and popu- 
lous province of Bihar. It was certain that, should the 
three native regiments break away, as their comrades in 
other places had broken away, a great danger would be 
constituted for Bihar itself, and possibly for Calcutta. 
Common sense urged that the first opportunity should be 
taken to disarm them. But common sense was a quality 
conspicuous by its absence among the Hallidays, the 
Beadons, and the Birches, who had the ear of Lord 
Canning. These men invented the policy of feigning 
confidence when confidence had been lost, and of de- 
clining to disarm men whom they knew to be rebels, lest 
they should instigate a premature rising. The terrible 
dangers which persistence in this policy — persistence in 
spite of warnings and remonstrances — led to will be re- 
corded in subsequent chapters. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE PROGRESS OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE 
NORTH-WEST IN MAY AND JUNE. 

The news of the insurrection at Mirath reached the station 
of Firuzpur on the 1 2th of May. Firuzpur lies immediately 
south of the river Satlaj, on the direct road from Dehli to 
Lahor. There were stationed the 6ist Foot, the 45th and 
57th Regiments N. I., the loth Native Light Cavalry, and 
about 150 European artillerymen. The Brigadier, Colonel 
Innes, had only arrived the day before, and had had no 
opportunity of testing the temper of the native troops. 
But on receiving, on the morning of the 12th, news of the 
Mirath catastrophe, he ordered a brigade parade, that he 
might judge for himself. The impression made by the 
demeanour of the infantry was not satisfactory, but the 
commandants of the three regiments reported favourably 
regarding the disposition of their men. 

That same afternoon information reached the Brigadier 
of the startling events at Dehli. He at once directed 
arrangements for relieving the sipahis of the 57th N. I. 
of the charge they had held of the magazine and arsenal. 
But his orders were either misunderstood or carelessly 
carried out, for the sipahis, though relieved by a company 
of the 6 1 stand some European gunners, were allowed to 
remain in the intrenched position in which the magazine 
was located. At five o'clock of the same day the Brigadier 
paraded the native troops, with the intention of marching 



lOO MtUiny at Firtizpur. 

them outside the cantonment. But as they approached 
the intrenchment they halted, despite the orders and 
entreaties of their officers, and endeavoured to escalade 
it. The sipahis who had been allowed to remain within 
threw to them scaling ladders, and about 300 of them 
succeeded in effecting an entrance. The company of the 
6 1st held them at bay until two other companies of that 
regiment arrived. The mutinied sipahis made a last 
desperate effort, and on the failure of that fled in con- 
fusion. The Brigadier, instead of pursuing them, allowed 
them to roam about for a time unmolested. Gaining courage 
from the supineness of the authorities, the sipahis then 
burned the church, the Roman Catholic chapel, the 6ist 
mess-house, two vacated hospitals, and several bungalows. 
The Brigadier, in sheer panic, then caused the regimental 
magazines of the two mutinous regiments to be blown up. 
Hardly had this been accomplished when information 
reached him that the men of the 45th were about to start 
for Dehli. Then, for the first time, he acted with vigour. 
With one party he disarmed the 57th N. L, whilst with 
another he pursued the 45 th, caught and dispersed them. 
The greater number of them, however, and some of the 
57lh, found their way to the revolted city. Few affairs 
were worse managed during the rebellion than the affair 
of Firuzpur. It almost matched the blundering at 
Mirath. 

At Aligarh the four companies of the native regiment 
stationed there, the 9th N. I., considered one of the best 
regiments of the Bengal army, mutinied on the 20th 
of May. The circumstances were somewhat peculiar. 
Aligarh lies on the grand trunk road eighty-two miles 
to the south-east of Dehli. Apparently the events of the 
loth and 12th of May, at Mirath and Dehli, had not 
shaken the loyalty of the sipahis* They continued re- 



Mittinies at Aligark and Bttlaiidshahr. loi 

spectful in their demeanour and assiduous in the perform- 
ance of their duties. But, on the 20th, a parade had been 
ordered to witness the infliction of the punishment of death 
on a man caught in the act of endeavouring to seduce the 
men from their allegiance. The man had been awarded 
this sentence by a court-martial composed entirely of 
native officers. It was carried out in the presence of the 
sipahis, on that eventful morning, without a murmur or 
sign of disapproval from them. But as they were march- 
ing from the ground there arrived a detachment of men 
of their own regiment, one of whom, on seeing the dangling 
corpse, exclaimed, pointing to it, ' Behold a martyr to our 
religion.' These few words were sufficient to light a flame 
which had lain repressed in the bosoms of the sipahis. 
They broke into open insurrection, and though they in- 
flicted no injury on their officers, they plundered the 
treasury, released the prisoners from the gaol, and went off 
bodily to Dehli. 

The detachments of the same regiment at Buland- 
shahr, forty miles from Aligarh ; at Ttawah, in the Agra 
Division, seventy-three miles from the city of that name ; 
at Mainpuri, seventy-one miles from the same place, 
followed the example of their comrades at headquarters. 
The outbreak at Bulandshahr was unaccompanied by vio- 
lence, though the men plundered the treasury ; that at 
Mainpuri was chiefly remarkable for the courage, coolness, 
and presence of mind displayed by the officer second in 
command of the sipahis, Lieutenant De Kantzow. 

Information of the revolt of the 20th at Aligarh had 
reached Mainpuri on the evening of the 22d. The 
magistrate, Mr Power, at once held a consultation with 
Mr Arthur Cocks, the Commissioner, as to the course to 
be pursued. It was resolved to despatch the ladies and 
children into Agra, and to march the sipahis to a village 



I02 Mtttiny at Mainpuri. 

some miles from the station. Early the following morn- 
ing the ladies and children were duly despatched on their 
journey, and reached Agra, unmolested, in due course. 

Meanwhile, the two officers of the 9th N. I., Crawford 
and De Kantzovv, were doing all they could to induce 
their men to march from the station. The sipahis, how- 
ever, steadily refused to budge one inch from the extreme 
end of the parade ground. Finally, they warned their 
officers that it was well for them to depart, and some of 
them even discharged their muskets. In the confusion 
that followed, the two officers got separated from one 
another. De Kantzow had dismounted, and Crawford, 
believing that he had been killed, rode back to warn the 
civilians of the mutiny of the men, and to announce his 
own intention to ride for Agra. 

Crawford found assembled Mr Cocks, above referred 
to, the elder Power, Dr Watson, and a missionary named 
Kellner. The younger Power, just returned from escorting 
the ladles on their first stage, joined them. After a brief 
consultation. Cocks and Crawford decided to make for 
Agra. The two Powers, Watson, Kellner, three sergeants 
of the Road and Canal departments, Mitchell, Scott, and 
Montgomery, and a clerk, Mr Glone, determined to remain. 
The cousin of the Raja of Mainpuri, Rao Bhowani Singh, 
with a small following, expressed his intention of standing 
by them. 

Meanwhile, De Kantzow, on foot, had been doing all 
he knew to stem the torrent of mutiny. He had. In turn, 
implored, upbraided, and menaced the turbulent sipahis, 
In vain did they level at him their loaded muskets, 
threatening to kill him ; still did he persevere. At length, 
casting off the last bonds of discipline, they rushed to- 
wards the treasury, carrying their officer with them. Just 
as they reached the building, De Kantzow dashed forward 



At Itdzvah. 103 

to its iron gates, and appealed to the civil guard on duty 
there, consisting of thirty men, to be true to their salt, 
and repel the unauthorised invasion. The men of the 
guard responded; they rallied round him. The gaol 
officials joined them, and, by their united resistance, the 
torrent of the attack was stemmed. 

More than that, it was stopped. Forbidding the men 
of the gaol guard to fire, De Kantzow drew them up facing 
the sipahis, and for three hours kept them at bay. At 
the end of that period the Bhowani Singh, above referred 
to, arrived on the spot, and induced the mutineers to retire. 
The only condition made by the baffled men was that 
Bhowani Singh should accompany them. He complied.^ 

At Itawah the scene was more tragic and more bloody. 
The force at this station, which lies nearly midway between 
Agra and Kanhpur, though somewhat nearer to the latter, 
was a company of the 9th N. I. The chief civil officers 
were Mr Allan Hume and Mr Daniell. On hearing of the 
events at Mirath these gentlemen sent patrolling parties 
to watch the roads, and to intercept, if possible, any stray 
mutineers. On the night of the i6th of May one of the 
patrolling parties brought in as prisoners, though without 
depriving them of their arms, seven troopers of the 3d 
Native Cavalry, a regiment which had mutinied. The 
patrols brought the prisoners to the quarter-guard of the 
9th N. I., in front of which was drawn up the company of 
that regiment, with its two officers at its head. Seeing the 
state of affairs, the seven troopers suddenly levelled their 
carabines and let fly at the two Englishmen. But the men 

^ On the news of this occiuTence reaching Calcutta, Lord Canning wrote 
to De Kantzow an autograph letter, from which the following is an extract :— 
' Young in years, and at the outset of your career, you have given to your 
brother soldiers a noble example of courage, patience, good judgment, and 
temper, from which many might profit.' 



104 Mutmy at Itdwah. 

of the 9th N. I. were staunch, and, replying vigorously, they 
killed five of the troopers. The two survivors escaped for 
the moment. 

Three days later the patrols attempted to lay hands 
upon and to disarm a larger body of troopers of the same 
regiment well supplied with fighting material. But in 
the struggle the men of the patrol were worsted. The 
rebels, then, probably fearing an attack in force, took up 
a position in a small Hindu temple, strong in itself, and 
stronger still in the approaches, which rendered assault 
difficult and dangerous. 

Information of tliis action having been brought to 
Messrs Hume and Daniell, they resolved, despite the fact 
that assault was almost impossible, and that the villagers 
had shown a disposition to aid the troopers, to venture on 
an attack with the men of their police. But in reply to 
the summons to follow them but one of that force obeyed. 
He was promptly killed ; Daniell was shot through the 
face. Hume, who was then left alone, forthwith retired, 
supporting Daniell to his carriage, and returned with him 
to Itawah. That night the troopers evacuated the temple. 
Four days later, the company of the 9th, which had 
remained quiet in the interval, suddenly mutinied, looted 
the treasury, released the prisoners from the gaol, and in- 
augurated a reign of terror. Fortunately timely warning 
had enabled the civilians to ensure the safety of the 
women and children. Two days later there was a change. 
A regiment of the Gwaliar contingent, the ist Grenadiers, 
which was to mutiny in its turn, arrived, and for the 
moment restored order. 

But these isolated mutinies, however deplorable in them- 
selves, counted for comparatively little so long as British 
authority remained supreme in the great station of Agra. 
Agra was a very important place. Not only was it the 



Agra. 105 

seat of the Government of the North-west Provinces, but, 
as a royal residence in the times of the early Mughals, it 
had great traditions, whilst its position, almost touching 
the territories of Gwaliar and of Rajputana, made it a gate 
the possession of which by the rebels would constitute an 
enormous peril to British interests. A great deal, then, de- 
pended on the /^rj-^;^;^^/ of the officials, civil and military. 

The Lieutenant-Governor was Mr John Colvin, a 
civilian trained in Bengal proper, but who had been 
private secretary to Lord Auckland during the troublous 
times of the first Afghan war. It is possible that in quiet 
times Mr Colvin might have gained a great reputation. 
He had a cultivated mind, and large intellectual faculties. 
But to guide the State vessel through a storm, to sway 
the minds of others in dangerous times, there was wanted 
a man with iron nerves, complete self-confidence, one who 
could impress his will alike on his friends and his foes. 
The Great Revolt of 1857 did bring to the front some 
men of that stamp — Havelock, Strathnairn, Nicholson, 
Hodgson, Roberts, Napier, and some others — but amongst 
them cannot be reckoned the amiable John Colvin. 

The troops stationed at Agra consisted of the 3d 
European Regiment, a battery of artillery (D'Oyley's), 
and the 44th and 67th Regiments N. I. The officer com- 
manding the brigade was Brigadier Polwhele. The 
station was very straggling. The troops were cantoned 
in the open ground between the fort and the civil lines. 
The fort is a handsome quadrangle of red sandstone, built 
by the illustrious Akbar. It was used as a magazine and 
general emporium. 

To the indications of ill-feeling and discontent given 
by the 19th and 34th N. I. in Bengal Mr Colvin had 
been as blind as the Government of India. Nor had 
the circulation of the chapatis, which had taken place 



io6 Agra. 

about the same time in Bundelkhand and elsewhere, 
caused him any serious apprehension. Amongst minds 
of a certain order there always is the conviction that, 
however disturbed the surface may be, matters, if only 
one remains quiet, will settle down of their own accord. 
That feeling strongly prevailed at Agra during the early 
months of 1857. 

The news of the mutiny at Mirath, on the night of the 
loth of May, followed by that of the easy occupation of 
Dehli, came to give the first shock to those notions. 
Never had men received a greater surprise. Nor was the 
surprise unmingled with apprehension. Dehli is but 115 
miles from Agra, and the first impression, based on infor- 
mation actually received, was to the effect that the rebels, 
after sacking Dehli, would march on Agra. Under the 
influence of this impression, it was resolved, at a meeting 
of the notables of the station summoned by Mr Colvin, 
to secure the fortress by a detachment of the 3d 
Europeans, to raise volunteers, horse and foot, and to 
hold a brigade parade the following morning, when the 
Lieutenant-Governor would address the troops. 

The parade was held on the morning of the 14th, and 
Mr Colvin did address the troops, English and natives. 
He told the former not to distrust their native comrades, 
but added : 'The rascals have killed a clergyman's daughter, 
and if you meet them in the field you will not forget this.' 
His address to the sipahis might have been spoken by 
any of Lord Canning's councillors. It breathed the same 
tone ; it expressed the confidence which was not felt. He 
told them that he trusted them. The demeanour of the 
sipdhis was eminently suggestive. ' Prompted by their 
officers to cheer,' wrote Judge Raikes, who was present 
' the sipahis set up a yell ; they looked, however, with 
a devilish scowl at us all.' 



Agra. 107 

Wisdom dictated the disarming then and there of the 
two sipahi regiments, but, alike at Calcutta and at Agra, 
'wisdom was crying in the streets.' In both places this 
policy was urged upon the Government by those who did 
not wield authority. In both places the Government, to 
the detriment of the country, and to the sacrifice of many 
valuable lives, preferred to act the farce of feigning a 
confidence which they did not feel. Noting the de- 
meanour of the sipahis on that 14th of May, the Chief 
Engineer of the Agra Division, Colonel Hugh Fraser, 
advised Mr Colvin to recognise the emergency, to distrust 
the native soldiery, and to move into the fort. But Mr 
Colvin had not at all realised the nature of the crisis. 
He believed he would be able to maintain order, and he 
reported to this effect to the Government in Calcutta. 

Far more astute was the native prince whose capital 
lay but sixty-six miles from Agra. I have said that the 
city of Agra almost touched the plains of the territory 
known as the dominions of Sindhia. The actual repre- 
sentative of that family, Maharaja Jaiaji Rao, possessed a 
vigorous intellect, and a thorough knowledge of his country- 
men. He had read much, conversed much, and thought 
much, and the conclusion at which he had arrived had 
satisfied him with the position which, as a protected prince, 
supreme in his own territories, he held under the overlord- 
ship of the British. Between him and them no discordant 
clash had arisen. During his career he never ceased to 
remember that it was to the statesmanlike moderation of 
a Governor-General of India, Lord EUenborough, that he 
was indebted for the complete inheritance of his immediate 
predecessor. During the visit to Calcutta, of which I have 
written in a previous chapter, this sagacious prince had 
noticed, with an accuracy never at fault, the signs of the 
times. He had observed the strong undercurrent of native 



io8 Afahdrdjd Sindhid. 

feeling working- against the British. The impressions con- 
ceived in Calcutta were more than confirmed after his 
return to Gwaliar, and he had informed the Governor- 
General's Agent at his Court that, in his opinion, the situ- 
ation was extremely perilous. The news of the events at 
Mirath and Dehli had driven fast into his mind these 
convictions, and he was satisfied that a very evil time was 
approaching for his overlord. 

Could his great predecessor, M^dhaji Rao, have risen 
from his grave, it is possible that, holding these convic- 
tions, he might have used all the resources at his disposal 
to drive home the blow which had been dealt at Dehli. 
But Jaiaji Rao had had far more personal experience of 
the English than had been granted to the greatest repre- 
sentative of his house. He knew, from his own dealings 
with them, that they were to be trusted implicitly. Under 
their suzerainty he enjoyed all the internal authority his 
ancestors had wielded, whilst his suzerain bound himself 
to assure him against aggression from without. For what 
compensating advantage was he to renounce this position? 
To place himself and the resources of his State at the dis- 
posal of mutinous soldiers or a puppet king? Who, too, 
was that puppet king? He was no other than the de- 
scendant of the Mughal sovereigns who had in vain tried to 
sudue the Marathas, and whom the Marathas had instead 
subdued. No ; there was no temptation to turn against 
those whom he had proved to support others whom he 
despised. Not for a moment did he hesitate. From the 
hour he heard of the events at Dehli he threw himself 
heart and soul into the cause of the British. 

Sindhia had in this very month warned the British 
Agent at his Court not only that the sipahi army was 
undermined to the core, but that the men of his own regi- 
ments, officered by British officers were not more to be 



Mr Colvin s Proclmnation, 109 

depended upon. When, therefore, after the famous parade 
at Agra, described in a previous page, Mr Colvin, believ- 
ing that the mutiny was a Muhammadan movement, in 
the repression of which those not imbued with the faith 
of Islam would aid, applied to the Maharaja Sindhia 
and to the Bhartpur regency for material assistance, 
that assistance was indeed immediately afforded by the 
despatch of native troops, alike from Gwaliar and 
Bhartpur. But, whilst responding to the call, Sindhia 
expressed to the British Agent his grave doubts as to the 
consequence of his compliance. 

The parade at Agra had been held on the morning of 
the 14th of May. On the 21st Mr Colvin heard of the 
mutiny at Aligarh, and two days later of the events at 
Bulandshahr, at Mainpuri, and at Itawah. They were 
serious events for Agra, as they severed direct communica- 
tions with the North-west, but they brought to the mind 
of the Lieutenant-Governor no solid conviction as to the 
cause of the general uprising. 

Still mistaking the signs of the times, still beating the 
air, still hoping that an appeal to the reasoning powers of 
the sipahis might induce them to reflect, Mr Colvin, at 
this period, issued a proclamation which, though well 
meant, was, to say the least, injudicious. The proclama- 
tion was based upon the possibility that the majority of 
the sipahis had been, and were being, misled by turbulent 
ringleaders. It therefore offered a frank and free pardon 
to all sipahis, irrespective of their offences. Naturally 
enough the proclamation produced no effect whatever, 
that is, it did not bring back a single penitent into the 
fold. But it had the result of convincing the sipahis and 
their leaders that they might continue their treasonable 
work with impunity. 

It is due to Lord Canning and his colleagues to add 



1 1 o The Sipdhis at Agra disarmed. 

that they disapproved of Mr Colvin's proclamation, and 
substituted another for it of their own composition. This, 
though dealing largely with offers of mercy, made ex- 
ceptions against men whose hands had been imbrued in 
blood. But this proclamation was as ineffective as that 
which it was intended to supersede. 

Mr Colvin's proclamation was issued on the 25th of May. 
Five days later three companies of sipdhis, constituting 
the garrison of Mathura, thirty miles to the north-west of 
Agra, mutinied, shot down one of their officers, wounded 
another, plundered the treasury, fired the houses of the 
English, released the prisoners from the gaol, and started 
off for Dehli. Their example was followed by the bulk of 
the troops sent to the aid of Mr Colvin from Bhartpur. 

This outrage, known the same evening at Agra, roused 
Mr Colvin to striking point. He directed the Brigadier to 
hold a parade the following morning to disarm the native 
troops. The parade was held (May 31), and in the pre- 
sence of a battery of European artillery and the 3d Euro- 
pean regiment, the sipahis of the 44th and 67th N. I. 
were directed to pile their arms. There was a moment 
of hesitation followed by sullen obedience. On examin- 
ing the muskets afterwards many were found loaded with 
ball. The disarming of these regiments was followed 
by a resolution, promptly carried out, to raise volunteers, 
horse and foot, from the planters, clerks, traders, merchants, 
and others in the district. 

Still the situation, though less immediately dangerous, 
did not improve. The risings in the vicinity had left Agra 
isolated. The power of taking an initiative had passed 
from Mr Colvin. It was for him now to await the action 
of the rebels. This, too, when he was to a great extent 
ignorant of the events passing around him. Nor was this 
all. The reports from Major Charters Macpherson, the 



The Gwdlidr Rising, 1 1 1 

British Agent at Sindhia's Court, left no doubt upon his 
mind that the sipahis of the Gwaliar contingent nnight 
break out at any moment. Any insurrection in that 
quarter must be full of danger for Agra. 

The Gwaliar contingent was composed of four field- 
batteries — one of which, under Captain Pearson, had 
been sent to Agra — a small siege-train, two regiments 
of cavalry, and seven of infantry, aggregating 8318 
men. Some of these were absent on command, but 
the bulk was at Gwaliar. 

On the night of the 14th of June the whole of these 
men broke out into insurrection. They rushed from their 
lines in tumultuous disorder, murdering every European 
they met. Seven British officers, one lady, wife of one 
of the officers, an English nurse, the wife of a warrant 
officer, three children, and six sergeants and pensioners, 
fell victims to their fury. The remainder escaped to 
Agra. They reached that place in driblets, and were 
kindl}^ received. Mr Colvin, however, still maintained his 
position in the plains ; nor was it until quite the end of 
the month that the pressure of circumstances compelled 
him to give the order to take refuge within the fort. 
There we must leave him whilst we turn to notice the 
action of the Commander-in-Chief 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE MARCH TO DEHLI. 

The Commander-in-Chief in India, General George Anson, 
though he had had but a slight experience of the Bengal 
sipahi, possessed in an eminent degree the gift of common 
sense. If he did not penetrate the mysteries which baffled 
men who had been trained in India, and who had spent 
their lives with the sipahis, no blame can on that account 
attach to him. He was conscientious, painstaking, self- 
sacrificing, and gave to the work which had been entrusted 
to him all his time and all his capacity. In intellectual 
ability he towered above the men who surrounded him. 

The summer headquarters of the army were at the 
pleasant hill-station of Simla. Thither General Anson 
was progressing in the third month of 1857, inspecting 
troops and stations as he marched. Early in that month 
he had reached Ambalah, fifty-five miles north of Karnal, 
and thirty-seven from Kalka, immediately at the foot of 
the Himalayan range. At Ambalah was one of the 
depots of instruction in the use of the new rifle. Now, 
although no greased cartridges had been served out to 
the men, the instructors in the new drill had noticed 
a general feeling of alarm and suspicion pervading their 
minds, not only as to the nature of the grease, but as to 
the materials of which the ungreased paper wrapped 
round the cartridges was composed. The matter came 
to the knowledge of General Anson. A circumstance, 



Genei'al Anson and the Cartridges. 1 1 3 

slight in itself, convinced him that the suspicions of the 
men, unless removed, might lead to great danger. Ac- 
cordingly, on the 23d of the month, he inspected the 
instruction depot, and after the inspection he sum- 
moned round him the native officers, and, assisted by 
the instructor, Lieutenant Martineau, an officer of great 
intelligence, who spoke the language like a native, and 
who translated to the native officers each sentence of the 
Commander-in-Chief as it was uttered, addressed them 
frankly and sensibly on the subject of the new rifle. He 
told them that great improvements had been made of 
recent years in the manufacture of small-arms, and that 
it was with the view of placing in the hands of the sipdhi 
a superior weapon that detachments from several regi- 
ments had been sent to Ambalah for instruction ; that the 
improved weapon required improved cartridges ; that it 
was madness to suppose that the British Government, 
which had no designs whatever on the religion of the 
people, should take advantage of the improvement of 
the cartridge to endeavour to subvert their caste by a 
fraud ; that the Government of India would never coun- 
tenance any scheme which would coerce the Hindu or the 
Muhammadan in the matter of religion. In the case 
before him, neither caste nor religion was involved ; but 
another thing was, and that was discipline. That disci- 
pline he was resolved to maintain, and he trusted that the 
native officers present would exert themselves to allay the 
fears of their men, would caution them not to give credit 
to the insinuations of designing persons, and would thus 
avert the shame which would overwhelm those who should 
prove false to their colours and faithless to the oaths they 
had taken to the Government. 

It was a new thing in the history of the Bengal army 
to see the Commander-in-Chief condescending to explain 

li 



1 14 General Anson and the Cartridges. 

the action of the Government, and the reasons for that 
action, to a large number of regimental native officers. 
That the native officers present were touched by General 
Anson's act cannot be doubted. They listened respect- 
fully, and, when the meeting was over, they expressed to 
Martineau their high sense of the goodness of the 
Commander-in-Chief, and of the honour he had done 
them. ' But,' they added, ' it is not a mere question to us 
of obedience or disobedience. The story has been so 
generally circulated, and is so generally believed, not only 
by the sipahis but by their relations and by villagers all 
over the country, that the sipahis cannot use the cart- 
ridges without incurring the certainty of social degrada- 
tion, the consequence of their loss of caste.' They begged 
Martineau to represent this fact to the Commander-in- 
Chief. Martineau did so, and General Anson, who re- 
cognised more plainly than anyone about him the dangers 
staring him in the face, suspended the issue of the new 
cartridges until a special report should have been prepared 
of the composition of the paper with which they were 
wrapped. 

The secret agents of the vast conspiracy hatched by 
the Maulavi of Faizabad and his associates had by this 
time done their work so thoroughly, had roused to a 
pitch of pent-up madness of which an oriental people 
are alone capable, the feelings of the sipahis and the 
population of the North-western Provinces generally, that 
it is improbable that, if the Government had even gone 
the length of withdrawing absolutely the new musket, and 
the new cartridge with it, the plague would have been 
stayed. The attempt of General Anson in that direction 
was undoubtedly the best thing to be done. But, un- 
happily, his scheme was not given a chance. Lord 
Canning and his advisers wrote to say that they would 



Reasons of his Failtire. 115 

regard any postponement of the target practice at the 
drill depots as a concession to unreasonable fears. No 
violation of caste would be caused by the use of the cart- 
ridges, therefore the drill must be persisted in. The main 
offence of the 19th N. I. had been the refusal to take the 
cartridges. For that they had been punished, and it 
would be inconsistent with discipline to go back on the 
resolution then taken. Despite, then, the consequences 
clearly shadowed forth by the assembled native officers to 
Martineau, the drill instruction was continued. 

In due time General Anson continued his journey to 
Simla. He was there when the report reached him of the 
behaviour of the eighty-five troopers of the 3d N. L. C. at 
Mi'rath, already described. The Commander-in-Chief con- 
sidered their offence so serious that he directed they 
should be brought to trial before a court composed of 
their own countrymen. How they were tried, how con- 
demned, how lodged in confinement, has been already 
told. It has been told, also, how the vindication of dis- 
cipline led immediately to the revolt of Mirath and the 
uprising of Dehli. 

The news of this double catastrophe reached General 
Anson in a bleared and imperfect form on the afternoon of 
the 1 2th. His clear and practical mind recognised that 
im^mediate action was necessary. He had three English 
regiments near him, on three different spurs of the Hima- 
layas. To that on the spur nearest to the plains, the 
75th Foot, at Kasauli, he sent orders to march immediately 
for Ambalah. To the two others, the ist Fusiliers and 
the 2d Europeans, at Dagshai and Sabathu respectively, 
he transmitted orders to hold themselves in readiness to 
march at a moment's notice. Simultaneously he sent 
expresses to desire that the fort at Firuzpur should be 
secured by the 6ist, and that at Govindgarh by the 8ist, 



1 1 6 Difficulties of Genei^al Anson. 

and to order two companies of the 8th Foot, from Jaland- 
har, to secure Philaur on the Satlaj. Bethinking then of the 
other means available to him, he ordered a Gurkha regi- 
ment, known as the Nasi'ri battalion, stationed close to 
Simla, to march, with a detachment of the 9th Irregular 
Cavalry, to that important point (Philaur), in order to 
escort thence the siege-train which, he recognised at a 
glance, would be necessary for the operations he contem- 
plated against Dehli. On the afternoon of the 14th he 
started for Ambalah himself, and reached it early the 
following morning. He, at least, had lost no time. 

But it was there that his difficulties commenced. He 
found the sipahis of the native regiments there ready to 
break out in revolt. With the English force at his dis- 
posal he could easily have disarmed them, and that course 
was pressed upon him by Sir John Lawrence. It seemed 
so natural that he should do so. He could not take 
mutinous regiments with him. Still less could he leave 
them at Ambalah, unwatched, to perpetrate untold mis- 
chief in his rear. But General Anson was conscious that 
his own local experience was limited whilst he was sur- 
rounded by men who professed to understand the natives 
amongst whom their lives had been spent. These men 
protested that the disbanding of the sipahis would be 
regarded as a breach of faith. The argument was absurd, 
but it was accepted. 

Another misfortune came at this moment to render 
the situation more involved. The Gurkhas of the Nasiri 
battalion, when ordered to march to Philaur, refused 
point-blank, and made as though they would plunder 
Simla. The residents there were terribly frightened, and 
some of those who should have given an example of 
courage and daring betrayed a strong capacity for leading 
the way in pusillanimous flight. The fears, fortunately, 



Difficulties of General Anson. 1 1 7 

proved unfounded. The Gurkhas of the Nasiri battaHon 
were quickly satisfied, returned to their duty, and marched 
gaily for Philaur. 

Meanwhile, at Ambalah, General Anson began to 
realise every day more keenly that the means at his hand 
for the recapture of a strong fortress, garrisoned by a 
superior number of disciplined troops, were very insuffi- 
cient Not only were his European troops i^\M in numbers, 
but the several war departments — the Commissariat, the 
Medical, the Transport, the Ordnance, and Ammunition 
— taken by surprise, were unprepared for a prompt move- 
ment. On the 1 8th of May the men had no tents, but 
twenty rounds apiece of ammunition, no artillery reserve 
ammunition, no transport.^ Under these circumstances. 
General Anson doubted whether it would be prudent with 
his small means to risk an attack on Dehli. He wrote in 
this sense to Sir John Lawrence, expressing not only his 
own opinion but that of the chief officers of his staff. 
The Commissary-General, he added, declared his inability 
to provide the wherewithal for such a march under from 
sixteen to twenty days. These views, backed as they 
were by the highest military authorities on the spot, 
found no acceptance either with Sir John Lawrence, with 
Lord Canning, or with the self-constituted critics in other 
parts of India. The idea widely prevailed that, because 
Dehli had never, in the history of India, offered a serious 
resistance to an armed force, it would not and could not 
do so now. There Avas absolutely no reason for this 
argument beyond that suggested by the notion that that 
which had happened before must always happen again. 
There was, I have already mentioned, a very indistinct 
idea in military circles as to the defensive power of the 
Imperial city. Everyone knew that it was encompassed 

^ Letter from General Barnard, dated Ambalah, May i8, 1857. 



1 1 8 Should Dehli be attacked ? 

by walls. But, it was argued, with the superficiality which 
was one of the signs of the times, that siege-guns were 
cast in order that they might batter down walls. The 
man would have been laughed at who should have asserted 
that Dehli was as strong as Bhartpur had been. It was 
expected, alike in Calcutta and in the Panjab, that General 
Anson had but to appear with his British force before 
Dehli to induce the rebels to surrender the city.^ I write 
with the most absolute certainty when I state that this 
was the main reason which incited alike Lord Canning 
and Sir John Lawrence to urge the advance with a force 
they knew to be insufficient for a great enterprise. I am 
confident that if the givers of that advice had realised the 
strength of Dehli, and its splendid capabilities of resist- 
ance, they would have urged the advance, if they had 
urged it at all, in language betokening far less confidence. 
Undoubtedly they felt, and felt most keenly, the enor- 
mous issues at stake. Sir John Lawrence did not attempt 
to conceal his conviction that the maintenance of order in 
the Punjab depended on the prompt reduction of Dehli. 
Lord Canning knew that the safety of the long and weak 
middle piece between Allahabad and Mirath would be 
enormously affected by the retention by the rebels of a 
place possessing such a history and such prestige. Yet, 
keenly anxious as they wxre to strike the decisive blow 
at the decisive point, I doubt much whether they would 
have employed the language, almost of remonstrance, 
which characterised their letters to General Anson if they 
had imbibed anything like a correct idea of his difficulties, 
and of the still greater resistance which was awaiting his 
troops at their destination. 

1 Sir John Lawrence wrote (May 21): 'My belief is that, with good 
management on the part of the civil officers, it' (Dehli) 'would open its gates 
on the approach of our troops.' 



General Anson resolves to attack. 119 

Goaded by the tone and matter^ of the letters he re- 
ceived, General Anson prepared to march. For the task 
before him his force was singularly inadequate. It con- 
sisted of the 9th Lancers, the 75th Foot, the ist and 
2d European Regiments, two troops of horse-artillery, 
and a native regiment, the 60th N. I. These troops were 
at Ambalah. At Baghpat, one march from Dehli, they 
would be joined, if the General's orders were carried out, 
by the Mirath brigade, composed of two squadrons of the 
Carabineers, awing of the 60th Rifles, one light field-battery, 
one troop of H. A., and some sappers. At the same place, 
where he expected to arrive on the 5th of June, General 
Anson hoped to be joined by a small siege-train from 
Lodiana. It was a great advantage to him that at this 
critical period the Cis-Satlaj chiefs and the Nuwab of 
Karnal decided to cast in their lot with the British. The 
assistance they afforded in keeping open the communi- 
cations and in influencing the populations of the several 
districts cannot be over-estimated. 

Providence did not permit General Anson to witness 
the triumph of the measures he had organised with so 
much diligence, so much forethought, and so much ability. 

^ For instance, such words as these from Sir John Lawrence : ' Pray 
only reflect on the whole history of India. Where have we failed when we 
have acted vigorously? Where have we succeeded when guided by timid 
counsels?' Lord Canning wrote him that everything depended 'upon 
speedily disposing of Dehli, and making a terrible example.' To the letter 
from which I have quoted he added a paragraph which showed how incom- 
pletely he and his advisers had, at this period, grasped the situation : ' Your 
force of artillery will enable you to dispose of Dehli with certainty. I there- 
fore beg that you will detach one European infantry regiment and a small 
force of European cavalry to the south of Dehli, without keeping them for 
operations there, so that Aligarh may be recovered and Kanhpur relieved 
immediately.' This request to a Commander-in-Chief whose troops were 
already too few, and who had before him the hardest task ever allotted 
to a British commander in Lidia ! 



1 20 Death of General Anson, 

He waited at Ambalah until he had despatched all but 
the very last of his troops, and with these, on the 25th of 
May, he set out for Karnal. Shortly after his arrival there, 
on the 26th, he was attacked by cholera, and a little after 
midnight succumbed to that terrible disease. He was 
succeeded by Sir Henry Barnard, who arrived just in time 
to be recognised by his dying chief General Anson's 
death was a great loss to the army. Those who least 
cared for him have admitted that ' he was a brave soldier 
and an honest gentleman.' He was that, and much more. 
Those who knew him best were convinced that had he 
lived through the Mutiny he would have gained a splendid 
reputation. 

Sir Henry Barnard was a worthy successor in com- 
mand of the advancing force to General Anson. He, like 
his late chief, had felt bitterly the criticisms and the carp- 
ings levelled against the military plans by ignorant and 
uninstructed outsiders. But, imbued with the conviction 
that if a thing is to be done at all it must be done 
thoroughly, Barnard threw all his energies into the work 
which had devolved upon him. ' So long as I exercise 
any power,' he wrote to Sir John Lawrence, on the 26th, 
' you may rest assured that every energy shall be devoted 
to the objects I have now in view, viz., concentrating all 
the force I can collect at Dehli, securing the bridge at 
Baghpat, and securing our communications with Mirath.' 
Determining not to wait for the siege-train, he set out 
from Karnal, on the morning of the 27th, and reached 
Alipur, twelve miles from Dehli, on the 6th of June. 
There I must leave him for a moment to look after the 
force which was to join him from Mirath. 

The authorities at Mirath had taken some time to 
recover from the effects of the horrors of the night of the 
loth of May. The country seemed to be surging around 



Mirath, and its Districts. 1 2 1 

them. The scum of the population had risen in the vil- 
lages, the gaols had disgorged their prisoners, and, gener- 
ally, except on the actual spot still occupied by Europeans 
in Mirath itself, order had everywhere disappeared. In 
the cantonment and the civil lines martial law had been 
proclaimed. But a deep despondency had crept over all 
minds — a despondency augmented by the news of the suc- 
cess of the rebels in Dehli, and of outrages from outlying 
stations. There had been risings at Rurki, sixty miles from 
Mirath, the headquarters of the engineering science of the 
country, at Saharanpur, and at Muzaffarnagar. There were 
murmurings, to break a little later into open mutiny, in 
the several stations of Rohilkhand. It is true that the 
energy and firmness of Baird-Smith, a man whose name 
will for ever be connected with the fall of Dehli, saved 
Rurki ; and that the strong character and devotion of 
Robert Spankie and Dundas Robertson maintained order 
in Saharanpur. But the alarm created by the attempts at 
rising there and elsewhere tended greatly to depress those 
at Mirath, who apparently had been thoroughly unnerved 
by the terrible night of the loth of May. 

Nothing created so much surprise throughout India as 
the inaction of the troops at Mirath during the days which 
succeeded that night. Two splendid English regiments, 
supported by two batteries of artillery, might surely, it was 
argued, do something in the district. Those in authority 
elsewhere, who argued thus, waited in vain for the develop- 
ment of the action they were impatiently expecting. At 
last Mr Colvin, who, from his post at Agra, the importance 
of which I have pointed out, had the best reason in the 
world to dread the consequences of inaction, noting its 
continuance, addressed Brigadier Wilson, passing over his 
senior officer. General Hewitt, and begged him, at the very 
least, to keep open the main road, so as to prevent the 



122 The Miratk Brigade moves, 

combinations of revolted troops pushing for Dehli. But 
not from Wilson even did Mr Colvin receive the answers 
he hoped for. 'The only plan/ replied that officer, 'is to 
concentrate our forces and attack DehliV 

That was all very well and very true. But, in his 
general contention, Mr Colvin was right and Brigadier 
Wilson was wrong. The force might have been kept 
concentrated to join General Anson and yet have shown 
itself in the district. Because it did not show itself, the 
idea began to prevail in the villages round about that all 
the English had perished on the night of the loth of May. 
Much looting and much bloodshed occurred in conse- 
quence. It was in repressing one of the outbreaks caused 
by this belief that a promising civil officer, Mr Johnston, 
lost his life. 

At length orders arrived from the Commander-in-Chief 
that the brigade should take the field and join the force 
marching from Ambalah at Baghpat. It set out on the 
27th of May. It consisted of two squadrons of the 
carabineers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, Tombs's troop of 
horse-artillery, Scott's light fiield battery, two eighteen- 
pounder guns, manned by Europeans, some sappers and 
irregular horse (natives). Three days' marching brought 
the force to the town of Ghazi-ud-din Nagar, about a mile 
from the left bank of the little river Hindan. Partly on the 
opposite bank, and partly in the bed of that river, then a 
fordable rivulet, abounding in quicksands and spanned by 
a suspension bridge, they beheld a considerable body of 
the mutinied sipahis, well equipped, their guns occupying a 
strong position to the right of the bridge, commanding the 
advance. The English had to march along a causeway 
exposed to the enemy's fire. This opened at once, but 
it was almost immediately replied to by the eighteen- 
pounders and by Scott's field-battery. Under cover 



Combats on the Hindan, i 2 



v) 



of this fire the rifles advanced, and soon came in 
contact with the enemy in the bed of the rivulet. The 
sipahis fought well, and the contest was fiercely contested, 
when the carabineers, making their way across the stream, 
turned the enemy's left. This was the decisive moment. 
Pressed in front by the 60th, and mauled in their left 
flank by the carabineers, the rebels gave way, and fell 
back on a walled village. The 60th, however, followed 
them close, and expelling them from this position, forced 
them to flight along the Dehli road. The sipahis lost 
many men, and left in the hands of the victors five of 
their guns. The British loss, though small in itself, was 
large in proportion to the numbers engaged. The intense 
heat prevented the following up of the victory. 

Never was more clearly illustrated the truth of the 
axiom that a victory not followed up is but half a victory. 
Undaunted by their defeat, and possibly stimulated by the 
taunts of their comrades, the sipahis returned the next 
day to the battle ground. Taking up about midday a 
position on a ridge to the right of the Hindan, they opened 
fire from their guns on Wilson's force. The English guns 
replied, and for two hours ensued a fierce artillery combat. 
At the end of that period, Wilson, noticing that the fire 
of the rebels was slackening, ordered a general advance. 
The sipahis did not await it. Discharging into the ad- 
vancing columns of the English a shower of grape-shot, 
they limbered up and fell back in orderly array. The 
intense heat, and the parching thirst suffered by the 
English, prevented any pursuit. The English were much 
exhausted, and there were some cases of sunstroke. But 
great satisfaction prevailed in the camp from the fact that 
the Mirath brigade, which had been the first to suffer from 
the treachery of the sipahis, had been the first to retaliate. 

The next day (June i) the camp was cheered by 



I 24 Junction of the Force near Dehli. 

the arrival of the 2nd Gurkhas, 500 strong, commanded 
by an officer who was to occupy a prominent position 
during the siege, Major Charles Reid. The brigade, 
after its two engagements, had halted for orders. These 
were received on the 4th. In pursuance of these, Wilson 
marched, on the 6th, to Baghpat. The day following he 
effected the desired junction at Ali'pur. There also had 
arrived the siege-train from Philaur, after having under- 
gone some dangers from the contemplated treachery of 
the mutinous sipahis of the 3d and 5th N. I. 

The junction of all the then available forces had been 
effected on the morning of the 7th of June. There was now, 
therefore, no excuse for delaying to carry out the policy 
insisted upon by Lord Canning and of Sir John Lawrence, 
that of marching straight into Dehli. The one had ex- 
pressed his opinion that the artillery with the force was 
sufficient to deal with the place ; the other that, on the 
approach of the English troops, the city would open its 
gates. These theories were now put to the test. Early 
on the morning of the 8th of June (one o'clock) General 
Barnard gave the order to advance from Alipur. The 
scouts had reported that the rebels had taken a strong 
position at Badli-ki-Sarai, six miles to the north of Dehli, 
a place where groups of old houses and walled gardens, 
once the country residences of nobles of the Imperial 
Court, supplied positions capable of prolonged defence. 
Day was just dawning when Barnard came in sight of 
this position. As far as he was able to judge, the salient 
points were strongly armed with guns. To test their 
strength he sent to the. front four heavy guns, a troop of 
horse-artillery, part of a battery of field-artillery, and 
directed them to open fire. A few rounds disclosed the 
fact that the enemy's guns, which had promptly returned 
the fire, were of heavier calibre than those Barnard had 



Battle of Badli-ki-Sardi. 125 

sent to the front. The British gunners began to drop, 
and it seemed doubtful whether they would be able to 
hold their own. There was but one remedy for this 
— a remedy which has never failed against Asiatics. 
Barnard tried it. He sent the 75th deployed, and sup- 
ported by the 2d Europeans, to charge the rebels' guns. 
The charge was splendid, but the rebels displayed a stern 
resolution, clinging to their guns and giving back thrust 
for thrust. There was no flinching, and there was no cry 
for quarter. 

Whilst the 75th and the 2d Europeans were struggling 
bravely for the guns, the second brigade, led by Brigadier 
Graves, attacked the enemy's left, whilst, a minute later, 
Hope Grant, with the cavalry and the horse-artillery, 
appeared on their rear. The movement of Hope Grant 
was decisive. The front defence collapsed almost imme- 
diately, and the rebels fell back. At first it seemed as 
though their retreat would be orderly, but the lancers 
and the horse-artillery took care that this should not be 
so. Making charge after charge, despite of water^ courses 
and other obstacles, and firing round after round, they 
compelled the beaten enemy to loose his hold on his guns 
and his camp equipage, and to retire, baffled and humiliated 
within the walls of the city. Barnard, with consummate 
judgment, pushed on ; then having completed the rout 
of the enemy, he turned to the ridge overlooking Dehh' 
drove thence the rebels posted there, and encamped in the 
position whence he could best direct his attacks on the 
proud city, which, in spite of his appearance before it, 
still defied his arms. He and his men had done good 
work on that eventful day. He had driven the enemy 
within the walls, with a loss to them of about 350 men 
twenty-six guns, and some serviceable ammunition. He 
had gained and firmly occupied the finest base of opera- 



I 26 Barnard seizes the Ridge. 

tions against the city, a position open in the rear to the 
reinforcements which he hoped to receive, whilst com- 
manding the plain right up to the walls. What was, 
perhaps, of scarcely less importance, he had distinctly an- 
nounced to the rebels throughout India, avowed and 
concealed, the plain issue between themselves and the 
British. From this time forth there was no possibility of 
doubt. The fate of Dehli would decide the fate of India. 

Barnard had not accomplished his end without loss. 
The killed and wounded amounted to 137. Amongst the 
former was the Adjutant-General of the army, Colonel 
Chester, shot down at the commencement of the action. 
His death was a loss to the gallant soldier, who, fresh from 
his service in the Crimea, had, without much Indian ex- 
perience, assumed the command of the besieging army at 
a moment's notice. 

The day following the Corps of Guides, a regiment 
composed of cavalry and infantry, stationed normally at 
Hoti-Mardan, on the Panjab frontier, arrived in camp, led 
by its commandant, Colonel Henry Daly. Soon after its 
arrival it was despatched to the front to drive back parties 
of horse and foot which had sallied from Dehli to attack 
the advanced posts of the British. In the engagement 
which followed the Guides carried all before them. They 
had, however, the misfortune to lose their acting second- 
in-command. Lieutenant Quintin Battye, an officer of 
great promise and of far-reaching popularity. Mortally 
wounded by a bullet through the body, he murmured to 
the chaplain who tended him, and who had warned him 
that but a very brief span of hfe yet remained to him : 
' Didce et decorum est pro pair id mori' A few minutes 
later he died. 

Leaving the besiegers on the ridge they had so gallantly 
won, I propose, before returning to Calcutta, to take a 



The G tildes arrive. 127 

glance at Kdnhpur and Lakhnao. I shall then visit Jhansi 
and Bundelkhand, and then devote separate chapters to the 
complete story of the places which bore the brunt of the 
early conflict. These, in the Bengal Presidency, were Bihar, 
Kdnhpur, Oudh, Agra, and Dehlf. Western, Southern, 
and Central India will likewise demand a large share of 
the attention of the reader. 



CHAPTER X. 

KANHPUR, LAKHNAO, AND ALT.AHABAD. 

KaNHPUR was the centre station in that weak middle 
piece of which I have written as causing so much anxiety 
to Lord Canning. It Hes on the right bank of the river 
Ganges, 270 miles south-east from Dehh', and 120 above 
the confluence of the Jamnah and Ganges at AUahabdd. 
From Calcutta it is distant by rail 684 miles, somewhat more 
by the river route. The station is long and straggling, the 
houses having been erected more with the view to secure 
pleasant and healthy situations than for military defence. 

In 1857 the garrison of Kanhpur consisted of the ist, the 
53d, and the 56th Regiments N. L, the 2d Native Light 
Cavalry, and sixty-one English artillerymen, with six guns 
— five nine-pounders, and a twenty-four-pounder howitzer. 
The station also sheltered the families of the 32d Foot, 
then stationed at Lakhnao. Kanhpur was the head- 
quarters of a division. The general commanding was Sir 
Hugh Massey Wheeler, an officer of the highest character 
as a soldier. He had spent fifty-four years in India, had 
served with the sipahis, under Lord Lake, in the Maratha 
wars, in Afghanistan, and in the wars against the Sikhs. 
He was very much esteemed, and it was thought that if 
any man could unravel the mysteries which shrouded 
the early events of 1857 that man would be Sir Hugh 
Wheeler. 

Sir Hugh had watched, with the deepest anxiety, the 



Sir Httgh Wheeler at Kdnhpttr. 129 

early development of the action of the sipahis. It is due 
to his memory to record that he had taken a far more 
serious view of it than that which had commended itself 
to the advisers of Lord Canning. In his eyes it was ' no 
passing and groundless panic/ but a deliberate scheme for 
the overthrow of the British power. He did not know, he 
had no reason to suspect, that the principal conspirator 
was within a few miles of him. The outward demeanour 
of the Nana Sahib was never more suave than it was just 
before the outbreak. He was the adviser, and the trusted 
adviser, of the civil authorities. 

Confident that the native army was infected from the 
crown of its head to the soles of its feet. Sir Hugh, look- 
ing round at the straggling station in which he com- 
manded, recognising the utter impossibility of organising 
a plan of general defence, resolved to select, partially to 
fortify and store with provisions, one spot in the station, 
which should be a rallying point, when the danger signal 
should sound, for all the English and Eurasians, men, 
women, and children, and which he might be able to 
defend until succour should arrive. The idea showed 
prescience and courage. It was the same idea which at 
the same time occurred to, and was acted upon, by the 
sagacious Mr Boyle at Arah, by Sir Henry Lawrence at 
Lakhnao. 

His great difficulty was to select a suitable position. 
The station, I have said, was straggling, covering, as far 
as the magazine at its further end, that is, the end nearer 
to Dehli, a length of seven miles. The cantonment was 
open, and possessed no kind of fortification. It was 
separated by the Ganges from Oudh, and Sir Hugh 
Wheeler was too experienced in the modes of thought 
of the natives not to be absolutely certain that in the 
men of Oudh the English would find their most per- 

I 



130 The Defensive Position at Kdnhpttr. 

sistent enemy. He had to choose a spot the situation of 
whicli should lend itself easily to succour from the side of 
Allahabad. From that direction alone was succour to be 
expected. In a military sense, then, it was doubly advis- 
able to select a locality the approaches to which from 
the Allahdbad side should be easy. Such a locality 
seemed to be at hand. In the centre of a large plain, with 
a tolerably clear space all round them, were two barracks, 
formerly used as the hospitals of the European regiment, 
but at the moment unoccupied. The locality was about 
the best he could have chosen. He has been blamed since 
alike for not choosing the magazine and for not choos- 
ing a place of refuge immediately on the river. But the 
magazine was an impossible locality. It was seven miles 
distant, and to reach it one had to traverse the lines of 
sipahis and the native town. A barrack or large house 
on the river bank would undoubtedly have been the best 
place of refuge had any such of sufficient size existed, but 
there was none. The position chosen fulfilled some neces- 
sary conditions. It lent itself to aid from Allahabad. The 
space around it was tolerably clear, the only drawback 
being that on its left front, at a distance of about 400 
yards, was a row of unfinished barracks then in course 
of construction. These might be used either by the de- 
fenders as an outwork, or by the rebels as a substantial 
place of cover, for their attacking parties. 

It is further due to the memory of Sir Hugh Wheeler 
to add that no one then anticipated that the sipahis, if 
they should mutiny, would endeavour to slaughter the 
Europeans. After the events of the loth and 12th of 
May, at Mirath and Dehli, the cry amongst the sipahis 
had been to march to the centre point, to the ancient 
capital of the Mughals. By attacking the position on the 
plain they could gain neither loot nor glory. Such an 



Mr mile rs don and JVdnd Sahib . 1 3 1 

attack, by chaining them to the spot, might ultimately 
involve their own destruction. I shall have to relate that, 
so far as the sipahis were concerned, this reasoning was 
justified to the letter. No one dreamt at that time that 
the smiling and obsequious prince, who was wont to drive 
in from Bithor to aid the civil authorities with his advice, 
would possess the influence and the inclination to turn the 
fury of the revolted sipahis against the wives and children 
of the officers they had followed in many a hard-fought 
field. 

Sir Hugh Wheeler made the selection I have spoken 
of the very day that the sad story of the revolt at Mirath 
reached him. From that date there reigned in his mind 
the conviction that a rising at Kanhpur might take place 
at any moment. He pushed on, therefore, the fortifying 
and victualling of the two barracks with as much speed 
as possible. The fortifications were to consist of earth- 
works. But the rains had not fallen ; the soil of the 
plain was baked almost to the consistency of iron, and 
the progress was consequently slow. Whilst pushing on 
these works, Sir Hugh communicated freely with the civil 
authorities at the station, with Sir Henry Lawrence at 
Lakhnao, and with the Government at Calcutta. 

The Collector of Revenue at Kanhpur was Mr Hillers- 
don. Between this gentleman and Nana Sahib there had 
been considerable official intercourse, and the Englishman 
had been pleased by the friendly and courteous manner and 
conversation of the Asiatic. When the news of the Mirath 
outbreak reached Kanhpur, the Asiatic showed his further 
friendliness by advising Hillersdon to send his wife and 
family to Bithor, where, he assured him, they would be 
safe against any possible outburst on the part of the 
sipahis. Hillersdon declined for the moment, but when, 
a little later, the Nand offered to organise 1500 men to 



132 Critical Position of Wheeler. 

act against the sipahis if they should rise, Hillersdon con- 
sidered that the proposal was one to be accepted. To 
a certain extent it was acted upon. 

I have said that Wheeler, feeling that the storm might 
burst any moment, pushed on with all his energy the pre- 
paration of the barracks. His spies told him that every 
night meetings of an insurrectionary character were taking 
place in the lines of the 2d N. L. C. and of the ist N. I. 
In ordinary times these meetings would have been stopped 
with a high hand ; but the example of Mirath had shown 
that, even with a strong force at the disposal of the 
General, high-handed dealing was sure to precipitate 
mutinous action, and Wheeler had but sixty-one men 
to depend upon. On the 21st he received information 
that the 2d N. L. C. would rise that night. He accord- 
ingly moved all the women and children into the intrench- 
ment, and attempted to have the contents of the treasury 
conveyed thither ; but the sipahis would not part with 
the money. Then it was that the General, much against 
the grain, availed himself of the offer made by the Nana 
to Mr Hillersdon, and agreed that 200 of the Bithor 
chief's men should be posted at Nuwabganj, guarding the 
treasury and the magazine. 

The next day Wheeler was cheered by the arrival of 
eighty-four men and two officers of the 32d, sent to him 
in his dire strait by Sir Henry Lawrence. The week 
that followed was a particularly trying one. The officers 
of the native regiments, to show their sipahis that they 
still trusted them, slept every night in the lines of their 
men. The non-combatants meanwhile, that is, the trad- 
ing Europeans, the Eurasians, and their families, had 
removed, on the 22d, to the intrenchment. Towards the 
end of the month the General had pitched his tent within 
the position. Still, time went on and no move was made 



The Dangers seem to lessen. 133 

by the sipahis, and when, on the mornings of the 31st 
May and the ist and 2d of June, the first relays of the 
1st Madras FusiHers and the 84th, despatched by Lord 
Canning from Calcutta, reached Kanhpur, Wheeler con- 
sidered that the crisis was past, that is, that the sipahis, 
noting, from the arrival of English troops, that the country 
to the south-east was open, would feel that mutiny was too 
hazardous to be attempted. So great, indeed, was his con- 
fidence that he passed on fifty of the 84th to Lakhnao. 

It is possible, indeed, that, could the line between Cal- 
cutta and Kanhpur have been maintained intact, this 
result might, to a certain extent, have been obtained. 
The sipahis, that is to say, might have been content to 
march on Dehli without attempting to molest the English 
at Kanhpur ; but early in June that line was broken, in 
the manner to be described, at Allahabad ; it was men- 
aced at Banaras ; and, later still, it was rent in twain at 
Danapur. The consequences of the breaking of the line 
at the place first named, and of the example set by 
the sipahis there and elsewhere in the vicinity, were seen 
when, on the night of the 4th of June, the men of the 
2d Cavalry mutinied. I must ask the reader to permit 
me to defer the story of the events which followed that 
uprising until I shall have cleared the ground by narrating 
the contemporaneous events at Lakhnao, at Allahabad, 
and at Calcutta. 

In a previous chapter I have narrated how Sir Henry 
Lawrence met and suppressed the first attempts at mutiny 
at Lakhnao (May 3d and 4th), Knowing the impression- 
able character of the natives of India, and having at the 
moment no means of judging the extent to which the ill- 
feeling had been nurtured, or the depth to which it had 
taken root. Sir Henry resolved to emphasise the first re- 
pression of disloyal action by the holding of a grand 



134 »5'zV Hen7y Lawrence at Lakhnao. 

Darbar, to be attended by all the English residents, by the 
officers and men of the native regiments, and by all the 
native officials. The announced reason for the holding of 
the Darbar was the presentation to the native officer and 
non-commissioned officers and men, who had behaved 
with distinguished loyalty on the 3d of May, of honours 
to mark the sense entertained by the Government of their 
conduct. 

The Darbar was held on the evening of the 12th of 
May. Sir Henry seized the occasion to make to the 
assembled natives, in their own language, an address 
which, if it had then been possible for words to affect the 
question, could scarcely have failed to produce great 
results. He began by alluding to the fears which had 
been expressed by the Hindus for their religion. Turn- 
ing to them, he pointed out how, under the Muhammadan 
rule prior to Akbar, that religion had never been respected ; 
how Hindus had been forcibly converted, and cruelly per- 
secuted ; how the third prince in succession to Akbar had 
reverted to a similar system. Turning then to the Mu- 
hammadans, he reminded them how the great sovereign 
who had founded the Sikh kingdom would never tolerate 
the exercise of the faith of Islam at Labor. Speaking 
then to both sections, he asked them to contrast with 
such actions the action of the British rulers. He referred 
to the principle of toleration, acted upon for a century ; to 
the manner in which Europeans and natives had worked 
together with a common purpose, sharing the same toils 
and the same dangers, and mutually congratulating one 
another when reaching the goal at which each had aimed. 
He then implored them not to allow themselves to be led 
away by the devices of men who were trying to entrap 
them, with the view of leading them, for their own selfish 
purposes, to assured destruction. Calling then to the 



The Time for Action approaches, 135 

front the native officer and the men who had signalised 
themselves by their loyalty on the 3d, he bestowed upon 
them, in the name of the Government, substantial tokens 
of its appreciation of their conduct. 

The solemn occasion, the character of the speaker, the 
truth of the language he employed, combined to produce 
a considerable effect. Those present were much moved; 
but the conspirators had done their work too well to allow 
their dupes to be baffled by a few eloquent and impres- 
sive sentences. Whatever was the effect produced by the 
speech of the 12th of May, that effect was entirely obliter- 
ated when, on the i6th, the events of the loth and nth of 
the same month, at Mirath and Dehli, became common 
property. No one then recognised more clearly than Sir 
Henry Lawrence that the days of parleying had gone 
by, and that the differences between the sipahis and the 
Government had entered upon a phase in which victory 
would be to the strongest. Much, in Oudh, he realised, 
would depend upon the action of those in whose hands 
should be concentrated the supreme civil and military 
authority. He possessed the first, but not the second. 
Representing the case to Lord Canning, he received, on 
the 19th, a notification of his appointment as Brigadier- 
General, in supreme command in Oudh. Then he set to 
work to prepare for the crisis which he knew might be 
upon him at any moment. 

The city of Lakhnao, built on the west bank of the 
river Giimti, but having suburbs on the east bank, lies 
forty-two miles to the east of Kanhpur, and 610 miles 
from Calcutta. All the principal buildings lie between 
the city and the river bank. Here also are the Residency 
and its dependencies, covering a space 2150 feet long 
from north-west to south-east, and 1200 feet broad from 
east to west. A thousand yards to the west of it was the 



136 Sketch-D e scrip ti 071 of Lakhnao. 

Machchi Bhawan, a turreted building used for the storage 
of supplies. Close to it, and in the present day incor- 
porated with it, is the Imambarah, a mosque, 303 feet by 
160. The other palaces will be spoken of when it shall 
be my task to describe the ' leaguer ' of this famous place. 
It must suffice to state now that a canal which intersects 
the town falls into the Gumti about three miles to the 
south-east of the Residency, close to the Martiniere ; that 
about three-quarters of a mile to the south-south-east of 
this is the Dilkusha, a villa in the midst of an extensive 
deer park. To the north-east of the Residency lay the 
cantonment, on the left bank of the Gumti, communicating 
with the right bank by means of two bridges, one of stone, 
near to the Machchi Bhawan, the other of iron, 200 yards 
from the Residency. Recrossing by this to the right bank 
the traveller comes to the palaces, to be hereafter men- 
tioned, between the Residency and the Martiniere. To the 
south-west of the town, about four miles from the Residency, 
is a walled enclosure of 500 square yards called the Alam- 
bagh, commanding the road to Kanhpur. In May 1857 the 
troops at Lakhnao consisted of the greater part of the 32d 
Foot, about 570 strong, fifty-six European artillerymen, 
a battery of native artillery, the 13th, 48th, and 71st 
Regiments N. I., and the 7th Native Light Cavalry. Up 
to the time of the receipt by Sir Henry Lawrence of the 
patent of Brigadier-General these troops had been em- 
ployed in the way then common in India, that is, the 
sipahis had been entrusted with the care of important 
buildings, the Europeans being sheltered as much as 
possible from the heat of the sun. 

Sir Henry at once changed this order. He reduced 
the number of posts to be guarded from eight to four, 
three of which he greatly strengthened. All the magazine 
stores he removed into the Machchi Bhawan, to be guarded 



Sir Henry concentrates His Troops. 137 

by a company of the 326 and thirty guns. At the 
treasury, within the Residency compound, he stationed 
130 Europeans, 200 natives, and six guns. At the third 
post, between the Residency and the Machchi Bhawan, 
commanding the two bridges, he located 400 men, 
Europeans and natives, with twenty guns, some of them 
eighteen-pounders. The fourth post was the travellers' 
bungalow, between the Residency and the cantonment. 
Here he posted two squadrons of the 2d Oudh Native 
Cavalry, with six guns. 

In the cantonment, on the left bank of the Gumti, 
there still remained 340 men of the 3 2d Foot, fifty English 
gunners, six guns, and a complete battery of native 
artillery. The 32d were, towards the end of May, reduced 
by eighty-four men, despatched to the aid of Wheeler at 
Kanhpur. The 7th Native Cavalry remained at Miidkipur, 
seven miles distant from the Lakhnao cantonment. 

As soon as these arrangements had been completed. 
Sir Henry, on the 24th of May, caused to be moved into the 
Residency enclosure the ladies, the families, and sick men 
of the 32d, and the European and Eurasian clerks. These 
last he armed and drilled, and had them told off into 
parties for night duty. On the 27th he wrote to Lord 
Canning that the Residency and the Machchi Bhawan 
' were safe against all probable comers.' That very day, 
however, he had evidence that the country districts were 
surging around him, and he had to despatch one of the 
ablest of his assistants, Gould Weston, to Maliabad, 
fifteen miles from Lakhnao,' to restore order. Further, 
also on the 27th, he despatched Captain Hutchinson, with 
200 sowars and 200 sipahis, to the northern frontier of the 
province, there to be under the orders of the civil officer 
who had asked for them. The measure certainly ridded 
Lakhnao of the presence of 400 disaffected soldiers, but 



13S The Lakknao Sipdhis rise, 

it resulted in the murder by them of all their officers save 
one. Hutchinson was able to return safely to his post. 

Before this mutiny occurred (7th and 8th June) the 
catastrophe at Lakhnao had come upon Sir Henry. On 
the night of the 30th of May the greater number of the 
sipahis of the 71st N. I. rose in revolt, fired the bungalows, 
murdered Brigadier Handscomb and Lieutenant Grant, 
wounded Lieutenant Hardinge, and attempted further 
mischief The attitude of the European troops, vigilant 
at the posts assigned them by the Brigadier- General, com- 
pletely baffled them, and they retired in the night to 
Miidkipur, murdering Lieutenant Raleigh on their way. 
Thither, at daylight, Sir Henry followed them, and though 
deserted by the troopers of the 7th N. L. C, who joined 
the mutinied 71st N. I., and by some men of the 48th N. I., 
drove them from their position, and pursued them for some 
miles. Their action had, in fact, proved advantageous to 
Sir Henry Lawrence. It had rid him of pretended friends, 
and had shown him upon whom he could rely. The great 
bulk of the 13th N. I. had proved loyal ; but the whole of 
the 7th Cavalry, more than two-thirds of the 71st N. I., 
a very large proportion of the 48th N. I., and a few of the 
1 3th N. I. had shown their hands. Their departure enabled 
Sir Henry still further to concentrate his resources. 

Every day brought intelligence from the outlying 
districts of the seriousness of the crisis. At Sitapur, fifty- 
one miles from Lakhnao, there had been incendiarisms at 
the end of May. On the 2d of June the sipahis of the 
loth Oudh Irregulars, there stationed, had thrown into the 
river the flour sent from the town for their consumption, 
on the pretext that it had been adulterated with the view 
of destroying their caste. On the 3d the 41st N. I. 
and the 9th Irregular Cavalry broke out in mutiny, and 
murdered many of their officers and of the residents, under 



Outbreaks in Otidh. 139 

circumstances of peculiar atrocity. The number of men, 
women, and children so murdered amounted to twenty- 
four. 

At Malaun, forty-four miles to the north of Sitapur, the 
natives rose as soon as they heard of the events at the 
latter place. At Muhamdi, on the Rohilkhand frontier, the 
work of butchery on disarmed men, women, and children, 
on the 4th of June, was not exceeded in atrocity by any 
similar event during the outbreak. At Faizabad, at 
Sikrora, at Gondah, at Bahraich, at Malapur, at Sultan- 
pur, at Saloni, at Daryabad, at Purwa, in fact at all the 
centres of administration in the province there were, 
during the first and second weeks of June, mutinies of the 
sipahis, risings of the people, and conduct generally on 
the part of the large landowners which proved that their 
sympathy was with the revolters. By the 12th of June 
Sir Henry Lawrence had realised that the only spot in 
Oudh in which British authority was still respected was 
the Residency of Lakhnao. 

We left Sir Henry chasing, on the morning of the 
31st of May, the mutinied sipahis from the station of 
Mudkipur. Between that time and the nth June his 
health, undermined by long service in India, had given 
way. But the measures of Mr Gubbins, the officer who 
acted for him during his illness, and which were in direct 
opposition to the principles which he had inculcated, had 
the effect of rousing him from his bed of sickness. One 
of his strong points was to maintain at Lakhnao as many 
sipahis as would serve loyally and faithfully. Without 
the aid of sipahis the Residency, he felt, could not be 
defended against the masses which a province in insur- 
rection could bring against it. Mr Gubbins, during his 
illness, had despatched to their homes all the sipahis be- 
longing to the province of Oudh. Sir Henry promptly 



140 Sir Henry calls in the Pensioners. 

recalled them. What was more. Believing he might 
successfully appeal to the memories of an imaginative 
people, especially to that class which had in former years 
enjoyed the benefits of British service, and in later 
had not been subjected to the manoeuvres of the con- 
spirators, he despatched circulars to all the pensioned 
sipahis in the province inviting them to come to Lakhnao 
to defend the masters to whom they owed their pensions, 
and whose interests were bound up with theirs. The 
response to these circulars was remarkable. More than 
500 grey-headed soldiers came to Lakhnao. Sir Henry 
gave them a cordial welcome, and selecting about 170 of 
them for active employment, placed them under a separate 
command. With these and the loyal sipahis he had now 
nearly 800 able-bodied men fit for any work they might 
be called upon to perform. 

But many disloyal sipahis still remained in his vicinity. 
Of these the cavalry and infantry of the native police 
broke out on the night of the nth and the morning 
of the 1 2th. Vainly did their commandant, the Gould 
Weston of whom I have spoken, endeavour to recall them 
to their duty. He owed his own life to his remarkable 
daring. The 32d, sent in pursuit, followed up the muti- 
nied policemen and inflicted some damage, but the ground 
was broken, the heat was great, and the mutineers had a 
considerable start. It was in many respects an advantage 
to be rid of them. 

In view of the great crisis now so near as almost to be 
touched by the hand. Sir Henry had continued to strengthen 
the slight defences of the Residency enclosure, and to make 
the Machchi Bhawan as defensible as possible. He had 
originally resolved to hold both places. But as soon as 
he had realised the fact that the small number of his troops 
would permit only of his retaining one portion against the 



Hears that Kdnhpu7' has fallen. 141 

surging masses of the city and the provinces, he had de- 
cided to concentrate all his forces within the Residency. 
He still, however, for the moment held the Machchi 
Bhawan, believing that the report of his preparations 
there would have some effect on the rebels. 

He was not quite certain, at this time, that he would 
be besieged at all. Everything depended on Kanhpur.^ 
If British reinforcements could reach that place whilst 
Wheeler should still be holding it, then, he argued, the 
people of Oudh, in face of an English force within forty- 
two miles, would not dare to attempt the siege. He 
feared very much, however, for Kanhpur. He would have 
marched to succour the place if it had been possible, but, 
in the face of the masses of the enemy holding the Ganges, 
he could not have reached Wheeler's intrenchment, whilst 
he would have certainly been destroyed himself At 
length, on the 28th, he heard that Kanhpur had fallen, 
and that the rebels of his own province, emboldened by 
the news, had advanced in force to the village of Chinhat, 
on the Faizabad road, eight miles from the Residency. 

Sir Henry promptly decided to move out and attack 
the rebels. He held, and I am confident he held rightly, 
that nothing would tend so much to maintain the prestige 
of the British at this critical conjuncture as the dealing of 
a heavy blow at their advanced forces. Accordingly, he 
moved his troops from the cantonment to the Residency, 
and at half-past six o'clock, on the morning of the 30th of 
June, set out in the direction of Chinhat, with a force 
composed as follows : 300 men of the 32d Foot, 230 loyal 
sipahis, a troop of volunteer cavalry, thirty-six in number, 
120 native troopers, ten guns, and an eight-inch howitzer. 
Of the ten guns four were manned by Englishmen and 

1 ' If Kanhpur holds out, I doubt if we shall be besieged at all.' Sir H. 
Lawrence to Lord Canning. 



142 The Action at Chinhat. 

six by natives. The howitzer was on a hmber drawn by 
an elephant driven by a native. 

After marching three miles along the metalled road 
the force reached the bridge spanning the rivulet Kukrail. 
Here Sir Henry halted his men, whilst he rode to the front 
to reconnoitre. Reining in his horse on the summit of a 
rising ground, he gazed long and anxiously in the direction 
of Chinhat. Not a movement was to be seen. Nor when 
he turned his glass in other directions did he meet with 
better fortune. There was no enemy. He sent back, then, 
his assistant Adjutant-General to order the column to 
retrace its steps. The column had begun to act on the 
order when suddenly there was descried in the distance 
a mass of men moving forwards. Instantly revoking his 
first order. Sir Henry sent fresh instructions that the 
column should advance. It advanced accordingly, and 
after proceding a mile and a half plainly saw the rebels 
drawn up at a distance of about 1200 yards, their right 
covered by a small hamlet, their left by a village and 
tank, whilst their centre rested, uncovered, on the road. 
Just as the English sighted them the rebels opened fire. 

Sir Henry at once deployed his men, and bidding 
them lie down, returned the fire. The cannonade lasted 
more than an hour, when suddenly it ceased on both sides. 
Shortly after the rebels were descried, in two masses, 
advancing against both flanks of the English. The 
ground lent itself to such a movement, made by vastly 
superior numbers. For, parallel to the line formed by 
the men of the 3 2d, was the village of Ishmailganj, and 
into it the rebels were now pouring. The seizure of this 
village by one-half of the rebel force was a very masterly 
manoeuvre, for it enabled the rebels to pour a concentrated 
flanking fire on the English line, whilst the other wing was 
threatened from the opposite side. Conspicuous success 



The Action at Cliinhat. 143 

attended the movement. In an incredibly short space 
of time the 32d had lost nearly half its numbers, and it 
became clear that the English force would be destroyed 
unless it could reach the bridge over the Kukrail before 
the enemy could get there. The retreat was at once 
ordered, and the British force, though pounded with grape 
and harassed by cavalry all the way, pushed on vigorously. 
Just, however, as the retreating troops approached the 
bridge they noticed that bodies of the enemy's cavalry had 
worked round and were heading them in that direction. 
The commander of the thirty-six volunteers observing the 
movement, and realising on the instant its importance, 
dashed, at the head of his men, against the rebel cavalry. 
The latter did not wait to receive the impetuous onslaught, 
but giving way at the sight of the English, sought safety 
in flight. Still the rebel infantry pressed on, and what was 
worse, the gun ammunition of the British was exhausted. 
In this crisis Sir Henry had recourse to one of those heroic 
remedies of which only men are capable who have the 
faculty of maintaining undaunted presence of mind in 
dangerous circumstances. He pushed his men across the 
bridge ; then placed the guns on it, and ordered the gunners 
to stand beside them with the port-fires lighted. The ruse 
produced the desired effect. The rebels shrunk back from 
attacking a narrow bridge defended, as they supposed, by 
loaded guns. The British force then succeeded in gaining 
the shelter of the city, and in retiring in some sort of 
order on the Machchi Bhawan and the Residency. But 
their losses had been severe, and they had left behind them 
the howitzer and two field-pieces. 

Sir Henry Lawrence, crossing the Kukrail bridge, 
and disposing his guns in the manner related, had 
galloped off, leaving Colonel Inglis to bring home the 
force, unattended by anyone save his assistant Adjutant- 



1 44 Concentration within the Residency. 

General, Captain Wilson, to the Residency. Arrived there 
he despatched fifty of the 32d, under Lieutenant Edmon- 
stone, to defend the iron bridge against the rebels. This, 
despite the efforts of the elated enemy, they succeeded in 
doing, though with some loss. The rebels, however, had 
penetrated within the city, and, aided by the mass of the 
population, began to loophole many of the houses in the 
vicinity of the Residency and the Machchi Bhawan. They 
went so far as to attack one of the posts of the Residency, 
afterwards known, from the officer who ultimately com- 
manded there, as ' Anderson's post' The house which 
constituted the salient point of the post was the residence 
of Mr Capper. That gentleman was standing in the 
verandah when a shot from the rebels brought it down 
and buried him in the ruins. He would have been lost 
but for the determination to save him at all cost ex- 
pressed by Anderson. Working with a will, under the con- 
centrated fire of the rebels, this officer, aided by Corporal 
Oxenham, 32d Foot, M. Geoffroi, a Frenchman, Signor 
Barsotelli, an Italian, and two Englishmen, Lincoln and 
Chick, succeeded, by incredible exertions, in rescuing him.^ 
It was a very gallant deed. 

The following evening Sir Henry, threatened at both 
points by the enemy, caused the defences of the Machchi 
Bhawan to be blown up, and concentrated his forces 
within the Residency enclosure. From that date, the ist 
of July, began that famous ' leaguer,' to the story of which 
I shall, in its proper place, devote a separate chapter. 

1 Oxenham received the Victoria Cross ; but Capper always felt that he 
owed his life primarily to Anderson, who was left unrewarded. It was 
Anderson who suggested the attempt to rescue, who summoned the others to 
assist him, and who took the chief part in the operation. That operation 
lasted three-quarters of an hour, during every second of which Anderson, 
acting against the advice of his superior officer, exposed himself voluntarily to 
imminent danger. 



The Story reverts to Allahdbdd, 145 

Following the plan I have laid down 01 narrating in 
as close order as possible the contemporaneous events in 
the stations whose proximity rendered the action in one 
more or less dependent upon the action in the others, 
I propose to turn, for a short space, to Allahabad. That 
place, situated at the junction of the Ganges and the 
Jamnah, constituted the armed gate through which alone 
succours from Calcutta could reach Kanhpur and Lakhnao. 
Should that gate be closed, or should it be occupied, the 
fate of both the places mentioned would have depended 
entirely on the result of the operations before Dehli. 

The fort of Allahabad, founded by Akbar in 1575, 
lies on a tongue of land formed by the confluence of 
the two great rivers above mentioned. It is 120 miles 
distant from Kanhpur, seventy-seven from Banaras, 564 
by the railway route, and somewhat more by water from 
Calcutta. It touched the southern frontier of Oudh, 
and was in close proximity to the districts of Juanpur, 
Azamgarh, and Gorakhpur, the landowners in which had 
been completely alienated from their British masters by 
the action of the land and revenue system introduced 
by Mr Thomason. 

The news of the disasters at Mirath and Dehli reached 
Allahabad on the 1 2th of May. The force there was entirely 
native, the garrison consisting of the 6th Regiment N. I. 
and a battery of native artillery. Additions to this purely 
native force were made early in the month of May. On 
the 9th a wing of the ' Regiment of Firuzpur,' a Sikh 
regiment which had been raised on the morrow of the 
campaign of 1846, and on the 19th a squadron of the 
3d Oudh Irregular Horse, also natives, reached the place. 
The bulk of these troops occupied a cantonment about 
two and a half miles from the fort, to which they fur- 
nished weekly guards. The commanding officer was the 

K 



146 Slight Preparations for the Storm. 

Colonel of the 6th N. I., Colonel Simpson, a polished 
gentleman, but scarcely a born leader of men. The chief 
civil officers were Mr Chester and Mr Court, both men of 
ability — the last named, who was magistrate, one of the 
most energetic, daring, warm-hearted, and enterprising 
men in India. 

These gentlemen had pointed out to the authorities 
in Calcutta the great danger of leaving a place so im- 
portant as Allahabad entirely in the hands of natives, and 
they received permission, in May, to procure from Chanar, 
a fortress on the Ganges, seventy-six miles distant, some 
of the European invalided soldiers permanently stationed 
there. Sixty-five of these arrived on the 23d of May, and 
a few more later. They were at once placed within the 
fort. 

One of the most remarkable features of the great re- 
bellion was the supreme confidence which officers of the 
native army reposed to the very last in their own men. 
This confidence was not shaken when the regiments 
around them would rise in revolt. Every officer argued, 
and sincerely believed that, whatever other sipahis might 
do, the men of his regiment would remain true. This 
remark applied specially to the officers of the 6th N. I. 
I had shortly before been serving at the same station 
with that regiment, and in no other had I noticed such 
complete sympathy as existed in it between officers and 
men. To make their men comfortable, to see that all 
their wants were attended to, had been the one thought 
of those officers. I am bound to add that the men, by 
their behaviour, seemed to reciprocate the kindly feelings 
of their superiors. 

When, then, regiments were rising all over India, the 
officers of the 6th boasted that, whatever might happen 
elsewhere, the 6th N. I. would remain staunch and true. 



The 6th Regiment N.I. 147 

So strong was this conviction among them that when, on 
the 22d of May, a council was held of the chief civil and 
military authorities, Colonel Simpson deliberately pro- 
posed that the whole of his regiment should be moved 
into the fort to hold it. Mr Court most strenuously, and 
ultimately successfully, opposed this proposal. The day 
following the invalids arrived from Chanar, and then all 
the non-combatants of the station, those in the civil 
-service excepted, moved into the fort with their pro- 
perty. 

A circumstance occurred towards the end of May 
which seemed to justify the confidence of the officers of 
the 6th N. I. The sipahis of the regiment, professing 
the greatest indignation at the conduct of their brethren 
in the North-west, formally volunteered to march against 
Dehli. Their offer was telegraphed to Calcutta, and 
afforded ground to the councillors of Lord Canning to 
insist upon their contention that the mutinous spirit was 
confined to but few stations. 

About a week after the sipahis of the 6th had volun- 
teered to march against the capital of the Mughals they 
rose in revolt, and murdered many of their own trusting 
officers, and some young boys, newly-appointed ensigns, 
who happened to be dining at the regimental mess. It 
happened in this wise. In reply to the offer to volunteer, 
the Governor-General had thanked the regiment for 
its loyalty. A parade was ordered for the morning of 
the 6th of June to read the Vice-regal thanks to the 
sipahis. Colonel Simpson read the words of Lord 
Canning, and then, on his own behalf, spoke feelingly 
to the men in their own language, telling them that their 
reputation would be enhanced throughout India. The 
sipahis seemed in the highest spirits, and sent up a ring- 
ing cheer. But that evening, whilst the officers and the 



T48 The Rising at Allahdbdd. 

new arrivals from England were dining at the regimental 
mess, they rose in revolt, and whilst one detachment at- 
tempted to secure the guns of the native battery, the bulk 
of the men gathered in front of their lines and received 
their officers as they rode to the spot with murderous 
volleys. Amongst those who fell were Captain Plunkett, 
an officer who loved his men, and who only that morning 
had expressed to them his admiration of their loyalty, 
the Adjutant, Lieutenant Steward, the Quarter-Master, 
Lieutenant Hawes, and Ensigns Pringle and Munro. 
Of officers not belonging to the regiment, the Fort Ad- 
jutant, Major Birch, Lieutenant Innes of the engineers, 
and eight of the unposted boys but just arrived from 
England, were mercilessly slaughtered. Nor was the 
attempt to capture the guns less successful. Despite the 
exertions of Lieutenant Harward, commanding the battery, 
who narrowly escaped with his life, and of Lieutenant 
Alexander of the Oudh Irregulars, who was killed, the 
guns were dragged into the lines of the mutineers. The 
native gunners, in fact, and the troopers of the Oudh 
Irregulars had fraternised with the rebellious sipahis. 
The other officers of the 6th succeeded in securing refuge 
within the fort. 

But was the fort a sure refuge for them ? At the 
moment it seemed very doubtful. And if the fort were to 
go, the sacrifice of the lives of those behind its ramparts 
would be the least part of the evil. The strongest and 
most important link between Calcutta and Kanhpur would 
in that case be severed. The bulk of the troops garrison- 
ing the fort were x^siatics. There was one company of 
the 6th N. I., and there was the wing of the Sikh regiment 
of Firuzpur. On the other side were sixty-five European 
invalided soldiers, the officers, the clerks, the women, and 
the children. The temper of the Sikhs was known to 



Rcsohite Action of Brasyer. 149 

be doubtful. News had arrived that, at Banaras, their 
countrymen had been fired upon by EngHsh gunners. 
Much, if not everything, depended upon the control pos- 
sessed over them by their officers. 

Fortunately their senior officer on the spot was a man 
of great daring, of strong character, and absolutely fear- 
less. This was Lieutenant Brasyer, an officer who had 
been promoted from the ranks for his splendid conduct 
during the Satlaj campaigns of 1846, and who had risen 
to a high position in the regiment of Firuzpur. Brasyer's 
keen instinct detected on the instant the necessity of 
taking a quick and bold initiative. Bringing up, then, his 
Sikhs, supported by the guns on the rampart manned by 
the sixty-five invalids from Chanar, and on his flank 
by the hastily armed Europeans and Eurasians, to a 
point commanding the main gate, at which was posted 
the company of the 6th N. I., he ordered the sipahis to 
pile their arms. There was a moment of hesitation, but 
then, sullenly and unwillingly, the mutinous soldiers 
obeyed the order. The muskets were secured, and the 
sipahis were expelled the fort. 

The fort was secured, but the town, the civil station, 
and the cantonments were for the moment in the power 
of the rebels. Most cruelly did they abuse that power. 
The gaols were broken open, and then the released scum 
of the population perpetrated atrocities at which the 
human mind revolts. Not only were the European shops 
pillaged, the railway works destroyed, the telegraphic 
wires torn down, but the Europeans and Eurasians, 
wherever they could be found, were cruelly mutilated and 
tortured. The death that followed their indescribable 
torments was hailed by the sufferers as a blessed relief. 
It need scarcely be added that the treasury was sacked. 
Then the sipahis, glutted with blood and gold, abandoning 



150 Horrors perpetrated at Allahdbdd. 

the intention they had previously announced of marching 
to Dehh', formally disbanded themselves and made their 
way, in small parties of twos and threes, each to his 
native village. 

Their departure did not for the moment affect the 
state of affairs in the city and the station. The land- 
owners, influenced mainly by their dislike of the system 
known as the Thomasonian system, had risen about the 
city and in the neighbourhood. A day or two later there 
came to lead them a man who styled himself the ' Maulavi,'^ 
and who possessed considerable organising powers. There 
we must leave them, whilst we return to Calcutta to note 
the impression which the events I have recorded in this 
chapter made upon Lord Canning and his advisers. 

^ This man is not to be confounded with the Maulavl of Faizabad, of 
whom I have spoken as having been one of the chief organisers of the 
rebellion. The Allahabad ' Maulavl,' whose name was Laiakat All, had been 
a schoolmaster, with a great reputation for sanctity. 



CHAPTER XL 

CALCUTTA IN JUNE AND JULY. 

I LEFT Lord Canning and his councillors, at the end of 
May, endeavouring, by the despatch of troops by driblets 
from the capital to the North-west, to strengthen that 
weak middle piece upon the security of which, until rein- 
forcements should arrive in sufficient strength, or until 
Dehli should fall, the safety of the Empire seemed to 
depend. For a moment the opinion prevailed that the 
second of these contingencies would happen first. For, 
as I have had occasion more than once to mention, the 
strength of Dehli was greatly underrated, and the majority 
of British residents, military as well as civil, believed that 
the appearance of General Anson before the gates of the 
city would suffice to induce the rebels to surrender it. 
That was certainly the opinion of Lord Canning and his 
councillors. It was under the influence of this convic- 
tion that the Home Secretary had disdained the offers 
of the Englishmen and foreigners who had volunteered 
to enrol themselves, telling them that ' the mischief 
caused by a passing and groundless panic had been 
already arrested.' 

But the first week of June saw the hopes of the Govern- 
ment rudely shattered. Thick as hail, post by post, came 
tidings of disaster. Accounts of the mutinies at Kanh- 
pur, at Allahabad, at Lakhnao, of the defection of Oudh, 
related in the last chapter, of revolts and murders at 



152 Lord Canning summons Sir Patrick Grant. 

Azamgarh, at Juanpur, at Banaras, at Jhansi, to be yet 
related, followed one another in quick succession. To 
counterbalance these misfortunes came the news of 
Brigadier Wilson's victory at Ghazi-ud-din Nagar on 
the 31st of May. But the information, which reached 
Calcutta about the same time, that General Anson had 
succumbed to cholera at Karnal, on the 27th, seemed at 
the moment a misfortune great enough to outweigh even 
this victory. 

Lord Canning and his councillors, however, made a 
great attempt to repair it. They telegraphed to Madras 
for Sir Patrick Grant, Commanding-in-Chief at that Pre- 
sidency, to come up to Calcutta to replace Anson. Grant 
was an officer in the Bengal army who had filled the 
office of Adjutant-General, and it was supposed that, in 
the existing terrible crisis, one who had been able to rise 
to such a position would possess experience from which 
the Government might profit. The mistake was a natural 
one, but it was not the less a mistake. A clerk promoted 
to the headship of the department in which he has served is 
rarely able to lift his mind above routine. So it was with 
Sir Patrick Grant. Sent for in the crisis of a mutiny, 
whilst the entire country was surging with revolt, he ar- 
rived with his mind full of reconstruction and reorganisa- 
tion, and he was unable to the last to apply it to any 
other consideration. For all the good he effected he 
might as well have remained at Madras. 

Before he arrived the news from the revolted districts 
became daily more alarming. To the list already given 
might be added Rohilkhand, Bundelkhand, and a part of 
Central India. The Government was indeed to be pitied. 
Little more than a fortnight had elapsed since they had 
refused the offers of the British and foreign residents of 
Calcutta to volunteer, on the ground that all difficulties 



Lord Ca7ini'iig enrols Volunteers. 153 

had been arrested, and now insurrection was approaching 
daily nearer to their doors. 

For the state of the three armed native regiments, 
within fifteen miles of Calcutta, was such as to cause 
great alarm. The followers of the ex-King of Oudh, 
considerable in number and hostile in feeling, swarmed 
in a very near suburb of the capital. Lord Canning could 
not but feel, under these circumstances, that he had been 
somewhat hasty in rudely repulsing the offers made to 
volunteer on the 25th of May. On the nth of June, 
then, he sent for the Town-Major, Major Cavenagh, a 
man possessing a singularly practical mind and quick 
perceptions, and consulted with him as to the advisability 
of conceding the prayer which he had previousljr rejected. 
The advice of Cavenagh was in entire accordance with 
his character. On the following day, then, the necessary 
orders were issued. The enrolment began immediately, 
and in an incredibly short space of time the Government 
had at its disposal a serviceable body of gentlemen, horse, 
foot, and artillery — men devoted, unselfish, desirous only 
to serve their country, and serving it with all their 
might, and whose enrolment permitted Lord Canning to 
despatch to the threatened districts the troops which, 
but for the volunteers, he would have been forced to 
retain at the capital. 

The order for the enrolment of the volunteers had been 
issued on the 12th of June. On the 13th the Governor- 
General and his councillors passed an Act to gag the 
press. That some restraint was requisite for the native 
press may be admitted, for it was preaching sedition all 
over the country. But to include in the gagging measure 
the loyal English press, which, whilst it had supported the 
English interests, had not shrunk from indicating, in no 
measured language, the mistakes and shortcomings of the 



154 * Panic Sti^iday ' in Calcutta. 

Government, was considered as but a poor return to the 
independent classes of Calcutta for the services which 
the Government had but the day before accepted. The 
feeling engendered by the inclusion of the English press 
in this otherwise necessary Act was, then, very bitter, and 
remained so to the very last. 

The Act was read three times on one day, and passed. 
The day was a Saturday. At a late hour that night Sir 
John Hearsey, commanding at Barrackpur, sent an ex- 
press to Lord Canning telling him that he had certain 
information that the sipahis of his brigade would rise 
the following day ; that he had therefore ordered down 
from Chinsurah the 78th Highlanders, and that, with their 
aid and that of the 35th Foot and a battery of guns, he 
proposed to disarm the sipahis the following day. Loid 
Canning gave him the required permission. 

It is perhaps as well that I should state what I 
witnessed in the capital on that eventful day, known 
in history as ' Panic Sunday.' The morning was clear 
and bright. There was nothing at the time to indicate 
that a crisis was at hand. At eleven o'clock I pro- 
ceeded, as was my wont, to the church within Fort 
William. As the service there proceeded I was struck 
by the continuous sound of the trampling of horses 
and the rolling of gun-carriages, evidently quitting the 
fort. On the conclusion of the service I drove to the 
house of the Home Secretary, Mr Beadon, then residing 
with two other gentlemen in Chauringhi. Mr David 
Money, of the civil service, a relation of my wife, was 
staying with him. Mr Beadon was in his shirt sleeves, 
engaged in writing, and apparently much occupied. I 
told him and his friends what I had heard in the fort, 
but my remarks elicited no reply. I returned home to 
luncheon, and remained in my house the rest of the day. 



' Panic Sttnday ' in CalctUta. 155 

About four o'clock I was roused by a sound of the move- 
ment of horses and carriages, and almost immediately 
afterwards a note was placed in my hand. It was from 
Mr David Money. It ran as follows : ' Come over with 
M. at once; the regiments at Barrackpur have mutinied, 
and are marching on Calcutta. There is no time to be 
lost. We have a stone staircase, five good rifles, and 
plenty of ammunition. Come without delay.' Proceeding 
to the gate of my house, which was in Chauringhi, and 
commanded the plain as far as the glacis of the fort, I saw 
that plain covered with fugitives, some riding, some in 
carriages of sorts, some in palanquins, some running, some 
walking — men, women, and children all making for the 
nearest fort gate. It was a sight, once seen, never to be 
forgotten. Deeming that at such a crisis it was the duty 
of every Englishman to stay at his post, I declined the 
kind offer made me, and stood there for some time watch- 
ing the extraordinary scene. I noticed, as I drove out 
that evening, that many of the houses near me were 
deserted, and that a terrible panic had taken hold of the 
Eurasians. I ascertained, too, that many high-placed 
officials had sent their families on board ship, that some 
of them had proceeded thither themselves, whilst others 
had been content to barricade their houses, to await, 
without undressing, the events of the night. 

There was just this reason for the alarm. The native 
regiments at Barrackpur had contemplated rising on that 
day. The admirable foresight and energy of General 
Hearsey defeated their plans. That night, Saturday, he 
summoned, by express, the 78th Highlanders from Chin- 
surah. One wing of the regiment started at once, and 
though misled by a guide, reached Barrackpur at day- 
break. The other wing came in about three hours later. 
At four o'clock in the afternoon Hearsey paraded the 



1 56 The King of Ottdh lodged in the Fort. 

brigade — the three native regiments, a wing of the 35th 
Foot, and the 78th, the two latter having their muskets 
loaded with ball, and a battery of artillery, the guns of 
which were also ready for action. The sipahis obeyed 
without a murmur the orders given to them to pile their 
arms, and the danger was over. It was the dread of 
what might have happened which had led so many in 
Calcutta to believe that it had happened. 

Early the following morning the Foreign Secretary, 
Mr Edmonstone, escorted by a party of English soldiers, 
proceeded to the residence of the ex-King of Oudh at 
Garden Reach, and, at the interview which followed with 
that prince, informed him that the exigencies of the time 
required that he should change his quarters to Fort 
William. The ex-King behaved with dignity and pro- 
priety, protesting in the most solemn manner that 
neither by word nor deed had he encouraged the mutineers. 
He declared himself ready to proceed whithersoever the 
Governor-General might direct. Taken to the fort, accom- 
panied by his late prime minister and a few other nobles, 
he was lodged in the Governor-General's own house- 
There his comforts were thoroughly attended to, and as, 
even when he was residing at Garden Reach, he had never 
quitted the domain allotted to him, it may be said truly 
that never was captivity less felt. 

The day after this event Sir Patrick Grant arrived in 
Calcutta and took up the nominal command of the army. 
He did not quit the city during his six weeks' tenure of 
office. His presence there may then be passed over as an 
incident not affecting the progress of affairs. 

The next day, the 17th, the news of the action fought 
by General Barnard before Dehli reached the capital. It 
was even rumoured that the success was greater than that 
which had been achieved, and that Dehli had fallen. 



The Darkness becomes intensified. 157 

Everyone expected that it would be so. In the exulta- 
tion caused by the impression, Lord Canning, four days 
later, despatched a request to Barnard to send down 
a column to clear the weak middle part of the Duab. But 
the truth soon became known. Before many days had 
passed the Government and the public alike realised that 
General Barnard's task was only beginning, and that 
assistance for the weak middle piece would be available 
only from Calcutta. 

Meanwhile, darkness was closing round them. At the 
close of the third week of June, whilst they had heard of 
further mutinies at Jhansi, at Naogang, at Nimach, and at 
Juanpur, they had no news from Kanhpur and Lakhnao 
later than the 4th. Agra was safe, they knew, on the loth. 
They knew likewise that Banaras and Allahabad had been 
made secure in the manner yet to be described. 

During the next fortnight, up to the 4th of July, the 
accounts became worse and worse. On the 2d of July 
the Government heard of the mutiny of the native regi- 
ments at Kanhpur, and that, joined by Nana Sahib and 
his followers, they were besieging Wheeler in his intrench- 
ment ; that Sir Henry Lawrence was about to be besieged 
in the Residency at Lakhnao, but that all was well there 
to the 30th of June ; that Agra was safe up to the 15th, 
but that Bandah had gone ; that the troops of the 
Gwaliar contingent had mutinied on the 15th ; and that 
an uneasy feeling prevailed at Haidarabad. The next 
day Lord Canning received a letter from Sir Henry 
Lawrence, dated the 28th of June. The letter simply 
stated that the writer had every reason to believe that the 
English at Kanhpur had been destroyed by treachery. 
Certain details, which eventually proved to be correct, 
were added as native reports, but these reports, it was 
said, were not believed at Allahabad or Banaras. 



158 The Situation alarming iji the extreme. 

The Government had up to that moment hoped that 
Wheeler would be able to hold out until they could relieve 
him. One regiment had been despatched in May, under 
Colonel Neill, and that officer had already secured Banaras 
and Allahabad. It was even hoped that he would be able 
to leave Allahabad for Kanhpur, somewtiere about the 
25th of June, with the four regiments which had been 
gradually collected at that station. Sir Henry Havelock, 
fresh from his Persian campaign,- having come up with Sir 
Patrick Grant on the i6th, had on the 24th been directed 
to proceed to Allahahad to assume command of that 
force. He had started the very next day. But if the 
news received from Sir Henry Lawrence were true, he 
must inevitably be too late to relieve Wheeler. The situ- 
ation was alarming in the extreme. If Kanhpur were in- 
deed gone, the weak middle piece was broken in twain. 
With rebellious Oudh on the one side, and the mutinied 
Gwaliar contingent on the other, what hope was there 
that even Havelock, with his four English infantry regi- 
ments, his scanty artillery, and his volunteer horsemen 
could possibly prevail ? 

In this state of terrible supense I must leave the 
Government at Calcutta whilst I tell the sad story of 
the ' leaguer of Kanhpur.' 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE LEAGUER OF KANHPUR. 

In the tenth chapter I have described how, towards the 
close of the month of May, a rising of the native troops at 
Kanhpur seemed inevitable ; how the officer commanding 
there, Sir Hugh Wheeler, had fortified, as a place of refuge 
for the Europeans and Eurasians, two barracks in the 
centre of a vast plain ; how he had stored in those 
barracks supplies of all sorts ; how, on the 22d of May, 
the non-combatant portion of the residents had crowded 
to those barracks for refuge ; how, a day or two later, the 
General himself, with his family, had repaired thither ; 
how, on the 2 2d likewise, he and they^had been cheered 
by the arrival from Lakhnao of eighty-four men of the 
32d Foot ; how, on the 31st of May and the two follow- 
ing days, the arrival from Allahabad of fifteen men of the 
Madras Fusiliers, and a hundred of the 84th, bearing with 
them the information that they were but the forerunners 
of several regiments, for that troops were pouring into 
Calcutta, had so influenced General Wheeler that, believ- 
ing his position now to be secure, and feeling very anxious 
regarding Lakhnao, he had forwarded on to that station 
fifty men of the 84th ; how that, on the night of the 4th 
of June, the native troops broke into open and violent 
mutiny ; and how, from that date, the ' leaguer ' of Kanhpur 
may be said to have begun. 

The fifty men of the 84th had left for Lakhnao on the 



i6o The Sipdhis at Kdnhpztr 7'ise. 

morning of the 3d of June. On the evening of the same 
day half of the 3d Oudh field-battery, under Lieutenant 
Ashe, which had been sent from Oudh to Fathgarh to 
keep open the road between Kanhpur and Agra, but 
which had been compelled to retreat on account of the 
mutiny of the native troopers accompanying it, marched 
into Kdnhpur. Their guns, two nine-pounders and a 
twenty-four-pound howitzer, were at once placed in the 
intrenchment. The native gunners had behaved so well 
on the march that it was hoped that they would con- 
tinue their good service. But the result showed that the 
defection was almost universal. 

On the following morning, the 4th, Wheeler received 
certain information that the 2d Cavalry and the ist and 
56th Regiments N. I. had resolved to rise within the next 
four-and-twenty hours and murder their officers. This 
information caused the issue of an order to the officers 
of those regiments to discontinue the practice of sleeping 
in the lines of their regiments. Wheeler saw, too, that 
the guns in the intrenchment were placed in position, 
and that arrangements were made to render a surprise 
impossible. 

On the night of the 4th the troopers of the 2d 
Cavalry rose, with a great shout, and setting fire to the 
sergeants' bungalows, mounted their horses, and rode to 
the cattle-yard of the Commissariat department. Taking 
thence thirty-six elephants, they marched to the treasury, 
guarded by the soldiers of Nana Sahib. The two bodies 
fraternised, and helped each other in packing the contents 
of the treasury on the elephants and on carts. They 
were still engaged in this congenial occupation when they 
were joined by the sipahis of the ist N. I., who, refusing 
to join their comrades at the first bidding, had been 
unable to resist when they heard of the proceedings at 



Mutiny breaks out at Kdnkptir. 1 6 1 

the treasury. Vainly had their English officers tried to 
restrain them. But, whilst deaf to the call of duty, they 
were not at the moment bloody-minded. They had 
begged their officers to return to the intrenchment, adding 
that they wished them no harm, but that their own course 
had been decided upon. 

But the mutineers were not content with the looting 
of the treasury. They first secured the magazine, with 
its priceless wealth of heavy guns and ammunition. 
General Wheeler had placed there a warrant-officer with 
instructions to blow it up as soon as the sipahis should 
break out. But the guard over it was a sipahi guard, and 
the warrant-officer, though he did his best, was prevented 
by the men from carrying out his orders. The sipahis 
then broke open the gates of the gaol and turned loose 
on the abandoned station hundreds of miscreants of the 
worst description. These made the night a night of 
horror. The burning of bungalows, and the excited cries 
of looting parties, gave to the Europeans in the intrench- 
ment a clear idea of the storm which had burst upon them. 

Through all this turmoil the sipahis of the two other 
regiments, the 53d and 56th, remained apparently 
quiescent. About seven o'clock in the morning Wheeler 
despatched four officers to reconnoitre. They had pro- 
ceeded two miles when they were fired upon, and one of 
the number was hit. Wheeler then ordered to their sup- 
port a company of Europeans and Ashe's half-battery, 
but these had not moved far when the native officers of 
the 53d and 56th arrived to report that their men could 
no longer be depended upon. The troops, having picked 
up the officers first sent out, then returned to the in- 
trenchment. 

It was now nine o'clock. The sipahis of the 53d and 
59th, in response to a bugle call, turned out at this mo- 

L 



i62 Mutiny of the Sipdhis at Kdnhpur. 

ment, and ranging themselves in columns, made as though 
they would march on the intrenchment. To prevent this, 
Wheeler brought a gun to bear upon them. At the third 
discharge the bulk of them dispersed to join their brethren 
of the 1st N. I. at Nuwabganj, the suburb in which were 
located the treasury, the magazine, and the gaol. But 
a few sipahis, true to their salt, made their way by a 
circuitous route to the intrenchment, and served there 
loyally to the very end. 

The station was now clear of insurgents. These, at 
Nuwabganj, barred the road to Dehli. To the eastward, 
the Allahabad road was open. It was from that quarter 
alone that help could come. Wheeler, then, had no alter- 
native. He must remain where he was. He still cherished 
the hope that the sipahis, satiated with loot, and knowing 
that but little in that respect could be gained by an attack 
on the intrenchment, would march to swell the national 
movement at Dehli. There were some, too, in the in- 
trenchment who, not remembering the bitterness engen- 
dered in the mind of Nana Sahib by the refusal of Lord 
Dalhousie and the Court of Directors to continue to him 
the pension of the prince of whom he was the adopted 
son, hoped much from his loyalty to the foreign overlord. 

Meanwhile, the assembled sipahis of the four regiments, 
now united, had elected Nana Sahib as their leader, and 
had tumultuously demanded to be led to Dehli. The 
sipahis had no desire to kill their officers. Against them 
they had no grudge. They had shaken off the bonds of 
discipline, they were free, they had looted to their 
hearts' content, and now they would join those com- 
rades who had resuscitated the rule of the Mughal. 
They were not to be thwarted. With loud shouts, then, 
they set out that same afternoon and marched seven miles 
to Kalianpur. 



Nana Sahib brings back Sipdhis. 163 

Nana Sahib had been powerless to prevent this march. 
A too great insistance on his part would have shaken to 
pieces his newly assumed authority. He had, then, ap- 
parently acquiesced in the propriety of the policy. But 
recognising that, if the movement were to continue, his 
labour had been in vain ; that at Dehli he, a Maratha, 
would be a cypher, whereas at Bithor it might be possible 
for him to play the part of a sovereign prince ; that the 
first essential to the success of his plans was to root out 
the hated English, to infuse his own hatred of them into 
the minds of the sipahis, so that with them also it should 
be a race hatred ; that to leave the English masters at 
Kanhpur was to leave open a gate upon the closing of 
which depended the success of his schemes, he and his 
agents employed all that night in endeavouring to persuade 
the sipahis that their work was but half done so long as 
one English person remained alive at Kanhpur. Not 
that he and they were so unwise as openly to oppose the 
march to Dehli. * By all means,' they said in so many 
words, ' let us march to Dehli ; but let us first exterminate 
the English now at Kanhpur. If you do not exterminate 
them, they will soon receive reinforcements and march on 
your track. At present they are few in number ; they 
have women and children with them ; the position they 
occupy cannot be long defended. In a few days you v/ill 
be able to wreak your vengeance upon them. Then we 
will march to Dehli — I first of all at your head. If you 
decide to march thither now, you can never be sure how 
quickly they may recover, and then you will all be 
marked men. But dead men tell no tales.' Whether 
the precise arguments used were in these words cannot 
be affirmed, but that they were in this sense is certain. 
They were effectual, for on the morning of the 6th the 
rebelled sipahis marched back from Kalianpur to Kanhpun 



164 Proceedings of the Rebels. 

On arriving there the Nana pitched his camp in the centre 
of the station, hoisted two standards — one to propitiate the 
Hindus, the other to humour the Muhammadans. He 
then sent out fifty troopers to kill any Christians who 
might be found, and directed the looting of the houses of 
those native gentlemen -whom he suspected of being 
favourable to the English. Within his position he threw 
up works and mounted heavy guns. 

General Wheeler had hoped, when he heard of the 
march to Kalianpur, that his difficulties were practically 
over. But in the return of the sipahis he recognised the 
hand of the Maratha chief Even if he had had any 
doubts on the subject, such doubts would have been no 
longer possible on the 7th. On the morning of that day 
he received a letter from Nana Sahib intimating his in- 
tention to attack the garrison. It was soon recognised 
that this was no idle threat, for two guns began at once 
to play upon the intrenchment. On the 8th three more 
guns opened fire, and on the i ith the rebels had in position, 
playing upon the garrison night and day, three mortars, 
two twenty-four-pounders, three eighteen-pounders, two 
twelve-pounders, the same number of nine-pounders, and 
one six-pounder. Their numbers had, meanwhile, consider- 
ably increased. From Allahabad, from Oudh, from the 
districts evil-disposed men had flocked in. Nana Sahib 
assumed, during these operations, the position of, and re- 
ceived the honours due to, a sovereign prince. In this 
capacity he appointed Subahdar Tika Singh of the 2d 
Cavalry to be general of that arm, and Subahdar Ganga 
Din and Jamadar Dalganjan Singh of the native infantry 
to be colonels of the infantry brigades. 

The garrison which had to sustain the attacks 
directed by these men was composed of 210 English 
soldiers, and nearly a hundred officers and civilians. The 



The Garrison. 165 

railway engineers, traders, and clerks were another hun- 
dred, and there were some forty Christians besides, 
including the drummers. They had six guns of differ- 
ent calibres. Had the 450 men above enumerated been 
alone, they could have fought their way to Allahabad. 
But they had with them 330 women and children, many 
of them reared tenderly, and some unable to travel. 
Their lot, indeed, in the terrible contest was the hardest 
of all. 

The defences which, since the 14th of May, Wheeler 
had been able to throw up were far from formidable. The 
earthworks were little more than four feet high, and were 
not bullet proof at the crest. The apertures for the 
artillery exposed alike the guns and the gunners, whilst 
in the unfinished barracks on the left front an enterpris- 
ing enemy could easily find cover for attack. The scanti- 
ness of the earthworks was mainly due to the iron-like 
hardness of the ground, baked by a sun which had shone 
uninterruptedly for seven months, and unmoistened during 
that period by a drop of rain. Within the intrenchment 
supplies calculated to last four weeks had been stored. 
But these, like everything else behind the feeble earth- 
works, were subject to destruction from the various causes 
incidental to war. 

From the very first the sufferings of the garrison were 
intense. The heat was great, the space was scanty, the 
fire of the guns of the rebels was incessant, the abso- 
lutely necessary exposure of the officers and men to 
that fire was deadly. From the first day the casualties 
were considerable. Then rose the question how to 
dispose of the dead. There was a well, outside the 
intrenchment, not far from the unfinished barracks. 
This was appointed to be the cemetery. The bodies 
of those killed during the day were placed at once 



t66 The Gallant Defenders. 

outside the verandah, amoncr the debris, until the fall 
of night should afford the required opportunity to the 
fatigue party. Then they were carried to the well and 
let down. 

Prominent among the officers who distinguished them- 
selves in the defence of the intrenchment may be men- 
tioned Captain Moore of the 32d, a soldier of the highest 
class and the most undaunted courage ; Captain Jenkins 
of the 2d L. C, one of the bravest and best of the party ; 
Lieutenant Daniell of the same regiment, full of pluck 
and fire ; Captain Whiting of the engineers, gifted with 
a clear brain and coolness unsurpassable ; Major Vibart 
of the 2d L. C, determined, unyielding, and ever watchful 
at the post assigned him, one of the most exposed and 
difficult of the defences ; Mowbray Thomson of the 56th 
N. I., daring even to rashness, ever longing to be where 
the fight was the thickest ; Delafosse of the 53d N. I., 
cool and calm in danger, ready to sacrifice his own life if 
that sacrifice could benefit his comrades ; Glanville of the 
2d Europeans ; Ashe of the artillery, as daring as devoted ; 
Jervis of the engineers, proud of his race, and maintain- 
ing to his last gasp its glorious prestige ; Sterling, whose 
splendid feats with his rifle were the terror of the rebels. 
Worthy to be classed with these and others like them, 
soldiers by profession, were the civilian Mackillop, one 
of the noblest of men, and throughout the siege a hero ; 
Heberden the railway engineer, Moncrieff the chaplain, 
and others whose names have not survived their deeds. 
The women of the garrison, too, displayed, under all cir- 
cumstances, the pride and endurance of their race. Where 
all behaved nobly it is difficult to distinguish. But con- 
spicuous amongst them all was the wife of the leader of 
the sallying parties, Mrs Moore. Her splendid courage 
and fortitude endeared her to every man, woman, and child 



Life in the Intrenchment, 167 

within the intrenchment. Nor must I omit to record the 
stalwart courage of Bridget Widdovvson, wife of a private 
of the 3 2d, who stood sentry, sword in hand, for some time 
over a batch of prisoners, bound only by a rope, and took 
care that not one of them escaped. 

It would serve no purpose to enter into the details of 
a siege of three weeks, the circumstances of every day of 
which differed only in minor details from the circumstances 
of its predecessor. The sufferings of the defenders through- 
out that period were terrible. On the second day of the 
attack the garrison realised that the supply of water 
would present great difficulties. There was but one well, 
in the middle of the intrenchment, and its locality was 
known to the rebels. Upon that spot they kept so con- 
tinuous a fire that to attempt to draw water exposed the 
daring volunteer to almost certain death. So great was 
the danger that, after the second day, it was resolved that 
every man should draw water for himself and his belong- 
ings. There was generally a cessation of fire about dusk, 
and then the space round the well became crowded with 
men, who endeavoured to utilise the fleeting moments by 
filling their buckets. 

After the fire of the first few days the barracks became 
so riddled with shot as to afford little or no shelter. To 
secure some sort of refuge a great many made holes under 
the walls of the intrenchment, and covered them with 
deal boxes, cots, or the first suitable article they could 
lay hands on. The heat in these was, however, very 
oppressive, and many died from apoplexy. At night 
every person in turn was required to take watch. The 
women and children belonging to them then slept under 
the walls of the intrenchment, near to their relatives. 
Here the bombshells kept them in perpetual dread, for 
during nearly the entire night these were seen flying 



1 68 ^t/^ ^^^ i^^^ Intrenchment. 

through the air and bursting, often doing mischief. 
Another source of misery was caused by the stench 
arising from the dead horses, and, what was even worse, 
by the myriads of flies they collected. Still the garrison 
bore up without a murmur. There was not a man who 
was not a hero. Hillersden, the Collector, who had nego- 
tiated the treaty with Nana Sahib, fell dead at the feet of 
his wife, killed by a round-shot. She survived him but a 
few days. A round-shot likewise carried off the head of 
the General's son. Lieutenant Wheeler, as he lay wounded 
in the room occupied by his mother and the members of 
his family. Another round-shot mortally wounded Major 
Lindsa)^ He, too, was soon followed to the grave by his 
wife. Colonel Williams of the 56th was carried off by 
apoplexy, whilst his wife died from the effect of a wound 
which had completely disfigured her. Colonel Ewart of 
the 1st was disabled early in the siege. Captain Halliday 
was shot dead, whilst carrying some horse-soup for his 
famishing wife, midway between the intrenchments and 
the barracks. Mackillop, of whom I have spoken, and 
who, in his unselfish anxiety to contribute to the neces- 
sities of the suffering, had in the last week constituted 
himself captain of the well, was mortally wounded at his 
post. Death was very near him, yet in his last moments 
he begged a bystander to carry the water he had drawn 
to the lady to whom it had been promised. Nobly, indeed, 
did the sons of the island-heart of the British Empire do 
their duty. 

In not one single respect did they fail. They suc- 
ceeded to the very last in holding the outposts formed of 
the unfinished barracks, which, if the position of besieger 
and besieged had been reversed, they would not have per- 
mitted their enemy to retain for a single day. The 
officers who commanded the small detachments which 



Cruelties of N and Sahib. 169 

held those outposts were Jenkins and Glanville of the 
2d Europeans. The latter, after holding number two 
barrack, with sixteen men, for almost as many days, was 
incapacitated by a severe wound. Mowbray Thomson 
succeeded him. Needless to add that the defence did 
not lose from being entrusted to his capable hands. 

All this time the rebels were receiving reinforcements. 
Revolted sipahis from Oudh,from Azamgarh, from various 
stations in the vicinity, swarmed in constantly. Every 
day, on the other hand, saw a diminution of the resources 
of the besieged. Towards the end of the third week the 
supply of food had become very short. 

Meanwhile, the Nana, puffed up with his brief 
authority, was venting on stray captives his hatred of 
the British race. In the early days of the attack his 
myrmidons had dragged from hiding, in a house near the 
ddk-bungalow, an old gentleman, supposed to be a mer- 
chant, his wife, and two children, both in their teens. He 
caused them to be shot on the spot. A like fate was 
meted out to four clerks found in a house on the bank 
of a canal. Another European, whose name could not be 
traced, was similarly treated. Later on, on the loth of 
June, an English lady, travelling with her four children 
from the North-west Provinces to Calcutta, and arriving, 
unsuspicious of evil, at Kanhpur, was taken before Ndna 
Sahib. They were all shot. The same fate was dealt out 
to another lady who arrived there under similar circum- 
stances the day following. 

On the 1 2th information reached the Nana that a party 
of Europeans was approaching by water from the North- 
west. He at once despatched cavalry and infantry to 
reconnoitre. These returned to report that they were 
European fugitives from Fathgarh, mostly women and 
children. These, likewise, numbering 126, were murdered. 



1 70 The Rebels constantly repulsed. 

Flushed with his easy conquest over unarmed women 
and children, Nana Sahib urged on his generals to push 
their attack on the intrenchment with vigour. For some 
time past his gunners had been firing shells in the hope 
of setting fire to the barracks. On the evening of the 
13th their labours were to a certain extent crowned with 
success, for at five o'clock on that day they succeeded in 
kindling the roof of the hospital barrack. As this barrack 
sheltered not only the sick but the families of the English 
soldiers, the advantage to the Nana was considerable, for 
the fire spread so rapidly that some forty of the inmates 
were burned to death, and nearly all the medicines and 
surgical instruments were destroyed. The sipahis took 
advantage of the evident confusion to advance, 4000 in 
number, to deliver an assault which should be final. But 
what were 4000 Asiatics against one-tenth of their number 
of Englishmen ? Afraid to try the hand-to-hand encounter 
which the latter invited, and daunted by the fire of the six 
guns, they slunk back, without daring an assault, dis- 
comfited, to their lines. 

Between the 13th and the 21st the rebels tried attacks 
or rather advances of the same character, and invariably 
with the same result. But on the 23d, the anniversary of 
Plassey, having received large reinforcements from Oudh 
and the districts, they made the most serious attack 
in force they had ever tried. They gained possession of 
three of the empty barracks, and attempted to dislodge 
Moore from the remainder, but that gallant officer was 
quite equal to the occasion. With twenty-five men he 
advanced, under cover of a discharge of grape, and after a 
desperate contest expelled the rebels from the barracks 
they had seized. Meanwhile, under cover of some bales 
of cotton which they had appropriated, the rebels advanced 
to within 150 yards of the intrenchment, which they then 



The Situation becomes desperate. 1 7 r 

attempted to carry with a rush. But the steady discharge 
of canister, and rounds of file-firing from the infantry, 
speedily induced them to change their minds. They fell 
back, leaving about 200, including their leader, dead or 
dying, on the field. 

The next day Lieutenant Delafosse particularly dis- 
tinguished himself by an act of combined coolness and 
courage. About midday one of the English ammunition 
waggons had been ignited by the enemy's fire. Whilst the 
waggon was still burning, and endangering by its proximity 
the other waggons, the fire of the rebels, who had noticed 
the catastrophe, was concentrated on that one spot. The 
situation was critical, for unless the fire should be ex- 
tinguished it could not fail to cause immense damage. 
In this crisis Delafosse crept up, and lying at full length 
under the burning waggon, pulled away from it all the 
loose splinters he could reach, at the same time throwing 
earth on the flames. Two soldiers, animated by his ex- 
ample, joined him with buckets of water, and by their 
united efforts the flames were extinguished. 

From the 21st to the 24th of June the defenders were 
subjected to an incessant bombardment. The time for 
the commencement of the rainy season had arrived, and 
it was evident to them that the initial storm, generally 
a fall of great severity, would bring down with a run the 
walls and roofs of the riddled barracks. They had already 
been for some time on half rations, and their supplies were 
now so attenuated as to threaten famine at a very early 
date. It was clear to all that, if the lives of the garrison 
were to be preserved, there must be a new departure. 
Had there been a single sign of relief from the direction 
of Allahabad they might have decided to fight on as they 
had fought, hoping that any day might bring relief. But 
since the arrival of the men of the 84th, on the 31st of 



172 N and Sahib offers Terms ^ 

May, a dead calmness, significant of disaster, had fallen 
on the district around them. They felt it must have gone 
hard with their countrymen in Oudh, to the east and to 
the west, since they were left unaided to perish. The 
bolder spirits talked, at times, of a sortie in force, but in 
their cooler moments even they rejected a measure which 
would have entailed the destruction of the women and the 
children, and which did not offer one chance in a thousand 
of success. 

I have spoken of the splendid repulse of the rebels 
on the 23d. This blow, severe as it was, seemed to the 
garrison almost the last they would be able to strike. 
Their guns were fast becoming unserviceable, ammunition 
was failing them, starvation was staring them in the face. 
They were in this position when, on the 24th, a slip of 
paper was brought them by Mrs Greenway, wife of one of 
the merchants of Kanhpur, who had been made prisoner, 
on which the following words, written by Azimullah, were 
traced : ' All those who are in no way connected with the 
acts of Lord Dalhousie, and are willing to lay down their 
arms, shall receive a safe passage to Allahabad.' 

The idea of capitulation was revolting to every soldier 
of the garrison. Sir Hugh Wheeler, the first to speak, 
protested strongly against it, and he was supported by 
the younger combatants. The Nana, they felt, was not 
to be trusted. To him they owed their actual position. 
But Moore and Whiting, who had borne the brunt of the 
defence, thought otherwise. It would be impossible, they 
knew, to prolong the defence. Their ammunition and 
their food supplies were alike all but exhausted. The one 
chance of saving the women and children was to capitu- 
late. For themselves they cared not. They would have 
preferred to die sword in hand, but in that case the women 
and children would perish too. If there were but one 



Which are accepted. 173 

chance in a thousand of saving these, that chance, they 
thought, should be taken. They did not know how the 
Nana had dealt with the stray travellers from the North- 
west, or with the fugitives from Fathgarh, and they 
believed that, faithless as he might be in other respects, 
he was not the man to war with women and children. 
A message was therefore sent to the Maratha chieftain to 
the effect that a reply would be given on the morrow. 

An armistice was then proclaimed for the 26th, and 
on that day AzimuUah and Jawala Parshad, a Hindu 
high in his master's confidence, met Moore, Whiting, and 
the postmaster, Roche, outside the intrenchment. An 
arrangement was easily arrived at. The Nana agreed to 
allow the British to march out with their arms and sixty 
rounds of ammunition ; to escort them safely to the river 
side, where, at the Sati-Chaura Ghaut, boats stored with 
provisions should be ready to take them to Allahabad. 
The Nana wished to carry out the arrangement that very 
night, and for a time strongly insisted on the point, but 
he ultimately gave way. Mr Todd, who had been his 
tutor, was sent to his headquarters to obtain his signa- 
ture to the agreement, now fixed to take effect on the 
morning of the 27th. He found him courteous in manner, 
and full of pretended compassion for the sufferings of the 
English ladies and children. 

On the morning of the 27th the members of the 
garrison set out, escorted by numbers of the rebel force. 
The distance to the ghaut was but a mile, but to the 
women and children the time to traverse it seemed an 
eternity. When, at length, about eight o'clock, they reached 
the ghaut, their hearts bounded with joy. The forty 
boats were there, and to them the boats promised safety. 
The river was very low, as the periodical rains, though 
overdue, had not begun to fall, and our countrywomen 



174 Treacheiy of Nana Sahib. 

had to wade ankle-deep in the water before they could be 
pulled on board. The embarkation lasted about an hour; 
then- some of the Englishmen began to push off. Two or 
three boats only had just moved, when suddenly, from the 
platform of a Hindu temple from which the ghaut takes 
its name, on which sat enthroned Tantia Topi, the military 
adviser of the Nana, there issued a bugle note. Instantly 
the boatmen hurried from the boats, climbing over their 
sides, whilst upon the European passengers the assembled 
sipahis opened a concentrated fire of grape and musketry. 
Vainly did the men on board exert themselves to push 
off. Some, whose boats were under weigh, managed to 
reach the opposite bank, only to find there the mutinied 
sipahis of the 17th N. I. and the rebel cavalry of Oudh. 
The sipahis on the Kanhpur side, meanwhile, were running 
along the bank and pouring in shot after shot. There 
was no escape ; defence was impossible. In many cases 
the fire kindled the thatch which formed a covering to 
the boats. Then all was over. Those who took to the 
water were shot. All the males, in fact, were massacred. 
The women, reserved for a worse fate, were dragged on 
shore and lodged in a brick building near the bungalow 
which for many years had served as the residence and 
office of the commissariat officer of the division. 

Of the forty boats so treacherously provided thirty- 
nine were now in the hands of the rebels. One, however, 
had managed to run the gauntlet. On board of this were 
Moore, Vibart, Whiting, Mowbray Thomson, Ashe, 
Delafosse, Bolton, and others. The thatch of this boat 
had fortunately escaped ignition, and, vigorously propelled 
by its English crew, it for a short time escaped the notice 
of the murderers, busily intent upon the other thirty-nine. 
Not for long, however. Soon sipahis were discerned 
running along the bank in pursuit, whilst others, embark- 



Efforts of one Boat's Crew to escape. 175 

ing on two boats, followed the fugitives. Their aim was 
but too deadly. Moore, Ashe, and Bolton were shot dead 
as they were propelling the boat with the only implement 
available, a long pole, for the oars had been taken away. 
During the first day and the first night the pursuit con- 
tinued, varied occasionally by the launch of a blazing 
fire-boat of smaller tonnage. One pursuing boat, armed 
with fifty natives, was rapidly approaching when it 
grounded, to the joy of the pursued, on a sandbank. 
For them this was an opportunity. Disembarking, they 
attacked the rebels on the sandbank so vigorously that 
but {^\N were left to tell the tale. They then seized their 
boat, which they found well provided with ammunition; 
then casting it on the stream, they slept whilst it drifted 
down stream. 

They woke soon after midnight to find the wind had 
risen, and that the boat was still drifting, whither they 
knew not. The hope that it might have descended be- 
yond the enemy's range was dissipated as soon as the 
day broke. They found to their despair that the boat 
had been carried out of the main channel into a small 
creek, on the banks of which the enemy were huddled, 
with muskets loaded. In such an extremity there was 
but one chance — the English charge, which has never 
failed. The few able-bodied survivors tried it. There 
were but two officers unwounded capable of such a service, 
Mowbray Thomson and Delafosse ; but they had with 
them a few stalwart men of the 32d and 84th. Wading 
through the water, they dashed at the astonished sipahis, 
rushed through them, then back again to the place where 
they had left the boat. But the boat was no longer there. 
They saw her in the distance, drifting down the stream. 

The two officers and their companions pushed at once 
down the river-bank in the direction taken by the boat, but 



176 Fotcr of Them escape. 

seeing no chance of overtaking her, and still followed by 
the sipahis, they made for a Hindu temple which seemed 
to offer a position of vantage. The door of this temple 
they defended so fiercely against the advancing enemy, 
with their bayonets, that there was soon formed in front 
of it a barrier of corpses, which served to them as a ram- 
part. Within the temple they obtained a little putrid 
water, which refreshed them. Meanwhile, the assailants, 
despairing of other methods, heaped up beneath the walls 
of the temple leaves, faggots, and other combustible 
materials, with the intent to smoke out the little garrison. 
But the wind was on the side of the English. It blew the 
smoke strongly in the eyes of the assailants. Under cover 
of it, the besieged made a sudden spring forward, and 
firing a volley, charged them. In the hand-to-hand fight 
seven of the English were struck down. The remain- 
ing seven, unhurt, dashed into the stream, the sipahis 
following along the bank, and firing as they ran. Pre- 
sently two of the swimmers were shot through the head ; 
a third was caught on a sandbank and killed, but the 
remaining four, Mowbray Thomson, Delafosse, and privates 
Murphy and Sullivan, struck vigorously down the stream, 
and, aided by the current, succeeded in evading their pur- 
suers. They pushed on till, panting and exhausted, they 
reached, on the Oudh side, the territories of a raja friendly 
to the British, who befriended them until they could rejoin 
the army in the field. 

It is a sad supplement to this story to add that the 
boat from which they had issued to charge the sipdhis on 
the bank was captured, and its living cargo taken back to 
Kanhpur. The number of the survivors of the massacre 
at the ghaut and in the boats amounted to eighty-four. 
Four of these, as we have seen, escaped. The remaining 
eighty were carried before the Nana. That chieftain 



Fate of the Prisoners. 177 

now regarding himself as reigning by divine right, had 
the men shot, and the women and children confined in 
the little house of which I have spoken. 

Thus sadly terminated the ' Leaguer of Kanhpur.' On 
the 1st of July the Nana proceeded to Bithor and there, 
with great pomp and circumstance proclaimed himself 
Peshwa. There, for the moment, I must leave him, whilst 
I relate the circumstances which prevented the timely 
arrival of relief to the devoted garrison, and which ulti- 
mately led to the chastisement of the men who had 
treacherously worked its destruction. 



M 



CHAPTER XIII. 

NEILL AT BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD — HAVELOCK'S 
RECOVERY OF KANHPUR. 

I HAVE told In a previous chapter how, on the 23d of 
May, the ist Madras Fusiliers, commanded by Colonel 
Neill, an officer of great decision of character, reached 
Calcutta, and how the regiment was despatched with all 
the expedition possible to the North-Wcst. Neiil reached 
Bandras, the morning of the 4th of June, at a very critical 
nioment. To understand the crisis it will be necessary to 
explain the state of affairs in that important centre. 

The city of Banaras lies nearly midway between Cal- 
cutta and Dehli, being 469 miles north-west of the former 
and 485 south-east of the latter. The normal population 
is about a quarter of a million, but the number ebbs and 
flows with the arrival and departure of pilgrims. The city 
lies picturesquely on the left bank of the Ganges, which, 
in 1857, was crossed by a bridge of boats. The district 
of which the city is the capital has an area of 998 square 
miles, and a population of, in round numbers, 900,000. It 
is bounded to the north by Ghazipur and Juanpur, to 
the west and south by Mirzapur, and to the east by the 
Shahabad district of Western Bihar. 

At the time of which I am writing the garrison of 
Banaras consisted of half a company of European 
artillery — some thirty men — of the Sikh regiment of 
Lodiana, and of the 13th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry. 



Influence of Mr Gubbins in Bandras. 179 

The cantonment for the infantry was at Sikrol, three 
miles from the city, that of the cavalry was some five 
miles distant. The force was commanded by Brigadier 
George Ponsonby. a man who had rendered excellent 
service in his day ; but he had only just assumed com- 
mand, and was suffering from ill-health and increasing 
years. 

The citizens of Banaras had always had the character 
of being a turbulent people. They required a master who 
would be obeyed. Fortunately, in 1857, they had such 
a master in the person of Mr Frederick Gubbins, of the 
Civil Service, then District Judge. Some years before, 
when that gentleman filled the office of Magistrate of 
Banaras, he had inaugurated sanitary and other improve- 
ments within the city. The inhabitants showed their 
appreciation of these improvements by receiving Mr 
Gubbins, on the occasion of his next visit to the city, with 
a shower of stones, and by compelling him to run for his 
life. But Mr Gubbins was not the man to be baffled. 
He persisted in carrying out his reforms. The people, on 
their side, seemed equally determined. They closed their 
shops, and declined to sell grain or other wares. But Mr 
Gubbins was firm. He procured supplies from Mirzapur, 
and when, three days later, he heard that the leaders of 
the movement were about to hold a meeting in the city, 
he proceeded to the spot with two companies of sipahis, 
arrested them, and lodged them in gaol. The next 
morning he rode through the city and opened all the 
shops. From that moment Mr Gubbins was lord of 
Banaras. 

In 1857 Mr Henry Carre Tucker was the Commis- 
sioner of Banaras. But, from, the moment affairs there 
assumed a threatening attitude, the strong character of 
Mr Gubbins asserted itself, and he became practically 



i8o The Situation in May '57. 

supreme. Well supported by the Magistrate, Mr Lind, 
by the assistants, Mr Archibald Pollock and Mr Jenkin- 
son, by a loyal native nobleman, Rao Devndrain Singh, 
by a brave and resolute Sikh gentleman, detained in 
Banaras for complicity in some of the troubles in the 
Panjab, Surat Singh, and to a considerable though lesser 
extent by the Raja of Banaras, and by an influential 
Brahman, Pandit Gokal Chand, he maintained order in 
the populous city until the arrival and action of Neill and 
his troops removed the pressing danger. 

For very soon after the information of the events 
at Mirath and Dehli reached Banaras it became clear 
that the sipahis of the 37th N. I. were infected, and 
would break out on the first convenient opportunity. 
They were somewhat restrained by the presence of the 
Sikhs, who were believed to be loyal to the core. Of the 
probable behaviour of the 13th Irregulars few except 
the officers of that regiment entertained the smallest 
doubt. The position, then, was critical, and it was recog- 
nised to be so specially by those civilians upon whom it 
devolved to maintain peace and order within the city. 

One resolution Mr Gubbins and his friends stood by 
in the darkest hour of the crisis, and that was to remain 
at their post. In the early days proposals were made 
to abandon the position and retreat to the fortress of 
Chanar. But Messrs Gubbins and Lind, Gordon, who 
commanded the Sikhs, Dodgson the Brigade-Major, and 
one or two others opposed this plan so resolutely that it 
was abandoned. Nor when the districts round and near 
to Banaras broke out into rebellion did they swerve a 
hair's-breadth from that determination. The one pre- 
caution which, in concert with the military authorities, 
they did take was to fix upon a strong central post to 
serve as a place of refuge for the ladies and children. The 



Neill reaches Ba^tdras. 1 8 1 

mint, a large, oblong, fire-proof brick building, capable 
of holding out against men unprovided with guns, was 
selected for this purpose. 

Towards the end of May the English at Banaras were 
cheered by the arrival of 150 men of the lOth Foot from 
Danapur, and on the 3d and 4th of June, Colonel Neill, 
with some sixty men of the ist Madras Fusiliers, followed. 
On the morning of the 4th news reached the place of the 
mutiny of the 17th N. I. at Azamgarh. A council was 
then called of the chief civil and military authorities to 
consider the advisability of disarming the 37th N. I. 
Gubbins, Gordon, Dodgson, and all the bolder spirits 
were in favour of carrying out that necessary measure at 
once. They were listening to the strong recommenda- 
tions of Mr Gubbins on this point when Neill himself 
entered the room, and in his plain, blunt way insisted 
that delay would be fraught with imminent danger. 
Orders then were issued for a parade of the troops of 
the garrison at five o'clock that afternoon. 

The lines of the 37th N. I. were in the centre of the 
general parade ground, about midway between those 
occupied by the Sikhs and by the artillery. The question 
was how, with the 250 Europeans, to disarm a native 
regiment, nearly a thousand strong, in the presence of 
three or four hundred cavalry, suspected of sympathy 
with them, and of a Sikh regiment, believed to be 
loyal, but whose loyalty must remain unproven until it 
had been tried. It was a difficult question, and I am 
bound to add that it was solved in a very clumsy fashion. 
Before the men of the 37th had formed up in front of 
their lines, the artillery and the few men of the lOth and 
the Madras Fusiliers had taken up a position on their 
right, the Sikhs and irregular cavalry on their left. 
Colonel Spottiswoode and the English officers of the 37th 



1 82 The Sipdhis are disarmed. 

then walked down the lines of their regiment, and directed 
the men to lodge their muskets in the bells of arms 
attached to each company. Some of them quietly obeyed, 
but others, calling out that the Europeans were coming 
to shoot them down unarmed, incited the rest to resist. 
Their appeal was responded to, for suddenly the sipahis 
grasped their muskets, and noticing the Europeans ap- 
proaching from the right, faced towards them and opened 
a brisk fire. At the first fire some eight men of the loth 
Foot were shot down. This was more than could be borne. 
The English infantry returned the fire, still moving on, 
whilst the guns, unlimbering, poured in a volley of grape. 
Meanwhile, a shot from a sipahi of the 37th had killed 
Captain Guise, commandant of the 13th Irregulars. Dodg- 
son, the Brigade Major, as brave a man as ever lived, and 
as modest as he was brave, rode up to the men, and tak- 
ing command, ordered them to advance. Instead of obey- 
ing, one trooper drew his pistol and fired at Dodgson. 
Another attempted to cut him down. At this crisis one 
of the Sikhs fired upon his colonel, Gordon. The rest of 
them, not knowing apparently what to make of the 
position, began shouting and firing indiscriminately, their 
muskets levelled in the direction in which the guns were- 
posted. The guns were unsupported, for the English 
infantry was following the 37th N. I., and it seemed as 
though the Sikhs and the irregulars were about to charge 
them. But the commandant of the artillery, William 
Olpherts,^ was quite equal to the occasion. He turned 
the fire of his battery upon the Sikhs. These then wildly 
charged, only, however, to be broken and to flee in dis- 
order. The troopers of the 13th accompanied them. The 

^ It was of this officer that the late Lord Napier of Magdala said to me, 
that ' Wilham Olpherts never went into action without entitling himself to 
the Victoria Cross.' 



rieill and Gitbbms trmniph. 183 

men of the 37 N. I. were already dispersing in wild 
disorder. 

But the danger was not yet over. So clumsy had been 
the programme that the sipahis had been allowed to escape, 
with arms in their hands, in close vicinity to a populous 
city, the inhabitants of which were renowned for their tur- 
bulent character. In this crisis Frederick Gubbins, Surat 
Singh, Devnarain Singh, and other loyal men were able to 
render splendid service. The Sikhs on guard over the as- 
sembled non-combative Europeans were pacified by Surat 
Singh, himself a Sikh. Gubbins, entering the city, exerted 
the supreme influence which his character as a resolute but 
just man had gained for him. The citizens preferred to 
trust him rather than cast in their lot with rebellious 
sipahis. His vigorous action, that of Surat Singh, sup- 
ported by Devnarain Singh, by the Raja of Banaras, and 
by Pandit Gokal Chand, preserved the great city of 
Banaras to the British.^ 

Meanwhile, Neill was not idle. In the midst of the 
contest he had assumed command. Some of the 13th 
Irregulars had remained faithful. The Sikhs, recovering 
from their mad escapade, returned to their duty. The 
indigo planters of the district, prominently Mr F. C. 
Chapman, volunteered their services. In a few days 
order was restored in the immediate vicinity of the holy 
city. The presence of Mr Gubbins and his companions 
was a voucher that that order would not be again dis- 
turbed. Other European troops were coming up from 
below. On the 9th of June, then, Neill, full of resolution 
to save Allahabad and to recover Kanhpur, set out for 
the former place. 

^ For their conduct during these trying times Mr Gubbins was made 
a Companion of the Bath ; Rao Devn^riin Singh and Surat Singh received 
titles and rewards. The Raja, too, received the thanks of the Government. 



184 Azanigai'k^ yttdnpur^ Gordkhpur. 

While he Is hastening to it, I must ask the reader to 
glance at the districts which, with Banaras, face the south- 
east frontier of Oudh — the districts of Juanpur, of Azam- 
garh, and of Gorakhpur. I will not detain him long. 

The landowners of those districts had been made 
hostile to British rule by the introduction of that land 
system with which Mr Thomason, forcing European ideas 
upon an oriental people, had superseded the time-honoured 
methods which not even Akbar had dared to repeal. 
Azamgarh was the first to display disaffection. The 
bulk of the 17th Regiment N. I. stationed there rose on 
the 3d of June, and though the place, abandoned by the 
civilians, was afterwards recovered by two men cast in 
the heroic type, Messrs Venables and Dunn, it continued 
for a very long time to be a festering sore in the British 
side. At Juanpur, nearly midway between Banaras and 
Azamgarh, the Sikhs stationed there, excited by the 
story of the manner in which their countrymen had been 
mowed down at Banaras, rose on the 5th of June. That 
place, though constantly reoccupied, continued to give 
trouble until the autumn of the following year. Gorakh- 
pur, on the Nipal side of Azamgarh, saved for a long time 
by the splendid daring and cool judgment of its Judge, 
Mr William Wynyard, gave way in July. Few districts 
gave more trouble during the revolt, or afforded more 
scope for the display of the noblest qualities of the British 
race, than did those three districts — bounded to the north- 
west by Oudh, to the north by Nipal, to the south by 
the city of Banaras, and to the south-east by the in- 
flammable division of Western Bihar — represented by 
Juanpur, Azamgarh, and Gorakhpur. 

Meanwhile, Neill, accompanied by forty-three men of 
his splendid regiment, had left Banaras by post, on the 
night of the 9th of June, to assume command at Allahabad. 



Neill at Allahabad. 185 

His journey was a difficult one, for the road was deserted, 
the post-horses had been carried off, and the district was 
full of marauders. It was not, then, till the afternoon of 
the nth that he and his party reached Jhusi, a village on 
the high bank overlooking the junction of the Jamnah and 
the Ganges, and the point where the road from Banaras 
passed over the bridge of boats then maintained across 
the former river. But Neill found the bridge partially 
destroyed, and the further end of it occupied by the rebels. 
He noticed that Daryaganj, a suburb of Allahabad, which 
commanded that further end, was also in their possession. 
He knew, too, that his men were worn out by fatigue. 
But the great aim of Neill's life was to conquer difficulties. 
Descending the Ganges, he espied and hailed a fisherman 
pursuing his craft in a solitary boat. He bought the man, 
and was about to trust ' Caesar and his fortunes ' to the 
frail canoe when the English guard on duty on the ram- 
parts of the fort of Allahabad recognised his men. Boats 
were then sent over in sufficient numbers. 

Neill entered the fort. He was aware that the task 
before him was a heavy one ; that to restore order the 
means at his disposal were scanty. In his journey from 
Banaras he had noticed that the entire country along the 
Ganges was in a state of anarchy. He now found the fort 
invested : the troops who mainly formed the garrison — the 
Sikhs of the same regiment he had laid his hand upon at 
Banaras — coaxed into the appearance of subordination : 
confusion and disorder in every department : an unchecked 
enemy without, vacillation ruling within. 

He immediately assumed command. Notwithstanding 
his fatigue, and the exhaustion consequent upon it, he did 
not sleep until he had arranged his plans for the morrow. 
The day of the 12th had scarcely dawned when he opened 
fire from the fort on the suburb of Daryaganj, held by a large 



1 86 Neilts Restorative Measures. 

body of insurgent rabble. When he had cleared the outskirts 
with a few rounds he despatched the forty-three men of his 
own regiment, three companies of Sikhs, and forty native 
horsemen to expel the rebels from the suburb and secure 
the bridge of boats. This they accomplished without loss. 
He then repaired the bridge, and placed a company of 
Sikhs to guard it. A company of the fusiliers from 
Banaras crossed it that same afternoon to enter the fort. 

The next day and the day following he continued his 
reorganising measures. With great tact he moved the 
Sikhs to a position outside the fort. He bought up all 
the liquor, and lodged it in the Government stores. On 
the 15th he despatched by steamer to Calcutta the numer- 
ous women and children, and then cleared of the enemy 
the villages in immediate vicinity to the fort. The effect 
of these strong measures was quickly visible. On the 17th 
the Magistrate, Mr Court, proceeded to the city, and re- 
installed his own officials at the Kotwali. Not only was 
there no resistance, but the whole place seemed deserted. 
The Maulavi himself had fled to Kanhpur. Neill improved 
the occasion by marching the following day, with his whole 
force, to the cantonment, the scene of the massacre of their 
own officers by the men of the 6th N. I. He found that a 
complete reaction had set in, that terror had taken the 
place of insolence, that the desire to escape punishment 
had succeeded to the love of killing. 

Leaving to the authorities appointed under the martial 
law, which had been proclaimed, to deal with rebels and 
murderers, Neill proceeded to develop the plan he had 
arranged in his own mind, viz., a march, as soon as possible, 
to the relief of Kdnhpur. On the i8th his force amounted 
to 360 English soldiers. The same day 150 more arrived. 
He had placed on a serviceable footing the Commissariat 
and Transport departments. These had procured carts and 



Havelock assttmes Command. 187 

camels, and more were coming in. His executive officers, 
Captain Russell, in the Ordnance department. Captain 
Davidson of the Commissariat, Captain Brown of the 
artillery, were working with a will. The natives, too, 
were now displaying untiring energy on behalf of the 
British cause. Messrs Chester and Court, of the Civil 
Service, were rendering invaluable aid. Cholera, though 
it came, did not stop the efforts of a single man of that 
heroic band. On the 24th the force had attained some- 
what larger proportions, so much so that Neill could talk 
of the advance on Kanhpur as a matter of a few days. 
That same day he heard that the Government had de- 
cided to entrust the command of the relieving force 
to Havelock. Bitterly as he felt the supersession, he 
did not in the least relax his efforts. On the after- 
noon of the 30th of June he despatched an advance 
force of 400 Europeans, 300 Sikhs, and 120 troopers, 
under one of his best officers, Major Renaud, on the road 
to Kanhpur. He arranged, also, to embark a hundred 
men and two guns, under Captain Spurgin, on a river 
steamer, under orders for the same destination. This 
intention was carried out — but by Havelock. 

Havelock, in fact, reached Allahabad on the 30th of 
June, the day on which Renaud started. A very capable 
soldier, possessing large experience, and gifted with the 
power of leadership to a rare degree, Havelock was the 
very man for the situation. One may sympathise with 
Neill in his disappointment, and yet recognise that Henry 
Havelock was the fittest soldier in all India for the occa- 
sion. He at once took up the thread of Neill's prepara- 
tions, despatched Spurgin and his steamer on the 3d of 
July, and at four o'clock of the evening of the 7th started 
at the head of his small brigade for Kanhpur. 

Rumours of disaster at that place had reached Alia- 



i88 Havelock marches to KdnlLpiir. 

habad on the 2d. Neill disbelieved tliem. Even Have- 
lock doubted. But not many hours elapsed after he set 
out ere the state of the districts gave to his mind the 
fullest confirmation of the worst reports. 

The force led by Havelock from Allahabad, on the 
afternoon of the 7th of July, consisted of seventy-six 
artillerymen, 979 English infantry, taken from the 64th, 
the 78th, and the 84th Foot, eighteen volunteer cavalry, 
Englishmen, 150 Sikhs, and thirty irregular cavalry. 
He was preceded by Renaud's small detachment, already 
noted, and by Spurgin's 100 men on board the steamer. 
He left behind him Neill and the remainder of the 
1st Madras Fusiliers, with instructions to follow as soon 
as another column should be organised and he should be 
able to consign the fort to proper hands. 

In the selection of his staff Havelock had been par- 
ticularly happy. From the loth Foot he had taken his 
son, a daring soldier, full of resources, and eager for 
opportunities, as his Aide-de-Camp. Stuart Beatson, a 
man instructed, able, and devoted was his assistant 
Adjutant-General. Eraser Tytlcr, an excellent cavalry 
officer, was his assistant Quartermaster-General. 

Assured that Kanhpur had fallen, and advised that the 
station of Fathpur, seventy-one miles from Allahabad and 
forty-nine from Kanhpur, had fallen into the hands of the 
rebels, Havelock transmitted orders to Renaud to halt 
where he was, fourteen miles to the east of Fathpur. 
Pushing on as rapidly as possible, Havelock reached 
Khagah, nineteen miles from that place, on the nth. 
There he received information from Renaud, then only 
five miles in advance of him, to the effect that the 
mutinied regiments of Kanhpur, reinforced by other 
rebels, were marching on Fathpur, with the apparent 
intention of holding that place against the advancing 




y^yr- r7l^yri^'?j. <^ta/i'^fL>cK. 



The Rising at Fathpit7\ 1 89 

British. Havelock then broke up his camp at midnight, 
joined Renaud an hour and a half later, and pushed on 
to Balindah, four miles to the east of Fathpur. 

The story of the mutiny at Fathpur may be told in 
a few words. The native troops stationed there, consist- 
ing of fifty men of the 6th N. I., had, after a show of 
loyalty, joined other rebels and mutineers in a general 
outbreak on the 9th of June. The Europeans, who for 
more than a fortnight had been daily expecting a rising, 
escaped, with one exception, to Bandah. That exception 
was Mr Robert Tucker, the Judge. He, after defending 
himself with great gallantry, and, if the testimony of a 
native Christian is to be believed, slaying sixteen men 
with his own hand, was captured, subjected to the forms 
of trial, and executed on the spot. The natives of Fath- 
pur and of the districts around it, under the guidance of 
one Hikmat-ullah, a Deputy Magistrate under British 
rule, rose in revolt, and declared their readiness to submit 
to the authority then paramount at Kanhpur. It was 
to secure this place that Nana Sahib now despatched a 
force composed of 1400 trained sipahis, 1500 local levies, 
500 trained cavalry, and 100 artillerymen, with twelve 
guns, to bar the road to the English. It was commanded 
by Tika Singh, a Subahdar of the 2d L. C, who had 
taken a prominent part in the leaguer of Kanhpur. 

On reaching Balindah Havelock sent Tytler to the 
front to reconnoitre. Tytler came upon the rebels as they 
were marching, having passed through Fathpur, towards 
the British position. Their infantry, in column of route, 
held the high road, with three guns in front of the 
column, the remainder in the rear, and the cavalry on 
both flanks. These latter, noticing Tytler almost as soon 
as he saw them, dashed at him. Tytler had to ride hard 
to give timely information to Havelock. The latter, who 



igo Combat of FatJipur. 

was resting his troops after their early march, at once 
formed them in order of battle. He placed the guns, 
eight in number, commanded by Captain Maude, R.A., 
in front ; in the same line with them a body of skirm- 
ishers, in loose order, armed with the Enfield rifle, then 
new in India, ready to open fire on the enemy as soon 
as he should appear. Behind the guns he disposed 
the several detachments of infantry, forming a line of 
quarter-distance columns ready to deploy. The eighteen 
volunteer-horse guarded the right flank ; the bulk of the 
irregulars the left. 

These dispositions had not quite been completed when 
the enemy's guns, now well within distance, opened fire, 
whilst their cavalry, galloping round, threatened the flanks 
of the English. For a few seconds their fire was un- 
answered. Only, however, for a few seconds. Then 
Maude, moving his battery to the front, opened fire, and 
in a second it became a species of duello at a distance of 
400 yards between the rival guns, those of the British 
being backed up by the fire of the Enfield rifles. Very 
soon this double fire silenced that of the rebels, and 
Maude, pushing on to within 200 yards of the rebel 
infantry, poured upon them the fire which had silenced 
the guns. The English infantry advanced at the same 
time, and although the rebels seemed as though they 
would stand to protect their heavy guns, their resolution 
faded away in the presence of the advancing British, and 
they turned and fled. 

During this time the rebel cavalry had been steadily 
manoeuvring on both flanks. Their efforts on the British 
left were checked by the handful of volunteers ; but on 
the right, where the horsemen were, with the exception of 
the officers, entirely natives, a disaster threatened. Some 
eighteen or twenty of the rebel cavalry, advancing at 



HavelocJc s First Victo7y. 191 

a trot, called out to the men serving under Havelock to 
turn and join them. They seemed to hesitate, when 
Palliser, who commanded them, sounded the charge. He 
was followed by Simpson, the Adjutant, but by only three 
or four of the men. Noticing this, the rebels charged in 
their turn. In the scrimmage which followed Palliser was 
unhorsed, and it would have gone hard with him but that 
some of the men who had refused to follow him rallied 
round him and brought him off. The irregulars then 
fled, followed by the rebel cavalry. 

Meanwhile, the main body of the infantry had pushed 
into Fathpur. Just as the right column entered it, 
Beatson, who was with it, noticed the handful of irre- 
gulars dashing towards it, followed by the mutinied 2d 
Cavalry. To halt, to allow the fugitives to pass through, 
then to pour upon the enemy a volley which sent them 
reeling back, was the work of a few moments. Whilst he 
was engaged in this, the centre and left had pushed 
through the one narrow street of the town, attacked the 
rear-guard of the rebels, driven it into flight, and captured 
all the baggage. Amongst the latter were two new six- 
pounders, large quantities of ammunition, and two tum- 
brils laden with specie. It was past midday when a 
final parting shot was sent after the retreating foe. The 
heat was intense. The sun, in fact, proved more deadly 
than the fire of the rebels. For though the casualties 
amounted to twelve, these had all been caused by sun- 
stroke. It was one o'clock before the men of the little 
force, which had marched nineteen miles, and foup-ht a 
pitched battle on an empty stomach, reached the en- 
camping ground. They had captured twelve guns, and 
had given the perpetrators of the Kanhpur massacre a 
first lesson of retaliation. There was but one drawback 
to complete success. A victory, not followed up, can 



192 He finds the Rebels at A oung. 

never be reckoned as complete. Havelock had no cavalry 
to follow up his victory. Eighteen volunteers — and he 
could then trust only Englishmen — were all insufficient 
to pursue thousands. 

On the 13th Havelock gave his men a rest. The day 
following he resumed his advance, and as he marched 
received abundant ocular demonstrations of the pre- 
cipitancy of the rebels' flight. The road was strewed with 
properties hurriedly cast away. The only event of im- 
portance which marked the day was the disarming of the 
native irregular cavalry. To mark his sense of the 
behaviour of these men in the Fathpur fight, Havelock 
had placed them on duty as baggage guards. It hap- 
pened that as the force was marching, on the 14th, a re- 
port was made that the enemy were occupying a village in 
front. The guns were therefore brought up, and opened 
fire. The report turned out to be unfounded, but the 
native troopers took advantage of the firing of the guns 
to plunder the baggage. They were caught in the act, and 
promptly disarmed and dismounted. Havelock utilised 
their horses for the public service. 

As the force was encamping that evening, information 
was brought to its leader that the rebels were in force at 
Aoung, a village some six miles distant. He marched, 
then, early the following morning, confident that he would 
have to fight them. The volunteers commanded by Captain 
Barrow, who formed the advance, descried them about day- 
break, their position covered by an intrenchment thrown up 
across the road, and ready for the contest. Barrow galloped 
back with the information, followed by round-shot, and 
by a body of 700 sipahis, who promptly took possession of 
a hamlet, several hundred yards m front of their position, 
and opened from it a smart musketry fire. Havelock at 
once made his dispositions. Remaining with the rear- 



Havelock beats the Rebels at Aoung, 193 

guard himself, he sent Tytler to the front with about a 
third of the force. Tytler ordered two companies of the 
Madras Fusiliers, under Renaud, to dislodge the rebels 
from the hamlet they had seized. Renaud started on this 
errand with his habitual gallantry, and carried it out 
thoroughly, though at the cost of his own life. He was 
struck in the thigh by a bullet, and died two days after- 
wards. Meanwhile, Maude's battery had come to the front 
and had begun to play on the intrenchment. The issue 
of his fire was not long doubtful. After a few rounds the 
rebels gave way. In the interval their cavalry had made 
a wide detour, in order to come round and plunder the 
baggage of the advancing force. A sergeant of the High- 
landers, who had charge of it, saw them coming, and 
collecting his men, received them with so sharp a fire that 
they were glad to make off. Again did the enemy's guns 
fall into the hands of the victors. But they had fought 
better, and their fire had inflicted more damage, than had 
been the case at Fathpur. 

But the work of the day was not yet over. The fight 
had lasted fully two hours. As the soldiers were resting 
after it, in the position whence they had dislodged the 
rebels, reports were brought to Havelock that the latter 
had retired to a very strong position, covered by a rivulet, 
swollen by the rains, known as Pandu Nadi. As the 
rivulet was unfordable at the season, Havelock recognised 
the importance of securing the stone bridge which crossed 
it ere it should be destroyed by the rebels. He therefore 
pushed on without delay, and after marching three miles 
came in sight of the rivulet, the stone bridge intact, and 
the rebels in force, covered by earthworks, on the opposite 
side. Another second and a puff of smoke, followed by 
the pounding shot, revealed the fact that the bridge was 
guarded by a twenty-four-pound gun and a twenty-five- 

N 



194 And at Pdnciii Nadi. 

pound carronade. Again was the order given to bring 
the guns to the front. Whilst a detachment of men, armed 
with the Enfield, moved down the lateral ravines and 
opened a steady musketry fire, Maude, moving forward 
under the fire of the enemy, held his reply until he had 
placed his guns in positions whence they could envelop 
the intrenchment in a concentric fire. No sooner had 
these opened than the fire of the rebels ceased as if by 
magic. It transpired that the very first discharge from 
Maude's guns had smashed their sponge staffs, and having 
none in reserve they could no longer load their pieces. 
They made one desperate effort to blow up the bridge — 
an effort which failed — and then gave way. Simultane- 
ously the Madras Fusiliers advanced, followed by the 
Highlanders, and rapidly crossing the bridge, caught the 
rebel gunners ere they could escape, and bayoneted them 
as they stood or ran. Maude followed with his guns, and 
pounded the enemy as they fled. Havelock pushed on 
for a mile beyond the bridge, and then halted for the 
nio'ht. The British loss in the two actions was about 
thirty men killed and wounded. The most regretable 
of these was that of Major Renaud, an excellent officer, 
always to be depended upon. 

The soldiers bivouacked that night on the spot whence 
the last gun was fired at the retreating enemy. That even- 
ing Havelock received information that Nana Sahib, at the 
head, it was said, of 7000 men of all arms, would oppose 
his entry into Kanhpur on the morrow. But other infor- 
mation, to the effect that there were still alive in that station 
some 200 women and children of British blood, who had 
escaped the massacre of the 27th of June, cheered him and 
his men. ' With God's help, men,' he exclaimed, ' we shall 
save them, or every man of us die in the attempt' Such was 
his spirit, such, also, the spirit of the men he commanded. 



Position taken by Nana Sahib. 195 

Kanhpur was twenty-two miles distant from the spot 
on which the handful of British troops was encamped. 
For them there was but little sleep that night. The 
knowledge that some of their countrywomen were alive, 
and that it might be theirs to rescue them, had excited 
them to feverish impatience. Very early the following 
morning they were ranged in marching order. A tramp 
of sixteen miles brought them to the village of Maharajpiir. 
The sun was well up in the heavens, and the heat was 
fearful— greater than on any previous day. Halting there, 
Havelock despatched Barrow to the front for information.' 
Barrow had not proceeded far when he met two loyal 
sipahis on their way, at the risk of their lives, to convey 
to the leader of the avenging force the particulars they 
had carefully noted regarding the dispositions of Nana 
Sahib. The information they gave was of the last im- 
portance. Nana Sahib, they said, was in front, occupying, 
with about 5000 men and eight guns, a position about 
800 yards in rear of the point where the branch road into 
Kanhpur leaves the grand trunk road. His left rested 
on an intrenched village, standing among trees on high 
ground, within a mile of the Ganges, and was defended 
by three twenty-four-pounders. His centre was covered 
by swampy ground, and by a low-lying hamlet, on the 
edge of which, commanding the trunk road, ' were a 
twenty-four-pound howitzer and a nine-pounder, covered 
by mud earthworks. His right was covered by a village 
in a mango grove, surrounded by a mud wall, through 
the embrasures of which two nine-pounders pointed their 
muzzles towards the fork. The sipahfs further reported 
that the rebels, certain that Havelock would advance 
towards the fork, had taken the measurements from their 
positions to that point very carefully, and had laid their 
guns with the view of meeting him with a concentrated fire. 



196 Havelock turns the Position. 

This timely information decided Havelock to attempt 
a turning movement He halted long enough to allow 
his men to have their dinners, then ' remembering/ as 
he said, ' old Frederic at Leuthen,' he advanced, covered 
by his cavalry, until he reached a point where a line of 
groves, on his right, promised to cover a flanking move- 
ment in that direction. This point was within half-a-mile 
of the forking of the roads. Directing Barrow to move 
straight on, accompanied, to deceive the rebels, by a 
company of the Madras Fusiliers, in skirmishing order, on 
either side of the road, he marched with the bulk of the 
force to his right, covered by the groves spoken of. The 
enemy, meanwhile, believing that in the horse and foot 
in front of them they beheld the heads of the British 
columns, opened a concentrated fire on the fork. This 
lasted the time it took the main body to march half-a- 
mile. Havelock's leafy screen then failed him, and the 
rebels discovered to their surprise that their left flank 
had been all but turned, and they at once changed, as 
best they could, the direction of their fire. The English 
general, however, recognising that the turning movement 
was not completed, withheld all reply to the shot and 
shell, which soon came whizzing about him, until he 
had reached a point at a right angle to the enemy's 
position. He then wheeled into line and advanced 
against it. 

The occasion was one which permitted a general to defy 
the rules which chain down pedants. Havelock had aban- 
doned his baggage, his communication with Allahabad, 
and he had placed his army between his enemy and the 
mighty Ganges, at the full swell of her power. In taking 
each of these steps he deliberately broke the rules of 
war. But never was there a clearer proof given that such 
rules are not made to bind, and never will bind, a man of 



He smashes the Rebel Left. 197 

genius. And certainly, on that i6th of July, Havelock 
amply vindicated his claim to that title. 

The time which had elapsed since the enemy caught 
sight of Havelock's turning movement and his completion 
of it, short as it was, had yet been sufficiently long to 
enable them to change their alignment, and to bring their 
guns to bear in the new direction. They had no longer, 
however, the exact knowledge of the distance, which they 
had hoped to utilise in the first position. But as Have- 
lock advanced their superiority in weight of metal became 
perceptible, and Havelock recognised that there was no- 
thing for it but the bayonet. When within eighty yards 
of the rebel batteries, then, he gave the order to charge. 
Like an eager pack of hounds racing to the kill the High- 
landers dashed forward. In a few seconds they were over 
the mound covering the rebel position and into the vil- 
lage which they had held. They did not fire a shot or 
utter a shout, so fierce was their anger ; but they did the 
work with the bayonet. It need scarcely be added that 
the slaughter was proportionate. But the great gun in 
the enemy's centre was now turned against the victorious 
soldiers. Havelock, noticing this, galloped up to the 
Highlanders, and with a few cheery words incited them 
to make one more charge. Then, indeed; they cheered, 
and scarcely waiting to make a regular formation, dashed 
on against the gun, led by the General in person. They 
carried it, completely smashing the rebel centre as they 
had smashed his left. Then they halted, impatient to 
direct their prowess in a new direction. 

Nor had success been less pronounced on the right. 
There the 64th and the 84th, the Sikhs and Barrow's 
handful of volunteers, had forced back the rebels, and 
compelled them to concentrate in a village about a mile 
in the rear of their first position. To drive them from 



198 The Rally of the Rebels. 

this position, a very strong one, was now the work before 
the undaunted infantry. The 64th approached it from 
the left, the Highlanders from the centre, whilst on the 
extreme right the Madras Fusiliers were carrying all 
before them. When the soldiers, tired and panting, 
arrived within charging distance, Havelock, appealing to 
the regimental spirit of rivalry, called out : ' Who is to 
take that village, the Highlanders or the 64th ? ' Instantly 
the two regiments raced for the village, and carried it 
without a check. 

The battle now seemed won. After the storm of the 
village Havelock halted to reorganise his line, and then 
advanced up the low rise which covers the entrance into 
Kanhpur. But scarcely had he crowned the summit when 
a fierce fire opened upon him, and he beheld, drawn up at 
a distance of half-a-mile, straight in front of him, the re- 
united masses of rebel infantry. From their centre a 
twenty-four-pounder gun belched forth its fire, whilst two 
smaller pieces on either side of it followed its example. 
Conspicuously seated on an elephant was Nana Sahib, 
moving about amongst the troops, encouraging them with 
sounds of native music and appeals to their fanaticism. 
The sight was as unexpected as it was formidable, for 
Havelock had fain hoped that the serious part of the 
business was over. 

He had, indeed, need of all his coolness and self-pos- 
session. His men, who had marched twent}^ miles, and 
fought one fierce battle, were worn out. His guns were 
a mile in the rear, and the horses which had drawn them 
were knocked up. It was asking a great deal of the 
infantry soldier to require him to charge those masses 
and those guns. But Havelock recognised that there 
was nothing else to be done. He recognised, moreover, 
that if to be done at all it must be done at once, for the 



The Charge of the 6'/\th. 199 

spirits of the soldiers were still high, and the sight was 
one calculated to discourage men not on the move. 
Realising the situation on the moment, he rode to the 
front on his .pony — for his horse had been shot under 
him — and turning round to the men, sitting between them 
and the enemy's fire, he said in a high-pitched voice : 
' The longer you look at it^ men, the less you will like it. 
Rise up. The brigade will advance, left battalion leading.' 
The left battalion was the 64th. I shall follow the 
example of the last of the biographers^ of Havelock, to 
whose vivid and picturesque account of the battle I am 
much indebted, and describe the action that followed in 
the words of the General himself: ' The enemy sent round- 
shot into our ranks until we were within 300 yards, and 
then poured in grape with such precision and determina- 
tion as I have seldom witnessed. But the 64th, led by 
Major Sterling and by my Aide-de-Camp ' — his son, the 
present Sir Henry Havelock-Allan — 'who had placed him- 
self in their front, were not to be denied. Their rear showed 
the ground strewed with wounded ; but on they steadily 
and silently came, then with a cheer charged and cap- 
tured the unwieldy trophy of their valour. The enemy 
lost all heart, and, after a hurried fire of musketry, gave 
way in total rout. Four of my guns came up, and com- 
pleted their discomfiture by a heavy cannonade ; and as 
it grew dark the roofless barracks of our artillery were 
dimly descried in advance, and it was evident that Kanh- 
pur was once more in our possession.' The little force 
bivouacked for the night on the edge of the plain which 
marks the entry into the station, about two miles from 
the town. They had neither food nor tents ; they had 
marched twenty miles, and had defeated an enemy, 
stronger in all arms, outnumbering them by nearly five 

^ Havelock. By Archibald Forbes. Macmillan, 1890. 



200 Nana Sahib massacres His Prisone7^s. 

to one, and occupying a carefully prepared position, but 
they lay down happy because conscious of deserving. 
Well might Havelock tell them, as he did in the order 
he issued on the occasion, that ' he was satisfied and 
more than satisfied with them.' The troops and the 
general were alike worthy of one another. The loss sus- 
tained by the victors in this fierce contest was about lOO 
killed and wounded. Amongst those who passed away 
was Stuart Beatson, the Adjutant-General of the force, 
a daring and most accomplished officer, who fell a victim 
to cholera. Knowing his end approaching, he had yet 
insisted in following, on a tumbril, Barrow's cavalry into 
action. So keen was his soldierly perception that, despite 
his agony, he had pointed out to Barrow, at a critical 
phase of the action, an opportunity for a cavalry charge. 
That officer had promptly availed himself of the hint. 
In the very presence of the destroyer, whose clutch he 
knew to be upon him, Beatson could yet devote all his 
energies to the interests of his country. Such men are 
priceless. But the campaigns of the Crimea and Indian 
Mutiny proved that Great Britain had a store of them. 

Meanwhile, Nana Sahib had by a foul and barbarous 
massacre deprived the troops who had defeated him in 
the field of the most ardently desired fruits of their 
victory. When he saw, on the 15 th, that the British 
soldiers were not to be withstood, when they had forced 
his position on the Pandu Nadi, and when he recognised 
that they would assail him in Kanhpur, he gave orders 
for the massacre of the women and children still confined 
in the little house I have described. These, with some 
fugitives from Fathgarh, numbered nearly 200. They 
were all, without one exception, brutally murdered by the 
myrmidons of the Nana, and their bodies were cast into 
a deep well adjacent to the house. The massacre was 



Have lock enters Kdnhpur. 201 

accompanied by circumstances of peculiar barbarity. It 
was a massacre which the Nana and those about him 
must have known was absolutely without excuse, even 
the excuse, which some crocheteers, eager to excuse the 
enemies of England, have urged, of self-preservation. 
For those who were acquainted with the English 
character knew well that such an outrage, far from in- 
ducing Havelock to retire ' because there remained no 
one to be rescued,' would only stimulate his determina- 
tion to exterminate the perpetrators. 

So, in fact, it was. The next morning Tytler, who 
had been sent forward to reconnoitre, returned to report 
that the rebels had evacuated the city and its environs. 
Shortly before a concussion which shook the plain had 
conveyed the information that the magazine had been 
blown up. It was the last parting shot of the rebels. 
They retired, then, on Bithor. 

After breakfast the troops marched into the station 
to witness the horrible and heart-rending sight I have 
spoken of It was sufficient to stir up the mildest among 
them to revenge. But before that vengeance could be 
wreaked many things required to be accomplished. 
Havelock stood, indeed, victorious at Kanhpur. But it 
was a position, so to speak, in the air. Close to him, at 
Bithor, was, he was informed, the army of Nana Sahib, 
still largely outnumbering his own. The Ganges alone 
separated him from the revolted province of Oudh, one 
spot in the capital of which, still held by Englishmen, was 
besieged and in imminent danger. At Kalpi, to the 
south-west, forty-five miles from Kanhpur, the mutinied 
Gwaliar contingent was gradually concentrating, and their 
presence there was a menace to his left rear. He had but 
1 100 men all told. On the 15th, presaging his early 
reoccupation of Kanhpur, he had directed Neill to bring 



202 Position of Havelock at Kdnhpur, 

him all the reinforcements he could. Neill brought him 
227 men on the 20th, a mere handful. The position was 
difficult in the extreme. To hold Kanhpur at all with 
such a force as his, with an enemy in front, an enemy on 
his right flank, and an enemy making for his left rear, 
was against all rules. But Havelock, we have seen, knew 
when to discard rules. With a noble courage he resolved, 
then, first to storm the position of the rebel chieftain who 
had ordered the massacre of his countrymen, and then to 
make a desperate effort to ward from the English, nobly 
defending the Lakhnao Residency, the fate which had 
overtaken Wheeler and his party at Kanhpur. He had 
the right to hope that the troops which he knew were 
daily reaching Calcutta would be sent on to strengthen 
him. 

Before describing his action it is necessary to bestow 
a glance on the position of affairs within the Lakhnao 
Residency. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THE RESIDENCY AT LAKHNAO AFTER CHINHAT— 
HAVELOCK'S first attempts to RELIEVE IT. 

I LEFT Sir Henry Lawrence, on the 1st and 2d ot 
July, concentrating his troops within the Residency of 
Lakhnao. He had, on the evening of the ist, caused the 
Machchi Bhawan to be blown up, and its garrison, guns 
and treasure to be withdrawn. to the enclosure which he 
had fixed upon as the place most capable of offering re- 
sistance to the rebels. Within that enclosure he had, on 
the morning of the 2d of July, 535 men of the 32d Foot, 
fifty of the 84th, eighty-nine artillerymen, 100 English 
officers attached to the loyal sipahis, or unattached, 153 
civilians, covenanted and uncovenanted servants of the 
State, and 765 natives. The place these held was, from 
a military point of view, not defensible. The slight for- 
tifications, in the shape of earthworks, which had been 
contemplated, were still incomplete, whilst distant from 
these less than the width of the Strand were houses cap- 
able of being occupied in force by the rebels. The west 
and south faces of the enclosure were practically unde- 
fended, the bastion commenced at the angle of the two 
faces having been left unfinished. The position may, in 
a few words, be roughly described as comprising a num- 
ber of houses built for ordinary domestic purposes, separ- 
ated originally from one another by small plots of ground, 
but now roughly united by mud walls and trenches. 



204 The Residency, 

These houses were contained in a space called, from the 
chief house within it, the Residency, 2150 feet long from 
north-west to south-east, and 1200 broad from east to 
west. The defences, as they were gradually constituted, 
beginning from the Baillie guard at the eastermost point, 
and continuing northward, were (i) Alexander's battery, 
(2) the water-gate battery, (3) the Redan battery, (4) a 
palisade. From that point southward there followed 
(i) Innes's garrison, (2) the bhusa guard, (3) Gubbins's 
garrison and Gubbins's battery, (4) the Sikh square. 
Thence eastward (i) the Kanhpur battery, (2) Thomas's 
battery, (3) Anderson's garrison, (4) the post-office garri- 
son, (5) the judicial garrison, (6) Sago's guard, (7) the 
financial garrison. The defences were not, I have said, 
complete when the blockade began. They were, at the 
best, very rough, run up under great difficulties, and never 
in their finished state deserving the character of regular 
fortifications. It was only gradually that the several 
houses and their occupants came to be distinguished by 
the names I have appended to each. 

From the day when Lawrence concentrated his troops 
within the enclosure the fire of the rebels upon it had been 
continuous. The mutinous sipahis, the old aristocracy, 
the dispossessed landowners, the discontented middlemen 
in the districts, all contributed their quota to the memor- 
able leaguer. In the cause to the triumph of which they 
devoted their energies they displayed a persistence, a per- 
severance, and a resolution which gave evidence of the 
strength of their convictions. Night and day, from the 
tops of the houses in close vicinity to the intrenchment, 
from every point where cover was available, they poured 
in an unremitting fire of round-shot, of musketry, of 
matchlock balls. From the howitzers they had filched 
from the British they sent shells hissing into the Resi- 



Death of Sii^ Hen7y Lazvrence, 205 

dency itself. One of these, the very first day of the siege, 
caused to the assailed a calamity which was mourned 
wherever the English language is spoken. 

Sir Henry Lawrence had occupied in the Residency 
a room convenient for noticing the movements of the 
enemy, but much exposed to their fire. Seated in this 
room, the day after the fight at Chinhat, conversing with 
his Secretary, Mr Couper, he was startled by the bursting 
within the room of an eight-inch shell. No harm followed 
the explosion, but the danger to the most precious life 
in the garrison made a deep impression on his staff, and 
Sir Henry at length agreed to remove to a less exposed 
room on the morrow. The following morning, the 2d, he 
went out early to arrange the disposition of the force 
which had come in from the Machchi Bhawan. He re- 
turned, tired, about eight o'clock, and lay on his bed whilst 
he transacted business with his Adjutant-General, Captain 
Wilson. Lying near him was his nephew, George Law- 
rence. Suddenly there came a sheet of flame, a terrific 
report and a shock, followed by intense darkness. It was a 
shell from the howitzer which had been fired in the morn- 
ing. It left George Lawrence, as it burst, unscathed, it tore 
off the shirt from the back of Captain Wilson, and it mor- 
tally wounded Sir Henry Lawrence. He lingered in ex- 
treme agony to the morning of the 4th, and then died. 

The death of this great man was felt by the garrison 
as a loss only not irreparable, because they inherited the 
splendid courage which had animated him from the first 
hour of the insurrection to the moment when he was 
called away. They felt, one and all, that they could best 
testify their respect for his memory by carrying out their 
stern defence on the lines he had laid down. He was 
succeeded, as chief commissioner, by Major Banks, an 
officer of rare merit, who had been his friend and con 



2o6 Casttalties ainone[st the Garrison. 



fidant. The command of the troops, however, devolved 
upon Brigadier Inglis of the 32d. 

Whilst Havelock was fighting his way from Allahabad 
to Kanhpur, in the manner described in the preceding 
chapter, the garrison of the Residency was exposed to the 
unremitting attacks of an enemy vastly superior to it in 
numbers and strength of position. The compass of this 
volume will not permit me to give in full detail a history 
of the several assaults. It must suffice to refer to those 
of the greatest importance. From the very outset the 
damage done to life and material were great. Sir Henry 
Lawrence died, as I have told, on the 4th of July. Mrs 
Dorin and Mr Ommanney, the latter one of the prominent 
members of the Civil Service, were killed or mortally 
wounded the same day. Major Francis, of the 13th N. I., 
a very gallant officer, who had successfully brought in the 
garrison of the Machchi Bhawan, and Mr Polehampton, 
the Chaplain, succumbed to the rebels' fire on the 7th. 
Before the dawn of the 20th of the month the casualties 
had been increased by Mr Bryson, at one time Sergeant- 
Major 1 6th Lancers, shot through the head on the 9th; 
by Lieutenant Dashwood, 48th N. I., who succumbed the 
same day to cholera ; by Lieutenant Charlton, 32d Foot, 
shot through the head on the 13th; by Lieutenant Lester, 
mortally wounded on the 14th ; by Lieutenants Bryce 
and O'Brien, wounded on the i6th ; by Lieutenant 
Harmer, wounded, and Lieutenant Arthur, killed, on 
the 19th. 

Nor was the damage less to the materials which formed 
the component parts of the defences. On the 15th Ander- 
son's house was entirely destroyed by round-shot. The 
garrison, however, still continued to hold the ground on 
which it had stood. On the i8th many round-shots were 
fired into the post-office, Fayrer's house, commanded by 



Prominent Events of the Defence. 207 

Gould Weston, Gubbins's house, and the brigade mess- 
house. At one time the rebels nearly succeeded in setting 
fire to the Residency house by means of carcasses.^ 

The difficulties the garrison had to contend with were 
enormous. They had, in addition to the work of active 
defence, to dig out and carry stores, to shift the guns, to 
dig trenches, to sink shafts for mines, to bury the dead, 
especially the dead animals, whose putrifying carcasses 
contaminated the air, to repair damages. In all these 
duties the officers shared equally the labours with the 
men, and all exerted themselves to the utmost. 

Sometimes they made a sortie. They attempted the 
first on the 7th. The sallying party succeeded in driving 
out the enemy from a position they held commanding the 
defences. Lieutenant Lawrence, who led it, obtained for 
his cool daring the coveted Victoria Cross. 

I have given-the casualties of the officers and others 
up to the 20th, because on that day the rebels made their 
first grand assault. Their movement began at half-past 
eight in the morning, was sustained vigorously for several 
hours, and was finally beaten back at four o'clock. 
Several officers and men covered themselves with glory. 
Conspicuous amongst them was Ensign Loughnan of the 
13th N. I., against whose post, Innes's house, the weight 
of the attack was directed. The garrison here consisted 
of twelve men of the 32d Foot, twelve of the 13th N. L, 
and some clerks. They repulsed an enemy vastly superior 
in numbers. Another attack, made simultaneously against 
the Redan, was repelled with equal courage and equal 
determination. 

Of this general attack, the first grand assault against 
the garrison, it has been remarked that it was a triumph 
of British coolness and pluck over Asiatic numbers and 

^ A carcass is a hollow vessel, filled with combustibles. 



2o8 Death of Major Banks. 

swagger ; of the mind over matter. The writer^ adds 
that, in another sense, it was still more important. It 
proved to the mutineers that they had miscalculated 
their chances ; that, unless famine should come to aid 
them, they and their countrymen would never triumph 
over that handful of Europeans. 

The result of that day's action, doubtless, greatly 
encouraged the garrison. Their losses, four killed and 
twelve wounded, had been small, whilst the casualties of 
the rebels had been severe. The day following, however, 
they suffered a bereavement second only to that which 
they had experienced when Sir Henry Lawrence died. 
His successor. Major Banks, whilst reconnoitring from the 
top of an outhouse, was shot dead through the head. He 
had been an invaluable colleague to Brigadier Inglis, and 
it was felt there was no one left who could replace him. 
The office he had held was accordingly left vacant until 
the Government of India could be communicated with. 

The garrison had no certain knowledge of the events 
passing at Kanhpur. They had despatched many letters 
by native messengers believed to be faithful, but up to the 
25th of July no reply had been received. Three days pre- 
viously, however, on the 22d, their most trusted messenger, 
a pensioned sipahi named Angad, arrived to state that he 
had seen the victorious English regiments at Kanhpur; 
but it was not till the 25th that the same messenger, who 
had been sent out again, returned with a letter from 
Tytler stating that ' Havelock was advancing with a force 
sufficient to bear down all opposition, and would arrive in 
five or six days.' Inglis replied by despatching, by Angad, 
to Havelock a plan of his position and of the roads by 
which it could be approached. This reply reached Have- 

^ Kaye's and Malleson's History of the Indian Mzitiny, Cabinet edition, 
vol. iii., page 303. 



The Story rehirns to Havelock. 209 

lock at Mangalwar, a village five miles from the Ganges, 
in the province of Oudh. To reach Lakhnao there still 
remained forty miles to traverse. Before describing the 
further progress of the leaguer of the Residency it is 
necessary that I should return to Kanhpur, and narrate 
how it was that Havelock had been able to push 
on so far, and yet failed to accomplish the entire 
journey. 

Neill, I have said, had joined Havelock, with a few 
troops, on the 20th of July. Five days later Havelock 
crossed the Ganges with the intention of endeavouring 
to relieve the Residency. In the interval between the 
two dates he had despatched Major Stephenson to de- 
stroy Bithor, evacuated by Nana Sahib and his troops. 
Stephenson burned down the palace, blew up the maga- 
zine, and brought back to Kanhpur twenty cannon 
abandoned by the Nana. Simultaneously Havelock had 
designed, armed, and nearly finished at Kanhpur a forti- 
fied work commanding the river, large enough to accom- 
modate the 300 men, all he could spare to hold the place 
in his absence. The command of these he intrusted to 
Neill. He had begun, on the 21st, his preparations for 
crossing the river ; had sent over his guns on that day, 
the infantry on the succeeding days. On the 25th he 
crossed himself, and moved that day to Mangalwar, five 
miles. There he halted to complete his arrangements for 
the carriage of his ammunition and supplies. These were 
completed by the 28th, and he made his first move for- 
ward the following morning. 

For the purpose which he had in view his force was 
small indeed. It was composed of less than 1500 men, 
of whom barely 1200 were Europeans. His cavalry con- 
sisted of sixty volunteers and mounted soldiers, his 
artillery of ten small field-pieces, his infantry of portions 

O 



2IO Havelock crosses the Ganges, 

of the 64th, the 84th, the 78th, the Madras Fusihers, and 
Brasyer's Sikhs. 

At five o'clock, on the 29th, this Httle force began its 
forward movement. After a march of three miles Have- 
lock discerned the rebels occupying a strong position in 
front of and in the village of Unao. From this position 
he dislodged them after a fierce conflict, in which they 
lost fifteen guns and about 500 men. He then pushed on 
to Bashiratganj, six miles distant. Bashiratganj was a 
walled town, intersected by the high road, its entrance 
protected by a turreted gateway, with lateral defences, and 
a wet ditch in front. Still more to the front of it was a 
large jhil, or shallow pond, whilst another, still larger, lay 
behind the town, on the road to Lakhnao, traversed by 
a narrow causeway. Havelock conceived the idea of 
sending round the 64th to cut off the enemy from the 
causeway, whilst he should assail it in front. Unfortu- 
nately the turning movement took longer than was ex- 
pected, and the troops with Havelock made their front 
assault before the 64th had completed it. The result was 
that, though the rebels suffered severely, the bulk of them 
escaped across the causeway. 

The British loss in the two actions had been severe 
also. Eighty-eight men had been placed hors-de combat, 
and eighty-eight men represented nearly a twelfth of his 
European fighting strength. A nearly equal number of 
sick reduced that strength still further. Havelock had 
used up, too, one-third of his gun ammunition, whilst he 
had accomplished but fifteen miles out of the forty-five 
necessary to traverse. In front of him were positions 
which would be held against him still more steadfastly, 
and by a greater number of troops. Then, too, the question 
forced itself upon him, how could he carry his sick and 
wounded ? He could not leave them, because he could 



Beats the Rebels, and retttrns, 2 1 1 

spare no troops to guard them. Just at the moment 
moreover, he had received information of that fatal mutiny 
at Danapur, the consequence of the imbeciUty of the Cal- 
cutta Government, which came at the mornent to add 
terribly to the existing complications. There were, also, 
rebel troops in the districts, any number of whom com- 
bining might, if he were to advance further, cut him off 
from the Ganges. Feeling that these difficulties were too 
great to be encountered with the force at his disposal, 
he fell back, on the 31st, to Mangalwar, and despatched 
thence his sick and wounded into Kanhpur, with a letter 
to Neill informing him of the reason of his retreat, and 
adding that, to enable him to reach Lakhnao, it was 
necessary he should receive a reinforcement of 1000 men 
and another field-battery. 

To this letter Neill wrote a most intemperate, even an 
insulting reply. Havelock was very angry. He contented 
himself, however, for the moment with warning Neill that 
considerations of the public service alone prevented him 
from placing him under arrest. But it is the opinion of 
Havelock's latest biographer^ that Neill's letter may so 
have operated on a high-strung temperament, made sensi- 
tive by disappointment following on an inspiriting sequence 
of brilliant successes, as to induce Havelock to attempt 
another advance without adequate reinforcements. At all 
events Havelock did attempt a second forward movement. 
Setting out on the 4th of August, he found himself the 
following morning in front of Bashiratganj ; occupied it, 
but could not prevent the rebels from carrying off all 
their guns, and taking a strong position a little further on. 
He then recognised that to advance further would prob- 
ably involve the loss of his whole force. Fortified by the 
opinion of the three officers of his staff whom he con- 

^ Archibald Forbes. 



2 12 Is foiled by the Action of the Government. 

suited, Tytler, Crommelin, and young Henry Havelock, he 
determined then to fall back. He had once again reached 
Mangalwar, on the loth, when he heard that the rebels 
were making a great show at Bashiratganj. Glad to 
seize the chance of inflicting upon them a severe blow be- 
fore he should cross, he promptly marched on that place, 
caught his enemy, killed 200 of them, and captured two 
guns ; then turning again, he recrossed the Ganges into 
Kanhpur on the 13th. There he read the details of that 
insane action of the Government of India by which the 
much desired and needful reinforcements had been with- 
held from him at the most critical period of his command. 
To understand how this happened I must ask the 
reader to return with me to Calcutta, and to accompany 
me thence to Danapur and Patna. 



CHAPTERXV. 

CALCUTTA AND WESTERN BIHAR IN JULY AND AUGUST. 

Reports of the terrible fate of the Engh'sh men and 
English women who had been besieged by the rebels at 
Kanhpur had reached Calcutta early in July, but it was 
not until Havelock telegraphed, on the 17th of the month, 
the account of his victory, and of their murder, that all 
hope of their survival disappeared. Then, for a moment, 
the crushing blight of despair succeeded to the agony of 
suspense. Only, however, for a moment. Almost in- 
stantly there rose in its place an intense eagerness to 
place in the hands of the avenging General all the avail- 
able resources of the State— resources which should make 
him strong enough to push on to ward off from other 
threatened garrisons, especially from the garrison of the 
Residency of Lakhnao, a similar calamity. For the mo- 
ment the Government, the press, the mercantile bodies, 
pubhc opinion generally, seemed to unite in concentrating 
their efforts to obtain this wished-for result. Lord Can- 
ning had, in the last days of July, sanctioned the raising 

in Calcutta of a corps of yeomanry cavalry a corps 

which, led by a very resolute and able officer. Major J. 
F. Richardson, was destined to render excellent service. 
He had, further, in conjunction with the Lieutenant- 
Governor of Bengal, directed similar enlistments from 
the unemployed sailors to meet the troubles then threat- 
ening in Bengal and Bihdr, and he had concluded an 



2 14 ^^^ Means available to the Government. 

arrangement with Jang Bahadur, Prime Minister and 
virtual ruler of the State of Nipal, for the despatch of 
a body of Gurkha troops to the districts of Gorakhpur 
and Azamgarh. 

So far he had done well. But none of those acts, praise- 
worthy as they were, touched the crucial point. They did 
not provide immediate succour to Havelock. Yet at that 
moment, besides the 53d, which garrisoned Fort William, 
there was a wing of the 37th regiment available; the loth 
Foot garrisoned Danapur ; whilst on the 5th of July, two 
days before Havelock started from Allahabad on his 
memorable campaign, the 5th Fusiliers, 800 strong, landed 
in Calcutta from the Mauritius. 

Havelock, we have seen, wanted on the 5th August, 
according to his own estimate, another thousand men to en- 
able him to reach Lakhnao. Now, on the 5th of July there 
were 1200 men available, either at Calcutta, or on their 
way, steaming towards Allahabad (for the wing of the 37th 
had been despatched just before) without weakening the 
garrisons of Calcutta and Danapur. With a little manage- 
ment that number could have been considerably increased. 
We left Havelock, in the last chapter, on the 13th August, 
stranded at Kanhpur for want of such troops. Why, in 
the terrible crisis which interrupted his victorious career, 
were the troops which might have been available not 
promptly despatched to him ? 

To this question there is an answer, and that answer 
indicates the difference which arose between the Govern- 
ment and the rest of the European community, and with 
respect to which the Government adopted a course, timid, 
shrinking, and politically ruinous. For the sake of a 
sentiment they risked the temporary loss of the Empire. 
Indeed, it will be proved that but for the heroic conduct 
of one man, the late Vincent Eyre, the country between 



The Position of Ddndpttr and Patnd, 2 1 5 

Calcutta and Banaras would have been overrun by the 
rebels. 

The water-line between Calcutta and Allahabad, about 
664 miles hi length, had one weak middle point at Ddndpur 
and Patna, two places only twelve miles apart. Danapur 
was 3-44 miles from Calcutta, the city of Patnd was twelve 
miles nearer to the capital. At Danapur there were, as 
I have already stated, three native regiments, the 7th, 8th, 
and 40th N. L, one company of European, one of native 
artillery, and the loth Foot. The position of the two 
places was a most important one. The province. Western 
Bihdr, of which Patnd was the capital, was one of the 
richest provinces in India. It contained a considerable 
number of native landowners, men of large estates and 
ancient lineage. English merchants, too, had invested 
large sums in the province in the cultivation of indigo, one 
of its staple exports. It touched on the one side, to' the 
north-west, the revolted districts of Ghdzipur, Azamgarh, 
Juanpur, and Mirzapur ; to the north, it touched Nipal ; to 
the east, the division of Eastern Bihar, not only com- 
bustible itself, but open to invasion by the sipahis in 
Eastern Bengal, then in a state of incipient mutiny. 

It will be recognised, then, that it was of paramount 
importance that the division of Western Bihar, the middle 
piece between Calcutta and Allahabad, should be pre- 
served from outbreak by a Government anxious to 
despatch English troops to Allahdbdd, thence to pro- 
ceed to reinforce Havelock at Kanhpur. 

Up to the period at which I have arrived the province 
had been preserved from revolt by the energetic measures 
taken by its Commissioner, Mr William Tayler. Harassed 
by the fussy interference of his superior at Calcutta, Mr 
Frederick Halliday, Mr Tayler had, nevertheless, with 
resources he had made for himself, put down insurrection 



2 1 6 Mr William Tayler. 

in the most Inflammable city in India, the headquarters 
of the intriguing Wahabis, and had preserved, amid great 
difficulties, complete order in the districts, those of Patna, 
Gaya, Shahdbdd, Saran, Champaran, and Tirhut, which 
went to make up the division of which he was the pro- 
consul. His services have never been acknowledged, he 
has been treated with contumely and insult, but he con- 
tributed as much as any man, in that terrible crisis called 
the Indian Mutiny, to save the Empire. 

To the mind of William Tayler there was, towards the 
end of June, but one possible danger to the province. That 
danger would be very great if the sipahis at Danapur, 
numbering nearly 3000 men, were to break out in revolt. 
If the Government would but order that they should be 
disarmed all would go well. For that he would answer. 

The opinion of Mr Tayler on this point was also the 
opinion of all intelligent men in Calcutta, that is, of the 
united merchants and traders, men who had shown their 
loyalty and devotion by raising the corps of volunteers, 
of the three arms, of which I have spoken, of the great 
majority of the members of the services, and of the loyal 
natives. It was the opinion, in fact, of everyone who 
was not a secretary to Government, or who hoped, by 
time-serving and subserviency, to become a secretary to 
Government. The question had been mooted at an earlier 
period. The reply, demi-official, of the Government then 
had been that, with only a sufficient number of European 
troops to preserve order close to the capital, it did not 
feel justified in proceeding to a measure which, unless 
there were sufficient white troops on the spot, might pre- 
cipitate the evil it was intended to heal. That answer 
sufficed for the moment. But when the 37th had started, 
and when preparations v/ere being made to despatch the 
5th Fusiliers, in steamers which must pass Patna and 



The Government evades Responsibility. 2 1 7 

Danapur, it was felt that the time had arrived when the 
disarming process might be carried out in an effective 
manner, under circumstances which would render resist- 
ance impossible. 

These ideas took possession of the English community 
in Calcutta, and were ventilated by the press. It was 
believed, at the outset, that the Government would 
welcome the suggestion as tending to relieve them from 
a great difficulty. The Government had acknowledged 
that the weakness of the middle piece constituted at the 
moment the great difficulty in despatching reinforcements 
to Havelock. Now that great difficulty could be removed. 
Great, then, was the surprise when the rumour pervaded 
the city that the Government had resolved to decline the 
responsibility which devolves upon all governments — the 
responsibility of directing the carrying out of a measure 
which each member of it knew to be essential to the well- 
being of the Empire. 

Great, I say, was the astonishment. Was it for this, 
men asked one another, that Lord Canning had summoned 
from Madras Sir Patrick Grant to advise him ? Nothing, 
it was true, had been seen or heard of Sir Patrick Grant 
since his arrival. It was known that he was occupying 
comfortable quarters at Government House, and that he 
was babbling about reorganisation, when the question was 
the suppression of the Mutiny. But in military matters 
he was, nominally at least, the chief councillor of the 
Governor-General, and it was supposed that he, an officer 
trained with sipahis, would at least understand the neces- 
sity of the position. But rumour further stated that Lord 
Canning was greatly guided by his advice, and by that of 
the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Mr Halliday. In the 
latter no one had any confidence. It was felt, then, that 
the time had arrived when the leading members of the 



2i8 The Responsibility cast on General Lloyd. 

mercantile community, all of whom, as proprietors of in- 
digo factories, had large interests in Western Bihar, should 
ask to be allowed to make a personal appeal to Lord 
Canning. They made a request to this effect on the 17th of 
July. Lord Canning agreed to receive them on the 20th. 

He did receive a deputation from them on that date, 
listened to their statements, heard from their mouths 
that the disarming of the native regiments at Danapur 
was the one measure necessary to restore public confi- 
dence in Bihar; that a favourable opportunity now pre- 
sented itself for the carrying out of such a measure, 
inasmuch as the 5th Fusiliers, which had quitted Calcutta 
by steamer on the 12th, would reach Danapur about the 
22d ; and that then the disarming could be accomplished 
in two hours. Lord Canning listened to them without 
interrupting them, then told them very curtly, using the 
fewest words he could command to express his meaning 
that he would not comply with their request. 

The Government of India had, in fact, previously 
decided to attempt one of those half-measures which 
weak and incompetent men cling to in an emergency. 
Unable to brace themselves to the resolution of directing 
the disarming of the native regiments, they had, on the 
1 2th of July, by the hand of Sir Patrick Grant, cast the re- 
sponsibility of disarming or of not disarming on the 
officer commanding the Danapur division. That officer, 
General Lloyd, was to be the sole judge of the advis- 
ability or the inadvisability of the measure. * If,' wrote to 
him Sir Patrick Grant, on the 12th July, 'when the regi- 
ment' (the 5th Fusiliers) 'reaches Danapur, you see 
reason to distrust the native troops, and you entertain 
an opinion that it is desirable to disarm them, you are at 
liberty to disembark the 5th Fusiliers to assist you in that 
object.' 



Such Action invites Disaster. 219 

The reader will not fail to comprehend the position. 
The native troops in Bengal and in the North-west 
Provinces of India had generally mutinied or had been dis- 
armed. At Ddnapur, twelve miles from the inflammable 
city of Patna, the centre of the richest province in India, 
were three native regiments still carrying their arms. 
Havelock was at Kanhpur crying for reinforcements. 
The arrival at Kdnhpur of such reinforcements depended 
on the continued tranquillity of the middle piece of country 
of which Danapur and Patna were the centres. The con- 
tinued tranquillity of that middle piece could only be 
insured by the prompt disarming of the three native regi- 
ments at Danapur. The public voice, the great mercantile 
community, besought the Government to issue positive 
orders for such disarming. The Government absolutely 
refused, but, as a sop, they threw the responsibility of 
the action to be taken upon an aged soldier, whose 
nerves were utterly unequal to the task ; who, in fact, 
emulating the action of his superiors at Calcutta, endeav- 
oured to reconcile the responsibility thrust upon him, with 
the evident reluctance of the Government that he should 
exercise it, by devising another half- measure, which 
brought about the very catastrophe which strong and 
resolute action would have avoided. Well might Lord 
Dalhousie write, as he did write, when the news of the 
catastrophe and its causes reached him : ' Why was it left 
to General Lloyd, or to General or Mister Anybody, to 
order measures so obviously necessary to safety ? ' 

For, be it remembered, throughout the period from 
the outbreak of the mutiny at Mirath and the casting 
upon the shoulders of General Lloyd of responsibilities 
which properly belonged to the Government, it had been 
with the utmost difficulty, and by the display of the rarest 
qualities of courageous statesmanship, that Mr William 



2 20 The Senile Action at Ddndpur. 

Tayler had been able to preserve order at Patna and 
throughout his division. He had put down an uprising in 
the city itself, had baffled the machinations of the Wahabi 
leaders, had instilled fear and discouragement in the ranks 
of the seditious, and by his splendid example had given 
confidence to his subordinates. Amongst those who 
had been acting with him in the districts was a very 
gallant officer, Major John Holmes, commanding the I2th 
Irregular Cavalry stationed at Sigauli, in the Champaran 
district. Holmes, like most officers serving with the native 
troops, believed implicitly in the loyalty of his own men, 
and certainly for some weeks they justified his confidence 
by their obedience and energy. It is just possible that, if 
the sipahis at Danapur had been quietly disarmed, those 
troopers would have remained loyal. The result showed 
that they could not be proof against the successful rising 
of their brethren at the chief station. 

It would serve no good purpose to dwell at length 
upon the incompetent action which threw the middle piece 
between Calcutta and Kanhpur into a condition of un- 
paralleled disorder, and delayed the advance of the troops 
for which the heart of the gallant Havelock was preying 
upon itself Under the weight of the responsibility thrust 
upon him the mind of General Lloyd vacillated like the 
pendulum of a clock. When, on the 22d, the main body 
of the 5th Fusiliers arrived off Danapur, the pendulum 
was at the left corner, and he would not order them to 
disembark. Two days later, when two companies of the 
37th reached the station, the pendulum had veered to the 
right, and he ordered them to land. The day following, 
the 25th, he resolved not to disarm the sipahis, but to 
deprive them of the percussion caps which had been 
served out to them, and of those in the magazine. By 
a display of force he succeeded in securing the caps in 



Rising of KiLHwar Singh. 221 

the magazine. Then, beHeving he had scored a triumph, 
he dismissed the European troops, and went comfortably 
to his luncheon. But when an hour or two later the 
officers, by his direction, endeavoured to persuade the 
sipahis to surrender the caps in their actual possession, 
the latter broke into open mutiny, and went off towards 
the river Son, in the direction of Arab. The European 
troops were at once called out, but there was no one pre- 
sent to give any orders. The General had gone on board of 
one of the steamers, and in the matter of taking upon them- 
selves the smallest responsibility in his absence the two 
officers next in command took example from the Govern- 
ment of India. Nothing, or next to nothing, was done. The 
mutineers got off scot free. It was one of the most painful 
incidents of those troublous times. 

Nor was the calamity confined to Danapur. The 
telegraph did its work. The very evening of the day on 
which these events occurred the troopers of the 12th 
Irregulars rose in mutiny and murdered their command- 
ing officer and his wife. Similarly, Kunwar Singh, a large 
landowner, who had considerable estates at Jagdispur, not 
far from Arab, and who had had bitter reason to complain 
of the action of the law courts of Calcutta, intimated to 
the sipahis, by some very practical assistance, his sympathy 
with their movement. It seemed probable that, unless the 
British should take prompt action, the whole of Western 
Bihar would be in a blaze. 

There were two officials in the province upon whom, 
at this period, devolved enormous responsibility. The 
one was ready to take that responsibility, and did 
take it. The other had completely lost his head. The 
action of these two officials will now be related. It was 
the obvious duty of General Lloyd to despatch English 
troops at once in pursuit of the rebels. He had a sufficient 



O O 9 



Dunbar marches against the Rebels. 



number at his disposal. But the heavy weight of responsi- 
bih'ty had made his brain slow, and his arm powerless 
to strike. He did, indeed, despatch a few riflemen the 
following day, in a river steamer, to the mouth of the river 
Son. But there the draught of water was insufficient, 
and the men returned, having accomplished nothing. 
Then the General wrote to Mr Tayler to the effect that, 
far from pursuing the mutineers, he intended to intrench 
himself at Danapur, as he feared that, joined by Kunwar 
Singh, they would return to attack him. Then it was 
that the nature of William Tayler showed itself. He was 
a civilian ; the other was a soldier. The soldier, sad 
to recount, his moral faculties overborne, proposed to 
intrench himself against an enemy who had no thought 
of attacking him. The civilian, with all his wits about 
him, his strong faculties never so clear as in the time of 
danger, deprecated the resolution of the soldier with all 
the eloquence he could command. He implored him to 
lose no time in pursuing the rebels, showed that there was 
yet time to catch them, and that vigour and energy 
might yet retrieve the disaster. 

Tayler's strong exhortations convinced the General. 
They impressed upon him some of the passionate con- 
viction which animated the daring Commissioner. He 
despatched then a body of troops, 415 in number, with 
fifteen officers, commanded by Captain Dunbar, to be 
conveyed by steamer to a point not far from the spot 
where the road to Arab strikes the river Son. Thence 
they would march to the former place, where, it was 
believed, the sipahis would be found. 

Leaving these men marching, I must return to the 
sipahfs. 

The rebel native soldiers, surprised at being allowed 
to escape without pursuit, reached the banks of the Son 



The L ea^tter of A rah . 223 

on the early morn of the 26th. For want of boats in 
which to cross they were delayed there till the evening. 
'Then, having received meanwhile most comforting assur- 
ances from Kunwar Singh, they were, thanks to the means 
provided by that chief, conveyed to the western bank. 
They then marched to Arah, released the prisoners from 
the gaol, plundered the treasury, and set forth to hunt 
for the Europeans. These, however, thanks to the pre- 
science of one of their number, had taken timely precau- 
tions to meet their attack. 

The story of the leaguer of Arah is a story of foresight, 
gallantry, perseverance, energy, and devotion unsurpassed 
in the world's history. The prescient organiser of the 
successful resistance to the bloodthirsty sipahis was Mr 
Vicars Boyle, an engineer connected with the railway. 
But his companions, Herwald Wake, Colvin, Halls, 
Combe, Littledale, and the rest, for there were fifteen 
Englishmen and Eurasians, besides the Deputy Collector, 
a Muhammadan gentleman named Sayid Azim-ud-dm 
Khan, fifty Sikhs, inclusive of native officers, a water- 
carrier and a cook, were all worthy of association with 
him. They had long regarded the outbreak of the 
sipahis at Danapur as possible, and when it did occur 
they collected in the house which Mr Vicars Boyle had 
prepared, provisioned, and to a certain extent fortified. 
The presence of the Sikhs among them was due, abso- 
lutely and entirely, to the prescient care of Mr William 
Tayler of Patna, a circumstance which was much appre- 
ciated at the time, but which, like many other of the 
noble acts of that gentleman, has been since conveniently 
forgotten. 

The mutinous sipahis, aided by the levies of Kunwar 
Singh, crowded to attack the little house on the evening 
of the 27th. They were met by a stern resistance such as 



2 24 Defeat of Dunbar. 

they evidently had not expected. They changed their 
tactics then, and brought up guns to assist them. They 
used these on the 28th, and during the day of the 29th. 
But that night there was a lull, and the garrison was 
cheered by hearing a musketry fire in the direction from 
which they expected assistance — the direction of 
Danapur. 

The musketry fire was indeed the consequence of the 
proximity of Dunbar's force, but, alas ! it was produced 
mainly by the muskets of the revolted sipahis. Dunbar, 
in fact, marching carelessly, and without the precautions 
essential to a night march in a country occupied by an 
enemy, had fallen into an ambuscade. He and other 
officers were killed ; the men, surprised, became dis- 
couraged, and attempting to retrace their steps to the 
Son, they were pursued by almost the full force of the 
rebels. It was a rout as complete as it was disgraceful. 
Many men were killed and wounded during the retreat. 
When the survivors reached the Son, they experienced 
the greatest difficulty in forcing their way to its eastern 
bank. They at last succeeded ; the steamer which had 
brought them to a certain point was still waiting for them 
there. On that steamer, in lieu of the 415 men and fifteen 
officers whom she had carried, full of hope, the previous 
morning, there were now only fifty men and three officers 
who had been untouched by the enemy's fire. 

The repulse of the force which, at the instance of Mr 
Tayler, General Lloyd had despatched to relieve Arah 
added greatly to the despondency of that officer. It 
would be difficult to exaggerate the gloom, not to say the 
terror, which fell upon Danapur. Upon Mr Tayler the 
effect was very different. It seemed, indeed, impossible to 
doubt that Arah must fall. If Arah should fall, then the 
several stations, isolated, each depending on its own re- 



Vincent Eyre. 225 

sources, must inevitably be overrun. Under these circum- 
stances, Mr Taylef, acting like a skilful general who feels 
that his detachments would be liable, when separated 
from one another and unsupported, to be cut up in 
detail, but would successfully resist the enemy if united, 
authorised his several subordinate officers at the isolated 
stations to fall back upon Patna, bringing the contents of 
their treasuries with them, unless in so doing their 
personal safety should be endangered. It was a wise and 
statesmanlike order, and it would have been so accepted 
by all the world but for the sudden appearance on the 
scene of a man whose genius and daring suddenly changed 
disaster into triumph. 

Such men are born seldom. The man who accom- 
plished this feat was a major in the artillery, who had 
served in the first Kabul war, had been kept there a 
prisoner, who had written a story of the events which 
led to and followed the disaster to the English, and who 
had since served in Gwaliar and in Burma. His name 
was Vincent Eyre. He had but just been recalled from 
Burma, and had been despatched with a European battery, 
on board a steamer from Calcutta bound for Allahabad, 
on the loth of July. 

Eyre had reached Danapur the evening of the 25th, 
the day memorable for the successful rising of the three 
regiments. He had gone on shore and off'ered his services 
to the General, but as these were not required, he had 
proceeded the next day to Baksar, forty-three miles from 
Arah. There he heard that the mutinied sipahis were 
advancing by way of Arah towards Baksar. As this 
place was the headquarters of the Government stud, and 
was but thirty miles from Ghazipur, Eyre decided to 
detain the tender of the steamer at Baksar, whilst he 
should proceed in the latter to Ghazipur to ensure the 

P 



2 26 Resolves to relieve A rah. 

safety of that place. This he did on the 29th ; left two 
guns and his only subaltern to protect Ghazipur, took 
instead twenty-five men of the 78th on to his steamer, and 
returned that night to Baksar. There he found 154 men 
of the 5th Fusiliers, who had arrived that afternoon, under 
the command of Captain I^Estrange. As the informa- 
tion he received conveyed to the mind of Eyre the impres- 
sion that the rebels had stopped at Arah to besiege our 
countrymen there, he determined to endeavour to induce 
L'Estrange to combine with him to march to the relief of 
that place. He wrote to him to that effect. L'Estrange 
replied that if Eyre, as senior officer, would send him 
a written order to that effect, and would take upon him- 
self the entire responsibility, he would obey him. Eyre, 
who had not graduated in the school of the Calcutta 
statesmen, issued the order forthwith. He knew, of 
course, that he was, so to speak, risking his commission, 
for his orders were to proceed to Allahabad, and the 
march to Arah would take him nearly fifty miles off his 
direct road. But to the courageous mind of Eyre the 
occasion was one in which it was imperative to risk his 
all — and he risked it. 

Eyre's force consisted of forty gunners and three guns, 
154 men of the 5th Fusiliers, six officers, including him- 
self, two assistant surgeons, eighteen volunteers, mostly 
mounted, of whom three were officers, one the Magis- 
trate of Ghazipur and one a veterinary surgeon. The 
twenty-five Highlanders he had borrowed from Ghazipur 
he left at Baksar to take the first opportunity of returning 
to their .station. His total force, it will thus be seen, 
amounted only to 220 men and three guns. With that 
he set out, on the 31st of July, to attempt a task which 
had already, less than forty-eight hours before, though he 
knew it not, baffled 430 officers and men. 



Eyres Fighting March. 227 

The news which reached him, on the night of the 31st, 
at his first halting ground of the defeat of Dunbar's party 
had no effect upon Eyre and his men. They pushed 
on all the next day without seeing any enemy, and 
bivouacked for the night at the village of Gujrajganj, 
some six miles from Arah. After marching a mile the 
next morning the rebels appeared in great numbers, occu- 
pying a wood which Eyre and his men must traverse. He 
reconnoitred their position, and then attacked them. The 
rebels had the advantage of numbers, and of position, and 
they were inspired by their defeat of Dunbar. But Eyre's 
first attack was so well directed and so sustained that he 
forced his foe to abandon his position, only however, he 
discovered to his vexation, to take a far stronger one 
about a mile in the rear. As this position was strong 
enough to repel a front attack, Eyre, under cover of the 
fire of his three guns, made a flank movement to gain the 
nearest point of the new railway embankment which had 
been constructed from Arah. The rebels, however, dis- 
covered the movement and its object, and commanding 
as they did the inner chord of the circle, rushed forward 
to gain it first, at the same time detaching Kunwar Singh's 
levies to harass the rear of the British. The rebels gained 
the decisive point first, and stationing themselves behind 
the trees of a wood which flanked the embankment, 
opened a severe musketry fire on the British as they 
approached. Eyre's position was now extremely critical. 
He must carry that wood, or be lost. Everything de- 
pended upon his coolness and self-possession ; and, under 
difficult circumstances, no man ever gave greater evidence 
of the possession of both these qualities. Calmly survey- 
ing the position, he formed his men in skirmishing order, 
whilst his guns played upon the wood. The damage these 
effected was not great, as the rebels were well sheltered 



228 Eyre relieves A rah. 

by the trees. Twice, indeed, they sallied forth to charge 
the guns, but each time they were repulsed. But they 
had all the advantage in musketry fire from behind 
shelter, and at the end of an hour Captain Hastings of 
the volunteers brought word to Eyre, who, having no 
subaltern, was obliged to stay with the guns, that the 
position of the Fusiliers was becoming critical. For such 
a state of affairs there was but one remedy — recourse to 
that splendid weapon which, wielded by British hands, 
has never failed. The order was given to close up and 
charge. Promptly was it executed. Led on one flank by 
L'Estrange, on the other by Hastings, the men of the 5th 
closed up, and rushing forward with a cheer, cleared the 
brook which separated them from the wood, and dashed 
at the enemy. The rebels did not stand to meet the 
encounter ; they gave way in tumultuous disorder. Eyre 
pushed rapidly on after them, hoping to reach Arah that 
night, but he was stopped on the way by an impassable 
torrent. He spent the whole night in improvising a cause- 
way. Over this, in the early morning, he passed his troops 
and his guns, and an hour later had the gratification of 
rescuing from their danger the gallant garrison which, for 
eight days, had successfully defied an enemy fifty times 
more numerous than themselves. 

The rebels, meanwhile, had fled to Jagdispur, the 
stronghold of Kunwar Singh. Thither Eyre, who was 
not the man to consider a task completed so long as any- 
thing remained to be accomplished, followed them on the 
nth of August, and stormed and captured it the following 
day. 

Such was the man, and such was the deed which 
changed the despair of the British residents of Western 
Bihar into triumph. Eyre, descending apparently from 
the clouds, had turned defeat into victory, despair into 



Skameftd Treatment of Mr Tayler. 229 

rejoicings. The Government acted precisely as govern- 
ments without a backbone will always act. The action 
of the victorious Eyre was upheld. But his companion 
in pluck and energy, William Tayler, who had, de- 
spite his transcendent services, become obnoxious to 
the Calcutta clique, was removed from his office and 
ruined, avowedly because at a critical period, before Eyre 
had redeemed Dunbar's disaster, and when it seemed 
certain that the rebels would overrun the province, he 
had advised concentration at Patna of the resources in 
men and money of the province. The same Government 
took the opportunity to reward an officer serving under 
Mr Tayler, Mr Alonzo Money, for a theatrical display 
which was really damaging to the interests of the country. 
This gentleman had left his station for Patna, but had re- 
pented and returned to it. Then taking advantage of the 
arrival of a company of British troops, he marched with 
them and the contents of the treasury, not to Patna, which 
was near, and where they were wanted, but to Calcutta, 
which was more than 300 miles distant, and where they 
were not wanted — this, too, at a time when Havelock was 
earnestly crying out for more soldiers. 

Eyre left Arah for Allahabad on the 20th of August. 
The failure of the Government to disarm the three regi- 
ments had thus wasted a month at the most critical period 
of the operations in the vicinity of Kanhpur. But the mis- 
chief done to the British cause was not entirely repre- 
sented by that loss of time. The disturbances in Western 
Bihar continued. They kept for some time in the province 
troops who were required in the North-west, nor were 
they entirely suppressed until a very late period of the 
following year. 

But by this time fresh troops are pouring into Calcutta ; 
a new Commander-in-Chief has arrived to displace Sir 



230 A Glance at the Sitidation. 

Patrick Grant; Sir James Outram, appointed to command 
the united Danapur and Kanhpur divisions, is on his way 
to Allahabad ; Captain Peel and Captain Sotheby are form- 
ing naval brigades from the crews of the Shannon and the 
Pearl; the Residency of Lakhnao is still holding out ; Agra, 
after a calamity, which will have to be recorded, is in a 
state of siege; the British troops before Dehli are holding 
their position on the ridge; Sir John Lawrence is despatch- 
ing from the Panjab Nicholson, with a compact force, to 
join them ; Lord Elphinstone is bearing himself bravely at 
Bombay, Lord Harris in Madras, Sir Bartle Frere in Sind; 
there have been disturbances in Rajputana and in the 
dominions of Holkar; Maharaja Sindhia remains loyal, 
but his troops are gathering against the English at Kalpi. 
The situation is on the whole more hopeful than it was in 
June and July, because it is more defined. The wiser 
statesmen have recognised that the real enemies of the 
British are the sipahis and the populations of the North- 
western Provinces, of Bundelkhand, of Rohilkhand, and 
of Oudh. To crush these the recently arrived resources 
of Great Britain must be directed. But, first of all, it is 
incumbent to attempt the relief of the Residency of 
Lakhnao, too long delayed by the action of the Calcutta 
Government, recorded in this chapter. I must, then, re- 
turn to Kanhpur. 



CHAPTER XV L 

THE FIRST RELIEF OF THE LAKHNAO RESIDENCY. 

I HAVE recorded in a previous chapter^ how the garrison 
of the Lakhnao Residency had been cheered, on the night 
of the 25 th of July, by the receipt of a letter from Tytler 
telling them that Havelock was advancing with a force 
sufficient to bear down all opposition, and that he would 
arrive in five or six days. The six days passed and no 
Havelock came. The sound of firing was occasionally 
heard in the direction of Kanhpur, and this sound tended 
to confirm the hopes already raised. But they were 
doomed to be disappointed for the moment. We have 
seen how Havelock, on the 13th of August, finally re^ 
crossed the Ganges. 

Three days before that happened the rebels, en- 
couraged doubtless by his retreat from Bashiratganj, 
made their second grand assault on the position of the 
Residency. It began about half-past ten in the morning, 
by the successful springing of a mine, which made a 
great breach in the defences. Against this they marched 
in considerable numbers, and with great resolution. But 
the men of the garrison were on the alert. A heavy 
musketry fire from the roofs of the adjacent houses was 
kept on the advancing foe, whilst a stern resistance met 
their front attack. Eventually they were driven back 
with enormous loss. A second attack on another point, 

^ Chapter xiv., page 208. 



232 The Leaotcer of the Residency. 

Sago's house, and a third, on Innes's, Anderson's, and 
Gubbins's posts, met with a like result. But the attacks 
had lasted twelve hours. Again the loss of the garrison 
was small. 

Two days later a sortie made by the garrison was 
repulsed. Six days after that, the i8th, the besiegers 
made their third grand assault. 

The springing of the mine on this occasion, under one 
of the Sikh squares, was most effective. It made a breach, 
some twenty feet wide, in the defences. Against this the 
rebels came with extraordinary enthusiasm. Again, how- 
ever, the men of the garrison were ready for them, and 
again did they drive them back with heavy loss. 

Still the rebels persevered. They believed it was but a 
question of time. They knew to some extent of the suffer- 
ings of the garrison ; how the necessity to be constantly 
on the alert must tell upon them. They kept up, then, a 
fire almost unremitting, varied by sudden rushes on points 
which they regarded as weak or likely to give way to 
pressure. In one sense the conviction they held as to the 
wearied condition of the garrison was too true. Their ranks 
were rapidly thinning. They had to repair the defences 
daily, to remove supplies from the buildings which had 
either fallen in or which succumbed to the enemy's shot, 
to countermine the rebels' mines, to remove guns, to erect 
barricades, to bury corpses, to serve out the daily rations, 
and, with the weak and daily diminishing garrison, to 
supply fatigue parties of eight or ten men each to do work 
for which, under ordinary circumstances, ten times that 
number would not have been considered excessive. The 
garrison, however, performed all these duties with cheer- 
fulness and resolution. In their ranks there was never 
a sign of faltering. 

Their hopes of relief were becoming less bright. On 



The Leaguer of the Residency. 233 

the 28th of August a letter from Havelock informed them 
that he had no hope of being able to relieve them for five- 
and-twenty days. Much might happen in that period. 
One result of the letter was a diminution of the rations. 

Eight days later the rebels made their fourth assault. 
They attacked two points simultaneously, but in vain. 
Again were they compelled to turn their backs. On this 
occasion the loyal sipahis of the 13th N. I. behaved 
splendidly. 

That these repeated failures dispirited the assailants 
was shown by the relaxation of their efforts on the morrow 
of their repulse. They never tried a grand assault after 
that of the 5th of September, but contented themselves 
with pouring in an unremitting fire of guns and musketry, 
with mining, with attempting surprises, and with assailing 
isolated points. But the labour of the garrison was by no 
means diminished. The season was the most unhealthy 
season of the year. Scarcely a day passed but some 
portion of one or other of the posts crumbled under the 
enemy's fire. Some idea of the incessant nature of that 
fire may be gathered from the fact that, on the 8th of 
September, 280 round-shot, varying in size from a twenty- 
four to a three-pounder, were gathered from the roof of the 
brigade mess-house alone. 

On the 1 6th the messenger Angad was again sent 
out for news. He returned, on the night of the 22d, 
with information that help from outside would certainly 
arrive within a fortnight. The next day a smart cannon- 
ade was heard in the direction of Kanhpur. The following 
morning firing was again heard. That night a messenger 
who had gone out returned with the information that the 
relieving force was in the outskirts of the city. The next 
day it was clear that a tremendous struggle was going on 
within the city. When, about half-past one, people were 



2 34 The Residency is relieved, 

noticed leaving the city with bundles on their heads, and 
when, half-an-hour later, sipahis and other armed bodies 
were observed to follow them, it became clear that the 
end was at hand. The garrison brought every gun and 
mortar to bear on the retreating foe. At four o'clock the 
report arose that some English officers, dressed in shoot- 
ing coats, and some soldiers, wearing blue pantaloons, had 
been seen in the vicinity of the Moti Mahall. An hour 
later volleys of musketry, rapidly growing louder, were 
heard in the city. Soon the bullets were whistling over 
the Residency. Five minutes later and the British troops 
were seen fighting their way through one of the principal 
streets. Once fairly seen the long pent-up feelings of the 
garrison found vent in a succession of deafening cheers. 
Even from the hospital many of the wounded crawled 
forth to join in that shout of welcome. ' Soon,' continues 
Captain Wilson, from whose graphic journal I have 
abridged the account in the text, ' soon all the rear-guard 
and heavy guns were inside our position ; and then ensued 
a scene which baffles description. For eighty-seven days 
the Lakhnao garrison had lived in utter ignorance of all 
that had taken place outside. Wives who had long 
mourned their husbands as dead were again restored to 
them. Others, fondly looking forward to glad meetings 
with those near and dear to them, now for the first time 
learned that they were alone. On all sides eager inquiries 
for relations and friends were made. Alas ! in too many 
cases the answer was a painful one.' 

But the Residency had been relieved, or, to speak 
more correctly, had been reinforced. For, after the de- 
lirium of joy had given place to sober considerations, it 
was recognised that the combined troops were not strong 
enough to escort the non-combatant portion of the garrison 
through the city, still thronged with armed rebels, and 



Or^ rather, reinforced. 235 

thence to Kanhpur. For that the strengthened garrison 
must await the arrival of the new Commander-in-Chief, 
Sir Colin Campbell. His action will be described in due 
course. Meanwhile it becomes my duty now to describe 
how it had become possible for Havelock and Outram to 
accomplish the splendid feat of arms which had brought 
joy and consolation to the beleaguered garrison of the 
Residency. 

I left Havelock, just returned to Kanhpur, on the 
13th of August. He gave his men a rest on the 14th and 
15th, then on the i6th marched against Bithor, at which 
place nearly 4000 rebels, mostly revolted sipahis of various 
regiments, had congregated in his absence. Havelock 
attacked and defeated them, though only after a very stub- 
born fight. However, the victory was complete, the position 
was captured, and two guns were taken. But the British 
loss was heavy, amounting to between sixty men killed 
and wounded, and twelve who succumbed to sunstroke. 

It was on the day following that Havelock read in 
the Calcutta Gazette the appointment of Outram to the 
command of Kanhpur. Outram's arrival could not be 
very distant. This nomination removed Havelock from 
the position of independent commander to that of a locum 
tenens for his superior officer. In such a case a sense of 
responsibility must necessarily weigh upon a commander. 
I have already pointed out that the position at Kanhpur, 
with a small force, fronted on one side by Oudh in re- 
bellion, in front by provinces in a state of insurrection, 
to the left rear by the gradually concentrating Gwaliar 
contingent, was not, in a military sense, defensible except 
by a large force. It had one merit, it was central. In the 
eyes of Havelock that fact alone almost compensated for 
the other disadvantages. He wrote, then, to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to announce that if hopes of speedy 



236 Reinforcernents reach Kdnhpur, 

reinforcements were held out to him he would continue 
to hold Kanhpur, otherwise he would be forced to retire 
on Allahdbad. The reply of Sir Colin was of a nature to 
decide him to remain at Kanhpur. 

Since the 3d of August reinforcements, in small parties, 
had been gradually arriving at that station. Outram him- 
self came only on the i6th of September. This illustrious 
man had reached Allahabad on the 2d of that month, and 
had despatched thence, on the 5th, to Kanhpur the 5th 
Fusiliers, Eyre's battery of eighteen-pounders, and had 
started himself the same evening with the 90th. On the 
way up Eyre, with 160 infantry and two guns, crushed a 
body of insurgents who had crossed over from Oudh with 
the view of cutting Outram's communications. This action 
completely cleared the road, and enabled Outram to reach 
Kanhpur with the much-needed reinforcements on the i6th. 

His first act illustrated the character of the man. 
Feeling that, under extraordinary difficulties, Havelock 
had made a most daring attempt to relieve the garrison of 
the Lakhnao Residency, and that but for his own arrival 
that general would have been enabled to renew the at- 
tempt under favourable conditions, he resolved that the 
credit of the relief should still belong to him above all 
others. He therefore on his arrival issued a divisional 
order, in which he declared that, ' in gratitude for, and 
admiration of, the brilliant deed of arms achieved by 
Brigadier-General Havelock and his gallant troops,' he, 
Outram, ' will cheerfully waive his rank in favour of that 
officer on this occasion, and will accompany the force to 
Lakhnao in his civil capacity, as Chief Commissioner of 
Oudh, tendering his military services to Brigadier-General 
Havelock as a volunteer.' 

This generous offer was accepted in fitting terms by 
Havelock. 




cv^?^ e_ya/?rie^i U^tfy'^/. 



Have lock marches to Lakhnao. 237 

The force now at Havelock's disposal consisted of 
3179 men of all arms. It was constituted as follows. The 
first infantry brigade, composed of the Madras Fusiliers, 
the 5th Fusiliers, the 84th, and two companies of the 
64th, was commanded by Neill. The second, composed 
of the 78th Highlanders, the 90th, and Brasyer's Sikhs, 
was led by Colonel Hamilton of the 78th, with the rank 
of Brigadier. The artillery brigade, composed of Maude's 
battery, Olpherts' battery, and Eyre's battery of eighteen- 
pounders, was commanded by Major Cooper. Barrow 
led the cavalry, consisting of 109 volunteers and fifty-nine 
native horsemen. Crommelin was the Chief Engineer. 

With this force, leaving Colonel Wilson of the 64th, 
with the headquarters of his regiment and some details of 
convalescents, in all about 400 men, to hold Kanhpur, 
Havelock crossed the Ganges, on the 19th, under cover of 
Eyre's heavy guns. Those guns followed the next day. 
On the 21st Havelock drove the rebels from Mangalwar, 
then halting at Unao for a mouthful of food, pushed on 
to Bashiratganj, already the scene of three contests, and 
bivouacked there for the night. It was raining heavily, 
and not a man but who was wet to the skin. However, 
the mipedimenta arrived two hours later, and with it the 
luxury of dry clothes and a dinner. The rain was still 
falling as the little force set out at half-past seven the 
next morning. Marching sixteen miles, it came in sight 
of the bridge of Banni, a very defensible position had the 
rebels had the heart to defend it. But badly led, or 
believing in the greater capabilities of the narrow streets 
of Lakhnao, they had neither broken down the bridge 
over the river Sai nor manned the two half-moon batteries 
which they had constructed on the further side of it. 
Havelock then crossed the bridge, bivouacked for the 
night on its further bank, and fired a royal salute to inti- 



238 The Fighting in Lakhnao begins. 

mate to the defenders of the Residency the near approach 
Z)f reHef. 

The 23d promised to be a day of action. Lakhnao was 
but sixteen miles distant. The wind no longer bore to the 
British Camp the customary sound of the booming of heavy 
guns against the Residency. It was plain that the rebels 
were concentrating their resources for a stern defence of the 
city. Havelock gave the men their breakfasts, and then 
moved forward. It was half-past eight. For some time 
no enemy was visible. But as the troops approached the 
Alambagh, some infantry appeared on their flanks, and 
they soon had evidence that the rebels were prepared to 
receive them at and near that walled garden. Havelock 
then halted his men, changed the order of his march from 
right to left in front, bringing Hamilton's brigade to the 
left front, their route lying across broken and heavy 
ground. Eyre's heavy battery then opened on the enemy's 
batteries, which occupied a tope of trees in front of his 
centre and left, whilst Olpherts was despatched to the left 
to cover the movement of the second brigade (Hamilton's) 
against the right, Barrow's cavalry leading. Overcoming 
every obstacle, Olpherts' battery took a position on the 
rebels' right flank and opened fire. The rebels on the left 
and centre, crushed meanwhile by the play of Eyre's guns, 
then gave way ; but the Alambagh remained, and two 
guns were firing on the British force from embrasures in 
its wall. To capture these Neill sent forward a wing of 
the 5th Fusiliers. The 5th, with their habitual gallantry, 
stormed the wall. Whilst they were engaged in a fierce 
fight for the two pieces, Captain Burton of the 78th had 
forced the main entrance, and rushed to their aid, taking 
the defenders of the guns in reverse. The Madras 
Fusiliers followed. The men of the three regiments did 
their work so well that in ten minutes the Alambagh was 



The Decisive Day dawns. 2^g 

cleared of its defenders, and Barrow and Outram and 
their companions were galloping in pursuit of the flee- 
ing enemy. As they were returning from pursuing the 
rebels to the Yellow House, near the Charbagh bridge, 
a despatch was placed in Outram's hands. It told him 
that our countrymen had stormed Dehli. He galloped 
to Havelock with the news a few minutes later, and 
Outram, bareheaded, announced the glad tidings to the 
hurriedly collected soldiers. The ringing shouts with 
which they received it might almost have been heard in 
the Residency. 

No tents were up, no food was forthcoming, but the 
day's work had been eminently satisfactory, and the men, 
exhilarated by their success and by the news, were content 
to wait until food should arrive. The next day they rested 
whilst their general made his last arrangements for the 
advance of the morrow. The rebels kept up a heavy fire 
all day in their direction, but Havelock had thrown back 
his line so as to be beyond its range. 

At last the decisive day dawned. The final scheme 
adopted was to force the Charbagh bridge, then to follow 
a winding lane skirting the left bank of the canal, thence 
to make a sharp turn to the left and push through the 
fortified palaces and bazaars which covered the ground 
extending to the very gates of the Residency. It was 
certain that the Charbagh bridge and every inch of 
ground beyond it would be desperately defended. The 
sick and wounded, the hospital, the baggage, and the food 
and ammunition reserves would meanwhile be left in the 
Alambagh, guarded by 303 men, mostly footsore, com- 
manded by Major M'Intyre of the 78th. 

At half-past eight o'clock the advance sounded, and 
the first brigade, with Maude's battery in front, accom- 
panied by Outram, moved ofi' towards the Yellow House, 



240 The C heir bag h Bridge, 

in column of sections, right in front. Soon the rebel fire 
opened upon them. Maude, however, quickly cleared the 
way with his guns, and the men pushing on, forced their 
way to a point near the bridge. There they were halted 
whilst Outram, with the 5th Fusiliers, should make a detour 
to the right to clear the Charbagh garden, with the view 
of bringing a flanking fire to bear on the strong defences 
of the bridge. 

The position of the rebels, indeed, could scarcely have 
been stranger. The Charbagh bridge was defended on 
its farther side by an earthen rampart about seven feet high, 
stretching completely across it, but having in the centre 
an opening through which only one man at a time could 
pass on foot. On this parapet were mounted six guns, 
two of them twenty-four-pounders. To the right of the 
bridge, on the side of the canal by which the British were 
advancing, were some enclosures occupied by the rebels. 

Such was the position. The men behind it were 
numerous, their guns were loaded, and there was every 
appearance that it would be desperately defended. On 
the British side were Maude's two guns in front ; to their 
left, thrown forward, twenty-five men of the Madras 
Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Arnold, endeavouring to beat 
down the musketry fire from the tall houses on the other 
side ; behind Maude's guns, close by, covered by a bend 
of the road and a wall, were the remainder of the Madras 
Fusiliers, lying down and waiting till Maude's guns should 
have done their work ; to the right, Outram had led the 
5th Fusiliers, for the purpose already indicated. These, 
I need hardly add, were not in sight. In a bay of the 
wall of the Charbagh garden stood Neill and his Aide- 
de-Camp, waiting until Outram's flank movement should 
make itself felt. On the other side of the road, mounted, 
was young Havelock. 



ro?e;f^ Havelock and His Comrades. 24 i 

The duel between Maude's guns and those of the 
rebels had raged for some time. The enemy had all the 
advantage of fighting under cover, and they had made 
deadly havoc wth Maude's gunners. One after another 
hese had fallen their places being supplied from the 
mfantry behind them. So great was the pressure that 
Maude and h,s Lieutenant, Maitland, were doing the work 
hemselves. At the end of half-an-hour Maude recognised 
hat he was making no impression. Then he called out 
o young Havelock that he could not fight his guns much 
longer, and begged him to 'do something.' Havelock 
rode at once to NeiU and suggested that he should charge 
the bridge But Neill, feeling himself hampered by the 
presence of Outram, with his brigade, declared that in his 
absence he could not take the responsibility; that Outram 
. must turn up soon. Tytler then attempted to persuade 
him to give the order, but with the same result 

th.^.t™*^!'' "°""'"^ ^"'^ ^^'=" '^^^■•d of Outram and 
T^A f P°"'"'°" ^^^ "'^'^'^^- Maude could not 

hold on much longer. A charge alone could remedy 
the position. Recognising this, young Havelock, full of 
ardour, despairing of overcoming in any other way the 
obstinacy of Neill, attempted a ruse. Riding to the rear 
a short distance, he suddenly turned his horse, and gallop- 
ing back rode up to Neill and. saluting him, said, as 
though the order had come from his father. 'You are to 
carry the bridge, sir.' Neill gave the order, directing 

Arnold dashed forward with his handful on to the brid<.e 
and made for the barricade. Young Havelock and Tyttei' 
were by his side in a moment. Then the hurrican^ 
opened. Arnold fell, shot through both thighs. Tytler's 
horse was killed, and he himself shot through the groin 
Of the twenty-eight men who had dashed forward, Have- 

Q 



242 They clear the Bridge, 

lock and a private named Jakes alone were unwounded. 
Unable to pass the barricade, Havelock, erect on his horse, 
waved his sword and called on the main body to come 
on. Jakes stood by his side, loading and firing as fast as 
he could. There they stood, the hero officer and the hero 
private, for fully two minutes exposed to the full fire of 
the enemy. They stood unharmed. Then suddenly 
there was a rush, and the Madras Fusiliers dashed for- 
ward, cleared the bridge, stormed the barricade, and 
bayoneted the rebel gunners where they stood. The 
bridge was gained. The entrance gate into Lakhnao 
was won. 

On the regiments of the second brigade closing up, the 
whole force crossed by the bridge, and then, in pursuance 
of the plan indicated, turned sharp to the right along the 
canal. There was one exception to this movement. The 
78th was sent with orders to hold the end of the direct 
Kanhpur road, cover the advance of the heavy guns, and 
then to follow the column as its rear-guard. The main 
body meanwhile, followed the lane along the canal for 
two miles, then turned northwards near the Dilkusha 
bridge, when its progress was suddenly checked by a 
formidable obstacle. Before them, under lee of the 
Kaisarbagh, was a narrow bridge across a nullah, com- 
manded by guns and musketry fire from that building. 
The bridge could not hold more than two abreast. How- 
ever, a rush was made, and the men who crossed opened 
a fire on the rebels to cover the passage of their comrades. 
Many men were here struck down, when suddenly the 
situation was mended by the 78th in a manner presently 
to be related. Then the crossing was effected, and the 
men, reuniting, halted under cover of some deserted build- 
ings near the Chatr Manzil. 

Darkness was now coming on. Outram, who had 



And enter the Residency, 243 

found the clearing of the Charbdgh garden more serious 
than he anticipated, and who had come up after the 
bridge had been stormed, then proposed that the force 
should halt where it was — at the Chatr Manzil — to 
await there the arrival of the rearmost guard, of which 
they had no tidings, and of those it was escorting. 
There were many considerations in favour of such a 
plan, and there was only a sentimental reason against it. 
But Havelock considered that the importance of joining 
the beleaguered garrison outweighed every other con- 
sideration. So they pushed on through the Khas bazaar, 
crowded with the enemy. From an archway in this 
bazaar Neill was shot dead in the act of giving an order 
to his Aide-de-Camp. Still the British forced their way, 
despite the continuous musketry fire, until at length they 
emerged from the bazaar. Then they were gladdened by 
the sound of cheering from the Residency. The 78th, and 
others who had pushed their way through other streets, 
appeared on the scene directly afterwards and joined 
in the cry. They were not yet, however, within the 
Residency. The night was dark, and a way had to be 
made for them before they could enter. At last the de- 
fences which had so long bidden defiance to the rebels at 
the Baillie guard were removed, and there was no obstacle 
to a joyful union between the relievers and the relieved. 

Not all entered that night. Many of the men lay 
on the ground between the Baillie guard gateway and 
the Farhatbakhsh palace, and rejoined their comrades 
early in the morning. It remains now to recount the 
course of the 78th. That regiment had had a hard 
time of it. Directed by Havelock to see to the safety 
of the heavy guns, it had diverged from the main 
body, and reached a point indicated on the Kanhpur 
road. There, for a time, the men remained unmolested, 



244 The Rear- Gttard conies Up, 

when suddenly swarms of natives set upon them. For 
three hours they resisted every attack ; then, the number 
of the rebels increasing, they stormed a temple, and held 
it against the infuriated enemy. Vainly did the latter 
bring up three brass guns. The British soldiers, led on 
by Webster, Herbert Macpherson, and other gallant 
officers, charged and captured these, and threw them into 
the canal. Still the fight went on, and it required another 
charge before the rebels could be compelled to renounce 
their hopes of success. The Highlanders then, seeing 
nothing of the heavy guns, pushed on, with the idea of 
rejoining their comrades of the main body, but taking a 
shorter road, through the Hazratganj quarter, they arrived 
in close vicinity to the Kaisarbagh just as the guns from 
that building were playing on the Fusiliers in the manner 
related. The 78th dashed into the battery, and made the 
road easy by its capture. They then pushed on in an 
alignment with the rest to the Baillie guard. 

But the heavy guns ? Their progress had been ren- 
dered very difficult by the deep trenches which the rebels 
had cut across the road. But under the guidance of 
Lieutenant Moorsom, who knew every inch of the ground, 
sent by Havelock to direct them, they had deviated from 
the main road and went by a shorter cut, unopposed, to 
the Baillie guard. The rearmost guard, however, with 
two big guns, still remained unaccounted for. To search 
for and rescue these, Outram, who had assumed command, 
despatched, on the 26th, a force under Colonel Robert 
Napier.^ Napier found them holding the passage in 
front of the Moti Mahall, and brought them in the follow- 
ing morning. It is sad to have to record that the 
wounded who had reached that palace were not so for- 
tunate in their attempt to reach the Residency. The 

^ The late Lord Napier of Magdala. 



Outram wisely decides to remain. 245 

volunteer escort mistook the way, and some forty helpless 
men were done to death, some by the daggers of the 
rebels, some by the fire wantonly applied to their doHs.^ 

The losses sustained in this glorious operation were 
heavy. The official return puts them at 196 killed and 
535 wounded, and there is every reason for believing that 
that return is accurate. Those losses were incurred in 
the hope that, as a satisfactory result of them, the de- 
fenders of the Residency would be relieved. As it was, 
they were merely reinforced. At first Outram inclined 
to the belief that it would be possible to fall back upon 
Kanhpur. But his better judgment prevailed. Subse- 
quent experience proved most clearly that the women 
and children could not have been withdrawn by the force 
under his orders except at a tremendous risk. If it had 
cost him over 500 men to make his way into the Resi- 
dency, unencumbered by non-combatants of that stamp, 
the reader may judge for himself how far he could have 
succeeded in making the reverse journey under circum- 
stances infinitely more complicated. Eager as was 
Outram to return to place himself and his troops at 
the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, he was surely 
right, situated as he was, not to attempt it. Circum- 
stances were too strong, even for a man who, through- 
out his career, had never flinched at either danger or 
responsibility. 

Whilst he remains besieged in the Residency, his 
troops occupying some of the adjacent palaces, and the 
Alambagh held by a small detachment, I propose to take 
a survey of the events which had been passing in that part 
of the country in which British interests were represented 
almost solely by the men who occupied the fortress of 
Agra. 

1 A doli is an inferior kind of palanquin, used for carrying a wounded man. 



CHAPTER XVI I. 

THE LEAGUER OF AGRA. 

In the eighth chapter I have given a brief account of the 
risings at Firuzpur, at Ahgarh, at Bulandshahr, at Itawah, 
at Mainpuri, and of the consequent movements at Agra. 
I have shown how, in consequence of the rising at Mathura, 
on the 30th of May, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North- 
west, Mr Colvin, had caused the sipahis of the 44th and 
67th N. I. to be disarmed (May 31); how he had directed 
the raising of volunteers; how, on the 14th of June, the 
sipahis of the Gwaliar contingent had mutinied at GwaHar ; 
and how the EngHsh men and women who had survived 
the massacre consequent upon that mutiny had found 
refuge at Agra ; and, finally, how it was not until the 
end of June that Mr Colvin had deemed it wise that the 
Europeans and Eurasians should abandon their houses 
in the station and take up their abode in the fort of red 
sandstone built by Akbar in 1565-73. He did not move 
thither himself till the 4th of June following. I propose 
now to take up the story, briefly, from that date. 

Mr Colvin's order to concentrate the resources in men 
and supplies of the English at Agra, within the fort, had not 
been issued a day too soon. Indeed it is to be regretted 
that it was not issued earlier, and that, when issued, it was 
accompanied with restrictions. Mr Raikes, a member of 
the Civil Service occupying a high position at Agra, records 
that the order directing the move to the fort forbade the 



Position of Affairs in the Noi^'th-west. 247 

transfer to that place of refuge of ' any property beyond 
the sort of allowance which a French Customs House 
officer at Calais or Marseilles passes under the term of a 
sac de nuit! This extraordinary prohibition, adds the 
same authority, entailed ' the loss 'and destruction of 
books, furniture, archives, records, public and private, and 
the ruin of hundreds of families/ The victualling of the 
fort proceeded, however, with great energy. 

By the end of June Agra was completely isolated. 
The entire country between the Jamnah and the Ganges 
was ' up,' whilst to the west of the former river Bundel- 
khand was surging with rebels ; Rajputana and Central 
India had become difficult to hold. Communications with 
the north, south, west, and east had been severed. In fact, 
in what direction soever Mr Colvin might turn his glance, 
the horizon was gloomy in the extreme. 

Nor was the position mended by the news which 
reached him on the 2d of July. This was to the effect 
that a strong rebel force had reached Fathpur-Sikri, 
twenty-three miles from Agra. To meet these he had 
within the fort the 3d European regiment and one battery 
of European artillery. But he had also native allies upon 
whom he believed rather fatuously that he could rely. 
These were a body of 600 Karduli match) ockmen, com- 
manded by Saifulla Khan, a native official of high char- 
acter, some levies from Bhartpur, and a detachment of the 
Kota contingent. Mr Colvin at once brought the last 
named within the cantonment, whilst he placed the others 
at Shahganj, four miles on the road to Fathpur-Sikri, to 
watch the movements of the rebel force at that place. 

The following day, the 3d, Mr Colvin being ill, a 
council of three gentlemen, Mr Reade, the senior member 
of the Board of Revenue, Major Macleod of the Engineers, 
Military Secretary to Mr Colvin, and Brigadier Polwhele, 



248 T/ie Situation becomes more defined. 

commanding the troops, was appointed to administer 
affairs. These gentlemen at once took active measures for 
the public safety. Some of these may sound strange, but 
they were probably justified under the circumstances. For 
instance, dreading lest the rebels might enter the station, 
and let loose upon it a number of hardened criminals, 
they conveyed the prisoners in the gaol across the J am n ah, 
and released them. Then they broke down the pontoon 
bridge communicating with the fort, they brought in all 
the native Christians, they directed that the Karauli and 
Bhartpur levies should be required to give up their guns, 
two in number, and they directed the officer commanding 
the Kota contingent to march against the rebels. These 
orders sufficed to clear the air. The Bhartpur and 
Karauli men, angered by the removal of their guns, re- 
moved themselves from the scene. It was the best course 
for the English they could adopt, for an open enemy is 
better than a pretended friend. Similarly with the Kota 
contingent. No sooner did the men composing it receive 
the order to advance than they shot down the English 
sergeant in charge of their military stores, and firing 
hastily at their European officers, rushed off to join the 
enemy they had been directed to combat. They did not, 
happily, effect their full purpose, for whilst a loyal gunner 
named Mathura managed unseen to spike their guns, 
their English doctor, Mathias by name, calm and collected 
amid dangers, strewed in the sand their powder, ammuni- 
tion, and case-shot. A party sent out from Agra brought 
the guns into the fort. 

That same evening Mr Colvin entered the fort and 
resumed authority. The next day, the 5th, the rebels 
marched in from Fathpur-Sikri and took up a position 
at the village of Sassiah, some five miles from the fort. 
They were reported to consist of 4000 infantry, 1500 



Polwhele marches against the Rebels. 249 

cavalry, and eleven guns. Brigadier Polwhele, after pro- 
viding for the defences of the fort, could take into the 
field against them 568 English infantry, a battery with 
sixty-nine Englishmen, including officers, and fifty-four 
native drivers, fifty-five mounted militia, and fifty English 
volunteers, mostly officers, making a total of 742 English- 
men, besides the officers of the European regiment and 
the staff. It was a force sufficient, if well handled, to 
drive the rebel force to Jericho. 

Believing that he could so handle it, Polwhele marched 
from the fort at one o'clock, and proceeded to Shahganj. 
There he halted till his reconnoitring parties should come 
in. These arrived at half-past two with the information 
that the rebels were still halted at Sassiah. Towards that 
village Polwhele then moved. When within half-a-mile 
from it the enemy's left battery opened fire. 

There is only one true method of fighting Asiatics. 
That mode is to move straight on. To play the game of an 
artillery duello with them, when they have nearly double 
the number of guns and the advantage of position, is 
simply madness. The experience of a hundred years 
would have been reversed if Polwhele, pushing on against 
the village of Sassiah, had failed to drive the rebels from it. 
But he did nothing of the sort. Far from profiting from 
the teachings of history, he tried a plan in which he was 
bound to be beaten. He halted his infantry, and made 
them lie down, whilst he engaged in an artillery duello 
with his six guns against the enemy's eleven. His men 
were in the open, the rebels were protected by the village 
of Sassiah. The logical consequences followed. Although 
the British guns were directed by two of the most gallant 
and skilled officers the splendid Bengal Artillery ever 
produced. Captain D'Oyley commanding half the battery 
on the right, Captain Pearson the other half on the 



250 Battle of Sassiah. 

left, the larger calibre of the enemy's guns asserted its 
superiority. They had, moreover, the exact range. In 
a short time they succeeded in exploding two tumbrils, 
and in inflicting considerable damage among the drivers 
and horses of the British. Vainly did D'Oyley and Pear- 
son send messages to Polwhele to tell him that a persist- 
ance in those tactics would exhaust their ammunition 
without securing for him any corresponding advantage. 
Polwhele heeded not. Eyre, at Arah, had been in a posi- 
tion somewhat similar, but the moment he had realised 
that pounding with guns would not win the day against 
an enemy strongly posted, he had tried the never-failing 
British charge. But Polwhele would not. Probably he 
was hampered by the considerations which hampered 
Lawrence at Chinhat. The infantry he had with him 
constituted the sole means at his disposal for the defence 
of the fort. At all events he persisted in waiting until 
another tumbril had been exploded by the enemy's fire, 
and until their cavalry, gathering courage from his inac- 
tivity, charged Pearson's half-battery. Cool and collected, 
Pearson awaited their approach, whilst the company of the 
Europeans nearest to him rose to their feet, their muskets 
levelled. A simultaneous fire, well directed, from the 
guns and the infantry sufficed to ward off the attack, and 
to send the survivors reeling back to the place whence 
they had ridden. A similar attempt threatened against 
D'Oyley's half- battery was defeated by the volunteer 
horsemen. These, eighteen in number, charged the 
200 of the rebels, and though they lost one-third of 
their number, they forced the rebels to retire. 

Two hours and a half had now elapsed. The rebels 
still occupied their unthreatened position. The English 
had effected nothing to drive them from it. D'Oyley 
reported to the Brigadier that his ammunition was all but 



The British forced to retire. 2 5 1 

exhausted. Then, and then only, did the Brigadier issue 
the order which, given two hours and a half before, could 
scarcely have failed to achieve success. He ordered the 
line to advance. The line did advance, and, despite the 
fire from men stationed in most advantageous positions in 
Sassiah, the men fought their way into the village. They 
even captured and spiked one of the enemy's guns. But 
in advancing to and in taking the village the British 
losses had been heavy. D'Oyley was mortally wounded.^ 
Major Thomas of the Europeans met the same fate. 
Several men were killed, but at last the village was 
gained. It required but the support of the guns to com- 
plete the victory, but by this time every round had been 
fired away. In his anxiety for the safety of his men Pol- 
whele had prematurely, and despite of repeated warnings, 
exhausted the one means by which he could assure success. 

For the rebels were not slow to recognise the cause of 
the silence of the British guns. They at least had ten, and 
still some, though not an abundance, of ammunition. They 
at once made a demonstration with the three arms against 
the village. Polwhele could not defend it with infantry 
alone, and he ran a great risk of being cut off from the 
fort. Under those circumstances, he had no other course 
but to retreat. The retreat was effected in good order; 
the infantry, though savage with their commander, to 
whose fatal tactics they rightly attributed the loss of the 
day, preserving their traditional calmness, and repulsing 
every attack. Fortunately, before the retreat was con- 
cluded, the rebels likewise fell short of gun ammunition. 

In this fight the British had lost forty-five men killed, 
and 108 wounded and missing. They had, also, left one 

^ Overcome by the intense pain of the wound, he turned to the man 
nearest him and said, ' They have done for me now ; put a stone over my 
grave, and say that I died fighting my guns.' 



252 Consequences of the Defeat. 

gun on the ground, though they recovered it a day or 
two later. The rebels signalised their triumph by set- 
ting fire to every building within their reach. They then 
returned to Sassiah, took a hasty meal, and set off for 
Dehli. Arriving there, on the 8th, they were greeted with 
a grand salute as ' the victors of Sassiah.' 

For the English the blow was severe. Though the 
rebels had departed, their allies, the rabble and the gaol- 
birds, finished what they had begun. They ruthlessly 
plundered the city, the cantonments, and the civil lines, 
burning the materials they cared not to take away. The 
following morning the town-crier, by order of the Kotwal, 
proclaimed the inauguration of the rule of the Mughal. 

Of Polwhele's battle it only remains to be said that 
it should stand out in history as a warning of the manner 
in which Europeans, or, I would rather say, the British 
race, should not fight Asiatics. From the date following 
that on which it was fought began, for the English at 
Agra, that long and tedious life in the fort, which was ter- 
minated only by the arrival of a force, under Greathed, on 
the loth of October, made disposable by^the fall of Dehli. 
In the interval, September the 9th, Mr Colvin died. 
He was succeeded temporarily, and until the orders of 
the Government of India should be known, by the senior 
Civil servant, Mr E. A. Reade, a man of lofty character — 
the type of a hard-working, unselfish English gentleman. 
More than two months later (September 30th), the 
Government, thinking that the times required a soldier 
rather than a civilian at the head of affairs, nominated 
Colonel Hugh Eraser of the Engineers to be their Chief 
Commissioner for Agra and its dependencies. Colonel 
Eraser held the office till the 9th of February following. 

The slight sketch I have given of the proceedings at 
Agra, till the fall of Dehli had released avenging columns 



Dehli the Centre of the Sitttation. 253 

to reconquer the North-west, will probably have brought 
home to the mind of the reader that, to the north and 
north-west of Allahabad, Dehli was the central point, the 
place upon the occupation of which the fate of the towns 
and districts in those provinces, the fate of Central India, 
the fate of the Panjab itself, depended. The whole of the 
North-west, including Bundelkhand and Rohilkhand, had 
risen because Dehli was held by the rebels. The assertion 
in that Imperial city of the rule of the Mughal was the 
cause : — insurrection all over the country was the conse- 
quence. The truth of this axiom was felt more clearly 
every day by those who were responsible for the main- 
tenance of British authority in the provinces and districts 
which remained loyal. Equally was it felt by the native 
princes who adhered to the British connection, by those 
who had shaken it off, and by the watchers of the atmo- 
sphere. If the British should be compelled to abandon 
their position before Dehli, it would be scarcely possible 
to prevent a tremendous conflagration. Most certainly the 
Panjab would have risen. In that event, most probably, 
the districts to the north-west and west of Allahabad would 
have been completely severed, for a time, from the British. 
Dehli being thus the centre of the situation, the point 
on the possession of which depended the fate of the sur- 
rounding districts, it becomes me, before detailing the 
result of the struggle before its walls, to take a bird's-eye 
view of the provinces and districts in which its influence 
had made itself the most felt. I propose, therefore, to 
glance at the events which had occurred in the Sagar and 
Narbada territories, in Central India, in Rajputana, in the 
districts dependent upon Mirath, in Rohilkhand, and, 
finally, in the Panjab, before I describe the 'crowning 
mercy ' which was vouchsafed to the British arms in the 
city which had become the kernel and focus of the revolt. 



CHAPTER XVII I. 

EVENTS IN THE SAGAR AND NARBADA TERRITORIES, 
CENTRAL INDIA, rAjPUTANA, THE MIRATH DIS- 
TRICTS, ROHILKHAND, AND THE PANJAB. 

The S^gar and Narbada territories, immediately south 
of, and adjoining, the North-west Provinces, comprised, 
in 1857, the districts of Sagar, Jabalpur, Hohsangabad, 
Sioni, Damoh, Narsinhpur, Betul, Chanderi, Jhansi, Nagod, 
and Mandlah. When, in 1843, the Gvvah'ar Darbdr com- 
menced those hostihties against the British which culmi- 
nated in the battle of Maharajpur, the chiefs and people of 
those districts, moved partly by their dislike to the foreign 
system of administration, partly incited by the Gwdliar 
Darbar, broke into rebellion. On the conclusion of the 
peace which followed Maharajpur, the then Governor- 
General, Lord EUenborough, made a clean sweep of the 
officers who had administered the territories, and deputed 
Colonel Sleeman to inaugurate a better system. Colonel 
Sleeman, working on eastern ideas, completely succeeded. 
His successor, Mr Bushby, continued his system with 
marked success. But after a rule of five or six years Mr 
Bushby was promoted. Then, in an evil hour, the Sagar 
and Narbada territories were placed directly under the 
Government of the North-west Provinces. 

That transfer caused the introduction of the system 
called after its inventor Mr Thomason. But for the ear- 
nest exhortations of the ablest man in the Commission, 



The Thomasonian System. 255 

Major Ternan, that system would have been introduced in 
all its strictness. Even wi-th some of its most stringent 
provisions softened down, it worked in a manner to cause 
great discontent among the chiefs, without satisfying the 
people. 

The mode in which this system worked may be illus- 
trated by the story of the Raja of Dilheri, the feudal lord 
of all the Gond clans. This chief had ever been a loyal 
supporter of the British connection. For his fidelity in 
the trying times of 1843 the Government had presented 
him with a gold medal. Like many of his tribe, he had 
been rather extravagant in his expenditure, and had in- 
curred debts. These, however, by exercising a strict 
economy, he had paid off a very short time after the 
transfer of the Sdgar and Narbada territories to the North- 
west Government. Now, it was one of the principles of 
that Government to discourage large landowners. Accord- 
ingly, in 1855, just after the Raja had paid off his debts, 
Captain Ternan, then in charge of the district in which his 
estates were situated, received instructions to inform the 
Raja that, inasmuch as he had shown himself unfit to 
hold the title he had inherited, and to manage the estates 
which had descended to him, he would be deprived of 
both ; that his title would be abolished, and his property 
distributed among his tenants, he receiving a percentage 
from the rents. When Ternan, most reluctantly, an- 
nounced this order to the Raja, the old man drew from 
his belt the medal bestowed upon him for his conduct in 
1843, and requested him to return it to those who had 
granted it, as they were now about to disgrace him before 
his clan and the entire district. With great difficulty 
Ternan pacified him, but his heart was deeply wounded. 
Many thought that he would rebel. But, despite the 
treatment he had received, he was loyal to his British 



256 Events in Bttndelkhand. 

overlord. He sought, indeed, every opportunity of dis- 
playing his gratitude to Ternan, who had been censured 
by the Agra Government for his persistent advocacy of 
his claims.! 

The Raja of Dilheri was the type of many land- 
owners in the Sagar and Narbada territories, in fact, 
throughout the territories subject to the Government of 
the North-west, who had been ruined by the Thomasonian 
system. Space does not allow me to give other instances, 
but in Juanpur, in Azamgarh, in the delta of the Ganges, 
in Oudh, in Rohilkhand, they abounded. It was they who 
roused the country, which offered so stout a resistance to 
Sir Hugh Rose, between Indur and Kalpi. 

I must pass lightly over the events which happened in 
the territories of which I am writing. It must suffice to 
state that three companies of the Gwaliar contingent 
garrisoning Lalitpur mutinied and expelled their European 
officers on the 13th of June; that a detachment of native 
infantry sent out from Sagar, under Major Gaussen, rose 
on the 23d ; that the 3d Irregulars and the 42d N. I., 
stationed at Sagar, broke out on the ist of July. The 
last-mentioned mutineers were, however, expelled the day 
following by the loyal 31st N. I., a regiment loyal to the 
last. From that moment, and until they were relieved by 
Sir Hugh Rose, the English men and women, and the 

^ When the Narsmhpur district was in a state of rebellion, the house of 
Ternan, who had refused to quit it, was surrounded early one morning by 
a considerable body of matchlockmen. Ternan saw at a glance that they 
belonged to the Dilheri clan. He at once summoned the chief, and asked 
him the reason for such a display. The chief replied : ' You behaved kindly 
to us, and fought our battle when the title and the estate were confiscated, 
and you were abused for so doing. Now we hear disturbances are rife, and 
we come to offer you our services. We will stick by you, as you stuck by us. 
What do you wish us to do ? ' Ternan accepted their offer, and the members 
of the large clan remained loyal, and rendered good service to the British 
Government throughout the trying events of 1857-8. 



yiidnsi. 257 

loyal sipahis occupied Sagar, but not one foot of terri- 
tory beyond it. The districts of Sagar, Chanderi, Jhansi, 
Lalitpur, and Jalaun continued until that period to be 
overrun by rebels. The Raja of Banpur, and others of 
lesser note, boldly asserted their independence. 

At Jabalpur, the headquarters of the territories, the 
5 2d N. I. continued for a long time in the performance of 
their duty. But in September they too mutinied. They 
were attacked, however, and completely defeated by a 
body of Madras troops which had been sent up from 
Kamthi. They then dispersed, but nevertheless refrained 
from ravaging the country. 

The energetic and far-sighted Ternan, of whom I have 
already spoken, managed, by means of his good under- 
standing with the natives, to clear the rebels from his 
district, that of Narsinhpur. The district of Nagod was 
not so fortunate. The 50th N. I., there located, feigned 
loyalty for a time, but broke out on the 27th of August, 
when they coolly dismissed their officers and inaugurated 
a system of plunder. They, too, formed a part of the rebel 
force which resisted the progress of Sir Hugh Rose. 

It remains now to speak of Jhansi. The city of Jhansi 
was the capital of a dependency which, in the break-up of 
the Mughal empire which followed the death of Aurangzib, 
had been appropriated by one of the Maratha officers 
serving the Peshwa, and to him confirmed by sanad} The 
territory so appropriated comprised nearly 1 608 square 
miles, and a population of a quarter of a million. As 
long as the Peshwa continued to exercise authority in 
Western India the Maratha officer and his successors ad- 
ministered the territory as vassals of that prince. But on 
the downfall of the Peshwa, in 18 17-8, Jhansf, with its 
other territories, was transferred to the British. The ruler, 

^ Sanad, a patent grant or charter issuing from the Government. 

R 



^5^ The Claims of the Rani refused. 

with the title of Subahdar, accepted the protection of the 
foreign overlord, and agreed to pay an annual tribute of 
74,000 rupees. In return, the British declared his title 
and position to be hereditary in his family. Fifteen years 
later, to mark their approval of his rule, they allowed 
him to assume the title of Raja. This prince, whose 
name was Ram Chand Rao, died without heirs, natural 
or adopted, in 1835. The Government of India, how- 
ever, had, as we have said, bestowed the hereditary rule 
upon his family. They therefore appointed his nearest 
relative, who happened to be his uncle, to succeed him. 

This man was a leper, and incapable. After three 
years of unpopular rule his death left the quasi-royal seat 
vacant. There was a lengthened inquiry regarding a suc- 
cessor, and then the Government nominated his brother, 
Baba Gangadhar Rao, to succeed him. 

It unfortunately happened that this man was also an 
imbecile. To prevent the country falling into irremedi- 
able confusion the Government then carried on the 
administration by means of British agency. When, in 
1843, a financial equilibrium had been restored, the 
Government was handed over to the Raja. After a rule, 
conducted neither wisely nor well for eleven years, this 
chief died in 1854, the last surviving member of the 
family to which the Government of India had, in 18 18, 
guaranteed the succession. There remained only his 
widow, a young, high-spirited, and ambitious lady. But 
Lord Dalhousie was of opinion that the guarantee did not 
extend to any person in whose veins the blood of the 
founder of the dynasty did not run. In spite, then, of the 
protestations of that lady he declared the state of Jhansi 
to have lapsed to the East India Company. 

The Rani, like Nana Sahib, never forgave that which 
she considered an insult and an outrage. Powerless, she 



Central India. 259 

nursed her resentment, until the revolt of Mirath and the 
seizure of Dehli gave her the long-wished-for opportunity. 
She then, in June 1857, gained to her cause the sipahis 
stationed at Jhansi, enticed the English officers and their 
families to accept her protection, and had them foully- 
murdered. On the 9th of June she caused herself to be 
proclaimed Rani of Jhansi. 

Bundelkhand, and Rewa or Baghelkhand, include, 
besides Rewa, the territories of Tehri or Urchah, Datia, 
Chatrpur, Pannah, and Ajaigarh. The area of the com- 
bined territories is 22,400 square miles, and the popula- 
tion 3,200,000. More than half of this belongs to Rewa. 
The Raja of Rewa was loyal to the British connection in 
1857, ^^<^ having the good fortune to have at his elbow, 
as his adviser, an officer of marked ability, the late Major 
Willoughby Osborne, he was able not only to put down 
mutiny within his territory, but to assist in repressing 
it outside its borders. The Rajas of Urchah and of 
Ajaigarh rendered likewise all the assistance in their 
power to their British overlord. The territories of the 
Rajas of the other places mentioned were subjected to 
the invasion and plundering of the rebels, but in their 
hearts they too were loyal. 

Between Chatrpur and the Jamnah lies the district 
represented by the stations of Naogang and Bandah, occu- 
pied by native regiments, and by several small states ruled 
by native chiefs. The sipahis at Naogang, belonging to 
the regiments stationed at Jhansi, mutinied as soon as 
they had heard of the action of their comrades at that 
place. The British officers and their wives, forced to flee, 
were hospitably received by the Raja of Chatrpur, but 
had to quit that place, and eventually succeeded in reach- 
ing Bandah. The Nuwab of Bandah received them and 
other British fugitives kindly. The time arrived, however, 



2 6o Central India — Holkar. 

when the Nuwab, unable to contend against the excited 
passions of his followers, was forced, nominally at least, 
to cast in his lot with the rebels. The same charge was 
made against the unfortunate Rao of Kirwi, a small 
state in the Bandah district. Though the territories of 
the chief were overrun by rebels, his sympathies were with 
his British overlord. He was a minor, and had no more 
power to repress the insurrection than a child has to 
knock down a prize-fighter. Yet the time was to come 
when, because he and others had not repressed the rebels, 
they were classed and punished as rebels. This was par- 
ticularly the case with the innocent Rao of Kirwi. 

Speaking generally, it may be said that, in July and 
during the following months of 1857, the Sagar and 
Narbada territories, and the country to the west of the 
Jamnah generally, Rewah and the town of Sagar excepted, 
were in the hands of the rebels. It seemed to depend upon 
the result of the operations before Dehli as to whether the 
rebellion would assume a more aggressive form. 

To the south-west of Jhansi lay the territories of 
Maharaja Holkar. These territories comprised the im- 
portant city of Indur, situated on a tributary of the Sipra, 
with a population of 15,000; the British cantonment of 
Mau, between thirteen and fourteen miles ^ distant from 
the Residency at Indur ; Mandu, an ancient and famous 
city, with numerous ruins, once the capital of Dhar, and 
at a later period the residence of the Muhammadan kings 
of Malwa ; Dipalpur, twenty-seven miles to the north-west 
of Mau ; and Mehidpur, on the right bank of the Sipra, 
a town garrisoned by a contingent composed of the three 
arms, officered by British officers. 

At Mau there were stationed, in 1857, the 23d Regi- 
ment N. I., a wing of the 1st Native Cavalry, and a field- 

1 A new road has since been made, reducing the distance to ten miles. 



Hoik a r and Dtirand. 261 

battery of artillery, with European gunners but native 
drivers. At Mehidpur the troops, with the exception of 
the officers, were natives. 

The acting British Resident, or, as he was styled in 
official language, the Agent for the Governor-General, 
was Colonel Henry Marion Durand, one of the ablest and 
most prescient of the officers serving the Government of 
India. His career had been one of strange vicissitudes. 
The unselfishness of his nature had been the cause of his 
missing chances which seldom recur twice to the same 
individual. 

The events of the loth of May at Mirath, and the con- 
sequences of those events at Dehli, had produced an un-- 
paralleled commotion in the native mind in the territories 
of Holkar. Durand felt his position to be one of peculiar 
importance. The maintenance of order in the country 
north of the Narbada depended upon one of two con- 
tingencies : one was the fall of Dehli, the other the 
arrival of reinforcements from Bombay. Now, the road 
from Bombay to Agra crossed the Narbada at a point 
just below Indur, and ran thence through Central India to 
a point on the Chambal directly to the north of Gwaliar. 
The maintenance of this road was the prominent feature 
in the plan of Durand. He resolved, then, to maintain his 
own position as long as was possible ; to sever, as far as 
he could, all communications between men of the regular 
army and those of the native contingents ; to secure the 
Narbada and the important road I have described ; and 
to reassure the native princes ^ under his superintendence. 

But events were too strong even for Durand. Dehli 
did not fall, and the reinforcements despatched from 
Bombay, under circumstances presently to be described, 

1 These were Holkar himself, the rulers of the States of Bhopal, Dhar, 
Dewas, and Barwani. 



262 D 71 rand is forced to leave Indttr. 

halted at Aurangabad. The rumour that Dehh' had fallen 
greatly aided his efforts to maintain order for a period of 
fifty-one days after the Mirath outbreak ; but, on the ist 
of July, he was attacked in the Residency by the native 
troops of Holkar. The native troops forming the garri- 
son of the Residency either coalesced with the rebels or 
refused to act against them. No reinforcements, though 
they had been sent for, came from Mau ; and after a 
brilliant defence of two and a half hours' duration Durand 
was compelled to evacuate the Residency, with his small 
European garrison and the eleven women and children 
under his charge. His first idea was to retreat on Mau, 
but as his native escort refused to follow him thither, he 
had no option, eventually, but to retire on Sihor. He and 
his companions "reached that place on the 4th July. 
Thence he set out, with the briefest possible delay, to 
urge upon the commander of the Bombay column the 
necessity of making safe the line of the Narbada, so as, 
to use his own words, 'to interpose a barrier between the 
blazing north and the smouldering south.' 

On the night of the day on which Durand had been 
compelled to evacuate the Residency at Indur the sipahis 
at Mau mutinied, killed three of their officers, and made 
their way to Dehli. Captain Hungerford, who commanded 
the field-battery, remained in occupation of the fort of 
Mau, and assumed the duties of the Governor-General's 
Agent, until the arrival of Durand with the Bombay 
column enabled the latter to resume his duties. 

The Mehidpur contingent remained passively loyal 
until November. On being attacked then by a rebel 
force superior in numbers, they displayed mingled 
cowardice and treachery. Ultimately the majority of 
them fraternised with the rebels. The station, however, 
was held for the British up to that period. 



BhopdL 263 

With the exception, then, of Bhopal, now to be re- 
ferred to, and Mehipiir, that part of Central India repre- 
sented by the dominions of Holkar had become hostile to 
the British from the ist of July. 

Bhopal, indeed, was a brilliant exception. The then 
reigning Begum, Sikandar Begum, had assumed office, in 
February 1847, as regent for her daughter. She was 
a very remarkable woman, possessing great resolution, 
and a more than ordinary talent for aff'airs. In six years 
she had paid off the entire public debt of the State, had 
abolished the system of farming the revenue, had put 
a stop to monopolies, had reorganised the police, and had 
reformed the mint. When she scented the breaking out 
of the rebellion of 1857, she at once made up her mind 
to fight for her trusted overlord. As early as April she 
communicated to the British Agent the contents of a litho- 
graphed proclamation, urging the overthrow and destruc- 
tion of the English, which had been sent her. In June she 
expelled from her territories a native who was raising men 
for a purpose he did not care to avow. In July she 
afforded shelter to Durand and those whom he was 
escorting. She did all these things under enormous diffi- 
culties. Her nearest relations were daily urging upon her 
an opposite course ; her troops mutinied, her nobles mur- 
mured. But Sikandar Begum never wavered. She caused 
the English fugitives to be escorted safely to Hoshangabad, 
she allayed the excitement in her capital, put down the 
mutinous contingent with a strong hand, restored, and 
then maintained, order throughout her dominions. Like 
Sindhia, she clearly recognised that the safety of the 
native princes depended upon the maintenance of the 
beneficently exercised power of the British overlord. 

But Bhopal was the exception. In the other portions 
of the dominions of Holkar the class whose taste is plunder 



264 The Dominions of Sindhid, 

assumed the upper hand. Their further action depended 
upon the result of the operations before Dehh'. 

Nor, although the Maharaja Sindhia was loyal to the 
core, was it otherwise in the dominions of that potentate. 
The straggling dominions of Sindhia contained an area 
of 19,500 square miles, and comprised the towns of 
Gwaliar, Ndrwar, Bhilsa, Ujjain, Rutlam, and the British 
cantonment of Nimach. 

We have seen how the Gwaliar contingent mutinied 
on the 14th of June. The contingent represented the 
feelings of the people over whom the Maharaja ruled. 
But he never wavered. Contrasting the British overlord- 
ship with the probable result of the triumph of the sipahis 
— and of the Mughal — he recognised that the welfare of 
himself and his people depended upon the ultimate success 
of the British arms — and he acted accordingly. 

The station of Nimach lies 371 miles to the south-west 
of Dehli. The garrison there consisted of the 72d Regi- 
ment N. I., the 7th Regiment of the Gwaliar contingent, 
and the wing of the ist Bengal Cavalry. These troops 
rose in revolt the 3d of June. The officers and their fami- 
lies escaped to Udaipur. Subsequently Nimach was the 
scene of many events pertaining more to the history of Raj- 
putana. The sipahis ultimately made their way to Dehli. 

To the north-west of the territory which bears the 
geographical name of Central India lies the province of 
Rajputana, one of the most interesting provinces of India. 
From the time of the departure of the great Lord Wellesley, 
1805, to the close of the Pindari war, 18 18, the princes 
and people of Rajputana had suffered from the want of an 
overlordship which should protect them against a foreign 
foe. The treatment which they endured at that period 
was still fresh in the memory, alike of princes and people, 
when the mutiny of 1857 broke out. From the moment 



Rdjp2ttdna. 265 

of its commencement, then, the princes of Rajputana 
clustered round the waning fragments of the British 
power, to protect them against an enemy more terrible 
even than Amir Khan and the Pindaris. It is true that 
the contingents furnished by Bhartpur and Kota revolted. 
Subsequently, too, the mutinied soldiers of Kota murdered 
the British Resident, Major Burton, and his two sons. 
But the Raja of Bhartpur was a minor, and it has never 
been proved how far the Maharao of Kota was coerced 
by his soldiers. Certainly the Rajas and Raos of the 
other sixteen principalities were entirely loyal, and they 
proved their loyalty on many a trying occasion. 

The station of Nasirabad, in the Ajmir-Mairwara dis- 
trict of Rajputana, 150 miles nearer to Dehli than was 
Nimach, was garrisoned by the 15th and 30th Regiments 
N. I., a battery of native artillery, and the ist Bombay 
Lancers. The infantry broke into revolt on the 28th of 
May ; the men of the other arms followed suit. Two 
officers were killed, and two were wounded. The re- 
mainder retreated to Biaur, a town in Ajmir-Mairwara, 
escorting the women and children. 

At a later date, August 22d, the contingent at Erin- 
puram, near Mount Abu, also revolted, and attempted, 
without much success, to surprise the Europeans, invalided 
or sick, resting at that sanitarium. 

There was one other exception to the general loyalty 
of the princes, nobles, and people of Rajputana. That 
exception was a Thakur or baron of Jodhpur. But that 
Thakur's grievance was not against the English, but 
against his liege lord the Raja. To coerce him, he used 
the revolted sipahis — very much, as the result proved — 
to his own detriment. 

But throughout those troublous times the chief figure 
in Rajputana was the Governor-General's representative, 



2 66 George St Patrick Lawrence, 

George St Patrick Lawrence, not the least gifted member 
of a family which had rendered splendid services to India. 
So long as George Lawrence remained in Rajputana it 
was certain that that province would remain firm and 
steadfast in its loyalty to its overlord. 

It did remain so, despite the risings at Nimach, at 
Nasirabad, at Erinpuram. Yet, even in loyal Rajputana, 
much depended upon the issue of contest before Dehli. 
In a population of nine millions there were many needy men 
who coveted the property of the wealthy. These doubtless 
looked forward with eagerness to the reports of the victories 
and defeats, of the sorties and the attacks, which daily 
inundated the bazaars. And if Dehli had not fallen, if the 
English army had failed in its final assault, the encourage- 
ment which would have raised the populations elsewhere 
might not have been without an effect even in Rajputana. 

In Mirath and the adjoining districts to the east the 
subversion of British authority had not been so complete 
as might have been expected. In Mirath itself authority 
had soon been restored. And, thanks to the energy dis- 
played by Mr Dunlop, by Mr Brand Sapte, and others, 
successful attempts were made to re-establish the British 
power in the villages near it. In June the energetic 
Magistrate, Mr Wallace Dunlop, had organised a troop 
of volunteers, composed of officers without regiments, of 
members of the Civil Service, and of others who happened 
to be at Mirath. Major Williams, Captain Charles 
D'Oyley, and Captain Tyrrhitt occupied the positions of 
commandant, second in command, and adjutant. Styled, 
from the colour of the uniform adopted, the Khaki i 
Risala, this troop, from the end of June to the fall of Dehli 
scoured the country, retook villages, punished marauders, 
and did all that was possible to restore and to maintain 

^ Khaki i.e. dust-colour. 



Spankie, Robertson, Keene, Sapte. 267 

tranquillity. The Risala was often assisted by regular 
troops, cavalry as well as infantry. 

The adjoining station of Saharanpur was administered 
by two men possessing rare capacity and great courage, 
Mr Robert Spankie and Mr Dundas Robertson. These 
gentlemen, cast upon their own resources, not only main- 
tained order among a rebellious and stiff-necked people, in 
very difficult circumstances, but they lent their aid to the 
adjoining districts. To use the words of the lamented 
Baird-Smith, Chief Engineer of the force besieging Dehli, 
Mr Spankie, aided by his energetic subordinates, ' made 
law respected throughout the district, saved life and pro- 
perty within and beyond it to almost an incalculable extent.' 
Major Baird-Smith added: 'The ability to complete the 
works necessary for the capture of Dehli, within the short 
time actually employed, was not more a consequence of 
the indefatigable exertions of the troops in the trenches 
than of the constant and laborious preparations system- 
atically carried on for months beforehand. To the latter 
your' (Spankie's) 'aid was frequent and most important.' 

Equally successful were the efforts of Mr H. G. Keene 
in Dehra Dun ; of Mr R. M. Edwards in Muzaffarnagar. 
In Bulandshahr the splendid exertions of Mr Brand Sapte 
restored order temporarily; but that station, Sikandarabad, 
Malagarh, and Khurja were so much under the control of 
the disaffected and turbulent Gujar population that it was 
not possible to retain them permanently until the fate of 
Dehli should be decided. The same remark applies to 
Aligarh, to Gurgaon, to Hisar, and to the district of 
Rohtak. The country likewise between Aligarh and 
Agra, notwithstanding the splendid exertions of the Agra 
volunteers, and the country between Agra and Dehli, by 
way of Mathura, remained in a state of rebellion during 
that long period of uncertainty. 



268 Rohilkhand. 

In the province of Rohilkhand matters were even 
worse. From the districts and stations of Bijnaur, of 
Muradabad, of Badaon, of Bareh', of Shahjahanpur, the 
Enghsh had been expelled under circumstances of great 
cruelty, and with much shedding of innocent blood. 
Then a pensioner of the British Government, Khan 
Bahadur Khan by name, the descendant and heir of 
the last ruler of the Rohilahs, proclaimed himself Viceroy 
of the province, under the King of Dehli, and despatched 
the sipahis he had helped to corrupt, under the orders of 
Bakht Khan, a Subahdar of artillery, with the title of 
Brigadier, to Dehli. Bakht Khan subsequently became 
Commander-in-Chief of the rebel forces in the Imperial 
city. Khan Bahadur Khan governed the province for 
three months and a half His rule drove to despair all 
the honest men in it. The nature of that rule may be 
gathered from the proverb the inhabitants repeated when 
describing it after the restoration of British rule. ' Life 
and property were equally unsafe,' they said ; ' the buffalo 
was to the man who held the bludgeon ' 

A glance at the map, then, will show that whilst the 
province immediately contiguous to Dehli on the east, 
the province of Rohilkhand, with a population of over 
five millions, was absolutely held for the King of Dehli ; 
whilst the Gujar villages between Mi'rath and the be- 
leaguered city, and the districts of Rohtak and Hisar to 
the north of it, were in the possession of the insurgents ; 
whilst Mirath, Saharanpur, and Muzaffarnagar were held 
with difficulty by the British ; whilst the country between 
Dehli and Agra had pronounced for the rebels ; whilst 
Central India, and the Sagar and Narbada territories, 
were overrun by mutineers ; whilst Rajputana itself alone 
remained true to its traditionary fidelity ; whilst, in a 
word, whether before Dehli, or in Mirath and the adjoining 



The Panjdb. 269 

stations, or at Sagar and Mau, the British held only the 
ground occupied by their troops, there was yet a most 
important province to the north and north-west of the 
city, containing a numerous and warlike population, which 
had not yet declared itself. That province was the Pan- 
jab. The question which was uppermost in every man's 
mind was how long the Panjab would remain quies- 
cent, Dehli being unsubdued. To the consideration 
of the means adopted to answer that question favour- 
ably to the British I now invite the attention of the 
reader. 

Sir John Lawrence was at Rawalpindi when the wires 
flashed to him the story of the outbreak at Mirath and 
the seizure of Dehli. Believing, in common with almost 
every soldier then in India, that, if promptly assailed by 
a British force, Dehli would succumb as readily and as 
promptly as it had succumbed in the time of Lord Lake, 
he endeavoured by all the means in his power to impress 
upon General Anson the urgent necessity of marching 
upon the rebellious city without the smallest delay. He 
expressed the most unbounded confidence in the imme- 
diate result of such a movement. ' I served for nearly 
thirteen years in Dehli,' he wrote, on the 21st of May, 
when General Anson had expressed his doubts as to the 
wisdom of attempting, with the means at his disposal, an 
enterprise against Dehli, ' and know the people well. My 
belief is that, with good management on the part of the 
civil officers, it would open its gates to us on the approach 
of our troops.' In a subsequent letter he wrote : ' I still 
think that no real resistance at Dehli will be attempted ; 
but, of course, we must first get the Mirath force in order, 
and, in moving against Dehli, go prepared to fight. My 
impression is that, on the approach of our troops, the 



270 Sir yohn Lawrence in the Panjdb. 

mutineers will either disperse, or the people of the city 
will rise and open the gates.' 

Sir John Lawrence impressed these opinions upon 
Lord Canning, and in the fourth week of May Lord 
Canning, under their influence, despatched the most 
emphatic orders to General Anson to make short work 
of Dehli. That he shared the ideas of Sir John Lawrence 
as to the easy occupation of that city has been shown in 
a previous page.^ 

Enough has been written, I imagine, to show clearly 
that Sir John Lawrence was the author of the plan of 
campaign the first object of which was the recapture of 
Dehli. No blame is due to him for having underrated 
the difficulties of such an enterprise. Dehli had become 
the heart of the rebellion, and it was necessary to strike 
at the heart. But, the step having been taken in com- 
pliance with his urgent solicitations, it became incumbent 
upon him to employ all the resources of the province he 
administered to render the success of the enterprise 
absolutely certain. 

To do this required the possession of a moral courage 
greater than is ordinarily allotted to mortals. The position 
of Sir John Lawrence in the Panjab was unique. But eight 
years had elapsed since the fighting classes of that province, 
led by some of their most powerful chiefs, had contested 
its possession with the British, on the fields of Chilianwala 
and Gujrat. Never had the English encountered a foe so 
determined, so daring, and, despite the unskilfulness of 
their commanders, so hard to defeat. The English had con- 
quered and had annexed the province. Now, only eight 
years later, Sir John Lawrence would have to call upon 
the same fighting classes to aid him in resisting the pre- 
tensions of the sipahis by whose assistance they had been 

1 Page 96. 



His Difficulties and His Lieutenants. 271 

conquered. It was, I repeat, a unique position. Sir John 
Lawrence had to consider whether he could afford to risk 
the departure from the province of some of the EngHsh 
regiments which were there for its protection, in order to 
enable him to despatch to the force besieging Dehli the 
assistance without which, as events were soon to make 
clear, that city could not be taken. He had to recollect 
that he, too, was encumbered by a large garrison of sipahis 
imbued with the leaven of mutiny ; that he would have to 
deal with these; that it would be incumbent upon him 
to repose a trust nearly absolute in the Sikhs ; that, in 
a word, he would have to risk everything to ensure the 
success of that march against Dehli, of which he had been 
the persistent advocate. 

A brave man, morally as well as physically. Sir John 
Lawrence even courted the ordeal. From the very first 
he devoted all his energies to the employment of the 
resources of the Panjab in the subduing of Dehli. One of 
his first acts was to despatch thither the splendid Guide 
corps, composed entirely of frontier men, and consisting 
of cavalry and infantry. That corps quitted the frontier 
on the 13th of May, and, as already related, joined the 
force before Dehli the day after Barnard had made good 
his position on the ridge. His lieutenants at Pashawar, 
Herbert Edwards, Neville Chamberlain, and John Nichol- 
son, had, in concert with General Reed, commanding the 
division, and Sydney Cotton, commanding the brigade, 
jotted down the heads of a plan for the formation of 
a moveable column. This scheme was approved by 
Lawrence, and acted upon somewhat later. 

Meanwhile, his lieutenant at Labor, Robert Mont- 
gomery, had taken the wise precaution of disarming the 
sipahis at Mian Mir (May 13th); the general at Pashawar 
carried out a similar policy on the 22d, and generally, by 



272 Outbreaks in the Paiijdb. 

the enlistment of old Sikhs as gunners, and by the timely 
securing of important places, Sir John made the province, 
which was to be the base of his operations, as secure as, 
under the circumstances, it could be made. 

That some outbreaks should take place was, in the 
excited state of the minds of the sipahis, but natural. 
These will be related in their proper place. 

The first indication of actual outbreak on the part of 
the sipahis occurred at Mardan, when the 55th N. I., who 
had replaced the Guide corps at that station, rose in re- 
bellion rather than surrender their arms, and rushed off 
towards the hills of Swat. Nicholson pursued them with 
a few trusty horsemen, caught them on their way, killed 
120 of them in fair fight, made 150 prisoners, and forced 
the remainder to take refuge in the Lund-khur hills. On 
the 7th of June the native regiments stationed at Jalandhar 
rose in revolt, and swept on to Lodiana, on their way to 
Dehli. An energetic member of the Civil Service, George 
Ricketts, in concert with Lieutenant Williams of the Indian 
army, made a most determined and gallant effort to 
prevent the passage by them of the Satlaj. But the 
levies at their disposal were {^\n, and some of these 
crumbled in their hands. After a fight of two hours' dura- 
tion the rebels had their way. Williams was shot through 
the lungs. The rebels, on reaching Lodiana, roused the 
population to revolt, released the prisoners, and pushed 
on to Dehli. The British troops at Jalandhar pursued 
them, but with so little energy that, alike at the passage 
of the Satlaj and at Lodiana, they were always too late. 

Meanwhile, Sir John Lawrence had gradually realised 
that, in predicting the immediate fall of Dehli on the 
appearance before it of the British troops, he had been 
over-sanguine. As day succeeded day, and the force of 
the rebels was augmented by the arrival of the mutinied 



Proposal to evacnate Pashdzvar. 273 

regiments, whilst that of the besiegers decreased by casu- 
alties, the outlook assumed very serious proportions. 
Still more than ever John Lawrence adhered to his 
resolution at all costs to pierce the heart of the enemy's 
position. He had had too much experience of the Sikhs 
not to know that their fidelity depended upon success; 
that it would be dangerous to prolong indefinitely a situa- 
tion which already was becoming critical. Impressed with 
these views, he wrote, on the 9th of June, to Edwardes, 
suggesting the advisabiHty, under certain circumstances, 
of relinquishing the British hold on Pashawar, and with- 
drawing the British forces across the Indus. Edwardes, 
Nicholson, and Sydney Cotton replied (June 11) by a 
joint protest against such a scheme. ' Pashawar/ wrote 
Edwardes, Ms the anchor of the Panjab, and if you take 
it the whole ship will drift to sea.' Eight days later 
Edwardes repeated his objections, supporting them with 
cogent arguments. 

But Sir John would not give way. He regarded 
Dehli as the decisive point of the scene of action, and 
argued that the importance of holding Pashawar must 
yield to the superior necessity of recapturing Dehli. 
'There was no one thing,' he wrote (June 22d), 'which 
tended so much to the ruin of Napoleon, in 18 14, as the 
tenacity with which,^ after the disaster at Leipsic, he 
clung to the line of the Elbe, instead of falling back at 
once to that of the Rhine.' So impressed had he been, 
almost from the first, of the wisdom of making the 
sacrifice, under certain circumstances, that he, on June 
loth, had written to Lord Canning for permission to carry 
his plans into effect should the necessity arise. 

On the 25th of June he believed that the necessity had 

^ This should surely read 'before.' Napoleon did fall back on the 
Rhine after Leipsic, 



2 74 Critical Condition of the Panjdb. 

almost arisen, and he telegraphed to Edwardes, detailing 
the bad news that had arrived, and adding, 'if matters get 
worse, it is my decided opinion that the Pashawar arrange- 
ment should take effect. Our troops before Dehli must 
be reinforced, and that largely.' Against this Edwardes, 
Cotton, and Nicholson strongly protested. The question 
was set at rest some weeks later by the receipt from Lord 
Canning of a telegram containing the words : ' Hold on to 
Pashawar to the last' 

Before that telegram had arrived events had occurred 
to show that the position was becoming more and more 
serious. On the morning of the 7th of July the 14th 
Regiment N. I. mutinied at Jhelam, and, taking a strong 
position, repulsed with some loss two attacks made upon it 
by the English troops. That night the sipahis evacuated 
their position and fled. It is supposed that most of them 
ultimately perished. But the affair was managed in a 
manner which reflected but little credit on the authorities. 
The day following the native troops at Sialkot followed 
the example of their brethren at Jhelam. The station had 
been denuded of European troops for the formation of the 
moveable column. The native regiments were the 46th 
N. I. and the 9th Cavalry. These men, summoned to 
Dehli by the King, were apparently anxious to reach that 
place, their hands red with the blood of English men and 
women. They therefore murdered as many of the race as 
they could find. The survivors took refuge in an old fort, 
once the stronghold of a Sikh chief, Tej Singh. Then 
the mutineers, having plundered the treasury, having 
released the prisoners, and effected all the damage they 
could, started for Dehli. I shall tell very shortly the fate 
which befell them on the way. 

Meanwhile, the moveable column had been formed, 
and on the 22d of June John Nicholson, with the rank 



yohn Nicholson. 275 

of Brigadier-General, had assumed command of it It 
augured no small courage on the part of Sir John Law- 
rence to take a regimental captain from Civil employment, 
and place him in command over the heads of men his 
seniors. But the times were critical, and at all costs the 
best man had to be selected if Dehli was to be relieved. 

The force commanded by Nicholson consisted of the 
5 2d Light Infantry, Dawes's troop of horse-artillery, 
Bourchier's field-battery, the 33d and 35th N. I., and a 
wing of the 9th native light cavalry. Nicholson joined the 
force at Jalandhar, and marched straight to Philaur. Under 
the walls of the fort of that name he disarmed the two 
sipahi regiments, then retraced his steps to Amritsar, a 
central position commanding Lahor, the Jalandhar Duab, 
and the Manjha. He was there when news reached him 
of the mutiny at Jhelam. His first step was to disarm the 
native regiment, the 59th N. I., located at Amritsar. The 
next day brought him information that the 58th N. I. and 
two companies of the 14th, the regiment which had fought 
at Jhelam, had been disarmed, though in a very clumsy 
manner, at Rawalpindi. On the 9th of July he heard of 
the insurrection at Sialkot, in which the left wing of the 
regiment, the 9th native cavalry, the right wing of which 
was with him, had taken a very prominent part. He 
promptly disarmed that wing; then learning that the 
Sialkot mutineers were marching on Giirdaspur, forty 
miles distant from him, he resolved to intercept them in 
the course which he felt convinced they would take, via 
Niirpur and Hoshiarpur, to Jalandhar. Quitting Amritsar 
on the loth, he made a forced march to Gurdaspur, reached 
it the evening of the nth to find that the rebels were at 
Nurk6t, some fifteen miles from the Rdvi, on its northern 
side. As they would have to cross that river, Nicholson, 
commanding the inner line, waited until their movement 



"jd Defeats the Rebels on the Ravi, 

had been pronounced ; then learning that they were cross- 
ing at Trimmu-ghat, he threw himself upon them, and 
after a contest so severe that it became necessary to try 
conclusions with the bayonet, drove them back upon the 
river, with a loss of between three and four hundred men. 
Unable, from the intense heat and the exertions to which 
his men had been exposed, to follow them further, he left a 
party to guard the ghat, and returned with the bulk of the 
brigade to Giirdaspur. The river, meanwhile, had risen, 
and the rebels, unable to reach the further bank, had taken 
a position on an island in its centre, whence, by the aid 
of an old gun they had brought from Sialkot, they hoped 
to defy all enemies. Nicholson, however, was resolved to 
give them a lesson. Devoting the three following days 
to the procuring of boats, watching the rebels carefully 
during that period, he embarked his infantry, on the morn- 
ing of the i6th, and landed them at one extremity of the 
island, whilst he placed his guns so as to cover their ad- 
vance against the enemy at the further end. These 
tactics completely succeeded. The rebels were defeated 
with very heavy loss, many were drowned in attempting 
to escape, and the few who reached the shore were given 
up by the villagers. 

Nicholson then returned to Labor, met there Sir John 
Lawrence, and learned that on his way to and beyond the 
Satlaj his column would be reinforced by 2500 men, of 
whom 400 belonged to the 6ist Foot, 200 to the 8th 
Foot, 100 to the artillery, and the remainder were Sikhs or 
Baluchi's. On the 24th he received his orders to march for 
Dehli, crossed the Bias on the 25th, and pushing forward 
with all speed, taking up his reinforcements as he marched, 
reached Bara, in Sirhind, on the 3d of August. There he 
received a despatch from General Wilson, commanding the 
force besieging Dehli, telling him that the rebels had 



Nicholson reaches Dehli. 277 

established themselves in force on the Najafgarh canal, 
with the intention of moving on Alipur and his com- 
munications to the rear, and requesting him to push 
forward with all expedition to drive them off. Nicholson 
did push on, reached Ambalah on the 6th, and thence 
wrote to Wilson to promise that the column should be at 
Karnal on the 8th, and would push on thence to Panipat, 
where he would rejoin it. Meanwhile, he hurried on in 
advance to see Wilson. He stayed in camp a few days, 
took note of all that was going on, then returning, met 
his column, and marched into camp at the head of it on 
the 14th of August. There for the moment I must leave 
him. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

THE SIEGE AND STORMING OF DEHLI. 

At the close of the ninth chapter we left General Barnard, 
and the British force under his orders, taking possession, 
on the 8th of June, of the ridge, whence he was to direct 
his operations against the rebellious city. He was joined, 
as I have also pointed out, the day following by the 
splendid corps of Guides. The experience he had had of 
the temper of the garrison had been but short, yet it had 
been sufficient to show him how futile were the anticipa- 
tions of Lord Canning and Sir John Lawrence that the 
city would surrender without a struggle. 

I propose, before describing the operations of the siege, 
to set before the reader a bird's-eye view of the relative 
positions of the combatants. 

The city of Dehli lies on a plain on the right bank of 
the river Jamnah, and is surrounded on three sides by a 
lofty stone wall, five and a half miles long. The fourth 
side, nearly two miles in length, runs parallel to and is 
covered by the river. On this face, the eastern, it is well 
protected. To the north-east it was defended by the 
fort of S^limgarh, the circuit of the high and massive 
walls of which covered three-quarters of a mile. In this 
were two gates, called respectively the Calcutta and the 
North gate. Adjoining the Salimgarh, to the south, was 
the Citadel or King's palace, built by Shah Jahan, having 
walls of red sandstone, very high, and with a circumference 




■^ i9 « S „^ uj 






The Defences of D eh It. 279 

of nearly a mile and a half. The entrance to this is from 
the west, by a gate opening on to the Chandni Chauk, 
known, in 1857 as the Lahor gate. The other gates were 
the Kashmir, to the north, near the English church and 
the Kachahri or Court of Justice ; to the west of this, 
though facing northward, the Morf gate ; to the proper 
west, at the angle formed by the north and west faces, the 
Kabul gate ; then, midway between the two angles of the 
western face, the Lahor gate, forming the entrance to 
the famous Chandni Chauk, leading through the city to 
the Citadel ; further to the south, just after the wall of 
defence makes a bend inwards, was the Farash-khana 
gate ; at the angle beyond it, the Ajmir gate ; then, form- 
ing entrances to the southern face, the Turkoman, and 
beyond it the Dehli gate ; beyond again, facing the river, 
was the Raj -ghat gate. 

The fort had been strengthened by English engineers 
and provided with perfect flanking defences. Round the 
walls, twenty-four feet in height, ran a dry ditch, some 
twenty-five feet in breadth and somewhat less than twenty 
in depth, the counterscarp being an earthen slope of very 
easy descent, much water and weather worn. There was a 
kind of glacis, but it scarcely merited the name, being but 
a short slope, seventy or eighty feet in breadth, spring- 
ing from the crest of the counterscarp, and provided 
with no special means of obstruction. The place was gar- 
risoned by some 40,000 sipahis, armed and disciplined by 
the British. Its walls were mounted with 114 pieces of 
heavy artillery, capable of being supplied with ammunition 
from the largest magazine established by the British in 
the upper provinces. The garrison had, in addition, some 
sixty pieces of field-artillery, and were well supplied with 
gunners, drilled and disciplined by the British. 

To take this strongly defended city the English general 



2 8o The British Position. 

had under his orders some 3000 British soldiers, a battalion 
of Gurkhas, the corps of Guides, some remnants of nativ^e 
infantry sipahis, whose fidelity was not assured, and twenty- 
two field-guns. He had, as we have seen, taken his position 
on the ridge, an elevation of from fifty to sixty feet above 
the general level of the city, extending along a line of 
rather more than two miles, its left resting upon the Jamnah 
some three or four miles above Dehli, its right extremity 
approaching the Kabul gate at a distance of about a 
thousand yards. The ridge intersected the old canton- 
ment towards its left centre. Following its front towards 
its right was a road which joined the grand trunk road 
from Karnal, beyond its extremity, and led down, through 
a mass of suburban gardens and ancient edifices, to the 
Kabul gate. Two other roads, also leading from Karnal, 
diverged through the old cantonment to different gates of 
the city. The position was open to the rear, and com- 
manded a splendid supply of water from the Najafgarh 
canal. The English tents, pitched on the left and centre 
of the ridge, obliquely to the front of attack, were con- 
cealed from the view of the enemiy by the houses very 
recently occupied by the officers of the Dehli brigade, still 
left standing. The weakest point of the position, that 
nearest the enemy, was the right. Here a strong body of 
troops were posted. There was an extensive building 
known as Hindu Rao's house. This house had been left 
empty by its owner, and was promptly occupied. Nearly 
in the centre of the position was a round tower called the 
Flagstaff Tower, double storied, and offering a good point 
for observation. Between that tower and Hindu Rao's 
house was an old mosque, with good masonry walls, 
admirably adapted as an outpost. This, too, was occu- 
pied. Further along the ridge road, at a distance of 
some 200 yards from the position on the extreme right, 



The British Position. 281 

was the Observatory, also capable of being utilised. 
Beyond Hindu Rao's house again, to the rear of the 
position, was the suburb of Sabzimandi, a cluster of 
houses and walled gardens, which an active enemy might 
occupy. Beyond this the plain was covered with gardens, 
groves, houses, and walled enclosures, bordering upon the 
grand canal. Stretching from the Sabzimandi to the 
Kabul gate of the city were the villages of Kishanganj, 
Trevelyanganj, Paharipur, and Taliwari, too far off to be 
occupied in force by the besiegers, and therefore afford- 
ing a convenient shelter to a daring foe. Somewhat to 
the south of the Flagstaff, but more to the east, was 
Metcalfe House, on the Jamnah, with substantial outbuild- 
ings, and a mound in its rear. Between that house and 
the city was an old summer palace of the Mughal sove- 
reigns, called Kudsiya Bagh, with lofty gateways and 
spacious courtyards ; whilst more remote from the river, 
and almost in a line with the Kashmir gate of the city, 
was Ludlow Castle, on the crest of a ridge sloping down 
towards the city walls, with the dry bed of a drainage 
canal at its base. Further, on the line of the Jamnah, 
between the Kudsiya Bagh and the water-gate of the 
city, was a spacious house surrounded by trees and shrubs, 
but so close to the city walls that they seemed almost to 
overhang it. 

Such was the position, or, rather, such were the relative 
positions. We cannot wonder that, as Barnard surveyed 
the city and the country between it and his camp, on the 
morning of the 9th of June, he recognised that he had 
done rightly not to follow the rebels into the city two 
days previously. But he knew what was expected from 
him. He had in his hand the written opinions of Lord 
Canning and Sir John Lawrence that, with proper action 
on the part of the British leader, the place must fall. He 



282 Progress of the Siege. 

ordered, then, an assault for the 12th. The scheme had 
been drawn up by Greathed, Maunsell, and Chesney of 
the engineers, and by Hodson, afterwards known as 
' Hodson of Hodson's Horse/ an officer of great in- 
trepidity. It had been arranged that the troops told off 
for the attack should assemble between one and two in 
the morning, and then, under cover of the darkness, should 
proceed noiselessly to the gates, blow them open, and 
effect an entrance. At the appointed time and place all 
the troops were assembled, with the exception of 300 of 
the 1st Europeans, to be commanded by Brigadier Graves. 
These never came, and in consequence the enterprise was 
abandoned. Graves had received no written orders, and 
as the verbal notice he received would have involved 
leaving the Flagstaff picket in the hands of natives, he 
declined to act upon it. It was fortunate he did so, for 
after events proved that, even had the gates been carried, 
the force was not nearly strong enough to hold Dehli. 
A repulse would possibly have involved the destruction 
of the besieging force, and the evil consequences of this 
to British authority in India it is difficult to over-estimate. 
On the 14th June General Reed, the senior divisional 
commander, arrived on the ridge to assume command. 
For the moment, however, on account of his health, he 
did not supersede Barnard. That officer continued to 
direct the operations till his death. In Reed's tent the 
question of a coup-de-niain was discussed for several days. 
The civilian who was consulted, Mr Hervey Greathed, 
brother of the engineer of the same name, was in favour 
of adopting a revised plan drawn up by his brother, to 
be put into execution without delay. But all the senior 
soldiers, Barnard, Archdale Wilson, and Reed were against 
it. It is fair to add that they did not object to the plan 
itself so much as to the moment of executing it. They 



Progress of the Siege. 283 

believed that in the course of fifteen days the force would 
be so strengthened in numbers as to render it possible to 
hold all that might be gained. There can be no doubt 
but that their decision was a wise one. 

The decision was arrived at on the i8th, and though 
Greathed (of the engineers) again subsequently urged 
a reconsideration, the generals were not to be tempted. 
In the interval there had been a great deal of fighting. 
On the 1 2th the rebels had attacked the British camp in 
front and rear, and had almost penetrated to its very 
heart. They were, however, ultimately driven back, and 
pursued through the grounds of Metcalfe House to the 
very walls of the city. From that date a strong picket 
was posted at that house, the communications being main- 
tained from the Flagstaff Tower. The same day attacks 
made upon Hindu Rao's house and the Sabzimandi were 
repulsed with great loss to the rebels. A regiment of 
irregular cavalry, however, seized the opportunity to ^o 
over to them. It was perhaps fortunate, as, under the 
circumstances in which the British were, it was better to 
have an open than a secret foe. The day following the 
rebels made another attack, the 60th Regiment N. I., which 
had joined them the previous day, taking a leading part 
in it. They were, however, repulsed. On the 17th the 
besiegers took the initiative, their attack being led most 
gallantly by Reid of the Gurkhas, from Hindu Rao's house, 
and by Tombs of the horse-artillery, from the camp. The 
assailants destroyed a battery the rebels were erecting, 
and drove them back headlong into the city. But the 
fire from the heavy guns of the rebels prevented a 
complete following up of the success. 

On the 1 8th, the day on which the decision not to 
attempt a coup-de-main was arrived at, the rebels were re- 
inforced by the mutinied sipahi brigade from Nasirabad. 



284 Neville Chamberlain arrives. 

They brought six guns with them. To celebrate the 
event, the rebels came out in force, and attacked the 
British camp in the rear. The contest was most desperate, 
and the loss on both sides was heavy. Yule of the 9th 
Lancers was killed ; Daly of the Guides and Becher, the 
Quartermaster-General, were wounded. Night fell upon 
a drawn battle, the rebels maintaining their position till 
the early morning. On the 23d, the anniversary of 
Plassey, the day foretold as that which would witness the 
downfall of British rule, they made a supreme effort to 
verify the prophecy. Fortunately the English had re- 
ceived that day a reinforcement of a company of the 75th 
Foot, four companies of the 2d Fusiliers, four H. A. guns, 
and part of a native troop, with some Panjabi infantry 
and cavalry, in all 850 men. The right bore the brunt of 
the attack, which was conducted with great courage and 
a coolness worthy of English troops. Reid and his 
Gurkhas, however, maintained their position, the 60th 
Rifles added to the imperishable glory they had previously 
acquired, and the Guides vied with them in cool courage. 
But for the steadiness displayed by Reid and the officers 
and men generally, it would have been impossible to hold 
the position. They did hold it, however, but it was only 
as the night fell, and after most desperate fighting, that 
the rebels fell back. 

On the 24th Neville Chamberlain came from the 
Panjab to assume the post of Adjutant-General. Rein- 
forcements, too, sufficient to raise the effective strength of 
the British force to 6600 men, poured in from the Panjab. 
But the rebels likewise had their share of fortune. On 
the 1st and 2d of July the Bareli brigade, consisting of 
four sipahi regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, a horse- 
battery, and two post-guns, and commanded by a Sub- 
ahdar of artillery, Bakht Khan by name, who was almost 



B air d- Smith arrives. 285 

at once nominated Commander-in-Chief of the rebel forces 
in the city, marched in. Meanwhile, the arrival of rein- 
forcements within the camp had revived the question of 
assault. Once more the plans had been arranged, the 
regiments told off, the date, the 3d of July, had been fixed, 
when, suddenly, the information that the rebels contem- 
plated a serious attack on the weakest part of the British 
position that very day caused its postponement. 

To partake in the contemplated assault on the city, the 
rumour of which had reached him, there had hurried on, 
from the small detachment he was leading from Riirki, a 
man destined to take a leading part in the eventual storm- 
ing of the place. This was Baird-Smith of the engineers. 
Summoned from Riirki to take his place as senior officer 
of his scientific regiment, he arrived, by hard riding, at 
three o'clock on the morning of the 3d, to find that the 
assault had been postponed. 

Baird-Smith found that, as far as ordnance was con- 
cerned, the British force was in a very unenviable position. 
The heavy guns consisted of two twenty-four-pounders, 
nine eighteen-pounders, six eight-inch mortars, and three 
eight-inch howitzers. The rebels, on the other hand, could 
bring to bear on any point thirty guns and twelve mortars. 
What was still worse, the English had in store only suffi- 
cient shot for heavy guns for one day, whilst the rebels 
had the almost inexhaustible supplies of the Dehli maga- 
zine in their midst. To add to the gravity of the position, 
the day after his arrival in camp, Barnard was seized with 
cholera. The fell disease carried him off on the 5th. He 
was a conscientious man and a brave soldier, and his 
death was universally lamented. General Reed, who had 
remained in camp since we last saw him there, succeeded 
to the command. 

Before Barnard had been attacked by cholera, Baird- 



286 « Gallantry of yames Hills. 

Smith, keenly alive to the difficulty of carrying on a 
regular siege with resources in guns and material so obvi- 
ously inadequate, had written to that officer to suggest 
the advisability of an assault. ' The probabilities of 
success,' he wrote, ' are far greater than those of failure, 
and the reasons justifying an assault stronger than those 
which justified inaction.' Barnard died before the pro- 
posal could be considered, and it devolved upon Reed to 
give the necessary decision. Reed neither rejected nor 
accepted the plan ; ^ but he kept it so long ' in contempla- 
tion ' that the opportunity passed away. 

On the 9th the rebels made another grand attack in 
force. They despatched the 8th Irregulars, the regiment 
which had mutinied at Bareli, through the right of the 
British camp, by the rear, and as their uniform was the 
same as that of the loyal irregular regiment in the camp, 
they were allowed to pass unchallenged. The conse- 
quences of this mistake were alike deplorable and glori- 
ous. They were deplorable in that the cavalry picket at 
the Mound, half-way between the Ridge and the canal, 
on discovering their error, turned and fled. Not so the 
artillery, commanded by James Hills, one of the most 
gallant and daring soldiers in the world. Hills promptly 
ordered out his two guns for action. But the rebels were 
upon him, and he had not time to fire. Then, with the 
cool courage of a man determined at all cost to stop the 
foe, he dashed into the midst of the advancing troopers, 
cutting right and left at them with splendid effect. At 
last two of them charged him and rolled over his horse. 
Hills speedily regained his feet, just in time to renew the 
combat with three troopers — two mounted, the third on 

^ Four months afterwards Baird-Smith wrote that he thought then, with 
the full experience before him of the actual capture, that if an assault had 
been attempted between the 4th and 14th of July it would have succeeded. 



Desperate Fighting. 287 

foot. The two first he cut down ; with the third the con- 
flict was desperate. Hills had been shaken by his fall, 
and was encumbered by his cloak. Twice did his pistol 
miss fire. Then he missed a blow at his opponent's 
shoulder, and the latter wrested his sword from his tired 
hand. But Hills was equal to the occasion. Closing 
with his enemy, he smote him several times with his 
clenched fist in the face until he fell. Just at the moment 
Tombs, who had found his way through the enemy, seeing 
Hills's danger, shot the trooper dead. It was a splendid 
pistol shot, fired at a distance of thirty paces. To reach 
that point Tombs had cut his way through the enemy, whose 
advance Hills had checked, but not completely stopped. 
The danger to them was not over then. It required the 
sacrifice of another native trooper to insure perfect safety. 
But this was only accomplished at the cost to Hills of 
a sword-cut, which clave his skull to the brain.i 

By this time the whole British camp was roused, and 
after a while the rebel troopers were driven back towards 
Dehli. A fierce battle had been going on, meanwhile, in 
the Sabzimandi. This likewise ended in the repulse of 
the rebels, but not until 233 men had been killed or 
wounded on the British side. 

Five days later there was another hard-fought en- 
counter. This time the rebels attacked Hindu Rao's 
house. After a battle which lasted from eight o'clock in 
the morning till close upon sunset, Neville Chamberlain, 
with the 75th, Coke's Rifles (Panjabis), and Hodson's 
Horse, drove back the rebels to the gates of Dehli. But 
again was the loss severe, amounting to seventeen men 
killed and 193 wounded, of whom sixteen were officers, 

1 The wound was not mortal. Hills recovered to render splendid service 
to his country in India, in China, in Abyssinia, in Afghanistan. He is now 
Sir James Hills-Johns. 



2 88 Baird-SmitJi and Archdale Wilson. 

among them Chamberlain, whose left arm was broken. 
In the week the besiegers had lost, in killed and wounded, 
twenty-five officers and 400 men. 

Meanwhile, Gerald Reed's health had completely 
broken down. On the 17th, then, he made over com- 
mand to Archdale Wilson. The day following the rebels 
made another sortie, but they were repulsed by Colonel 
Jones of the 60th Rifles. The attack had been made, as 
often before, on the Sabzimandi. To prevent future 
attacks in that quarter, the engineers cleared away the 
houses and walls, which had aflbrded cover to the rebels, 
and connected the advanced posts with the main pickets 
on the Ridge. The effect of this was most salutary. 
There were no more attacks on the Sabzimandi. 

It was the day before this attack, the day, in fact, on 
which Wilson assumed command, that a report reached 
the Chief Engineer, Baird-Smith, that the question whether 
circumstances did not require the raising of the siege, in 
consideration of the great losses incurred, and the im- 
possibility of taking the place without further reinforce- 
ments, would be mooted at the next meeting of the 
General and his staff. Impressed with the absolute 
necessity of retaining the 'grip we now have on Dehli',' 
Baird-Smith took the very earliest opportunity of speaking 
to Wilson on the subject, and of pointing out the enor- 
mous calamities which the raising of the siege would entail. 
The result of the conversation was to confirm Wilson in 
his resolution to prosecute the siege, and to render its 
success certain, by ordering up a siege-train from Firzupur. 

On the 23d the enemy made a final attack before the 
arrival of Nicholson. This time it was directed aeainst 

o 

Ludlow Castle. The attack was repulsed, but the British, 
pursuing the rebels too closely to the city walls, suffered 
very severely. 



Nicholson beats the Rebels at Najafgai^h. 289 

On the 7th of August Nicholson arrived, as stated in 
the last chapter, in advance of his troops. On the 12th 
Showers expelled the rebels from Ludlow Castle, which 
meanwhile they had managed to occupy. On the 14th 
Nicholson's column arrived. On the 25th he marched, 
with a strong force, to attack the rebels, who had moved 
from Dehli in great strength to intercept the siege-train. 
The march took him through marshy ground, intersected 
with swamps, and lasted a good twelve hours. At length, 
close upon sunset, the weary soldiers espied the rebels, 
composed of the Nimach brigade, occupying two villages 
and a caravansarai, protected by guns and covered by deep 
water, fordable only in one place. The British, however, 
waded through the ford, which was breast high, under a fire 
from the guns at the caravansarai. Against this Nicholson 
directed his own attack, whilst he sent his other troops 
against the villages. Addressing his men a few cheering 
words, he ordered them to lie down. Then the batteries 
of Tombs and Remmington opened fire. After a few 
rounds he ordered the men to rise, and he led them 
through the still marshy ground, they cheering loudly. 
Needless to say, they carried the position. At the same 
time the other troops had driven the rebels from the two 
villages. The sipahis fought well, but only the Nimach 
brigade was there, that from Bareli, which had been 
ordered to support it, not having come up in time. 
When they found that they were beaten, the sipahis 
limbered up their guns and made for the bridge crossing 
the Najafgarh canal. But Nicholson pursued and caught 
them, killed about 800 of them, and captured thirteen 
guns. Pie then blew up the bridge, and the troops 
returned next day to Dehli, taking their spoils with them. 
Ten days later, the 4th of September, the siege-guns 
arrived, the remainder of the 60th Rifles on the 6th, and 

T 



290 TJie Qtiestion of Assault, 

the Jammu contingent, led by Richard Lawrence, one of 
the four famous brothers, on the 8th. 

The arriv^al of reinforcements had increased the 
number of troops at the disposal of General Wilson to 
8748 men, of whom 3317 were British. Barnard had 
directed the coup-de-inaiii of the 12th of June, when his 
entire force scarcely exceeded half that number. Yet, up 
to the 20th August, Wilson could with difficulty make up 
his mind to hazard the assault, which, if successful, would 
break the back of the Mutiny. On that date he wrote to 
Baird-Smith a letter, to be subsequently forwarded to the 
Governor-General, in which he freely stated the reasons 
on which his hesitation was based, and asked that officer 
to return the letter, 'with such remarks and emendations 
as your experience as Chief Engineer suggests.' The 
answer given by Baird-Smith was empathic, clear, and 
decided. He gave his voice for prompt and immediate 
action. True, he argued, the rebels are more numerous 
than the assailants ; true that their position is formidable, 
their resources are unlimited, their defences strong. But 
in war something must be risked. In his opinion, the 
risk of a repulse, in an attack well contrived and well 
organised, was less than the risk of further delay. The 
Panjab, he argued, on the authority of Sir John Lawrence, 
denuded of its European troops, was quivering in the 
balance. To wait for reinforcements would involve in- 
action, at a time when action alone, in all human pro- 
bability, could secure the continued acquiescence of the 
Sikhs. And if the Sikhs were to rise the danger would 
extend to the very camp in which Wilson commanded. 

These reasons, clear, pointed, logical, decided Wilson. 
Though he still believed that the results of the proposed 
operations would ' be thrown on a hazard of a die,' he 
was willing, on the advice of the Chief Engineer, to try 



The Defences to be assailed, 291 

that hazard. For the decision to assault the rebelHous 
city Baird-Smith, then, was responsible. He at once, in 
conjunction with his second in command, Alexander 
Taylor, drew up the plan of assault. 

To understand the plan the Chief Engineer worked 
out it is necessary that I should lay before the reader 
a short and concise description of the defences to be 
assailed. I cannot do this better than in the very words 
of Baird-Smith. 

' The eastern face,' he wrote, ' rests on the Jamnah, and 
during the season of the year when our operations were 
carried on the stream may be described as washing the 
base of the walls. All access to a besieger on the river 
front is therefore impracticable. The defences here con- 
sists of an irregular wall, with occasional bastions and 
towers, and about one-half the river face is occupied by 
the palace of the King of Dehli and its outwork, the old 
Mughal fort of Salimgarh. The river may be described 
as the chord of a rough arc formed by the remaining 
defences of the place. These consist of a succession of 
bastioned fronts, the connection being very long, and the 
outworks limited to one crown work at the Ajmir gate, 
and martello towers, mounting a single gun, at such points 
as require additional flanking fire to that given by the 
bastion themselves. The bastions are small, generally 
mounting three guns in each face, two in each flank, and 
one in the embrasure at the salient. They are provided 
with masonry parapets, about twelve feet in thickness, and 
have a relief of about sixteen feet above the plane of site. 
The curtain consists of a simple masonry wall or rampart, 
sixteen feet in height, eleven feet thick at top, and fourteen 
or fifteen at bottom. The main wall carries a parapet, 
loopholed for musketry, eight feet in height and eight 
feet in thickness. The whole of the land front is covered 



292 The Engineei^s begin their Work. 

by a berme of variable width, ranging from sixteen to 
thirty feet, and having a scarp wall eight feet high. 
Exterior to this was a dry ditch, of about twenty-five feet 
in width, and from sixteen to twenty in depth. The 
counterscarp is simply an earthen slope, easy to de- 
scend. The glacis is a very short one, extending only 
fifty or sixty yards from the counterscarp. Using general 
terms, it covers from the besiegers' view from one-half to 
one-third of the walls of the place.' 

Such being the defences, the plan of assault traced out 
may be thus stated. 

It was necessary that the attack should be directed 
against the northern face — the face represented by the 
Mori, Kashmir, and Water bastions, and the curtain wall 
connecting them. Fortunately the carelessness of the 
rebels allowed the besiegers to concentrate on the curtain 
wall a fire sufficient to crush that of the defence, and thus 
to effect breaches through which the infantry could be 
launched. The plan of the Chief Engineer, then, was to 
crush the fire of the Mori bastion. That fire silenced, the 
advance on the British left, which was covered by the 
river, would be secure, and there the assault would be 
delivered. The evening of the 7th was fixed for the 
commencement of the tracing of the assailing batteries. 

That day Wilson issued a stirring order to the troops, 
telling them that the hour was at hand when, as he 
trusted, they would be rewarded for their past exertions 
by the capture of the city. That evening the engineers 
began their work. For No. i battery a site had been 
selected below the Ridge, in the open plain, within 
700 yards of the Mori bastion. This battery was divided 
into two sections, the right one to be commanded by 
Major Brind, a real hero of the siege, intended to silence 
the Mori bastion ; the left one by Major Kaye, designed 



Brind. Kaye, and Lock hart. 293 

to keep down the fire from the Kashmir bastion until the 
'order for the delivering of the assault should be given. 

The engineers worked with so much energy at these 
sections that, on the morning of the 8th, whilst still un- 
finished, and mounting but one gun, the enemy discovered 
Brind's section, and opened upon it a fire so concentrated 
and so incessant that to venture from its protection was 
to invite almost certain death. A little later the rebels 
tried to improve the opportunity by despatching a body 
of infantry and cavalry from the Lahor gate. This diver- 
sion really favoured the English. For, whilst it lasted, 
the men in the new battery worked wath such a will that 
they succeeded in completing five platforms. As each 
platform was completed the gun mounted on it opened 
against the enemy. It is needless to add that the sortie, 
which had thus given badly-wanted time to the defenders, 
was beaten back with loss. The first section of No. i 
battery had no sooner been completed than its fire, well 
directed by the energetic Brind, rendered the Mori bastion 
harmless. Nor had the gallant Kaye done his work with 
less zeal. The fire directed from the left section had done 
good work against the Kashmir bastion, when, at noon of 
the lOth, the half-battery caught fire from the constant 
discharge of the guns. For a moment or two it seemed 
that the hard work of the three previous days would be 
thrown away, for the rebels at once directed on the 
burning battery every gun they could command. 

But from such a catastrophe the battery was saved by 
the gallantry of Lieutenant Lockhart, on duty on the spot, 
with two companies of the 2d Gurkhas. As soon as he 
saw the fire, Lockhart, apprehending its fatal consequences, 
suggested to Kaye whether it might not be possible to 
save it by working from the outside, and on the top of the 
parapet. Kaye replied that something might be done if 



294 ^/^^ Batteries are completed. 

a party were to take sandbags to the top, cut them, and 
smother the fire with the sand. But the attempt, under 
the concentrated fire of the rebels, involved almost certain 
death. Lockhart nobly thought that the occasion was 
one to justify the risk. Calling for volunteers, he jumped 
on the parapet, followed by six or seven Gurkhas, and set 
himself to the task. The enemy's fire immediately re- 
doubled. Two of the Gurkhas were shot dead. Lock- 
hart rolled over the parapet, with a shot through his jaw, 
but the survivors persevered, and by incredible exertions 
succeeded in extinguishing the fire. 

Meanwhile No. 2 battery had been traced, also on the 
evening of the 7th, in front of Ludlow Castle, 500 yards 
from the Kashmir gate. This, too, was divided into two 
sections, at a distance from each other of 200 yards. 
They were both directed against the Kashmir bastion, 
and intended to silence its fire, to knock away the parapet 
to the right and the left that gave cover to its defenders, 
and to open a breach for the stormers. Before dawn of 
the nth it had been completed and armed, and was then 
unmasked. Major Campbell commanded the left section, 
the right was first entrusted to Major Kaye, transferred to 
it from the ignited left section of No i ; but on that officer 
being wounded, on the nth, it was placed in the capable 
hands of Major Edwin Johnson. 

The third battery required in its construction a large 
amount of skill and daring. It was traced, under the 
directions of Captain Medley of the engineers, within 
160 yards of the Water bastion. This battery was finished 
and armed by the night of the nth. 

A fourth battery, commanded by the gallant Tombs 
for four heavy mortars, was traced in the Kudsiya Bagh. 
It was completed on the nth, ready to open fire when its 
fire might be required. 



The Rebels zvake tip. 295 

The rebels had been neither bhnd nor indifferent to 
the active movements in the camp of the besiegers. Re- 
cognising at last that the meditated attack would be 
directed against their left, they adopted measures which, 
if carried out sooner, would have added enormously to 
the difficulties of the attack, if, indeed, they had not 
rendered it impossible. They at once set to work to 
mount heavy guns along the curtain between the bas- 
tions on the northern face. In other convenient nooks 
they mounted light guns. Taking advantage, too, of the 
broken ground, they made in one night an advanced 
trench parallel to the left attack, and 350 yards from 
it, covering their entire front. This trench they lined 
with infantry. 

A tremendous fire from both sides continued from the 
opening of the new batteries till the afternoon of the 13th, 
the damaore done to assailants and defenders being tre- 
mendous. Never was there displayed in the British army 
greater energy, more splendid determination. Men fear- 
lessly exposed themselves to repair damages. Each man 
felt that on his own personal exertions the issue greatly 
depended. At length, on the afternoon of the 13th, 
Wilson and Baird-Smith came to the conclusion that 
two sufficient breaches had been made. Wilson directed, 
accordingly, that they should be examined. 

This dangerous duty was performed by four young 
engineer officers — Medley and Lang for the Kashmir 
bastion, Greathed and Home for the Water. The two 
first named reached the edge of the ditch undiscovered, 
descended into it, and although they saw the enemy was 
on the alert, carefully examined the breach. They re- 
turned, pursued by a volley, to report it practicable. A 
similar report reached Baird-Smith from Greathed and 
Home. He therefore advised Wilson not to delay a single 



296 The Order of the Assault. 

day, but to assault the coming morning. Wilson, agree- 
ing with him, issued forthwith the necessary orders. 

The order of the attack was as follows. Nicholson, 
with 300 men of the 75th, under Lieutenant - Colonel 
Herbert; 250 men of the ist Fusiliers, under Major 
Jacob; 450 men of the 2d Panjab Infantry, under Captain 
Green, was to storm the breach near the Kashmir bastion, 
and escalade the face of the bastion. The engineers 
attached to this column were Medley, Lang, and Bingham. 

At the same time Brigadier William Jones of the 61 st, 
commanding the second column, composed of 250 men of 
the 8th Foot, under Lieutenant-Colonel Greathed; 250 men 
of the 2d Fusiliers, under Captain Boyd ; 350 men of the 
4th Sikh Infantry, under Captain Rothney, was to storm 
the breach in the Water bastion. The engineers with 
this column were Greathed, Hovenden, and Pemberton. 

Similarly, Colonel Campbell of the 5 2d Light Infantry, 
commanding the third column, composed of 250 men of the 
52d, under Major Vigors ; 250 Gurkhas of the Kumaon 
battalion, under Captain Ramsay ; 500 men of the ist 
Panjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Nicholson, was to 
assault by the Kashmir gate after it should have been 
blown open. The engineers were Home, Salkeld, and 
Tandy. 

Major Reid of the Sirmur battalion commanded the 
fourth column, composed of the Sirmur battalion (2d 
Gurkhas), the Guide corps, such of the pickets, European 
and native, as could be spared from Hindu Rao's house, 
and 1200 men of the Kashmir (Jammii) contingent, led by 
Captain Richard Lawrence, was to attack the suburb of 
Kishanganj, and enter by the Labor gate. The engineers 
attached to this column were Maunsell and Tennant 

The fifth, or reserve column, was commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Longfield of the 8th Foot. It con- 



The Assault begins. ^97 

sisted of 250 men of the 6ist, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Deacon ; 450 men of the 4th Panjab Infantry, under 
Captain Wilde ; 300 men, Baluch battalion, under Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Farquhar ; 300 men of the Jhi'nd auxiliary 
force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunsford. To these were 
subsequently added 200 men of the 60th Rifles, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Jones of that regiment. This 
column was to support the first column. Its engineers 
were Ward and Thackeray. 

In a work which professes to give merely a com- 
pendium of the story of the great Indian Mutiny space 
will not allow me to follow the several columns step by 
step. I must content myself with giving a summary of 
the tremendous conflict that followed. At three o'clock 
in the morning the columns of assault were drawn up. 
There was not a man amongst those who composed them 
who did not feel that upon the exertions of himself and 
his comrades depended the fate of India. There was a 
slight but inevitable delay ; then, as day was dawning 
the columns advanced, and quietly took up the positions 
assigned them until signal to advance should be given. 
Meanwhile, an explosion party, consisting of Lieutenants 
Home and Salkeld, Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, 
Corporal Burgess, Bugler Hawthorne, and eight native 
sappers, covered by 100 men of the 60th Rifles, sped their 
way to the front to attach kegs of powder to, and blow 
up, the Kashmir gate. The bugle-sound from this point 
was to be the signal of success, and for the advance of 
the third column. 

Nicholson, after one glance to see that the first and 
second columns were in position, gave the order just after 
daybreak to advance. The first column moved steadily 
forward at a walk, until it reached the further edge 
of the jungle ; then the engineers and storming party 



298 The Sto7'niing of Deiili. 

rushed to the breach near the Kashmir bastion, and in 
a few seconds gained the crest of the glacis. Upon them 
there the whole fire of the rebels seemed to be concen- 
trated. So fierce was it that for ten minutes it was im- 
possible to let down the ladders. At last they let down 
two, and down these the officers led their men. Once in 
the ditch, to mount the escarp and scramble up the breach 
was the work of a few seconds. There the rebels, who 
had been so bold up to that point, did not await them. 
They could not stand the hand-to-hand encounter, but fell 
back on the second line. The breach at this point was won. 

Simultaneously the second column, its engineers in 
front, pressed forward towards the breach in the Water 
bastion, whilst the storming party, carrying the ladders, 
moved to the appointed spot, and though exposed to 
a tremendous fire, which made great execution in their 
ranks, let down their ladders and carried the breach ; their 
supports, by mistake, rushed to the counterscarp of the 
curtain, slid into the ditch, climbed the breach, and won 
the rampart. The mistake was a fortunate one, for al- 
though the actual storming party had been reduced by the 
fire concentrated upon it in its advance to twenty-five, 
the supports entering into a vital point of the defences, 
where an attack had not been anticipated, paralysed the 
rebels. Jones promptly seized the situation to clear the 
ramparts as far as the Kabul gate, on the summit of which 
he planted the column flag, carried that day by Private 
Andrew Laughnan of the 6ist.i 

Meanwhile, the forlorn hope, composed of the two 
officers and their following, whose names are given in 
a preceding page, had advanced straight on to the 
Kashmir gate, in the face of a very heavy fire. Arrived 

1 This flag was subsequently, the 1st of January 1877, presented by Sir 
William Jones to Her Majesty. 



The Forlor7i Hope. 299 

in front of it, Home and Salkeld, and their followers, each 
carrying a bag containing twenty-five pounds of gun- 
powder, crossed the ditch by a barrier gate, which they 
fortunately found open, to the foot of the great double 
gate. The enemy seemed completely paralysed by the 
audacity of the proceeding, and for a moment suspended 
their fire. Home and Salkeld used the opportunity to 
attach the bags to the gateway, then to fall back as fast as 
they could. The bags were laid when the rebels, recover- 
ing their senses, reopened their deadly fire. Home had 
time to jump into the ditch unhurt. Salkeld was not so 
fortunate. He had laid his bags, when he was shot 
through the arm and leg, and fell back disabled on the 
bridge. He handed the port-fire to Burgess, bidding him 
to light the fusee. Burgess, in trying to obey, was shot dead. 
Carmichael then seized the port-fire, lighted the fusee, 
and fell back mortally wounded. Then Smith, thinking 
Carmichael had failed, rushed forward to seize the port- 
fire, but noticing the fusee burning, threw himself into 
the ditch.^ The next moment a tremendous explosion 
shattered the massive gate. Home then told the bugler, 
Hawthorne, to sound the advance. The bugle-call, re- 
peated three times, was not heard in the din. But the 
gallant commander of the third column, Campbell, noticing 
the explosion, at once ordered the advance of the column. 
It dashed forward, crossed the bridge, and entered the city 
just as the first and second columns had won the breaches. 
Campbell at once pressed on to the main-guard, cleared 
the Water bastion, forced his way through the Kashmir 

1 Of the six British engaged in this deed of valour two were killed, 
Burgess and Carmichael. Salkeld died a few days later. Home was killed, 
during the same month, at the assault of Malagarh. Smith and Hawthorne 
alone survived. They both received the Victoria Cross. Home and Salkeld 
were also recommended for it, but they did not survive to get it. 



300 Failure of the Fourth Column. 

gate bazaar, reached the gate opening on the Chandni 
Chauk, forced it, and pressed on till a sudden turn brought 
him within sight of the great mosque, the Jami Masjid, its 
arches and gates bricked up, and impossible to be forced 
without powder bags or guns. He waited in front of it 
for half-an-hour, in the expectation of the successful ad- 
vance of the other columns. But as there were no signs 
of such approach, he fell back on the Begam Bagh, a large 
enclosure. There I must leave him to relate the progress 
of the fourth column. 

An unfortunate incident, a failure on the part of the 
department concerned to carry out the General's instruc- 
tions, interfered greatly with the success of the fourth 
column. It was formed up, composed as already detailed, 
at 4.30 A.M., in front of the Sabzimandi picket. But the 
four H. A. guns which had been ordered to accompany 
it had not arrived. When at last they did come they 
brought with them only sufficient gunners to man one gun. 
Reid was waiting until gunners could be procured when 
he heard the explosion at the Kashmir gate. He dis- 
covered immediately afterwards that 500 of the Jammu 
troops, despatched two hours earlier for the purpose of 
effecting a diversion by occupying the Idgar, had become 
engaged. No time was to be lost, so he pushed on with- 
out any guns at all. 

On this point it must suffice to state that the assault 
failed. Reid, who was greatly embarrassed by the want 
of guns, facing, as he had to face, the unbroken wall of 
Kishanganj, eighteen feet high, lined with guns and 
marksmen, had gained the canal bridge with the head of 
his column, and was meditating a diversion to draw off 
the attention of the rebels from the main attack when a 
musket ball, coming from a slanting direction, struck him 
on the head, and knocked him into the ditch, insensible. 



John Nicholson, 301 

How long he remained so he never knew. Those about 
him thought he had been killed. When he returned to 
his senses, he found himself on the back of one of his 
Gurkhas. He was very weak, but he had still strength 
enough to send for Captain Lawrence, and to direct him 
to take command, and to support the right. The delay, 
however, had been very injurious, and the disorder was in- 
creased by the fact that Captain Muter, seeing Reid fall, 
and regarding Lawrence in the light of a political officer, 
had assumed command of the portion of the column with 
which he was serving. By the time that Lawrence had 
asserted his authority success had become impossible. 
He withdrew his men, therefore, leisurely and in good 
order, on the batteries behind Hindu Rao's house. The 
attack on the Idgar, made by the Jammu troops alone, 
was still more unfortunate. They were not only repulsed, 
but lost four guns. 

The repulse of the fourth column added greatly to the 
difficulties of the other three. To these I must return. 

I left the first and second columns victorious inside the 
breach. Nicholson at once massed his men on the square 
of the main-guard, and turning to the right, pushed on 
along the foot of the walls towards the Labor gate, whence 
a galling fire was being kept up on his men. Beyond the 
Kabul gate, which, as we have seen, had been occupied by 
the second column, he hoped to feel the support of the 
fourth column. But, as just related, the attack of that 
column had failed, and it was this failure which rendered 
his advance difficult and dangerous. 

To reach the Labor gate Nicholson had to push on 
under the fire of the Burn bastion, then to force his way 
through a long lane, every building in which was manned 
by sharpshooters — the further end of it commanded by 
two brass guns, one about 160 yards from its opening, 



o 



02 Nicholson pushes on. 



pointed in the direction of the advance, the other about 
100 yards in rear of and commanding it. Behind both 
was a bullet-proof screen, whilst projecting, as it were, 
from the wall was the bastion commanding the Labor 
gate, armed with heavy pieces, and capable of holding a 
thousand men. 

In his advance Nicholson had been exposed to a con- 
tinuous fire, but he had a position at the Kabul gate 
which was strong enough for him to maintain until the 
movements of the other columns should facilitate his 
advance. But Nicholson, though urged to halt there, was 
so fully impressed with the necessity of taking the fullest 
advantage of the so far successful assault that he resolved 
at all costs to push on to the Labor gate. He felt this 
the more because he was convinced that the repulse of the 
fourth column had renewed the hopes of an enemy pecu- 
liarly liable to be affected by success or its opposite. He 
directed, then, his men to storm the narrow lane of which 
I have spoken. 

Gallantly did his men respond. With a rush not to 
be withstood they cleared the space up to the first brass 
gun, and captured it. Then they dashed on the second. 
But within ten yards of this they were assailed by a fire of 
grape and musketry, by volleys of stones and round-shot, 
thrown by hand, so severe that they recoiled under the 
terrible and ceaseless shower. Not quite all, indeed. Lieu- 
tenant Butler, who many a time on the field of battle 
earned the Victoria Cross, which could be bestowed only 
once, penetrated beyond the second gun, up to the bullet- 
proof screen. How he escaped with his life was a miracle, 
but he rejoined his men. 

The men had recoiled only to form again, and once 
more rush forward. Again did they capture the first gun, 
which this tim.e Greville (ist Fusiliers) spiked, and again 



Is Mo7^tally Wotmded. 303 

did they dash at the second. Never has there been a 
greater display of heroism, of contempt for death. The 
leader of the assault, Jacobs, of the ist Fusiliers, was 
mortally wounded. Wemyss, Greville, Caulfield, Speke 
(the brother of the African traveller), Woodcock, Butler, 
all attached to the same regiment, were in turn struck 
down. The men, greatly discouraged by the fall of their 
officers, were falling back a second time, when an inspiring 
voice called upon them to follow where their general led. 
It was the clear-sounding voice of Nicholson. But the 
broken order could not be restored in a moment, and 
before a sufficient number of men could respond to the 
inspiring cry, a bullet pierced the body of the illustrious 
leader. 

The wound was mortal, and Nicholson knew it to be 
so. But neither the pain he suffered, nor the conscious- 
ness of approaching death, could quench the ardour of 
his gallant spirit. He still called upon his men to go on. 
But he was asking that which had now become impos- 
sible. He had no guns, and already eight officers and 
fifty men had fallen in the attempt. There was nothing 
for it but to retire on the Kabul gate. This was done, 
and Jones assumed the command of the two columns. 

We have left the third column in front of the Jami 
Masjid, without artillery to beat down its defences. Camp- 
bell maintained this position for an hour and a half, ex- 
posed to a heavy fire of grape, musketr}^, and canister. 
The failure of the attack of the fourth column was fatal 
to a longer maintenance of that position. The Labor 
gate being in the hands of the rebels, he was liable to be 
cut oft". He fell back, then, in a soldierly manner, on the 
Begam Bagh, resolved to hold it till he could communi- 
cate with headquarters. An hour and a half later, how- 
ever, learning that the fourth column had failed, and that 



304 Hope Grant, Tombs, Boiirchiei\ 

the first and second had been unable to advance beyond the 
Kabul gate, he fell back on the church, and disposed his 
men for the night in it and in the houses in the vicinity. 

Scott's field-battery which had entered the city by 
the Kashmir gate, had during all this time rendered 
splendid service to the several columns, but at a large 
expenditure of life. 

Meanwhile, the failure of the fourth column had become 
known to the English leaders outside the city, and Wil- 
son had directed Hope Grant to move down, with 200 
of the 9th Lancers and 400 Sikh cavalry, to cover the 
Sabzimandi defences and Hindu Rao's house, laid open 
to attack. At the same time Tombs's battery, under 
Grant's order, opened fire on the advancing rebels. In 
so far as related to the checking of the rebels' advance 
these measures were successful, but Tombs's fire pro- 
voked a reply from the heavy guns on the Burn bastion, 
and this fire, at a distance of 500 yards, made terrible 
openings in the ranks of the cavalry. Six officers and 
forty-two men were struck down. Rosser of the Cara- 
bineers fell with a bullet through his forehead. Nine 
officers of the Lancers had their horses shot under them. 
But for two long hours they stood to receive fire. They 
felt that by drawing upon themselves the attention of the 
rebels they were serving the common cause. In vain 
did the battery of the gallant Bourchier come up to aid 
them with its fire. The blazing from the Burn bastion 
still continued. Nor did they move until information 
came that the stormers had established their positions 
for the night. They then fell back on Ludlow Castle, 
conscious that they had not only prevented the disastrous 
results which the defeat of the fourth column might have 
entailed, but that they had occupied the rebels' attention 
with very considerable advantage to the main operations. 



Summary of the First Days Operations. 305 

The reserve column, meanwhile, led by Longfield, had 
followed the third column through the Kashmir gate, and 
cleared the college gardens. One portion of the column 
had occupied those gardens, the other held the Water 
bastion, the Kashmir gate, Skinner's house, and another 
large building. 

Thus ended the first day's operations. The result may 
thus be briefly summarised. The entire space inside the 
city, from the Water bastion to the Kabul gate, was held 
by the first, second, third, and fifth columns. The fourth 
column, outside the city, held the batteries behind Hindu 
Rao's house. It was clear, then, that within the city a 
solid base had been obtained for further development. 
But the cost had been enormous. In the day's fight the 
assailants had lost sixty-six officers and 1104 men in 
killed and wounded. Four out of the five assaulting 
columns were within the walls, but the position they 
held was extended, and their right flank was very open 
to attack. The rebels were still strong in numbers, in 
guns, and in position. They, too, had had success as 
well as reverses, and they had no need to abandon hope 
of ultimate victory. 

To the British general the result of the day's work 
was discouraging. The plan which had been so urgently 
pressed upon him had failed to secure success ; his 
columns had been stopped and driven back ; instead of 
the whole city, his troops held simply a short line of 
rampart. Very doubtful as to whether it was not his 
duty to withdraw to the ridge, he asked Baird-Smith if 
he thought he could hold what had been taken. The 
reply of Baird-Smith was decisive : ' We must do so.' 
Neville Chamberlain also wrote in the same sense to the 
General. The opinions of these two strong men sufficed 
to decide Wilson. 

U 



3o6 The Action of the Following Days. 

The 15th was employed by the troops within the 
city in securing the positions gained, in preparing the 
means to shell the city, in the restoration of order, 
and in putting a stop to indiscriminate drinking and 
plundering. The rebels, strange to say, interfered but 
slightly with this programme. The result showed how 
thoroughly Baird-Smith and Chamberlain had mastered 
the nature of Asiatics. The stationary position of the 
British cowed them. A retreat would have roused them 
to energetic action. 

The 1 6th gave further evidence of the marked effect 
on their spirits of the British lodgment. In the early 
morning of that day they evacuated Kishanganj, whence, 
on the 14th, they had repulsed the fourth column. The 
British then stormed the great magazine, the scene of the 
heroic action of Willoughby and his comrades on the 
nth of May. It was found to be full of guns, howitzers, 
and ammunition. Vainly did the rebels, during the after- 
noon, make a desperate attempt to recover it. They were 
repulsed with loss. 

If the progress made was, in the desponding language 
of General Wilson, 'dreadfully slow work,' it was sure. 
Bit by bit the important positions in the city were wrested 
from the rebels. On the 17th and i8th the bank, Major 
Abbott's house, and the house of Khan Muhammad Khan, 
were occupied, and the besiegers' posts were brought close 
to the Chandni Chauk and the palace. On the evening 
of the 1 8th the position occupied by the besiegers was as 
follows. Their front was marked by the line of the canal, 
on the banks of which light guns were posted at the main 
junction of the streets, and sandbag batteries erected. 
The right and left, indicated respectively by the Kabul 
gate and the magazine, communicated by a line of posts. 
The rear was secure against attack. It had been attempted, 



The Ldhor Gate occupied, 307 

during that day to extend the right, in the manner con- 
templated by the gallant Nicholson, to the Lahor gate, but 
the attack, directed by Greathed of the 8th, had failed. 

It had become absolutely necessary to take that gate, 
now twice attempted. The Burn bastion, which com- 
manded it, was no longer supported, as on the 14th, by 
rebels in Kishanganj and Taliwari. The General then 
authorised Alexander Taylor of the Engineers to work 
his way, on the morning of the 19th, to the Burn bastion. 
Whilst Taylor, with a party of men, was engaged in 
this somewhat slow process. Brigadier William Jones held 
himself in readiness to proceed, with 500 men from the 
8th, 75th, and Sikh regiments, to attack the Labor gate. 
This time success crowned the joint efforts. Taylor 
worked his way through the buildings to the summit of 
a house commanding the bastion. Then Jones advanced, 
and finding it abandoned, took up his post there for the 
night. Early the following morning he launched his 
troops from it, and carried the Labor gate with a rush, 
then the Garstin bastion. After that success, dividing his 
force, he detached one portion up the Chandni Chauk to 
capture the J ami Masjid, the other to gain the Ajmir 
gate. Major Brind arrived opportunely with reinforce- 
ments to command in the carrying out of the first of these 
operations. He entered the mosque without difficulty. 
Simultaneously Jones occupied the Ajmir gate. 

Brind, when he had carried the Jami Masjid, had 
noticed, with the eye of a true soldier, that the one thing 
wanting to assure complete success was to storm the 
palace at once. He sent for and obtained permission to 
attempt it. His success was complete. The famous fort^ 
palace of Shah Jahan was not even defended. The gates 
were blown in, and British troops entered. The Salimgarh 
had been previously seized by the brilliant forethought of 



o 



08 Demonstration of the Rebels. 



a young lieutenant named Aikman. The same afternoon 
Wilson took up his quarters in the Imperial palace. 

Dehli was now virtually won. But there still remained 
in the vicinity, even in the city itself, thousands of armed 
rebels, ready to take advantage of the slightest slack- 
ness on the part of the victors. So large had been the 
casualties that Wilson had fit for service but little over 
3000 men. From these the guards of the several posts 
had to be provided. The King of Dehli was still at large, 
a rallying point to the disaffected. It seemed to the 
General essential that a determined effort should be made 
to capture his person. 

The King and his principal advisers had been painfully 
affected by the success which had depressed General 
Wilson. The lodgment effected at so much cost, on. the 
14th, which had caused Wilson to doubt the advisability 
of proceeding further, had produced in the mind of the 
King and his surroundings the conviction that, unless the 
British should retire, the game of the revolters was up. 
Fortunately he had no Baird-Smith at his elbow to 
whisper to him how the small hours of the night might be 
advantageously employed. And although he felt that as 
long as the Labor gate, the magazine, and the fort should 
hold out there was still hope, yet the success of the British 
on the 14th, partial though it was, had taken all the fight 
out of the rebels. The men who, whilst the British were 
on the ridge, had been so daring in sortie, so unremitting 
in attack, had been completely demoralised by the display 
made by the British on the 14th. The reader will notice 
how lacking in force and energy were the blows they 
struck after the British troops had displayed their enor- 
mous superiority in hand-to-hand fighting on that day. 
The fact that the lodgment effected on the ramparts on 
the first day of the assault had cowed them, accounts for 



Flight and Captiu^e of the King of Dehlt. 309 

the remarkable ease with which the British were able to 
push forward on the 15th, i6th, 17th, i8th, and 19th. 

When at last, on the 19th, the Burn bastion had 
been captured, the Commander-in-Chief, the old artillery 
Subahdar, Bakht Khan, represented to the King that 
his only way of safety lay in flight ; he begged him to 
accompany the sipahi army, which still remained intact, 
and with it to renew the war in the open country. That 
was the course which the descendant of Babar, had he 
been young, would have undoubtedly followed. But the 
King was old— other influences were at work — and the 
King was persuaded to reject the bold counsels of his 
general and to accept those of his Queen and courtiers. 
He allowed the sipahi army to depart, whilst he took 
refuge at the tomb of Humayiin, three miles and a half 
south from the city, prepared to submit to the conqueror. 

Information of this retreat was conveyed to an officer 
who throughout the siege had made himself conspicuous 
for his love of adventure and daring, Hodson, of Hodson's 
Horse. Hodson asked and obtained the General's per- 
mission to bring in the old man, on the condition that his 
life should be spared. Hodson performed his task with 
tact and discretion. That night, the 20th, the King slept 
a prisoner in the Begam's palace. 

But there were still his sons, the princes, to whom 
rumour had ascribed an active participation in all the 
bloody deeds which had characterised the early days of 
the rebellion. Hodson learned the day following that two 
of these, and a grandson, lay concealed in Humayiin's 
tomb, or in the vicinity. Again did he ask and obtain per- 
mission to bring them in. This time there was no stipu- 
lation for their lives. Hodson rode out with a hundred 
armed troopers, found them, persuaded them to surrender, 
disarmed their numerous following, placed the arms on 



3 1 o Slaughter of the Princes, 

carts, the princes on a native akka (or gig), and led the 
long cavalcade in the direction of the Lahor gate. They 
had safely accomplished five-sixths of the journey to that 
gate when Hodson, on the pretext that the unarmed ^ 
crowd was pressing too closely on his troopers, halted the 
carts, made the three princes descend, stripped them, and 
shot them with his own hand. It was a most unnecessary 
act of bloodshed, for it would have been as easy to 
bring in the princes as it had been easy to bring in 
the King. 

Whilst these events were occurring outside the walls, 
Wilson had commissioned Brind to clear the city of the 
murderers and incendiaries who, to the number of many 
thousands, still lurked within it. Brind accomplished 
this task with the completeness which was necessary. 

On the 2 1st the restoration of regular rule was 
announced in the appointment of Colonel Burn to be 
Governor of the city. The day following John Nicholson 
died from the effects of the wounds he had received on the 
14th. He had lingered in agony for eight days ; but, as 
fortunate as Wolfe, he had lived long enough to witness 
the complete success of the plans to the attempting and 
accomplishing of which he had so much contributed. He 
died with the reputation of being the most successful 
administrator, the greatest soldier, and the most perfect 
master of men in India. The reputation w^as, I believe, 
deserved. He was of the age which a great master, whom 
in face he resembled, the late Lord Beaconsfield, has 
called 'that fatal thirty-seven.'^ 

^ The crowd had been disarmed at the tomb. Hodson was not the man 
to allow armed men to collect with impunity. 

^ Arguing that 'genius, when young, is divine,' the author ot Coningshy 
proceeds to illustrate his argument by quoting the names of Alexander the 
Great, Don John of Austria, Gaston de Foix, Conde, Gustavus Adolphus, 



Moral of the Storming of Dehli. 311 

* In the history of sieges/ I wrote in a work published 
at the time/ and which correctly recorded all the impres- 
sions of the hour, 'that of Dehli will ever take a pro- 
minent place. Its strength, its resources, and the prestige 
attached to it in the native mind, combined to render for- 
midable that citadel of Hindustan. Reasonably might the 
Northern Bee or the Invalide Russe question our ability to 
suppress this rebellion if they drew their conclusions from 
the numerical strength of the little band that first sat 
down before Dehli. But the spirit that animated that 
handful of soldiers was not simply the emulative bravery 
of the military proletarian. The cries of helpless women 
and children, ruthlessly butchered, had gone home to the 
heart of every individual soldier, and made this cause his 
own. There was not an Englishman in those ranks, from 
first to last, who would have consented to turn his back 
on Dehli without having assisted in meting out to those 
bloody rebels the retributive justice awarded them by his 
own conscience, his country, and his God. It was this 
spirit that buoyed them up through all the hardships of 
the siege ; that enabled them, for four long months of 
dreary rain and deadly heat, to face disease, privation, and 
death without a murmur.' 

The siege was indeed calculated to bring out all 
the great qualities which distinguish the British soldier. 

Duke Bernhard of Weimar, Banner, Cortez, Maurice of Saxony, Nelson, 
Clive, John de Medici, Luther, Ignatius Loyala, John Wesley, and Pascal. 
' Pascal,' he continues, ' wrote a great work at sixteen, and died at thirty- 
seven.' Then, 'Ah! that fatal thirty-seven, which reminds me of Byron.' 
Pie shows, further, how Raphael died at thirty-seven ; and, still supporting his 
argument that ' genius, when young, is divine,' brings forward the names of 
Richelieu, Eolingbroke, Pitt, Grotius, and Acquaviva. To this long list 
Nicholson, the greatest by far of all the Panjab school, might most properly 
be added. 

1 The Red Faniplilef, published in 1857. 







12 T/ic Heroes of the Siege. 



Vying with him, alike in his endurance of hardships, his 
contenapt of death, his eagerness for enterprise, were the 
Gurkhas of the Himalayas, the frontier men of the Guides, 
the hardy Baluchi's, the daring Sikhs, the resolute Pathans. 
Nor will English-speaking races soon forget the names of 
those gallant officers who contributed so much to the 
success of the undertaking. There were many besides 
those I am now mentioning. But a careful and impartial 
examination of correspondence, public and private, has 
especially brought before me, amongst the most deserving, 
the names of Baird-Smith, of Nicholson, of Barnard, of 
Neville Chamberlain, of Charles Reid, of James Brind, 
of Frederick Roberts, of Hope Grant, of John Jones, 
of Edwin Johnson, of Alec Taylor, of Tait, of Lockhart, of 
Turnbull, of Seaton, of Hodson, of Dighton Probyn, 
of Daly, of Tombs, of Renny, of Jacob, of John Coke, of 
Speke, of Greville, of Watson, of Medley, of James Hills, 
of Quintin Battye, of Rosser, of Aikman, of Salkeld, of 
Home. There are many others, for the list is a long 
one. 

These men have now broken the back of the rebellion. 
We shall see them display equal energy in the task 
which supervenes on the morrow of victory — the follow- 
ing of it up. 



CHAPTER XX. 

FROM DEHLI TO AGRA AND KANHPUR — SIR COLIN 
CAMPBELL AT KANHPUR. 

No sooner had the capture of Dehh' been thoroughly 
assured than Wilson despatched a corps of 2790 men, 
under the command of Colonel Edward Greathed of the 
8th Foot, to open the country between Dehli and Agra, 
and to join Sir Colin Campbell at Kanhpur or its 
vicinity. 

Greathed set out on the morning of the 24th of Sep- 
tember, crossed the Hindan, and marched, by way of 
Dadri and Sikandarabad, on Bulandshahr, punishing on 
his way the inhabitants proved to have committed atro- 
cities, reassuring those who had remained loyal. He arrived 
before Bulandshahr on the 28th, attacked and completely 
defeated a rebel force which attempted to cover that town, 
then pushing on, occupied it and Malagarh. In destroy- 
ing the fortifications of the latter he had the misfortune to 
lose, by an accident. Lieutenant Home of the Engineers, 
one of the survivors of the gallant men who had blown 
up the Kashmir gate on the 14th. Thence, still pushing 
on, Greathed reached Khiirja, a considerable town. Here 
the passions of the troops were roused to extreme fury 
by the sight of the skeleton, pronounced by the medical 
officers to be the skeleton of a European female, stuck up 
on the roadside exposed to public gaze, the head severed 
from the body. They were for taking instant vengeance 



314 G7^eathed receives imploring Messages from Agra. 

on the inhabitants. But, in deference to the remonstrances 
of the civil officer accompanying the force, who repre- 
sented the impolicy of destroying a place of considerable 
importance, and which paid a large revenue to the State, 
Greathed spared Khurja, 

From Khurja Greathed marched on Aligarh, defeated 
there a body of the rebels who had so long dominated 
the district, and marching in the direction of Agra, 
reached Bijaigarh on the 9th of October. There he re- 
ceived the most pressing solicitations from the authorities 
at Agra to hasten to their relief. A formidable body of 
rebels, he was told, was threatening the sandstone fort, 
• and his credit would be at stake if Agra were attacked 
and he so near.' Greathed was but forty-eight miles from 
Agra. He accordingly despatched that night the cavalry 
and horse-artillery, with instructions to hurry on by 
forced marches. Four hours later he followed with the 
infantry, mounting his men on elephants, carts, and 
camels to get over the ground the more quickly. Whilst 
he is thus hurrying on I propose to ask the reader to 
take a bird's-eye glance at Agra. 

Of the condition of Agra after the defeat of Polwhele 
and the death of Mr Colvin I have wTitten in a previous 
chapter.^ Ever since that time, whilst the life within the 
fort had been dull and monotonous, the country around 
had been occupied and reoccupied by roving bands of 
rebels. The mutineers from Mau and other parts of 
Central India, though detained for a time at Gwaliar, 
thanks to the loyalty of Maharaja Sindhia, had broken 
loose from his hold early in September, and marched on 
to Dholpur. Thence they had gradually spread detach- 
ments over the districts of Khairagarh, Fathpur-Sikri, 
Iradatnagar, and Fathabad. The news of the doubtful 

^ Chapter xvii., page 252. 



Greathed at Agra. 3 1 5 

success, as it seemed, of the British in the storming of 
Dehh', on the 14th, had not discouraged them. The suc- 
cess of the British on the following days had even had 
the effect of releasing from Dehli a considerable body of 
men who hoped to renew their tactics elsewhere. A 
number of these had reached Mathura, on the 26th, and 
joined there by a large body of mutinied sipahis, effected 
a day or two later a junction with the rebels from Central 
India. These were the men whose threatening attitude 
was now causing consternation in Agra, though so indiffer- 
ently was the Intelligence department managed that no 
one within the fort knew exactly where they were. 

Meanwhile, Greathed, pushing on with speed, crossed 
the bridge of boats under the walls of the fort at sunrise 
on the morning of the loth. Inquiring as to the position 
of the rebels, he was told by the authorities within the fort 
that ' the insurgent force from Dholpur was beyond the 
Karl Nadi, ten miles from cantonments, across which they 
would find difficulty in passing.'^ The same authorities 
wished Greathed to encamp in a ' series of gardens over- 
grown by brushwood, where their guns would not have 
had a range of fifty yards, and where the cavalry could 
not possibly act.'^ But Greathed was too good a soldier 
to accede to such a proposition. He insisted on encamp- 
ing on the parade ground, a magnificent grassy plain, with 
not an obstacle within three or four hundred yards of it, and 
at that distance only some high crops. There the camp was 
pitched, the horses were picketed, and the men proceeded 
to divest themselves of their accoutrements, preparatory 
to taking their well-earned breakfasts. Between the camp 

1 Major Norman, who adds: 'This information was given in positive 
terms.' 

2 Bourchier's Eight Months' Campaign^ a book which everyone should 
read. 



3 1 6 Gi^eathed^ s Force surprised by the Rebels. 

and the fort a lively communication was opened, and con- 
scious of security, the authorities took few if any precau- 
tions regarding the characters they admitted. 

But the rebels, instead of being, as the Agra authori- 
ties believed, ' beyond the Kari Nadi, ten miles from 
cantonments,' were in the cantonment itself, hidden from 
the sight of the troops by the long crops which bounded 
the view of Greathed's force. Taking advantage of the 
security into which the men of that force had been lulled, 
and of the facilities permitted to strangers of every degree 
to go in and out of the camp, four of them, dressed as 
conjurors, came strolling up to the advanced guard of the 
9th Lancers. The sergeant in charge of the post ordered 
them off, whereupon one of them drew his tahvdr and cut 
him down, and another who rushed to his rescue. Eventu- 
ally these four men were despatched by the troopers, but 
before the occurrence had become known to everyone in 
the camp round-shot, from the leafy screen in its front, 
came pouring in. The alarm sounded, but there was 
scarcely need for it. The soldiers of Dehli, accustomed 
to sudden attacks, turned out with all possible speed. 
But though they used every despatch,^ before they were 
ready, the rebel cavalry, springing from no one knew 
where, appeared as if by magic on the scene. They had 
charged the still motionless artillery, and had sabred the 
gunners of one gun, when a squadron of the 9th Lancers, 
which had formed up very rapidly, dashed on them and 
drove them back in disorder. The charge cost the 
squadron dear, for French, who led it, was killed ; Jones, 
his subaltern, was dangerously wounded, and several men 
were killed or wounded. But it gave the respite that was 
wanted, and allowed Greathed, who had hurried from the 

^ For a lifelike description of this surprise, and the events connected with 
it, everyone should read Bourchier's Eight Months' Campaign. 



splendid Victory of the British. 317 

fort, to deploy his line and to despatch Watson, with a 
portion of his cavalry, to turn the left flank of the rebels, 
whilst he should advance from the centre. He was joined, 
as he advanced, by a battery of artillery, which Pearson 
had manned, experimentally, with men of Eurasian ex- 
traction, and which on this occasion rendered excellent 
service. The prompt advance of the force, the celerity 
with which it had been transformed from a heterogeneous 
mass of individuals sleeping or lounging into a living 
machine, upset the calculations of the rebels, and the 
British cavalry, gallantly led by Ouvry, Probyn, Watson, 
and the guns, splendidly managed by Bourchier, Turner, 
and Pearson, completed the confusion which this celerity 
had produced. They fell back in disorder, pursued in 
front by the infantry, which had been joined by the 
3d Europeans from the fort — under Colonel Cotton, 
who, by virtue of his seniority to Greathed, took the 
command — and on the flanks by the cavalry and artillery. 
The infantry followed them as far as their camp, which 
was found standing midway between Agra and the Kari 
Nadi, and there halted, dead tired ; but the pursuit was 
continued as far as that stream by the two other arms. 
Only once did the rebels attempt to make a stand, but 
then a few rounds of grape sent them flying. They were 
unable to carry a single gun across the stream. For 
seven miles the road was one continued line of carts, guns, 
ammunition waggons, camels, and baggage of every de- 
scription. The whole of this fell into the hands of the 
victors. Much that was useless they destroyed ; but they 
brought back into camp thirteen pieces of ordnance and 
vast quantities of ammunition. No victory could have 
been more rapid or decisive. It was a splendid perform- 
ance, especially if one takes into consideration the circum- 
stances under which the battle was engaged. Bourchier's 



3 1 8 The Force enters Oitdh. 

nine-pounder battery had marched thirty miles without a 
halt before the action began. From first to last Great- 
hed's cavalry and artillery had marched over sixty-four 
miles, the infantry fifty-four, in less than thirty-six hours, 
to be then surprised in camp, to beat off the surprisers, 
and to follow them up ten miles. It was a great perform- 
ance — well marched, well fought, and well followed up. 
The force did not return to its encamping ground till 
seven o'clock in the evening. 

The victory secured the restoration round Agra of law 
and order. The return of law and order, again, was illus- 
trated by a change in the command, contrived and carried 
out in a very mysterious manner, Greathed had not given 
satisfaction either to the Agra authorities or to the re- 
presentative of a very powerful military clique in his camp. 
Under their joint influence the Secretary to the Agra 
Government wrote to Dehli to request that Hope Grant 
of the 9th Lancers might be sent down to assume com- 
mand. Hope Grant was sent, and travelling rapidly, 
joined the column at Firuzabad, the third march from 
Agra on the Kanhpur road, and with it reached Kanhpur 
on the 26th October. At Kanhpur Grant found that Sir 
Colin Campbell had made arrangements to increase the 
column to the divisional strength of about 5000 men. 
On the 30th Hope Grant crossed the Ganges into Oudh, 
and in consequence of orders received from Sir Colin, 
encamped his force in a plain beyond the Banni bridge, 
within a few miles of the Alambagh, to await there further 
instructions. 

Whilst Hope~ Grant was marching into Oudh, other 
columns, despatched from Dehli, were doing excellent 
work in the districts contiguous to that city. In all of 
these the authority of the Mughal had been recognised, 
and sharp actions were requisite to prove to the revolted 



Order is restored in the Dehli Districts. 319 

populations that the power of that family had ceased for 
ever. Whilst Van Cortland t, an excellent officer, with 
native levies, cleared the ground to the north-west of the 
city, Showers, with a mixed column, marched to the west 
and south-west, forced the chief of Ballabgarh to submit, 
and took in succession Riwari, Jajhar, and Kanauri. He 
returned to Dehli, on the 19th of October, with three rebel 
chiefs as prisoners, and much booty, specie of the value 
of ;^8o,ooo, seventy guns, and a large quantity of 
ammunition. 

Scarcely had Showers returned when the mutinied 
troops of the Jodhpur legion, fresh from a victory over 
the soldiers of the loyal Raja of Jaipur, invaded the 
territories he had but just overrun, and occupied Riwari. 
Against them Gerrard, an officer of conspicuous merit, 
was despatched with a strong column.^ Gerrard, march- 
ing from Dehli, the lOth of November, reoccupied Riwari 
on the 13th, and pushed on to Narnul, which the rebels 
had occupied in considerable force,, So strong, indeed, 
was their position there that, had they had the patience 
to await attack, Gerrard would have found that all his 
work had been cut out for him. But, either from sheer 
incapacity or from utter recklessness, no sooner had it 
been reported to him that the British were in sight than 
the rebel leader advanced to meet him in the plain. The 
cavalry fight which followed was most desperately con- 
tested ; the Guides, led by Kennedy, and the Carabineers 
by Wardlaw, fighting splendidly against considerable odds. 
The rebels, too, fought well, but eventually they gave way. 
On the left the Multani horse, new levies, had at first dis- 
played considerable reluctance to join in the fray. Roused 

1 The 1st Fusiliers, the 7th Panjab Infantry, Cookworthy's troop of horse- 
artillery, Gillespie's heavy battery, the Carabineers, the cavalry of the Guides, 
the Multani horse. 



320 Sir Colin Campbell. 

at length by the example of their officers, and by the 
success achieved by the Carabineers and the Guides, they 
joined in the combat, and took their proper place in 
the front. Meanwhile, the infantry and the artillery had 
been following up the advantage gained by the defeat of 
the rebel horse. The enemy was now in full flight. At 
this crisis Gerrard, riding in front, conspicuous on his 
white Arab charger, was mortally wounded by a musket- 
ball. In the momentary confusion which followed, the 
rebels, rallying, made a desperate effort to restore the 
fortunes of the day. In vain, however. The Fusiliers 
charged and drove them into flight, and completed their 
expulsion from the fort of Narnul. Caulfield, who had 
succeeded to the command, followed up his advantage. 
He, however, a few days later, was relieved by Seaton, 
and, under orders from headquarters, that officer led back 
the force to Dehli, preparatory to taking part in the 
measures which Sir Colin Campbell was devising for the 
recovery of Oudh, Fathgarh, and Rohilkhand. 

Sir Colin Campbell had arrived in Calcutta on the 
13th of August. Already at that period, although Dehli 
had not fallen, the position for an advance from Kanh- 
pur, though far from perfect, had, thanks to the splendid 
efforts of Neill, Frederick Gubbins, William Taylor, Vin- 
cent Eyre, Havelock, and Outram, materially improved. 
There was, however, still much to be accomplished. The 
line of 600 miles, the security of which had been pro- 
minently put forward by Mr Secretary Beadon in the 
early days of the Mutiny, was not only insecure, but was 
being daily broken. The evil had been intensified for 
a time by the refusal of the Government to disarm the 
native regiments at Danapur, and by the consequences 
of that refusal. Then, too, the division of Chutia Nagpur, 
a mountainous territory lying between Southern Bihar, 



Sir Colin Campbell starts for Kdnhpttr, 321 

Western Bengal, Orisa, and the Central Provinces was 
surging with revolters, and these were constantly travers- 
ing the grand trunk road, impeding communications, and 
rendering travelling- dangerous. However, none of these 
difficulties daunted Sir Colin. His aim was to despatch 
troops, and to proceed himself, to Kanhpur, thence to 
march to relieve Outram and Havelock. Under the 
pressure of his requisitions the Government organised a 
bullock-train for the despatch of troops to Allahabad, 
whilst he sent out strong parties to patrol the road. 
The opportune arrival of the British troops intended for 
China, but which the patriotism of Lord Elgin had placed 
at the disposal of the Government of India, enabled Sir 
Colin to utilise the means thus prepared for their despatch. 
Then the Shannon and the Pearl arrived, and Captain 
William Peel, of glorious memory, proceeded to organise 
his famous brigade from the crew of the former, whilst 
Captain Sotheby did the same from the crew of the Pearl. 
Troops arrived from England in October. On the 27th of 
that month Sir Colin, having completed all his arrange- 
ments for the prompt despatch of regiments as they might 
arrive, set out for Allahabad. Narrowly escaping capture on 
his way from a body of rebels who had broken the famous 
line, he arrived there the evening of the ist of November. 
He found matters in good progress. The Naval 
brigade had left Allahabad for Kanhpur in two detach- 
ments, on the 23d and 28th October. The 53d and drafts 
for other regiments had accompanied the second detach- 
ment, the whole commanded by Colonel Powell of the 53d. 
Sir Colin, having organised a party, under Longden of the 
1 0th, for the clearing of the Azamgarh district, set out for 
Kanhpur on the 2d, and arrived there on the 3d. He 
found the position there, in a military point of view, 
dangerous. Oudh was still teeming with rebels, whilst 

X 



322 Sir John enters Oiidh, 

to the south-west of him, within a distance of forty-five 
miles, the trained soldiers of the Gwdliar contingent were 
threatening his communications. The road which he had 
but just traversed, between Allahabad and Kanhpur, was 
liable to invasion from Oudh, and was far from safe. Only- 
two days before he had proceeded along it Powell and 
Peel had a very sharp encounter with the rebels at Kajwa, 
twenty-four miles from Fathpur, in which, though it termi- 
nated in a victory, Powell had been killed, and ninety-five 
men killed and wounded. The problem Sir Colin had to 
consider was whether, with the road communicating with 
Allahabad liable to invasion, and his left rear seriously 
threatened, he could venture to engage in an operation 
which would occupy many days, and the duration of 
which any untoward accident might prolong. The rebels 
were well served by spies, and Sir Colin well knew the 
opportunities which his invasion of Oudh with the bulk of 
his force would open to men possessing soldierly instincts. 
In war, however, it is always necessary to risk something. 
The rescue of the garrison of the Residency seemed to 
Sir Colin's mind the most pressing necessity. He resolved, 
then, to attempt it with as little delay as possible. 

We have seen how he had ordered Hope Grant, with 
a portion of the Dehli force, to await further instructions in 
the plain beyond the Banni bridge. There he formed the 
point d'appiii of the invading army, upon which all carts 
and supplies were to concentrate. Thither, too, he had 
despatched all his available troops. Arranging to leave 
behind him at Kanhpur about 500 European troops, under 
Windham of Crimean fame, and some Sikhs, and giving 
authority to Windham to detain a brigade of Madras 
sipahis, under Carthew, expected the next day, Sir Colin 
and his staff quitted Kanhpur on the 9th, and joined 
Hope Grant beyond the Banni bridge the same afternoon. 



CHAPTER XXL 

THE SECOND RELIEF OF THE LAKHNAO RESIDENCY — 
WINDHAM AND THE GWALIAR CONTINGENT. 

Before describing the proceedings of Sir Colin Campbell 
and his force it will be well to cast a glance at the occu- 
pants of the Residency, increased in numbers since the 
25th of September by the arrival of the troops so gallantly 
led by Outram and Havelock. 

These troops had, as I have said, scarcely entered the 
defences when it was universally realised that their advent 
had constituted not a relief but a reinforcement ; that 
means of transport for the ladies and children, the sick and 
wounded, were wanting; that an enormous addition had 
been made to the hospital list ; and that, even had trans- 
port been available, the combined force was not strong 
enough to escort them to Kanhpur. Compelled thus, 
perforce, to remain, Outram devoted all his endeavours to 
the providing of accommodation for the increased force. 
With this view he caused to be occupied the palaces 
along the line of river, the Tarawala Kothi, the Chatar 
Manzil, and the Farhatbakhsh. These he consigned to 
the newly arrived troops, under the command of Havelock, 
whilst the old troops continued to occupy their former 
posts. The care of the important post of the Alambagh he 
consigned to Major Mclntyre of the 78th, with 250 men 
fit for duty, and others who, although sick at the time, 
speedily became convalescent. The orders to Mclntyre 



324 The Blockade of the Residency. 

were to hold the place as long as he could, and only in 
case of absolute necessity to fall back upon Kanhpur. 

The six weeks that followed have not incorrectly been 
termed a blockade. No longer did the rebels make those 
desperate assaults from postswhich dominated the defences. 
The attacks rather came now from the defenders. They 
came in the shape of sorties, of countermining, of extend- 
ing their borders. To write a history of the sorties would 
require a volume. It must suffice here to state that they 
were frequent and successful. It is true that an attempt 
made on the 3d of October, and one or two following days, 
to open communications with the Alambagh, by way of 
the intermediate houses, was relinquished. But even this 
attempt resulted in a certain advantage to the garrison. 
Boring through a number of houses, they seized a large 
mosque just beyond them, and made of it a permanent 
outpost. This was held successfully, and with great ad- 
vantage, until Sir Colin arrived. By these and similar 
means the limits of the British position became gradually 
extended. Extension meant relief to the old garrison 
from all molestation on its east, north-east, and south-east 
faces ; that is, from the Kanhpur road to the commence- 
ment of the river front. Meanwhile, the defences of 
the original Residency were repaired, and new batteries 
were constructed. No longer was heard that incessant 
musketry fire from a distance not exceeding the width 
of the Strand. From the posts occupied in a vicinity 
so close the rebels had been driven so far that their 
musketry fire could no longer effect mischief within the 
intrenchment. But they did not even then feel baffled. 
Withdrawing to a convenient distance, they so planted 
their guns that the balls might be sure to clear the outer 
defences and lodge within the intrenchment. To annoy 
still further the garrison they constantly shifted their point 



Means for communicating with Sir Colin. 325 

of fire. They knew not, apparently, the deadly result to 
the garrison of this mode of attack, for they displayed 
no continuity in the working of it. 

On the 9th of October the garrison was cheered by 
the news of the complete success obtained at Dehli, and 
of the successful march of Greathed's column as far as 
Bulandshahr. Then it was that, realising that Sir Colin 
Campbell's march to his relief had now become a question 
of three or four weeks, Outram set to work to devise a 
plan to communicate with him as he should approach. 
Already he had forwarded to the Alambagh a despatch 
for Sir Colin, containing plans of the city and the ap- 
proaches to it, and his own idea as to the best mode 
of effecting a junction. But though written despatches 
might tell much, something more, something in the shape 
of personal communication with Sir Colin, by an intelli- 
gent man who knew every point of the position of the 
blockaded garrison, seemed to Outram to be almost 
essential. But how to secure to Sir Colin such personal 
communication ? It could be accomplished only by one 
of the garrison, and by that one having recourse to dis- 
guise. But for a European to disguise himself, and to 
attempt to penetrate in that disguise the hostile masses 
which surrounded the blockaded position, which guarded 
every avenue, and carefully watched every approach, was 
apparently to court certain and ignominious death. No 
one could be asked to incur such a risk. Indeed, it would 
have required, on the part of Outram, a conviction that 
the chances of success were at least equal to those of 
failure to allow him to accept the offer of a volunteer. 

The anxiety of Outram for some such personal com- 
munication was greater when he learned that Sir Colin 
was on the point of joining the force between the Alam- 
bagh and the Banni bridge, and there can be no doubt 



326 Thomas Henry Kavmtagh. 

that his anxiety on this head became generally known 
Amongst others it reached the ears of one Thomas Henry 
Kavanagh, a clerk in one of the civil offices. Kavanagh 
at once communicated to Outram his readiness to assume 
the role. To all appearance there were few men less quali- 
fied than Kavanagh to escape detection. For he was a fair 
man, much taller than the general run of the natives of 
Oudh, and his red hair glittered like gold. On the other 
hand, he possessed a courage that nothing could daunt, a 
perfect knowledge of the native patois, and a will of iron. 
No one loved a brave man more than Outram. The offer 
made by Kavanagh was an offer after his own heart. But, 
humane beyond the ordinary run of men, he hesitated to 
expose a fellow-creature to almost certain death. Whatever 
doubts he may have entertained on this head were, however, 
dissipated after his first interview with Kavanagh. In him 
he recognised a man whose innate pluck and iron resolu- 
tion would carry him through all dangers. He accepted, 
therefore, his offer, and bade him prepare for his enterprise. 

Kavanagh then had his hair and his skin stained with 
lamp-black ; the hair he also cut short. Then, donning 
the dress of a Badnidsh — a native ' swashbuckler,' a type 
very common in those days — he set out, on the evening 
of the 9th of November, accompanied by a native spy of 
proved fidelity, Kanauji Lai by name. 

Mr Kavanagh subsequently published an account ^ of 
his journey, which may yet be read with deep interest. 
It was not without its alarms. He did not reach the Alam- 
bagh that night, but, on the morning of the lOth, he fell 
in with a party of the Panjab cavalry, and this party con- 
ducted him to Sir Colin, who, as we have seen, had reached 
the plain beyond Banni bridge the previous evening.^ 

^ How I Won the Victoria Cross, Ward & Lock. After a somewhat 
chequered career, Kavanagh died in St Tliomas's Hospital in 1883. 



Plan of Sir Colin Campbell. 32^ 

Sir Colin Campbell had, on his arrival, despatched 
Adrian Hope of the 93d, with a large convoy of pro- 
visions, to the Alambagh. The sick and wounded he had 
despatched in carts to Kanhpur. On the loth he halted 
to confer with Kavanagh, and to complete his arrange- 
ments. On the nth his engineer park arrived, and he 
issued orders for an advance the following day. At 
sunrise on the 12th the troops marched. Sir Colin's plan, 
based mainly on that which Outram had sent him, was to 
move on the Alambagh, to store there all the impedunenta ; 
then, drawing to himself the detachments still in the rear, 
to make, with a wide sweep, a flank march to the right on 
the Dilkusha park and the Martiniere ; then to force the 
canal close to its junction with the Gumti ; then, covered 
by that river, to advance on the Sikandarabagh. This 
point once secured, he would detach a portion of the force 
to seize the barracks to the north of Hazratganj, and 
plant there batteries to play on the Kaisarbagh. During 
that time he would move, with the main body, on the Shah 
Najaf and Moti Mahall, and forcing these, would effect 
a junction with Outram. That officer would support this 
operation by opening a heavy fire on all the inter- 
mediate positions held by the rebels. Forcing these, he 
would then move out, with all his sick and wounded, 
women and children, and effect a junction with Sir Colin. 

The first day's march had the object of placing the 
force solidly in communication with the Alambagh, the gar- 
rison of which, still commanded by the gallant Mclntyre, 
had been gradually increased to 930 Englishmen, a few 
Sikhs, and eight guns. This having been effected at the 
cost of one or two successful skirmishes with the rebels, 
Sir Colin proceeded to arrange for his decisive advance on 
the morrow. First, he despatched Hope to seize the fort of 
Jalalabad, to the right rear of the Alambagh. He then 



328 Force at His Disposal. 

stacked within the Alambagh all the camp equipage not 
required for the hard work in prospect. His last rein- 
forcements arriving that evening, he placed the 75th, 
which had suffered much, and the strength of which had 
been reduced to something under 300, within the Alam- 
bagh, to relieve the men till then located there. He 
gave them, also, a few Sikhs from Brasyer's regiment and 
some guns. Counting up his men, he found that, after 
deducting those sent back with sick and wounded and the 
garrison of the Alambagh, he had fit for service about 
4700 men. These he divided into six brigades. There 
were the Naval brigade, commanded by William Peel ; the 
Artillery brigade, comprising the batteries of Blunt, Rem- 
mington, Travers, Bridge, and Bourchier, commanded by 
Brigadier Crawford ; the Cavalry brigade, led by Brigadier 
Little, and comprising two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, 
one each of the ist, 2d, and 5th Panjab Cavalry, and 
Hodson's Horse; the 3d Infantry brigade, com.manded by 
Greathed, and composed of the remnant of the 8th, of a 
battalion formed of detachments of the three regiments 
shut up in the Residency, and the 2d Panjab N. I. ; the 
4th, led by Adrian Hope, and consisting of the 93d, a wing 
of the 53d, the 4th Panjab Infantry, and a battalion also 
formed from men proceeding to join the regiments to be 
relieved ; the 5th, led by Russell, and comprising the 23d 
Fusiliers and a portion of the 82d. Hope Grant, with the 
rank of Brigadier-General, directed the operations, under 
the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief. 

The following morning the troops, having breakfasted, 
set out at nine o'clock, and after some skirmishing carried 
the Dilkusha. Not halting there, they pressed on to the 
Martiniere and carried that also. Sir Colin proceeded to 
secure the position thus gained by placing in the gardens 
of the Martiniere Hope's brigade and Remmington's troop. 



The Troops sectu^e the Martiniere. 329 

Russell he placed on the left, in front of the Dilkusha, 
whilst he directed Little, with the cavalry, to occupy a 
line drawn from the canal on his right to a wall of the 
Dilkusha park on his left. With him he posted likewise 
Bourchier's battery. Somewhat later in the day, Russell, 
under his orders, occupied, with some companies, two 
villages on the canal covering the left of the advance. 

But the rebels had no intention to allow the British 
general to remain in peaceful occupation of his line of 
attack. No sooner had they realised the exact nature 
of his dispositions than they massed their troops towards 
their centre, with the intention of making a grand assault. 
Little, noticing the gathering, sent an officer, Grant, to 
reconnoitre. On receiving Grant's report he despatched 
to the front the gallant Bourchier, supporting him with 
his cavalry. It was seen that the rebels had lined the 
opposite bank of the canal, and had only been prevented 
from making their forward movement by the timely occu- 
pation by Russell of the two villages above referred to. 
. Bourchier's guns quickly sent back their skirmishers, and 
his fire reaching their supporting masses, these in their 
turn also fell back. A second attempt, made about five 
o'clock, on the Martiniere was baffled by the vigilance of 
Adrian Hope and the successful practice of Remmington's 
guns. Here, again, Bourchier's battery and Peel's guns 
rendered splendid service, literally ' crushing,' by their 
flank fire, the rebels out of their position. 

The troops bivouacked for the night in the places they 
had gained. The next day, the 15th, was devoted to pre- 
parations, though it was not altogether free from desul- 
tory skirmishing. In the evening Sir Colin signalled to 
Outram, by a code previously arranged, that he would 
advance on the morrow. 

Accordingly, early on the morning of the 1 6th, a 



330 The Advance on the Sikandardbdgh. 

strong body of cavalry, with Blunt's horse-artillery and 
a company of the 53d, forming the advance guard, 
marched from the right, crossed the canal, then dry, 
followed for about a mile the bank of the Gumti, then, 
turning sharply to the left, reached a road running parallel 
to the Sikandarabagh. Sir Colin had so completely 
deceived the enemy as to his line of advance that this 
movement, followed though the advance guard was by 
the main body of the infantry, was absolutely unopposed, 
until the advance, making the sharp turn mentioned, 
entered the parallel road. Then a tremendous fire from 
enclosures near the road, and from the Sikandarabagh, 
opened on their flank. Their position was very dangerous, 
for they were literally broadside to the enemy's fire. The 
danger was apparent to every man of the advance. It 
served, however, only to quicken the resolve to baffle the 
rebels. The first to utilise the impulse was the gallant 
Blunt. Noticing that there was a plateau whence he could 
assail the Sikandarabagh on the further side of the road, 
hemmed in by its banks, apparently impossible for artillery 
to mount, he turned his horses' faces to the right bank, 
galloped up it, gained the open space on the plateau, and, 
unlimbering, opened his guns on the Sikandarabagh. It 
was one of the smartest services ever rendered in war. 
It at once changed the position. 

For, whilst Blunt was drawing on himself the fire 
of the rebels by his daring act, the infantry of Hope's 
brigade had come up with a rush and cleared the en- 
closures bordering the lane and a large building near 
them. There remained only the Sikandarabagh itself 
Against the massive walls of this building the light guns 
of Blunt's battery, and the heavier metal of those of 
Travers, who had joined him, were doing their best to 
effect a breach. No sooner was this breach believed to 



Ewart, Cooper, Ltmisden, Burrottghs, 331 

be practicable than there ensued one of the most wonder- 
ful scenes witnessed in that war. Suddenly and simul- 
taneously there dashed towards it the men of the wing of 
the 93d and the Sikhs, running for it at full speed. A 
Sikh of the 4th Rifles reached it first, but he was shot 
dead as he jumped through. A young officer of the 93d, 
Richard Cooper by name, was more fortunate. Flying, 
so to speak, through the hole, he landed unscathed. He 
was closely followed by Ewart of the same regiment, by 
John I. Lumsden, attached to it as interpreter, by three 
privates of the same regiment, and by eight or nine men, 
Sikhs and Highlanders. Burroughs of the 93d had also 
effected an entrance, for he was in the enclosure before 
Ewart, but he was almost immediately wounded. The 
enclosure in which these officers and men found them- 
selves was 150 yards square, with towers at the angles, 
a square building in the centre, and was held by 2000 
armed men. It seemed impossible that one of the assail- 
ants should escape alive. 

But what will not the sons of this little island do when 
the occasion demands it } It must suffice here to say that 
they rushed forward and maintained a not unequal contest 
till reinforcements poured in through the gate. Lumsden 
was killed. Cooper received a slash across his forehead at 
the moment that he laid his antagonist dead at his feet. 
Ewart, attacked by numbers, preserved his splendid pre- 
sence of mind and slew many. He was still holding his own 
against enormous odds when the front gate was burst open 
and reinforcements dashed in. Then the struggle increased 
in intensity. It was a fight for life or death between 
the rebels and the masters against whom they had risen. 
For, it must not be forgotten, the defenders were all 
sipahis who had rebelled. Nor did the struggle cease 
so long as one man of the 20DD remained alive. 



^^2 The Advance on the Shdh Najaf. 

Whilst this bloody scene was being enacted at the Sik- 
andarabagh a detachment of the same brigade had captured 
the large building known as the Barracks, Captain Stewart 
of the 93d greatly distinguishing himself Then Sir Colin 
made preparations to storm the Shah Najaf, a massively 
built mosque in the direct road to the Residency, situated 
in a garden surrounded by very strong loopholed walls. 

It was at the Shah Najaf that the rebels had counted 
to stop the British advance. They almost succeeded. 
For three hours the front attack made no way. Worse 
still, the road along which the force had advanced became 
so jammed that retreat by it was impossible. All this 
time the troops were exposed to a deadly fire of heavy 
guns and musketry. From other points, too, heavy 
guns were brought to play upon the baffled soldiers of 
England. A shot from one of these blew up one of Peel's 
tumbrils. The men were falling fast. Even the bright 
face of William Peel became overclouded. Sir Colin sat 
on his white horse, exposed to the full fire of the enemy, 
his gaze bent on the Shah Najaf, upon whose solid walls 
not even the heaviest guns could make an impression. As 
a last resource he collected the 93d about him, and told 
them that the Shah Najaf must be taken, that he had not 
intended to employ them again that day, but that as the 
guns could not open a way they must make one. In carry- 
ing out this necessary work he would go with them himself. 

But neither the dashing gunners of Middleton's battery, 
the daring of the Highlanders and the Sikhs, the persistent 
fire of the heavy guns of Peel, could effect the desired end. 
The Shah Najaf baffled them all. The shades of evening 
were falling fast. Success seemed impossible. Then 
Adrian Hope, collecting about him some fifty men, stole 
silently and cautiously through the jungle to a portion of 
the wall on which, before the assault, a sergeant of his 



The Caphu^e renders Success certain. ^'^'^ 

regiment had thought he had detected a sign of weakness. 
On reaching it unperceived, Hope found there a narrow 
fissure. Up this a single man was with difficulty pushed. 
He helped up others. More men were sent for. Then 
those who had entered moved forward. The surprise to 
the rebels as these men advanced was so thorough that 
they made no resistance, but evacuated the place. The 
fight was then over. Adrian Hope's victorious stormers 
had but to open the main gate to their comrades outside. 

The British force halted there for the night. The 
occupation of the Shah Najaf had rendered success on 
the morrow certain. In the capture of that place they 
had accomplished an action declared by their leader to 
be ' almost unexampled in war.' The same praise might 
be given to the wonderful storming of the Sikandarabagh. 
It is impossible to discriminate narrowly when almost 
every man was deserving. But it may at least be affirmed 
that the conduct of Cooper, Ewart, Lumsden, and the 
privates Dunley, Mackay, and Grant at the Sikandara- 
bagh; of Stewart at the Barracks; of Sergeant Baton, who 
first pointed out to Adrian Hope the weak point in the 
wall of the Shah Najaf; of Adrian Hope himself; of Blunt, 
who made possible the attack on the Sikandarabagh ; of 
William Beel, of Travers, of Middleton, of Bourchier, of the 
two Alisons, of Anson, and of many others, for the list is 
a very long one, gave ample proof that the race which, from 
the basis of a little island in the Atlantic, had made the 
greatest empire the world has seen had not degenerated. 

The next morning the force, thoroughly refreshed by 
sleep, advanced to complete its work. To reach the 
Residency the troops had yet to carry the mess-house and 
the Moti Mahall, and to do this whilst the guns of rebels 
posted in the Tdra Kothi and the Kaisarbagh were playing 
on their left flank. To secure his left, then, Sir Colin de- 



334 Hopkins^ Roberts, Wolseley, 

tached the 5th Brigade, under Russell, to seize Banks's 
house and four bungalows close to the Barracks, and to 
convert them into military posts. By this process his left 
rear would be secured, and his retirement with the impedi- 
menta from the Residency made safe. He then proceeded 
to cannonade the mess-house. 

No sooner had the musketry fire of the enemy been com- 
pletely silenced than the order to storm was given. This feat 
of arms was most gallantly achieved by Captain Hopkins 
of the 53d — one of the bravest men that ever lived, a man 
who literallyrevelled in danger — who carried the place with 
a rush. He had just reached the entrance when Roberts, 
now the Commander-in-Chief in India, handed him a Union 
Jack, and requested him to hoist it on one of the turrets. 
Hopkins, assisted by one of his men, did this twice in suc- 
cession. Twice was the Jack shot down. Hopkins was 
about to hoist it the third time when he received an order 
from Sir Colin to desist. The flag was attracting too ear- 
nestly the attention of the enemy. In an equally gallant 
manner Captain Garnet Wolseley had carried the houses 
to the right of the mess-house, and pushing on his enter- 
prise, had stormed the Moti Mahal). It was a great 
feat. 

An open space, nearly half a mile in width, still inter- 
vened between the assailants and the advanced posts of 
Outram and Havelock. On this space the fire of the 
guns from the Kaisarbagh played with unintermitting 
fury. To cross it was to run a great risk. But in those 
days risks when an object was to be gained were not 
considered. Outram, Havelock, Napier,^ Vincent Eyre, 

^ The late Lord Napier of Magdala. Sitwell v/as A.D.C. to Outram ; 
Russell, a very gallant ofificer of the Engineers. Dodgson was, and happily 
is, one of the bravest and most retiring men that ever lived. No one has 
suffered so much from the innate modesty of his nature. Young Havelock 
is the present Sir Henry Havelock-Allan, 



Preparations for Withdrawal. 335 

young Havelock, Dodgson, Sitwell, Russell, and Kavanagh 
attempted it. They did not all pass the ordeal unscathed ; 
Napier, young Havelock, Sitwell, and Russell were struck 
down. The others reached the Moti Mahall uninjured. 
Then, to use the language of Sir Colin, 'the relief of the 
garrison had been accomplished.' 

The conversation between the Commander-in-Chief 
and his visitors was short. When it was finished, again 
had the visitors to traverse the terrible space. Sir Henry 
Havelock, leaning on Dodgson, could, from the weak 
state of his health, walk but slowly, but amid the con- 
tinuous storm of bullets the two returned unscathed. 
It was Havelock to whom Outram had consigned the 
task of working out towards the relieving force so as to 
give it a hand as soon as the mess-house and Moti Mahall 
should be carried ; and right well had the gallant veteran 
performed the task allotted to him. 

It remained now to Sir Colin to devise a plan for the 
withdrawal of the women and children. It was no easy 
task even after he had by his advance made a way for 
the movement. It seemed to him, at first, absolutely neces- 
sary to silence the fire of the Kaisarbagh. The plan he 
adopted was the following. 

I have told how, on the first day of the advance, he 
had directed Russell to occupy Banks's bungalow and the 
bungalows adjoining. This had been done. But to com- 
plete the communications it was necessary also to seize 
a building known as the Hospital, between the bungalows 
and the Barracks, already taken. In attempting to take 
this Russell was wounded, Biddulph was killed, and Hale, 
who succeeded, though he took the Hospital, was unable 
to maintain himself there. Whilst this attack was pro- 
gressing, the rebels, gathering heart, attacked the pickets 
between the Barracks and the Sikandarabagh in consider- 



336 Sir Colin rehtrns to Kdnhpur. 

able force. They were repulsed after some hard fighting, 
in which Remmington and his troop covered themselves 
with glory. 

The line of retirement by Banks's house proving dif- 
ficult and dangerous, Sir Colin reconnoitred the ground 
between the positions actually held by the British and the 
canal, and finally resolved to move by that. He carried 
out the operation on the 20th and four following days. 
Turning the fire of William Peel's heavy guns on the 
Kaisarbagh, so as to lead the rebels to expect an assault, 
he moved the women and children from the place in which 
they had been so long defended, and on the evening of 
the 22d had them safely landed in the Dilkusha. Hale, 
who commanded the rear-guard, joined him there on the 
23d. On the 24th, whilst he was halting, though not 
resting there, the gallant Havelock passed away. He had 
indeed fought a good fight, and he had died as he had 
lived, in the performance of his duty. On the 26th the 
noblest of his comrades followed his remains to his grave 
in the Alambagh. 

That place had been reached on the 25th. There Sir 
Colin made a fresh distribution of his force, leaving Outram, 
with rather less than 4000 men, at the Alambagh, threaten- 
ing the still rebellious Lakhnao, whilst he should return to 
look after Windham at Kanhpur. About that place he was 
very anxious, for he had no news, and the reports received 
were to the effect that heavy firing had been heard in that 
direction. On the 27th, then, at eleven o'clock in the 
morning. Sir Colin started for Kanhpur. He slept at 
Banni, and really alarmed, started early the next morning 
on his forward march towards the Ganges. On his way 
he received despatches which showed him that the place 
was in great peril. At Mangalwar he halted his troops, 
fired three salvoes to announce his approach, and galloped 



Windham at Kdnhpur. 337 

forward, with his staff, in mingled fear and hope as to the 
state of the bridge of boats. To his joy he saw, by the 
pale evening light, that it was intact. Vast sheets of flames, 
arising from burning buildings, showed to him as clearly 
that the rebels must have beaten Windham and occupied 
Kanhpur. How it had all happened I must tell whilst 1 
leave my readers watching Sir Colin and his staff crossing 
the bridge, on the late evening of the 28th, to find out the 
reason, and to remedy the catastrophe. 

Windham had been left with about 500 Europeans 
and a few Sikhs, a number that would be largely aug- 
mented, to occupy and improve the intrenchment erected 
by Havelock on the river, and to watch the movements 
of the Gwaliar rebels then threatening from Kalpi, forty- 
five miles distant. Between the 9th and the 15th Wind- 
ham received reinforcements in the shape of Carthew's 
brigade of Madras sipahis, largely reduced in numbers ; 
and, between that date and the 26th, of drafts from several 
European regiments, and half a native regiment of Car- 
thew's brigade. Anxious regarding the movements of the 
Gwaliar rebels, commanded, he believed, by Tantia Topi, 
he took up, on the 17th, with his augmented force, a posi- 
tion, at the junction of the Kalpi and Dehli roads, cover- 
ing Kanhpur, and whence he could closely watch the 
movements of the rebels. He occupied that position up 
to the 20th. He had heard then of the successful capture 
of the Sikandarabagh and the Shah Najaf But, on the 
22d, having in the interval received no further news, he 
was disquieted by the rumour that the police guard left 
at the Barmi bridge had been surprised and defeated. 
Sensible of the all-importance that Sir Colin's communi- 
cations with Kanhpur should be maintained intact, he 
despatched, on the 23d, a wing of a sipdhi regiment, with 
two guns, to re-occupy the bridge at Banni. Had he con- 

Y 



i,;2^S Wiiidham is driven Back. 

tented himself with doing that, and with maintaining his 
watchful position, it is possible that the catastrophe which 
followed might have been avoided. 

But Windham, brave as a lion, was anxious to do 
something. He accordingly transmitted to Sir Colin a 
plan he had devised of meeting the advance of the Gwaliar 
rebels by a system of ' aggressive defence,' by which he 
might destroy them in detail. Receiving no reply to that 
proposal, he resolved to carry it out. Early on the 24th, 
then, he marched six miles down the Kalpi road, and 
took a position so decidedly threatening to the rebels 
that, regarding it as a challenge, they took up the glove, 
and resolved to try to beat Windham at his own 
game. 

Of the action which followed, fought on the 26th, 27th, 
and 28th, it must suffice to state that, whilst the early 
advantage lay with Windham, the astute leader opposed 
to him quickly perceived that the very success of his 
enemy might, with the numerical superiority he possessed, 
be used against him. Windham, though he had suc- 
ceeded, had been compelled, by the nature of the ground, 
to fall back for the night to a position he considered he 
could hold until Sir Colin should arrive. It was a weak 
position, however, and Tantia Topi saw that it offered 
many advantages to a superior force which should attack 
it. Having that superior force, he attacked him then the 
following morning, and after a contest, in which there 
were many changes of fortune, and the display of much 
soldierly ability on the part of Brigadier Carthew, drove 
Windham back into Kanhpur. Not content with that, 
he renewed the attack the following day, seized the 
station of Kanhpur, fired the bungalows, burned the 
clothing prepared for the relieved garrison of Lakh- 
nao, and the stores for the British army, and forced 



How Sir Colin found Kdnhpur. 339 

Windham to take refuge within the intrenchment. This 
was the position of affairs at Kanhpur when Sir Colin 
Campbell crossed the Ganges on the evening of the 28th 
of November.^ 

' In my larger history (Kaye's and Malleson's History of the Indian 
Mutiny, cabinet edition, vol. iv., pages 159 to i8i) I have given a detailed 
account of this famous action, of which Cardew was the real hero. I cannot 
quit the subject of the final relief of the Residency without mentioning the 
names of those gallant men whose exertions so greatly contributed to its de- 
fence before their reinforcement by Havelock and Outram. They were, 
according to the report of the coiiimander of the garrison, Colonel Inglis, 
Lieutenant James, of the Commissariat, of whom it was written : ' It is not 
too much to say that the garrison owe their lives to the exertions and firm- 
ness of this officer ' ; Captain Wilson, the D. A. Adjutant-General, ' ever to 
be found where shot was flying thickest ' ; Lieutenants Ilardinge, Barwell, 
and Birch; Mr, now Sir George, Couper; Mr Capper; Mr Martin ; Colonel 
Master; Major Apthorp ; Captain Gould Weston ; Captains Sanders, Boileau, 
and Germon; Lieutenants Loughnan, Aitken, Anderson, Graydon, Long- 
more, and Mr Schilling, commanding posts ; Lieutenants Anderson, Hutchin- 
son, and Innes, of the Engineers; Lieutenants Thomas, M'Farlane, and 
Bonham, of the Artillery, and Captain Evans, employed with that arm ; 
Major Lowe, commanding the 32d ; Captain Bassano ; and Lieutenants 
Lawrence, Edmonstone, Foster, Harmar, Cork, Clery, Brown, and Charlton 
of that regiment ; of other regiments. Captain O'Brien, Kemble, Edgell, 
Dinning ; Lieutenants Sewell, Worsley, W^arner, Ward, Graham, Mecham] 
and Keir. In the Medical Department, Superintending - Surgeon Scott ; 
Surgeons Brydon, Ogilvie, and Campbell ; Assistant-Surgeons Fayrer, Bird, 
Partridge, Greenhow, and Darby; and Apothecary Thompson. In other 
departments. Captain Carnegie ; the Rev. Messrs Harris and Polehampton ; 
Mr M'Crae, Mr Cameron, and Mr Marshall. 



CHAPTER XXII. 

SIR COLIN CAMPBELL RECOVERS THE DUAB. 

As soon as Sir Colin Campbell had mastered the extent 
of Windham's disaster he recrossed the Ganges to Mangal- 
war, then pushing forward with his convoy of women and 
children, well covered by his troops, baffled an attempt of 
the rebels to destroy the bridge of boats, and re-entered 
Kanhpur. His convoy he encamped, on November 30, on 
the further side of the canal, near the mouldering remains 
and riddled walls of the position Wheeler had held so 
long, and then turned to look at the position occupied by 
the rebels. 

It was a strong one. Numbering 25,000 men, of whom 
rather less than one-half were trained sipdhis, they rested 
their centre on the town, separated from the British force 
by the Ganges canal, and interspersed with bungalows, high 
walls, and cover of various kinds. Their right stretched 
out behind the canal into the plain, and was covered in 
front by lime-kilns and mounds of brick. Over the canal 
they had thrown a bridge, but the extreme right flank 
was uncovered. Their left rested on the Ganges. They 
were very resolute, and very confident. 

Before attacking them Sir Colin spent two days in 
making preparations for the despatch of his large convoy 
of women and children, of sick and wounded, to Allahabad. 
He sent them off on the night of the 3d, then, waiting 
until they had placed some miles between themselves and 



Sir Colin attacks the Rebels. 341 

Kanhpur, he carefully examined the rebels' position, 
and concluded that, strong as it was on the left and 
in the centre, it might be possible to turn the right and 
roll them up. He had with him, inclusive of recently 
arrived troops, about 5000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 
thirty-five guns. The infantry of this force he divided 
into four brigades. The third, commanded by Greathed, 
counted the 8th, the 64th, and the 2d Panjab Infantry. 
The fourth, under Adrian Hope, contained the 53d, the42d, 
the 93d, and the 4th Panjab Rifles. The fifth, under 
Inglis, counted the 23d, the 32d, and the 82d. The sixth, 
led by Walpole, was formed of the 2d and 3d Battalions 
Rifle Brigade, and a part of the 38th. The cavalry, com- 
manded by Little, consisted of the 9th Lancers, and details 
of the 1st, 2d, and 5th Panjab Cavalry and Hodson's 
Horse. The artillery counted Peel's Naval brigade, the 
troops of Blunt and Remmington, the batteries of Bour- 
chier, of Middleton, of Smith, of Longden, and of Bridge, 
under the chief command of Dupuis. To Windham was 
consigned the charge of the intrenchment. 

With this force Sir Colin attacked the rebels on the 
morning of the 6th of December. After an artillery fire, 
which lasted two hours, he directed Greathed to make 
a false attack on the centre whilst Walpole, Hope, and 
Inglis should turn the right. Walpole thereupon crossed 
the canal, and attracted the fire of the rebels, whilst Adrian 
Hope, supported by Inglis, took a long sweep to the left, 
and then, wheeling round, charged the unprotected flanks 
of the rebels' right. In this movement the 4th Panjab 
Rifles and the 53d covered themselves with glory. They 
drove the rebels from mound to mound despite a resist- 
ance resolute and often fierce. At length they reached 
the bridge which the rebels had thrown over the canal. 
This the enemy had well cared for. Upon it they had 



342 And completely defeats Them. 

concentrated so strong an artillery fire that it seemed 
almost impossible to force the way across. But the 
gallant men, who had pushed the rebels before them up 
to that point, were not to be daunted by appearances. 
They rushed at the bridge with a stern determination to 
carry it. The rebels seemed equally resolved to prevent 
them. For a moment the struggle seemed doubtful, when 
a rumbling sound was heard, and William Peel and his 
sailors, dragging a heavy twenty-four-pounder, came up 
with a run, planted the gun on the bridge, and opened 
fire. The effect was decisive. Whilst it roused the 
assailants to the highest enthusiasm, it completely cowed 
the rebels. With loud shouts Highlanders, Sikhs, and 
53d men rushed past the gun, dashed at the rebels, and 
drove them before them in wild disorder. The Gwaliar 
camp was now almost within their grasp. But before 
they could reach it the gallant Bourchier, always in the 
front, passed them at a gallop, and, unlimbering, opened 
fire. A few minutes later the assailants repassed the 
guns, and the Gwdlidr camp was their own. 

The victory was now gained. The Gwdliar portion of 
the rebel force made, in wild flight, for the Kalpi road. 
In that direction they were pursued by Sir Colin in 
person to the fourteenth milestone. They had lost their 
camp, their stores, their magazines, a great part of their 
material, and their prestige. 

The remainder of the rebels, composed for the most 
part of the armed retainers of revolted princes, had fallen 
back on the Bithor road. The pursuit of these Sir Colin 
had entrusted to the chief of his staff, General Mansfield. 
Mansfield advanced to a position from which he might 
have forced the surrender of the whole of the rebel force 
as it passed him. But Mansfield was shortsighted, and 
he cared not to trust to the sight of others. Consequently, 



Sir Colin follozvs up His Victory, 343 

to the intense indignation of his men, he allowed the rebels 
to defile close to him, unpunished and unpursued, taking 
with them their guns. What Sir Colin said to the chief 
of his staff may not be known. But he despatched, on 
the 9th, a force under Sir Hope Grant to remedy his tre- 
mendous mistake. Hope Grant marched in pursuit of 
them, discovered their line of retreat by the articles which 
the heavy roads had compelled them to abandon, caught 
them on the banks of the river just as they were about 
to escape across it into Oudh, and completely defeated 
them, taking all their guns. He pushed on further to 
Bithor, found it evacuated, and, as far as it was possible, 
destroyed it. 

Thus did Sir Colin avenge the defeat sustained by 
Windham. He was anxious to push on at once to recover 
the Duab, but he had to wait a fortnight for the arrival of 
carriage. It reached him on the 23d. Meanwhile, learn^ 
ing that Seaton was advancing from Aligarh with a por- 
tion of the Dehli force, he detached Walpole's brigade 
to occupy Itawah and Mainpiiri. Seaton, about the same 
time, defeated the rebels between Gangari and Kasganj, 
and had pushed on to Patiali, where they were reported 
to be in force. Here he attacked, and inflicted upon them 
a defeat which crashed the life out of many and the heart 
out of all. Advancing rapidly towards Mainpiiri, he de- 
feated on the way a rebel Raja, and by means of a very 
daring expedition made by Hodson and M'Dowell opened 
communications with Sir Colin, then with his force at 
Miran-ki-sarai (December 30). Four days later Seaton 
effected a junction with Walpole. 

Meanwhile, the necessary carriage having arrived, Sir 
Colin had marched from Kanhpur, the 24th December. 
He had reached, we have seen, Miran-ki-sarai on the 30th. 
On the 2d of January he forced a passage across the bridge 



344 Preparations f 01'' the Ozidh Cainpaign, 

over the Kali Nadi, in face of a very strong opposition, 
and drove the survivors of the rebels into Rohilkhand. 
The next day he occupied the fort of the rebel Nuwab of 
Fathgarh, a man who had almost equalled Nand Sahib in 
his cruelties towards Englishmen, and who was now a fugi- 
tive. There, the following day, the junction of Walpole 
and Seaton's divisions raised his force to more than 
10,000 men. Sir Colin was anxious now to push on at 
once to the recovery of Rohilkhand. But Lord Canning, 
who, now unfettered by the mischievous Calcutta coun- 
cillors who had misled him, was at Allahabad, strongly 
insisted, and rightly insisted, that the reconquest of Oudh 
demanded the earliest consideration. Sir Colin gave 
way, and made immediately preparations for carrying 
into effect the determination of the Governor-General. 
Manoeuvring so as to induce in Rohilkhand the belief 
that he intended to invade that province, he directed 
Seaton to hold Fathgarh and the Duab, Walpole to 
make a demonstration against Rohilkhand, whilst, on 
the sandy plain between Unao and Banni in Oudh, he 
massed infantry, cavalry, engineers, artillery, commissariat 
waggons, and camp followers. By the 23d of February 
he had collected there seventeen battalions of infantry, 
fifteen of which were British ; twenty-eight squadrons of 
cavalry, including four English regiments ; fifty-four light 
and eighty heavy guns and mortars. There we must 
leave them waiting for the order to advance whilst we 
examine the events which had occurred in the interval in 
Eastern Bengal, in Eastern Bihar, and, finally, in the 
Banaras districts, and in Eastern Oudh. The operations 
in these latter served as adjuncts to the great movement 
Sir Colin was contemplating against Lakhnao. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

EASTERN BENGAL, EASTERN BIHAR, AZAMGARH, 
ALLAHABAD, AND EASTERN OUDH. 

When Sir Colin Campbell had started for Allahabad and 
Kanhpur to carry out, in the North-west Provinces, those 
great military measures which I have described in the 
three chapters immediately preceding, he was well aware 
that he had left behind him many districts smouldering 
with revolt, others in which rebellion was raising its head, 
and which would require sharp measures of repression. 
With these I propose now briefly to deal. 

In Eastern Bihar, presided over by a gentleman of 
marked energy of character, Mr George Yule, there had 
been, up to the time of the revolt of the native garrison of 
Danapur, no outbreak on the part of the two sipahi regi- 
ments located there — one, the 63d, at Barhampur, the other, 
the •32d, at Bansi. Some men of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, 
stationed at Rohni, had indeed made a dastardly attempt 
to murder their officers, but their commandant, Major 
Macdonald, had frustrated their attempt, and had displayed 
an energy and a promptness of action which had com- 
pletely dominated the restless spirits of the disaffected. 
Mr Yule, ever watchful, had, with the aid of a small party 
of Europeans, maintained order in his division. But when 
Western Bihar, sympathising with the revolted sipahis of 
Danapur, rose he deemed it wise to secure the important 
posts of Bhagalpur and Munger, posts necessary to assure 



34^ Eastern Bihar and CImtid Ndgpttr. 

the free navigation of the Ganges. These places secured, 
he could hear with comparative indifference of the rising 
of the 5th Irregulars, on the 14th of August, more especi- 
ally as the men of that regiment failed to induce either of 
the two native regiments in his division to join them. His 
position, however, was full of peril, for those regiments 
were not to be depended upon,i and he was exposed to 
the inroad of mutineers from Chutia Nagpur on the one 
side and from Eastern Bengal on the other. 

Chutia Nagpur, a mountainous district lying between 
Southern Bihar, Western Bengal, Orisa, and the Central 
Provinces, and inhabited by aboriginal tribes, possessed 
four principal military stations, Hazaribagh, Ranchi, 
Chaibasa, and Parulia. The troops stationed there were 
a detachment of the 8th N. I. and the local Ramgarh 
battalion, composed of horse, foot, and artillery. The 
Commissioner was Captain Dalton, a man of energy and 
ability. 

Regarding this district it is merely necessary to record 
that its difficulties commenced when the native troops of 
Danapur were allowed to rise in revolt. From that time 
to the very close of the rebellion it remained a festering 
sore in the heart of the country, the mutineers harassing 
the neighbouring district, and interrupting communica- 
tions along the grand trunk road. Major English of the 
53d, despatched by Sir Colin Campbell to deal with them, 
inflicted a^ great defeat on their main body at Chatra, on 
the 2d of October, and thus temporarily relieved the 
grand trunk road. When English was compelled to march 
north-westwards, Rattray, with his Sikhs, replaced him, 
and maintained in the most salient posts a rough kind 
of order. But the danger was not wholly averted until 

^ Two companies of the 32d mutinied a fortnight later, and all but 
captured Sir Colin Campbell as he was journeying up country. 



Eastern Bengal. 347 

the repression of Kunvvar Singh and his brothers, after 
the fall of Lakhnao, pacified Western Bihar. 

In Eastern Bengal there had been, first, manifestations, 
then outbreaks, quite sufficient to cause considerable alarm. 
On the 1 8th of November the sipahis stationed at Chit- 
ragaon, and which belonged to the regiment which had 
made itself conspicuous for its disloyalty at Barrackpur, 
the 34th N. L, mutinied, released the prisoners from the 
gaol, and quitted the station, carrying with them the con- 
tents of the treasury, and three elephants. They made 
for Hill Tiparah, avoiding British territory, hoping thus 
to reach their homes. Four days later the authorities at 
at Dhaka attempted to disarm the sipahis stationed there, 
numbering 350 men. The attempt failed, for the sipahis 
resisted, and although in the contest which followed they 
were beaten, yet, as at Danapur, the majority got off with 
their muskets, and started for Jalpaigiiri, where was located 
the headquarters of their regiment, the 73d. 

The Government of India had been alive to the im- 
portance of taking measures to provide against the con- 
sequences of an outbreak in Eastern Bengal. The natural 
run of successful revolters would, they knew, be for the 
important stations at Purnia, Dinajpur, and Rangpur. 
To avert the danger from these, which may be described 
as the gates of Bengal and Eastern Bihar, Mr Halliday 
had obtained the sanction of the Government of India 
to enlist bodies of sailors, then lying idle in Calcutta, to 
serve as garrisons in those and other places. The pre- 
caution was not taken an hour too soon. But it was 
taken in time, and by means of it, and of the gallant and 
loyal conduct of the Silhat Light Infantry, led by Byng — 
who was killed — and after him by Sherer, the rebels from 
Chitragaon were intercepted and destroyed. 

Those from Dhaka \\ere, in a certain sense, more 



34^ George Sherer and George Yule. 

fortunate. Baffled by Mr Halliday's precautions in their 
original intentions, they apparently resolved to make for 
Jalpaiguri, to effect there a junction with the main body 
of their regiment, the 73d. That regiment had been kept 
from outbreak by two circumstances ; the first, that they 
were located in an isolated station, cut off from their 
comrades, and they had but a dim perception of what was 
passing in the world beyond them ; and, secondly, by the 
splendid firmness of their commanding officer. Colonel 
George Sherer,^ who, on the first symptoms of mutiny had 
seized the ringleaders, brought them to a court-martial, 
and, in pursuance of the sentence recorded, had had them 
blown away from guns, despite the order of the cowed 
authorities in Calcutta that he should release them. The 
execution of those three rebels had saved many hundreds 
of lives, and had helped to maintain order. But not even 
the haughty bearing of Sherer would have kept his men 
to their allegiance had their mutinied comrades reached 
Jalpaiguri. It became, then, a great object to prevent 
them, and this task was entrusted to the capable hands of 
George Yule. 

With a company of the 5th Fusiliers, a few local levies, 
and the officers of the district at his disposal, Yule marched 
to meet and baffle the Dhaka mutineers. Joined by the 
Yeomanry Cavalr}^, to be presently referred to, he pre- 
vented them from entering Purnia, barred to them the 
road to Jalpaiguri, and, finally, compelled them to cross the 
frontier into Nipal. Thence, after suffering many hard- 
ships, they made their way into Oudh, only to fall there 
by the bullet and the sword. 

In Western Bihar, and in the districts belonging to 
the commissionership of Banaras, those of Juanpur, 
Azamgarh, and Gorakhpur, abutting on Eastern Oudh, 

1 Father of the Sherer referred to in the page preceding, 



Ktmwar Singh and Western Bihar. 349 

the danger had been more pronounced and more 
serious. 

The removal of Mr William Tayler from the adminis- 
tration of the affairs of Western Bihar had given a marked 
impetus to the rebellion. The feeble men who succeeded 
him, Mr Samuells and Mr Alonzo Money, were as 
shuttlecocks in the hands of Kunwar Singh and his 
partisans. The difficulties of the situation were, too, con- 
siderably aggravated by the action of the landowners of 
Azamgarh and Gorakhpur, and by the exposure of the 
districts of Chapra, Champaran, and Muzaffarpur, to the 
incursions of rebels from Oudh. The arrival of the 5th 
Irregulars, and, a little later, of the two mutinied companies 
of the 32d N. L, from Eastern Bihar, still further increased 
the difficulties of the situation. Vainly did Rattray, with 
his Sikhs, pressed by Alonzo Money, attempt to bar the 
way to the 5th. He was compelled to fall back on Gaya. 
The victors, but for the prompt action of Skipwith Tayler, 
the son of the far-seeing man whom personal spite had 
removed from the scene of his triumphs, would have 
massacred all the residents at that station. After that 
there was a slight change of fortune, and Rattray avenged 
his defeat, by the 5th, by annihilating a body of rebels at 
Akbarpur (October 7), and by compelling the retreat of 
the two companies of the 32d at Danchua (November 6). 

The Government of India had, in the meantime, 
accepted the offer of the able ruler of Nipal, Jang Bahadur, 
to despatch, to co-operate with their own troops in the 
Azamgarh districts and in Eastern Oudh, a division of 
Gurkhas, led by their own officers. The Government had ^ 
also raised a regiment of cavalry, styled the Yeomanry 
Cavalry, composed for the most part of European adven- 
turers, and commanded by Major J. F. Richardson, a very 

^ Vide page 213. 



350 Arrival of the Nipdl Troops. 

gallant officer of the regular army. They had, further, 
directed Brigadier Rowcroft to co-operate, with a force 
under his command, on the eastern frontier of Oudh, and 
they had ordered to him Richardson and his yeomanry 
corps, fresh from aiding Yule in his pursuit of the Dhaka 
mutineers. The Naval brigade of Captain Sotheby had 
likewise been directed to join Rowcroft. 

The Nipal troops, to the number of 3000, had entered 
the Gorakhpur division at the very end of July, had dis- 
armed the sipahis stationed at Gorakhpur on the ist of 
August, had occupied Azamgarh on the 13th, Juanpur on 
the 15th of the same month. Joined there by three 
officers deputed for that purpose by the British Govern- 
ment, by the lion-hearted Venables, and by the high- 
spirited Judge of Gorakhpur, William Wynyard, they had 
surprised and defeated the rebels at Manduri, and had 
followed up their victory by occupying Mubarakpur and 
Atraolia. They beat them again at Kudya on the 19th 
of October, and at Chanda on the 30th. Just after the 
last-named action they were joined by a small European 
force, composed of 320 men of the loth Foot, two guns, 
and 170 men of the 17th Madras N. I., the whole com- 
manded by Longden of the loth. Three days later the 
Oudh rebels again crossed the border, but again were they 
driven back. By this time the conclusion had forced 
itself on the Government that successfully to combat the 
rebellion in those mutinous districts more troops were 
required, and they arranged with Jang Bahadur for the 
co-operation of a further body of 9000 picked Gurkhas, 
to be commanded by Jang Bahadur in person, but to 
which a British officer, Colonel MacGregor, should be 
attached as Brigadier-General. They arranged, likewise, 
to increase Longden's force, and to place it under General 
Franks, C.B., an officer of tried merit. Whilst these two 



Rower of fs Force clears the Groimd, 351 

bodies, united, should clear the ground to the north of 
Banaras and to the east of Oudh, and then march on 
Lakhnao, to co-operate with Sir Colin Campbell in the 
operations against that city, which we have seen him con- 
templating, the force above referred to, under Rowcroft, 
should move from Tirhut along the Gandak towards Gor- 
akhpur, and remain in observation on the frontier. It 
is necessary first, whilst the others are assembling, to deal 
with Rowcroft's force. 

That force, composed of thirty men of the Royal 
Marines, 130 of the Sotheby's Naval brigade, 350 Nipal 
troops, fifty of the police battalion, and four twelve-pound 
howitzers, was, in December, at Mirwa, forty-nine miles 
from Chapra. Seven miles distant from him, at Sobanpur, 
was a force of 1200 regular sipahis, supported by 4000 
armed adventurers. These Rowcroft attacked on the 
26th, defeated, followed up to Mijauli, and drove across 
the Gandak. Thence, in obedience to orders, Rowcroft 
marched to Burhat-ghat, on the Gogra, to await there 
further instructions. On the approach of Jang Baha- 
dur with his army (December 23 to January 5) he was 
directed to ascend the Gogra, to co-operate with the Nipal 
leader, who had signalised his advance by defeating the 
rebels at Gorakhpur. Rowcroft reached Barari, in close 
vicinity to Jang Bahadur's camp, on the 19th January, 
and was joined by a brigade of Nipal troops the day 
following. The next day, to assure the passage of the 
river by the main body of the Gurkhas, he drove the 
rebels from Phulpur. Joined then by the Yeomanry 
Cavalry, he proceeded to enter upon the second part of 
his instructions, to keep open the communications whilst 
Jang Bahadur should march on Lakhnao. 

The task was no light one, for the surrounding dis- 
tricts were surging with revolters. Rowcroft and his 



35^ Lord Canning at Allahabad, 

comrades, however, displayed a skill and energy not to 
be surpassed in the carrying out of their duties. Captain 
Sotheby, on the i8th February, captured the strong fort 
of Chandipur. On the 28th Rowcroft defeated the rebels 
at Gorakhpur. The force then crossed the Oudh frontier 
and occupied Amorha. There it repulsed with great 
loss an attack made upon it by a greatly superior body 
of rebels. In this battle the Yeomanry Cavalry greatly 
distinguished themselves. There I must leave Rowcroft, 
waiting for reinforcements which had been promised, 
whilst I record the movements of the Governor-General, 
and the final clearing of the districts round Allahabad 
Fathpur, and Kanhpur, which preceded the advance of 
Sir Colin Campbell into Oudh. 

In the third week of January 1858 Lord Canning 
quitted Calcutta for Allahabad, to assume there the ad- 
ministration of the Central Provinces. Freed from the 
pernicious influence of his Calcutta councillors. Lord 
Canning displayed at Allahabad a vigour, a wisdom, 
and an energy in marked contrast to the narrow policy 
which had characterised his action when he had deferred 
to advice thrust upon him by the councillors he had in- 
herited from his predecessor. He reached Allahabad the 
9th of February, and at once made his presence felt. The 
districts to the west and south of that place and Kanhpur 
had been to a great extent cleared of the rebel bands 
which had infested them by the united efforts of Carthew, 
of Barker, and of Campbell. Early in March moveable 
patrols were appointed, under the direction of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Christie, still more completely to clear the district. 
By degrees the country to the west and north-west of 
Allahabad was quieted. But the districts to the east of 
it, the turbulent districts of Azamgarh and Ju^npur, re- 
mained a danger to Lord Canning for some time after he 



yang Bahddur mid F^^anks, 353 

had moved his headquarters to Allahdbad. How that 
danger was averted by the skill and gallantry of Lord 
Mark Kerr I shall tell in another chapter. 

I left Jang Bahadur crossing the Gogra, at Phulpur, on 
the 2 1st of February. He marched forward on the 25th, 
and pushing on, reached the vicinity of Lakhnao, ready 
to co-operate with Sir Colin Campbell, on the loth of 
March. There, for the present, I shall leave him. Franks's 
force, which, as I have stated, was an amplification of 
Longden's, had been organised by the end of December, 
After temporarily clearing the Azamgarh district, ii moved 
forward, hampered by the want of cavalry, on the 21st of 
January. At Sikandra Franks came in sight of a large 
rebel force. It was the day on which it had been arranged 
that his cavalry should join him, the 22d. He waited for 
them till the evening, when, to his delight, they came up, 
accompanied by four H. A. guns. There was no more 
hesitation. Early the next morning Franks attacked the 
rebels, and defeated them. Obliged then, in obedience to 
orders, to send back his cavalry to Allahabad, Franks 
moved to Singramao, and waiting there until the arrival 
of Rowcroft at Gorakhpur should enable Jang Bahadur 
to advance, set out the same day, the 19th of February, 
in the direction of Sultanpur. He reached Chanda the 
same day, and inflicted, in front of it, a severe defeat on 
the rebels. Occupying Chanda, he pushed on to Rampiira, 
halted there for two hours, then moving to Hamirpur, 
defeated another body of rebels, marching to the assist- 
ance of those disposed of at Chanda. Pushing on thence, 
he occupied the strong fortress of Budhayun in the face 
of the rebels, and completely defeated them in the hard- 
fought battle of Sultanpur^ (February 23). The Labor 

^ In this battle Macleod Innes of the Engineers gained the Victoria Cross 
by a deed of splendid daring. 



354 Franks reaches Lakhnao, 

Light Horse joined him that evening, and the Jdlandhar 
Cavalry the following morning. Franks pushed on rapidly 
after the battle. On the ist of March Aikman, who 
commanded the Jdlandhar Cavalry, heard of the pre- 
sence three miles off the road of a rebel chief who had 
long been 'wanted.' Aikman dashed after him, caught 
him, killed more than a hundred of his men, and drove the 
remainder into the Gumti, capturing two guns. It was 
the resolute courage of Aikman that did it all, and for 
his daring and persistence he was awarded the Victoria 
Cross. 

On the 4th Franks had reached Amethi, within eight 
miles of Lakhnao. Hence he proceeded to attack the 
fort of Daurara, two miles off the road. But, in striking 
contrast to his usual tactics, he made the attack in a 
slovenly manner, and was repulsed. It was unfortunate 
for him, for it was believed he was to have held the 
command in the storming of Lakhnao, which Sir Colin, 
after the repulse, conferred upon Outram. 

The assaulting army, numbering 20,000 men and 
180 guns, is now collected round the doomed city. In 
the next chapter I shall have to relate how Sir Colin 
Campbell employed it. 



CHAPTERXXIV. 

THE STORMING OF LAKHNAO. 

The army concentrated by Sir Colin Campbell before 
Lakhnao consisted of the troops which, as I have told 

of tt TT ■'" ''' P'""^ ^^'"^^" Un^o and Bann/,' 
of the N.pal troops, of Franks's division, and of the 

oZ" nlV"" *' ^'^"^'^'^'^ ""'^^ 'he command of 
Outram. _ Of the three first I have written in the three 
chapters immediately preceding. It remains now to sav 
a word regarding the last. ^ 

with'^hf ^f '"" ''''' °" *^ ^^"^ °f November, 

vth between three and four thousand' men of all arras 

twenty-five guns and howitzers, and ten mortars to 

rebeTof'thT""" ''""''^ ^'°""^ ^^"'■"^ ''^^ Lakhnao 

locate a 1 th '"""? 1 ^""'^'^ '^°°P^- "« ^id not 
locate all these m the Alambagh, but occupying that 

royal garden-a square of about 500 yards-w4 f suffi 

half a""";'K'^r^^'^ '""^ ^^"^■"^- -•" 'he open abot 
half^ „,,,e behmd ,t. He thus occupied a positfon across 

fehf "ir Z'- '°" •"'"-^ *^ '°^' °^ J^'^'^hdd with h 
nght. Where th.s position was not naturally covered by 
swamps he placed batteries, dug trenches, and planted 
abattis to protect it. ^ a"i.cu 

The rebels in Lakhnao had been so severely handled 
by S,r Cohn ,n his relief of the Residency that for some 

.0 ^rz:t:^:: ""°" ^°°°' ^"' -^ ">- ^'-' 50° ^.h be™ se„. 



356 Outram at the Alambdgh. 

time they made no attempt to disturb Oiitram. But as 
time passed the memory of the losses they then sustained 
faded, and on the 22d December they made a skilfully 
conceived attempt to sever Outram's communications with 
Banni. But the British general was well served by his 
spies, and catching the rebels whilst marching to execute 
their plan, he inflicted upon them a very severe defeat 

About a fortnight later Outram despatched to Kanhpnr 
a convoy of empty carts, guarded by 530 men and four 
guns. The rebels soon obtained information of this move- 
ment, and believing that the force resting on the Alambdgh 
had been severely crippled, they determined to make a 
supreme effort to destroy Outram. Accordingly, on the 
1 2th, they issued from Lakhnao to the number of 30,000. 
They massed this body opposite to the extreme left of 
Outram's position, then gradually extended it so as to 
face his front and left. To the front attack Outram 
opposed two brigades, the one consisting of 733 English 
troops, the other of 713, whilst he directed the ever-daring 
Olpherts to take four guns, and, supported by the men of 
the military train, to dash at the overlapping right of the 
rebels. Olpherts fell on them just as they were develop- 
ing their overlapping movement, and not only compelled 
them to renounce it, but to fall back in confusion. The 
two brigades operating against the centre were equally 
successful. They not only drove back the rebels, but foiled 
an insidious movement which their leader was planning 
against the right of the British position. By four o'clock 
the rebels were in full flight. Their losses were heavy. 

But the famous Maulavi, one of the chief authors of 
the rebellion, was in Lakhnao, and the Maulavi had sworn 
that he would capture the convoy despatched with empty 
carts to Kanhpur, but now returning with the carts laden. 
Accordingly, on the night of the 14th, he quitted Lakhnao 



OiUram at the Alanibdgh. 357 

with a considerable force, in very light marching order, 
turned the British camp, and occupied a position whence 
he could fall upon the convoy as it marched. Fortune 
seemed to favour him, for a violent dust-storm concealed 
his presence from the leader of the covering party, who, 
moreover, had no warning of his presence. But the care- 
ful watchfulness of Outram foiled him. Noting how the 
weather favoured an attack, he despatched Olpherts, with 
two guns and a detachment of infantry, supported by 
others troops, to aid in bringing in the convoy. Olpherts 
cleared the ground of the Maulavi and his troops, and the 
convoy reached the camp in safety. On the i6th another 
attack made by the rebels was repulsed with loss. From 
that date till the 15th of February they made no sign. 

Then, directed by the Maulavi, they made an attack 
in force, only to be repulsed. They followed it up by a 
second the following day, with a like result. On the 21st 
they made a third, and on the 25th a fourth and very 
serious one. In all they were completely beaten. The 
last defeat apparently convinced them that it was hopeless 
to attempt to dislodge Outram. 

Thus did that illustrious man, aided by his capable 
officers, by Berkeley, his chief of the staff, by Vincent 
Eyre, by Olpherts, by Maude, by Dodgson, by Macbean, 
by Moorsom, by Gould Wqston, by Chamier, by Hargood 
by Barrow, by Wale, and by that excellent officer of the 
Engineers, Nicholson, by Brasyer, and by many others, 
for the list is a long one, maintain, with a comparatively 
small force, the position assigned to him by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief. Towards the end of February his force 
had been increased, but it never equalled 5000 men. 
It was computed, on the other hand, that the rebels had 
at their disposal no fewer than 120,000 men. Of these 
27,550 were trained sipahis, and 7100 trained cavalry 



358 Description of Lakhnao. 

soldiers. Of the remainder, 5400 were new levies, 
5150 were Najibs, or men drilled and armed in the 
native fashion, 800 belonged to the camel corps they had 
organised, whilst the armed followers of the talukdars 
numbered 20,000. Such was the force which guarded the 
city the storming of which by Sir Colin Campbell I shall 
now briefly describe. 

The city of Lakhnao stretches, in an irregular form, on 
the right bank of the Giimti for a length from east to west 
of nearly five miles. The extreme width of it on the 
western side is a mile and a half. The eastern side 
diminishes to the width of rather less than a mile. Two 
bridges, one of iron, the other of masonry, span the Gumti, 
whilst a canal of deep and rugged section, enclosing the 
city on the east and south sides, bears away to the south- 
west, leaving the approach there open, but intersected by 
ravines. Towards the north-east, where the canal joins 
the Gumti, its banks are naturally shelving and easy. 

The strong positions held by the rebels within the city 
were the Kaisarbagh, a palace about 400 yards square, con- 
taining several ranges of buildings. It had been completed 
only in 1850, and was not originally fortified. The rebels, 
however, had greatly strengthened it. To the east of the 
Observatory, overlooking the river, were the Farhatbakhsh 
palace and the palaces adjoining, the Residency, the ruins 
of the Machchi Bhawan, the great Imambarah, the Jam- 
aniabagh, the Shesh Mahall, All Naki's house, extending 
to the west along the banks of the river, the Musabagh, 
a mile and a half beyond it, the little Imambarah, and 
a range of palaces stretching from the Kaisarbagh to the 
canal. Beyond the canal, on the east of the city, was the 
Martiniere. Overlooking this and the eastern suburbs, on 
the brow of a table-land, stood the Dilkusha. 

The rebels, profiting by their experience of the British 



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Sir Colin s Plan of Attack. 359 

action in the previous November, had greatly strengthened 
the Hne by which Sir CoHn had then advanced. They 
had, too, formed three h'nes of defence. The first rested on 
Hazratganj, at the point where the three roads into Lakh- 
nao converge. The right of the second line rested on the 
little Imambarah, thence, embracing the mess-house, it 
joined the river bank near the Moti Mahall. The third 
covered the Kaisarbagh. These defences were protected 
by a hundred guns. All the main streets were likewise 
protected by bastions and barricades, and every building 
of importance, besides being loopholed, had an outer work 
protecting the entrance to it. 

Whilst thus protecting the city on three sides, the rebels 
had neglected the northern side. Sir Colin detected this 
error, and resolved, in his plan of attack, to take full ad- 
vantage of it. 

Whilst, then, he determined to cross the Giimti with 
his main force, and to march by the Hazratganj on the 
Kaisarbagh, he would employ a strong division, under 
Outram, to turn those defences. He could not, with the 
force at his disposal, completely hem in the city, but he 
hoped that, as he pushed on the main body in the line in- 
dicated, Outram would be able to move round the angle 
on one side, whilst Jang Bahadur and the force at the 
Alambagh would close up round the corresponding angle 
on the other. 

Having resolved on this plan, he advanced, with his 
main body, on the Dilkusha park and captured it. Whilst 
he erected batteries there to keep down the rebels' fire, he 
continued to bring up his troops. By the 4th he had 
assembled there the whole of the siege-train, and had the 
bulk of his force, Franks's division and the Nipalese ex- 
cepted, thoroughly in hand. That force now occupied 
a line which touched on the right the Gumti, at the village 



o 



60 Oidrani s Turning Movement. 



of Bibiapur, then, Intersecting the Dilkusha, stopped at 
a point nearly two miles from Jalalabad. The interval 
was occupied by Hodson's Horse, 1600 strong. Outram 
still continued to occupy his former position. On the 5th 
Franks and the Nipalese arrived. 

During the night of the 4th Sir Colin had directed the 
throwing of two bridges over the Giimti near Bibiapur. 
One of these was completed by the morning of the 5th, 
and across it a picket had been sent to cover the comple- 
tion of the remaining works. These were finished by 
midnight on the 5th. Sir Colin then sent Outram and 
his division across the river. He was very anxious for 
the success of the movement he had consigned to that 
officer, for he had resolved not to stir a step until Outram, 
charged to turn the rebels' position and to take them in 
reverse, should have marched beyond, and thus have 
turned the first line of defence. 

Outram crossed and marched up the Gumti for about 
a mile. The river makes a sharp bend at that point ; so 
Outram left the sinuosities of the river, and marched 
straight on in the direction of the city. He encamped 
that evening about four miles from it, facing it, his left 
resting on the Faizabad road, about half a mile in advance 
of the village of Chinhat. 

The following day and the 8th were spent in skirmish- 
ing, but on the 9th Outram made his spring. Preluding 
it with a heavy fire from the batteries he had constructed, 
he sent Walpole to attack the rebels' left, whilst he led 
his own left column across the Kokrail stream. Waiting 
there till Walpole had completed the task allotted to him, 
he then stormed the Chakar Kothi, the key of the rebels' 
position, and thus turned and rendered useless to them 
the strong line of intrenchments they had thrown up on 
the right bank of the Giimti. In the attack on the 



Great Advantages obtained by It. 361 

Chakar Kothi, Anderson of the Sikhs and St George of 
the 1st FusiHers greatly distinguished themselves, whilst, 
in opening communications with Adrian Hope's brigade 
on the opposite bank, young Butler of the ist Fusiliers 
performed a deed of cool intrepidity which won for him 
the Victoria Cross. The result of the day's operations 
was that Outram occupied the left bank of the Gumti as 
far as the Badshahbagh. His position took the rebels 
completely in reverse. 

Sir Colin had waited the three days, the 6th, 7th, and 
8th, whilst Outram was making his preparations ; but, on 
the 9th, he too advanced, carried the Martiniere, and 
moved Adrian Hope's brigade from the vicinity of 
Banks's house to a point whence, some six hundred 
yards from the river, it could communicate, as thanks to 
the gallantry of Butler it did communicate, with Outram 
on the opposite bank. Sir Colin completed the opera- 
tion the next day by storming Banks's house. The two 
army corps were then in complete communication. 

During the night of the loth Outram erected batteries 
to cover his projected movement of the following day ; 
then, when that day dawned, he carried all the positions 
leading to the iron bridge — the bridge leading to the 
Residency — and established batteries close to it. In this 
operation he lost two most gallant officers, Thynne of the 
Rifle Brigade, and Moorsom of the Quartermaster- 
General's department. He continued to carry out the 
operations entrusted to him on the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 
15th. He established himself, that is to say, in a position 
which enabled him, during those days, to rake and attack, 
by artillery fire in flank and rear, the positions which Sir 
Colin was assailing in front. It is impossible to over- 
estimate the value of the assistance which Outram thus 
rendered to the main attack. 



362 Adrian Hope captures the Begimi KothL 

Meanwhile, Sir Colin, having stormed Banks's house 
on the loth, occupied without opposition the Sikandara- 
bagh on the nth, and, owing to the happy audacity of 
three engineer officers. Medley, Lang, and Carnegy, took 
possession, also without fighting, of the Kadam Rasul, and 
of that Shah Najaf which had almost foiled him during 
his advance in November. But the Begum Kothi promised 
to offer a fierce resistance. It belched forth fire and flame, 
and it was so strong as to seem capable of repelling a 
direct attack. Lugard, however, who commanded the 
force in front of it, resolved to attempt one. The troops 
he employed were those companions in glory, the 93d 
Highlanders and the 4th Panjab Rifles, led by that model 
of a soldier the chivalrous Adrian Hope. The assault, 
made at four o'clock in the afternoon, though opposed 
with a fury and discipline almost equal to that of the 
assailants, was successful. But, to use the language of 
Sir Colin, ' it was the sternest struggle which occurred 
during the siege.' Six hundred corpses testified to the 
unerring force of the British and Sikh bayonet. 

The capture of the Begum Kothi gave to the Chief 
Engineer, Brigadier Napier, the opportunity of pushing his 
approaches, by means of sappers and of heavy guns, through 
the enclosures, to the mess-house, the little Imambarah 
and to the Kaisarbagh. The 12th, then, was chiefly an en- 
gineers' day. Some changes, however, were made in the 
disposition of the troops ; Franks's division relieved that of 
Lugard as the leading division, and the Nipalese troops 
were brought into line. They were placed on the extreme 
left, so as to hold the line of the canal beyond Banks's 
house. The 13th w^as, likewise, an engineers' day. On 
that day the Nipalese were moved across the canal against 
the suburb to the left of Banks's house, so as to attract the 
attention of the rebels to that quarter. By the evening 



Storming of the Kaisarbdgh. 363 

the engineers' work was completed. All the great build- 
ings to the left, up to the little Imambarah, had been 
sapped through, and by nine o'clock the next morning the 
heavy guns had effected a breach in its walls. Franks was 
then directed to storm it. He carried out the operation 
with brilliant success. 

The storm of the little Imambarah had whetted the 
martial instincts of the men. Following up the rebels as 
they evacuated it, they forced their way into a palace which 
commanded three of the bastions of theKaisarbagh. Thence 
they brought to bear on the rebels below them so heavy a 
fire that one by one they deserted their guns. Their flight 
left the second Hne of defence virtually at the mercy of the 
British. It was turned. A daring advance alone was neces- 
sary to gain it. The rebels, recognising this, had no thought 
but to save themselves. They ran then for security into 
the buildings between the little Imambarah and the Kaisar- 
bagh. But the 90th and Brasyer's Sikhs, who were in the 
front line of stormers, had equally recognised the advant- 
ages of their position. Led by young Havelock and 
Brasyer, they forced their way, cheering, under a terrible 
fire, into a courtyard adjoining the Kaisarbagh, driving 
the rebels before them. At this conjuncture young 
Havelock, seeing with a soldier's eye the extent of the 
possibilities before him, ran back to the detachment of 
the loth in support and ordered it to the front. Annesley, 
who commanded it, led it forward with alacrity, nor did 
his men halt till, driving the rebels before them, they had 
penetrated to the Chini bazaar, to the rear of the Tara 
Kothi and the mess-house, thus turning the rebels' third 
line. The rebels, congregated in the Tara Kothi and 
mess-house, numbering about 6000, realising their position, 
evacuated those buildings, and made as though they 
would re-enter the city through an opening in the further 



364 Stonning of the Kaisarbdgh, 

gateway of the Chini bazaar, and thus cut off the Sikhs 
and the 90th. But Havelock, with great presence of 
mind, advanced with some Sikhs to the support of 
Brasyer, and seizing two adjoining bastions, turned the 
six guns found upon them with so much effect against 
the rebels that their attempt was checked, and they 
abandoned it. By this time the fourth note sent by 
young Havelock^ had reached Franks, and that gallant 
officer pushed forward every available man in support of 
the advance. The results already achieved far surpassed 
in importance those which had been contemplated for the 
day, and the question arose whether the advantage should 
be pursued. After a brief consultation Franks and Napier 
decided in favour of pushing on. Some necessary re- 
arrangement of troops followed. Then, whilst those on 
the right advanced and occupied in succession, with but 
little resistance, the Moti Mahall, the Chatar Manzil, and 
the Tara Kothi, Franks sent his men through the court 
of Saadat All's Mosque into the Kaisarbagh itself The 
resistance there was fierce, but of short duration. The 
stormers were wound to a pitch which made them irre- 
sistible. They stormed, one after another, the courts and 
the summer-houses which made up the interior of the palace, 
and drove the rebels headlong into the garden. There 
those who failed to escape — and they were the majority — 
soon found the rest from which there is no awakening. 

I will not attempt to describe the plundering which 
followed the capture of this newest of the palaces of the 
Kings of Oudh. Rather would I dwell on the great 
military result thereby obtained. In the morning of that 
14th of March the British line had stretched from the 
Shah Najaf to Hazratganj. That evening it ran from the 

1 The ' young Havelock ' alluded to in the text is the present Sir Henry 
Havelock-Allan, son of the general v.'ho first relieved the Residency. 



Sir Colin checks Outrams Mai^ch. 365 

Chatar Manzil to the Residency side of the Kaisarbagh. 
Two strong defensive Hnes of works, including the Citadel, 
on which the second line rested, defended by nearly 
40,000 men, had been stormed. All honour to the men 
who planned and carried out so magnificent a work : to 
Havelock and Brasyer, to Franks and Napier, to 
Annesley, to the men of the loth and 90th, and to the 
Sikhs. All honour, also, to those who gave their lives in 
the noble enterprise. 

The rebels would have been completely destroyed, 

and the whole of Lakhnao would have lain, helpless, 

the next morning at the feet of Sir Colin Campbell if, 

whilst Franks and Napier were storming the Kaisarbagh, 

Outram had crossed by the iron bridge and cut off those 

who escaped from the several places as they were stormed. 

That this did not happen was no fault of Outram. He 

recognised the advantage to be gained, and applied during 

the day for permission to execute such a manoeuvre. The 

reply was the most extraordinary ever received by a 

general in the field. It consisted of a short note from 

Mansfield, chief of the staff, telling him he might cross 

by the iron bridge, but that ' he was not to do so if he 

thought he would lose a single man.' Such a proviso was 

a prohibition, for not only were guns posted to defend the 

bridge, but the bridge was commanded by a mosque and 

several loopholed houses. The loss, then, would have 

greatly exceeded that of one man. That the proviso was 

dictated by a very shortsighted policy can be realised by 

the slightest reflection. The ultimate pursuit of the rebels 

who escaped because Outram did not cross caused an 

infinitely greater loss of men to the British army than the 

storming of the bridge and the taking of the rebels in 

rear would have occasioned. 

On the right bank of the Gumti Sir Colin devoted the 



366 Otttram carries all before Hi?n, 

15th to the consolidating of the position he had gained. 
On the left bank, sensible, too late, of the error he had 
allowed to be committed by the despatch to Outram 
of the absurd order on which I have commented, he 
despatched Hope Grant, with his cavalry, and Campbell, 
with his infantry brigade and 1500 cavalry, to pursue the 
rebels on the Sitapur and Sandila roads respectively. 
But the rebels had taken neither of these roads ; the 
pursuit, therefore, was fruitless. It was not till the 1 6th 
that Sir Colin directed Outram to cross the Gumti, near 
the Sikandarabagh, and to join him, with Douglas's 
brigade, at the Kaisarbagh, leaving Walpole, with Hors- 
ford's brigade, to watch the iron and stone bridges. 
Outram crossed as directed, was joined by the 20th and 
Brasyer's Sikhs, and was then ordered by Sir Colin in 
person to push on through the Residency, take the iron 
bridge in reverse, and then, advancing a mile further, 
storm the Machchi Bhawan and the great Imambarah. 
Outram carried both places without much opposition ; 
but before he had accomplished his task the rebels, with 
the design of retreating on Faizabad, had made a strong 
attack on Walpole's pickets. They had been unable to 
force these — probably they never seriously intended to 
do so — but they held them in check whilst the bulk of 
their comrades made good their retreat on to the Faizabad 
road. I need not point out how impossible retreat by that 
road would have been had Sir Colin permitted Outram to 
cross on the 14th. 

The rebels attempted the same day another diversion, 
by suddenly attacking the Alambagh, but Franklyn, who 
commanded, Vincent Eyre, with his heavy guns, Robertson, 
with the military train, and Olpherts completely foiled 
them. 

Whilst the operations I have described had been 



And captures the Miisdbdgh. 367 

carried out in the advance, Jang Bahadur and the Nipalese 
had, on the 14th and 15th, moved up the canal and taken 
in reverse the positions which, for three months, the 
rebels had occupied in front of the Alambagh. Jang 
Bahadur performed this task with ability and success. 
One after another the positions held by the rebels, 'from 
the Charbagh up to the Residency, on that side, fell into 
his hands. 

On the 17th Outram, pursuing his onward course, 
occupied without resistance the Huseni Mosque and the 
Daulat Khana. In the afternoon he caused to be occupied 
a block of buildings known as Sharif-ud-daula's house. 
The rebels evacuated it hastily, but an accidental ex- 
plosion, caused by the careless unpacking of gunpowder 
found there, caused the deaths of two officers and some 
thirty men. On the i8th he proceeded to clear the streets 
in front of the position he had secured, when he received 
Sir Colin's orders to drive the rebels from the Miisabagh. 
Whilst he should march against that place, Campbell of the 
Bays was to take 1500 cavalry, and a due proportion of 
guns, and be ready to pounce upon the rebels as Outram 
should drive them from the Musabagh. The Nipalese 
were likewise so placed as to cut off their retreat in the 
other direction. 

Outram, as usual, did his part thoroughly. He 
captured All Naki's house and the Musabagh. The rebels 
fled from the last-named place by the road which Camp- 
bell should have guarded. But Campbell was not to be 
seen. He had engaged a part of his force in a srnall 
operation which had given Hagart, Slade, Bankes, and 
Wilkin, all of the 7th Hussars, an opportunity of display- 
ing courage of no ordinary character, followed though their 
splendid deed was by the severely wounding of the second 
and the death of the third; but as to the main object of 



368 Lord Canning s Proclamation, 

his mission he did nothing. It was officially stated that 
he had lost his way.^ The rebels, consequently, escaped. 

Not all, however. Outram was there to repair to a 
certain extent Campbell's error. Noticing that the rebels 
were preparing to escape from the Musabagh, he had 
despatched to cut them off the 9th Lancers, followed 
by some infantry and field-artillery. These killed about 
100 of them, and captured all their guns. 

This was the concluding act of the storming of 
Lakhnao. The day following was issued Lord Canning's 
proclamation confiscating the entire proprietary right in 
the soil of Oudh, save in the case of six comparatively 
inferior chiefs. To rebel landowners who should at once 
surrender immunity from death and imprisonment was 
promised, provided that they could show that they were 
guiltless of unprovoked bloodshed. To those who had 
protected British fugitives special consideration was pro- 
mised. The principles embodied in the proclamation were 
just, and when the time came they were acted upon with 
such consideration as to secure the loyalty which had been 
alienated by the enforcement of the stern code which had 
immediately followed the annexation ; but at the moment 
the effect was to embitter the hearts of those against whom 
the proclamation was directed. 

It having been ascertained that the famous Maulavi 
was still in Lakhnao, and that from Shadatganj, in the 
heart of the city, he still bade defiance to the conqueror, 
Lugard was sent, on the 21st, with the 93d and 4th Panjab 
Rifles, to attack him. He and his followers were effec- 
tively dislodged, and were pursued by Campbell, this time 
on the spot. But the Maulavi escaped. Two days later 
Hope Grant, sent after the rebels who had fled by the 

^ Hope Grant {Incidents of the Sepoy War) is very, but not unjustly, severe 
on Campbell. 



What remained to be accomplished. 369 

Faizabad road, caught a considerable number of them at 
Kursi, cut up many, and captured thirteen guns. 

Lakhnao had fallen, but the province of which Lakhnao 
was the capital still remained to be subdued. How this 
was accomplished, how Rohilkhand was recovered, and 
how the rebels were driven from Azamgarh into Western 
Bihar, and there annihilated, I shall show in the next 
chapter. 



2 A 



CHAPTER XXV. 

AZAMGARH — RECONQUEST OF ROHILKHAND, OF OUDH, 
OF THE AZAMGARH AND WESTERN BIHAR DISTRICTS. 

Whilst Sir Colin Campbell was putting the last finishing 
stroke to his operations against Lakhnao there occurred an 
event in the Azamgarh district which taxed very severely 
the resources immediately available to Lord Canning. 
On the 27th of March an express informed the Governor- 
General that, on the 22d, Kunwar Singh, the famous 
chieftain of Western Bihar, had surprised the British force, 
under Colonel Milman, near Atraolia, twenty-five miles 
from Azamgarh, had forced it to fall back on the last- 
named place, and was there besieging it. It was too true. 
Milman, whose force consisted of 2o5 men of the 37th Foot 
and of 60 Madras Cavalry, had been caught napping ; 
had fallen back, first on Koilsa, then on Azamgarh ; had 
received there reinforcements in the shape of 46 men 
of the Madras Rifles (natives) and 280 men of his own 
regiment, the 37th Foot, under Colonel Dames, who, 
as senior officer, then assumed command. On the 27th 
Dames had attempted a sortie, and had been beaten 
back. 

The situation was a difficult one for Lord Canning, 
for Azamgarh was not very distant from Allahdbad, where 
he was, and if Kunwar Singh were to compel the surrender 
of the force behind the walls of Azamgarh the conflagra- 



Coolness and Courage of Lord Mark Kerr. 371 

tion might reach even Banaras. ReaHsing to the fullest 
extent the possibilities which Kunwar Singh might utilise, 
whilst Oudh still remained unsubdued, Lord Canning took 
prompt and efficient measures to nip the evil in the bud. 
There happened to be at Allahabad awing of the 13th 
L. L, commanded by a most gallant soldier, Lord Mark 
Kerr. Lord Canning sent for Lord Mark, explained to 
him the situation, and authorised him to take the measures 
he might consider necessary to deal with it That night 
Lord Mark started, with his wing, 391 strong, for Banaras, 
picked up there a troop — fifty-five men and two officers — 
of the Queen's Bays, seventeen gunners and one officer, 
with two six-pounder guns and two 5-|-inch mortars, and set 
out for Azamgarh the night of the 2d of April His entire 
force consisted of twenty-two officers and 444 men. On 
the evening of the 5th he had reached Sarsana, eight miles 
from Azamgarh. Kunwar Singh had notice of his arrival 
there, and prepared an ambush for hiai, to entrap him 
whilst he should be pushing on in the early grey of the 
next morning. Lord Mark did so push on, and became 
entangled in the ambush, but by a display of combined 
coolness and courage, very remarkable under the circum- 
stances, largely outnumbered as he was, not only extri- 
cated his men, but inflicted upon the rebels a crushing 
defeat, and relieved Azamgarh. It was one of the most 
brilliant achievements of the war. 

The Commander-in-Chief had received news of 
Milman's disaster on the 28th of March. Realising, as 
Lord Canning had realised, its full significance, he de- 
spatched at once General Lugard, with three English 
regiments, 700 Sikh sabres, and eighteen guns, to march, 
by way of Atraolia, to Azamgarh, there to deal with 
Kunwar Singh. To Lugard's operations I shall refer 
presently. Meanwhile, I propose to take up the story 



372 Movement of Hope Grant and Walpole^ 

of the measures decided upon for the pacification of 
Rohilkhand and of Oudh. 

For the reconquest of Oudh Sir CoHn detailed one 
army corps, under Hope Grant, to march to Ban', twenty- 
nine miles from Lakhnao, to expel thence the rebels col- 
lected there under the Maulavi, to march eastward thence 
to Muhammadabad, and, following the course of the Gogra, 
to reconnoitre Bitauli, thence to cover the return to their 
own country of the Nipal troops, under Jang Bahadur. 
Whilst Hope Grant should be moving in that direction, 
Walpole, with a moveable column, was to march up the 
Ganges, await near Fathgarh the arrival of Sir Colin, who 
would draw to himself as he advanced other columns 
converging to the same point. 

Hope Grant carried out his instructions to the letter. 
He defeated the Maulavi at Ban', found Bitauli evacuated, 
saw Jang Bahadur on his way to the frontier, and then 
returned to protect the road between Kanhpur and 
Lakhnao, seriously threatened at Unao. Walpole was 
less successful. Obstinate, self-willed, and an indifferent 
soldier, he led his column against the fort of Ruyia, two 
miles from the Ganges, and fifty-one west by north from 
Lakhnao, attacked it on its only unassailable face, and after 
losing several men, and the most gifted soldier in the 
British army, the accomplished Adrian Hope, allowed the 
defenders to escape from the face which he himself should 
have assailed. He moved on thence, expelled the rebels 
from Sirsa, and was joined on the Rohilkhand side of 
Fathgarh, on the 27th of April, by Sir Colin. 

Seaton, who had been left at Fathgarh, noticing that 
the rebels had collected in considerable force in front of 
him, had issued from that place on the 6th April, and had 
inflicted on them a crushing defeat at Kankar, between 
Aliganj and Bangaun. By this victory he secured the 



Of Seaton, of Penny, and of Coke. -^-jx 

gates of Dudb against an enemy issuing from either of 
the menaced provinces. Whilst he was keeping that door 
closed Penny, with another column, was moving down 
from Bulandshahr. Penny met Sir Colin at Fathgarh, on 
24tii April, then crossed the Ganges and marched on 
Usehat. Fmding that place deserted, and being told 
that his march to Buddun would not be opposed. Penny 
started on a night march for that place. But the rebels 
ay m ambush for him and surprised him, and although 
his column defeated them, he was slain. Colonel Jones 
of the Carabineers succeeded him, and under his orders 
the column marched to join Sir Colin at Mirdnpur Katra 
on the 3d of May. 

_ Whilst these columns, united under Sir Colin, should 
mvade Rohilkhand from its eastern side, it had been 
arranged that a brigade, under Colonel Coke, should enter 
.t from Rurkf. Coke had arrived at Rvirki the 22d of 
February, but so disorganised was the country that 
April was approaching before he could complete his 
commissariat arrangements. When he was ready Sir 
Co m made the command a divisional one, and sent 
Colonel John Jones to lead it. The change, however, did 
not affect the order of the proceedings, for the good under 
standing between Coke and his superior in rank remained 
perfect to the end. 

The division crossed the Ganges at Hardwdr on the 
17th of April, defeated the rebels at BhogniwdIA Cl7th) 
and at Naghi'nd (21st), and reached the vicinity of 
Muradabad on the 26th of April. Entering that place 
Coke was able to seize the persons of several notorious 
rebels, and then pushed on to take part in the operations 
which Sir Colm was directing against Bareli', 

. ^'''..^cu"J°/"^'^ °" *^ ^7th of April by Walpole, had 
entered Shahjahdnpur the 30th. He had hoped to find 



374 '^^'^' Colin Campbell in Rohilkand. 

there the Maulavi and Ndna Sahib, but both had fled he 
knew not whither. Leaving there a small detachment, 
under Colonel Hale, he moved then on Miranpur Katra, 
picked up there, as I have told, the brigade but recently 
commanded by Penny, and marched on Bareli. There 
Khan Bahadur Khan still tyrannised. It seemed as 
though he had resolved to strike a blow for the per- 
manence of his sway. 

It was seven o'clock on the morning of the 5th of May 
when Sir Colin led his troops to attack the rebel chieftain. 
In his first line he had the Highland brigade, composed 
of the 93d, 42d, and 79th, supported by that excellent 
Sikh regiment the 4th Panjab Rifles, and the Baluch 
battalion, with a heavy field-battery in the centre, and 
horse-artillery and cavalry on both flanks. The second 
line, composed of the 78th, seven companies of the 64th, 
and four of the 82d, and the 2d and 22d Panjab 
Infantry, protected the baggage and the siege-train. The 
enormous superiority of the rebels in cavalry required 
such a precaution. 

It was apparently the object of the rebels to entice 
the British to the position they had selected as the best 
for their purposes, for they abandoned their first line as 
Sir Colin advanced, and fell back on the old cantonment 
of Bareli, covering their movement with their cavalry and 
guns. Sir Colin, inclined to humour them, anxious only 
to bring them to action, crossed the Nattia rivulet, and 
was advancing beyond it, when the Ghazis, men who de- 
voted their lives for their religion, made a desperate on- 
slaught on a village which the 4th Panjabis had but just 
entered. With the ela7t of their rush they swept the sur- 
prised Sikhs out of the village, and then dashed against the 
42d, hastening to their support. Sir Colin happened to 
be on the spot. He had just time to call out, 'Stand firm, 



Sir Colin occitpies Bai^dli. 375 

42d ; bayonet them as they come on ! ' when the Ghazis 
were upon them. But vain was their rush against that wall 
of old soldiers ! They killed some indeed, but not a single 
man of the Ghazis survived. Some of them, however, 
had got round the 42d, and inflicted some damage. But 
they, too, met the fate of their comrades. The first line 
then advanced, and for about a mile and a half swept all 
before it. Just then the information reached Sir Colin 
that the rebel cavalry had attacked his baggage, but had 
been repulsed. He halted to enable the second line, with 
the baggage and heavy guns to close up, sending only the 
79th and 93d to seize the suburbs in their front. This 
attempt led to fresh fighting with the Ghazis, which, 
however, ended as had the previous attacks. In a very 
important particular the halt made by Sir Colin, desirable 
as it was in many respects, was unfortunate, as it enabled 
the rebel chief to withdraw, with his troops, from the 
town. It would even have been better had the attack been 
delayed for a single day ; for on the following morning, as 
Sir Colin entered the evacuated town on the one side, 
the division commanded by Jones and Coke entered it 
on the other. Khan Bahadar Khan eventually escaped 
into Nipal. 

Meanwhile, the Maulavi, who had evacuated Shah- 
jahanpur on the approach of Sir Colin, had no sooner 
learnt that the British general was approaching Bareli, 
than he turned back from Muhamdi, and resolved to 
surprise Hale at Shahjahanpur. It is more than probable 
that, had he marched without a halt, he would have suc- 
ceeded. But when within four miles of the place he stopped 
to rest his men. This halt gave to a loyal villager the 
opportunity to hasten to apprise Hale of his approach, and 
that officer had time to take measures to meet his enemy. 
Giving up the town, he fell back on the gaol. The Maulavf, 



^y6 General yones and the Manlavi, 

who had eight guns, followed him to that place, invested it 
and from the 3d to the morning of the nth of May kept 
up against it an all but incessant cannonade. 

Information of the position of Hale reached Sir Colin 
on the 7th. He at once despatched John Jones, with the 
60th Rifles, the 79th, a wing of the 82d, the 22d Panjab 
Infantry, two squadrons of the Carabineers, the Multani 
horse, and guns in proportion, to dispose, if he could, of 
the most persistent of all the rebels. Jones started on the 
8th, reached the vicinity of Shahjahanpur the nth, drove 
the rebel outposts before him, and effected a junction with 
Hale. But the Maulavi was too strong in cavalry to 
permit of his being attacked with any chance of success. 
Jones halted, then, until he should receive from Sir Colin 
troops of the arm of which he stood in need. The 
Maulavi, meanwhile, occupied the open plain, whither 
rebels who had been elsewhere baffled flocked to him 
from all sides. Matters continued so till the morning of 
the 15th, when the Maulavi, whose following had greatly 
increased, attacked Jones. The fight lasted all day with- 
out his having been able to make the smallest impression 
on the serried ranks of the British. Sir Colin, meanwhile, 
deeming the campaign at an end, had distributed his 
forces. He was himself on his way to Fathgarh, with a 
small body of troops, when he received Jones's message. 
Sending then for the remainder of the 9th Lancers, he 
turned his course towards Shahjahanpur, and effected a 
junction there with Jones on the 18th. 

Even then he was too weak in cavalry to force the 
rebels to a decisive battle. A skirmish, however, brought 
on a partial action near the village of Panhat. It resulted 
in the repulse of the rebels, and in nothing more. But 
the Maulavi, realising that he could make no impression 
on the British infantry, fell back into Oudh, to await there 



Death of the Maulavi. ;^JJ 

better fortune. Sir Colin then distributed the troops, 
and closed the summer campaign. He had reconquered 
Rohilkhand, but a great part of Oudh still remained 
defiant. 

A fortunate chance rid him, a few days later, of his 
most dangerous and persistent enemy. No sooner had 
the Maulavi realised that Sir Colin had put his troops 
in summer quarters than, with a small following, he at- 
tempted on the 5th of June to effect a forcible entrance 
into the town of Powain. The Raja, a supporter of the 
British, had refused him entry, and when the Maulavi, 
seated on his elephant, pressed forward to force the gate, 
the Rajas brother seized a gun and shot him dead. 
Thus ignominiously, by the hands of one of his own 
countrymen, terminated the life of one of the principal 
fomentors of the Mutiny, and its ablest and most per- 
sistent supporter. 

It will be recollected that when Sir Colin, after the 
capture of Lakhnao, distributed his forces for the pur- 
suit of the rebels, he despatched a strong column, 
under General Lugard, to Azamgarh to dispose there 
of Kunwar Singh. To the proceedings of that general 
and of his successors I must now ask the reader's 
attention. 

Lugard left Lakhnao on the 29th of March, and made 
straight for Juanpur. When approaching that place he 
learned that the rebels had collected a few miles off to the 
number of 3000. He reached Tigra on the afternoon of the 
nth of April, after a march of sixteen miles, attacked the 
rebels the same evening, and defeated them, with the loss 
of eighty killed, and two guns. The victors lost but one 
killed and six wounded ; but the killed man was the gallant 
Charles Havelock, nephew of the renowned General. Lu- 
gard then marched for Azamgarh, still invested by Kunwar 



^yS Luga^'d and Kitmvar Singh, 

Singh with 13,000 men. That wily chieftain was resolved 
not to stake the issue of the campaign on a single battle. 
Whilst ranging his troops, therefore, so as apparently to 
guard the Tons, he really left there a widely spread out 
screen, whilst with the main body he hastily retreated to- 
wards the Ganges. Lugard forced (April 15) the passage 
of the Tons, but the ' screen ' left by Kunwar Singh had 
made so resolute a defence that the main body had gained 
some twelve miles before they were overtaken. They 
were mostly old sipahis, and on this occasion they did 
credit to the training they had received. Forming up, on 
the approach of the British, like veterans, they repulsed, 
whilst still retreating, every attack, and finally forced the 
pursuers to cease their efforts. The latter had to mourn 
the death this day, from wounds received in the fight, of 
the illustrious Venables, the famous indigo planter, who, 
with his comrade Dunn, had almost single-handed held 
his district when it had been abandoned by those to whose 
care it had been committed. On this day Middleton of 
the 29th Foot greatly distinguished himself by the rescue 
from crowds of the rebels of young Hamilton of the 3d 
Sikhs, who lay seriously wounded, and who ultimately 
died of his wounds. 

Lugard, on entering Azamgarh, had found for the 
moment sufficient occupation cut out for him in the dis- 
trict. He therefore committed the pursuit of Kunwar 
Singh to Brigadier Douglas. But before Douglas could 
make much way the rebel chief had reached the village of 
Naghai, where, in a strong position, he awaited his pursuer. 
Douglas attacked him there on the 17th, but though he 
forced the position, it was only to find himself baffled. 
Kunwar Singh had defended it long enough to secure two 
lines of retreat to his troops. By these his divided army 
fell back, misleading the pursuers, and reuniting when the 



Kunwar Singh in Western Bihdi\ 379 

pursuit ceased. On the 20th, however, Douglas succeeded 
in catching the rebels whilst halted at Sikandarpur, almost, 
indeed, in surprising them. But again they disappeared 
by several paths, to reunite again at some fixed spot. Not 
only did they so reunite, but, succeeding in putting on a 
false scent the officer who had been charged to pounce 
upon them should they attempt to cross the Ganges, they 
actually crossed that river, and reached Jagdispur un- 
molested. There Kunwar Singh received a large addi- 
tion to his force. His first overt act was to completely 
defeat, with considerable loss, a party of troops led 
against him by Captain Le Grand of the 35th Foot (April 
23). Again did Western Bihar seem at the mercy of the 
rebels. Expresses were sent across the river urging 
Douglas to come to the rescue. Douglas at once crossed 
into Shahabad, but, before he could act, the veteran chief, 
who had been driven by his wrongs into rebellion, and 
who had more than repaid the British for the insults he 
deemed they had showered upon him, was no more. 
Kunwar Singh died three days after he had defeated 
Le Grand. 

From that date till the pacification at the close of the 
year the contest in Western Bihar assumed all the char- 
acter of a guerilla warfare. The rebels were surrounded, 
they were beaten, they were pursued, only again to re- 
appear. From the end of April to the end of November 
they kept the district in continuous turmoil. To the 
genius of the present Sir Henry Havelock-Allan, then 
Captain Havelock, it was due finally that they were ex- 
pelled. That officer devised a system of mounted infantry 
who should give them no rest. In three actions, fought 
on the 19th, 20th, and 21st of October, he killed 500 of 
them, and drove 4400 across the Kaimur hills. In those 
hills, on the 24th of November, Douglas surprised these, 



380 Pacification of Western Bihar. 

killed many of them, and took all their arms and ammu- 
nition. Before the close of the year he could boast 
that the districts he had been sent to pacify had been 
completely cleared. But it had taken a long time, and 
had cost many lives. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

WESTERN AND CENTRAL INDIA. 

Amongst the few matters on which the British had reason 
to congratulate themselves when the Mutiny broke out 
there stood out prominently the fact that the administra- 
tion of the Western Presidency was in the hands of a man so 
capable, so brave, so resolute, and so unselfish as was Lord 
Elphinstone. From the very hour the news of the rising 
of the loth of May, at Mirath, reached him he displayed 
a power equal to every emergency. He arranged to 
despatch to Calcutta the 64th and 78th regiments, then 
on their way from Persia ; he telegraphed to Mr Frere, 
Commissioner of Sind, to send the ist Bombay Fusiliers 
from Karachi to the Panjab ; he urged General Ash- 
burnham to proceed to Calcutta to place at the disposal 
of Lord Canning the troops proceeding to China ; he 
chartered steamers, he wrote for troops to Mauritius 
and to the Cape, he entrusted the care of Bombay to the 
wise supervision of Mr Forjett, and he formed a moveable 
column with the object of saving the line of the Narbada 
and of relieving Central India. 

In his own Presidency Lord Elphinstone had need for 
the exercise of the greatest prudence combined with the 
greatest decision. The nobles and landowners of the districts 
known as the Southern Maratha country, comprising the 
territories of Belgdon, Jamkhandi, Kolapur, Miraj, Mudhal, 
Dhdrwdr, Sangli, and Satdrah had been alienated by the 



382 The SoiUhern Mardthd Country, 

action of the Inam Commission — a commission instituted 
to search out titles to property obtained during the 
decadence of the Mughal Empire. In these districts 
Lord Elphinstone was represented by a very able member 
of the Civil Service, Mr George Berkeley Seton-Karr, 
a gentleman whose sympathies were greatly with the 
class who had suffered from the Imperial legislation, and 
whose influence over them enabled him to repress for a 
time their excited feelings. His task was a difficult one, 
for treason was stalking abroad, and the sipahis of the 
regiments in the Maratha country, mostly Oudh men, 
were displaying symptoms akin to those which had been 
so largely manifested in the Bengal Presidency. But, con- 
sidering the means at his disposal, he did wonders. In 
June he arrested an emissary from the rebels in the North- 
western Provinces. Having, in July, obtained from the 
Governor enlarged powers, he prevented an outbreak in 
Belgaon, and despatched from that station the two com- 
panies of the 29th N. I., whose presence there might have 
been fatal. Finding, then, that the conspiracy had its 
ramifications all over the province, he gradually disarmed 
the districts under his charge, and succeeded, amid a 
thousand difficulties, in maintaining law and order. But, 
even so late as April 1858, he recognised that the fire was 
still smouldering, and was forced to apply for increased 
powers. Instead of granting to the official who had con- 
ducted the affairs of a difficult province with marked 
success the powers he asked for, the Bombay Government, 
whilst maintaining him in his civil duties as administrator, 
relieved him of his political functions, and bestowed these 
upon a gentleman who had been a member of the detested 
Inam Commission, Mr Charles Manson. Almost immedi- 
ately followed the rebellion of the Chief of Nargund, the 
murder of Manson, the despatch to the districts of troops. 



Mr Forjett in Bombay. 383 

under Colonel George Malcolm and Brigadier Le-Grand 
Jacob, and finally the suppression of the rebellion in the 
August following. 

In Bombay itself the danger had been no slight one. 
Fortunately the arrangements for the maintenance of in- 
ternal order had been entrusted to the competent hands 
of Mr Charles Forjett, Superintendent of Police. That 
most able and energetic officer detected the conspiring of 
the sipahis stationed there ; brought it home to some of the 
sipahi officers, theretofore incredulous, that his suspicions 
had been well founded ; prevented by his daring courage, 
an outbreak when it was on the point of explosion, and 
literally saved the island. That this is no exaggerated 
statement is proved by the terms of address made to 
Mr Forjett by the native mercantile community of 
Bombay when, on his retirement, they presented him 
with a testimonial. ' They presented it,' they wrote, ' in 
token of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic 
powers and zealous energy had so quelled the explosive 
forces of native society that they seemed to have be- 
come permanently subdued.' Lord Elphinstone likewise 
recorded a minute expressive of his deep sense of the 
services rendered by this able, energetic, and honest 
servant of the Government. 

I have stated that among the earlier acts of Lord 
Elphinstone was the despatch in the direction of Central 
India, of a column composed of the troops then available. 
This column marched from Puna on the 8th of June, 
under the command of Major-General Woodburn, whose 
orders were to proceed to Mau. Woodburn reached 
Aurangabad the 23d of June, disarmed there a cavalry 
regiment of the Haidarabad contingent which had 
mutinied, but lost much precious time by halting to try 
the prisoners he had taken. Fortunately sickness com- 



384 Sir HitgJi Rose arrives at Indur. 

pelled him to resign his command. His successor, 
Colonel C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, a very capable 
officer, quitted Aurangabad the 12th of July, and reached 
Asirgarh the 22d. There Stuart was met by Colonel 
Durand, who had hurried westward to meet his column. 
From Asirgarh Stuart marched to Mau,and then proceeded 
to recover Gujri, to protect Mandlesar, to bombard and 
capture the fort of Dhar, to disperse the rebels who had 
advanced from Nimach, to crush rebellion in Malwa, and 
to re-enter Indur in triumph (14th December). On the 
17th Sir Hugh Rose arrived to take the command of 
the force which was to reconquer Central India. 

Sir Hugh Rose was eminently qualified for the task 
committed to him. He was a diplomat as well as a 
soldier ; and in Syria, at Constantinople, and in the 
Crimea he had displayed a firmness, an energy, a resolu- 
tion which marked him as a man who required only the 
opportunity to distinguish himself. He found himself 
now in command of two brigades. The first, composed 
of a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, a troop of the 
3d Bombay Cavalry (native), two cavalry regiments of 
the Haidarabad contingent, two companies of the 86th 
Foot — ^joined a little later by the remaining companies, — 
the 25th Bombay N. I., an infantry regiment of the 
Haidarabad contingent, three light field-batteries, and 
some sappers, was commanded by Brigadier Stuart. The 
second, consisting of the headquarters of the 14th Light 
Dragoons, the headquarters of the 3d Bombay Cavalry, a 
regiment of cavalry of the Haidarabad contingent, the 3d 
Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay N. L, an infantry 
regiment of the Haidarabad contingent, a proportion of 
field-artillery, and a siege-train, was commanded by Briga- 
dier Steuart of the 14th Light Dragoons. Troops from 
Bhopdl, to the number of 800, formed also part of the force. 



Conqiiering March of Sir Hugh Rose. 385 

Sir Hugh marched with the second brigade from Sihor, 
on the i6th of January, for Rahatgarh ; the first, which 
set out from Mau on the loth, marching in a parallel line 
to it in the direction of Gunah. Sir Hugh invested 
Rahatgarh on the 24th, took possession of the town on 
the 26th, defeated the rebel Raja of Banpur, who had 
advanced to relieve the fortress on the 27th, and found 
the place evacuated on the morning of the 28th. Having 
discovered, two days later, that the same rebel Rdja was 
posted, with his forces, near the village of Barodia, fifteen 
miles distant, he marched against and completely defeated 
him. He then pushed on Sagar, which had been held, 
isolated in the heart of a rebel country, mainly through 
the loyalty of the 31st Regiment N. I., faithful amid the 
faithless, for more than six months ; reached it on the 3d 
of February ; marched on the 9th, after pacifying the sur- 
rounding country, against the strong fortress of Garhakotd, 
twenty-five miles distant, compelled the rebels to evacuate 
it, pursued, and cut them up. Waiting there until he 
should hear that a column which, under the orders of 
Brigadier Whitlock, should have quitted Jabalpur, and 
gathering in meanwhile supplies for his campaign, he 
marched, on the 26th of February, for Jhansi. On his 
way he inflicted a very severe defeat on the rebels at 
Madanpur, despite a most determined resistance. This 
defeat so daunted them that they evacuated, without resist- 
ance, the formidable pass of Malthon, the forts ol Narhat, 
Surahi, Maraura, Banpur, and Tal-Bahat, and abandoned 
the line of the Bina and the Betwa, retaining only, on the 
left bank of the latter, the fortress of Chanderi. 

Meanwhile, Brigadier Stuart, with the first brigade, 
had, as we have seen, quitted Mau on the loth of January, 
and marched upon Gunah, the road to which had been 
cleared in a most gallant and effective manner by a de- 

2 B 



386 Stuart storms Chanddrl. 

tachment of the Haidarabad contingent, directed by- 
Captains Orr and Keatinge. The fort of Chanderi, men- 
tioned in the preceding paragraph, lies about seventy miles 
to the east of Gunah. The town and the fort have alike 
been famous since the time of Akbar. Against it Stuart 
marched from Gunah, and, on the 5th of March, reached 
Khukvvasa, six miles from it, that distance being repre- 
sented by a dense jungle. This jungle Stuart forced 
not without resistance — though a resistance neither so 
fierce nor so effective as the nature of the ground made 
possible — and encamped to the west of the fort. The 
next few days he spent in clearing the surrounding 
country and in placing his guns in position. On the 
13th his batteries opened fire, and on the i6th effected 
a breach in the defences. On that date the bulk of 
the 86th was still twenty-eight miles from him. Stuart 
sent to the commanding officer an express informing him 
of the situation. The express reached the 86th just as 
they had completed a march of thirteen miles. Neverthe- 
less they at once set out again, and, marching quickly, 
reached Stuart by ten o'clock on the 1 6th. Early the 
next morning Stuart stormed the fort of Chanderi, with 
the loss of twenty-nine men, two of whom were officers. 
He then pressed on to join Sir Hugh Rose before Jhansi. 
Sir Hugh had reached Chanchanpur, fourteen miles 
from Jhansi, when he received a despatch from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief directing him to march against the fort 
of Charkhari, some eighty miles from the spot where he 
stood. The Agent to the Governor-General, Sir Robert 
Hamilton, who accompanied Sir Hugh, received from 
Lord Canning a despatch couched in similar terms. To 
obey would be to commit an act of folly scarcely con- 
ceivable, for Jhansi was the objective point of the cam- 
paign — the seat of the rebellion — the stronghold of one of 



Sir Hugh Rose and yhdnsi. 387 

the authors of the Mutiny — and Jhansi was within fourteen 
miles. To leave the objective point, when so close to it, 
in order to attack a distant fortress against which it was 
probable Whitlock was then marching, would be an act 
so devoid of common sense that Sir Robert Hamilton 
courageously resolved to give Sir Hugh the means by 
which he could evade obedience to the order, positive 
though it was. He wrote, accordingly, to Lord Canning, 
stating that he had taken upon himself the entire respon- 
sibility of directing, as Governor-General's Agent, Sir 
Hugh Rose to proceed with his operations against Jhansi. 

Fortified by this order, Sir Hugh set out for and reached 
Jhansi on the 21st. The strength of the fortress struck 
him as remarkable. Standing on an elevated rock, built 
of massive masonry, with guns peeping from every eleva- 
tion, it commanded the country far and near. The city, 
from the centre of three sides of which the rock rises, the 
rock forming the fourth side, sheer and unassailable, was 
four and a half miles in circumference. It was surrounded 
by a massive wall, from six to eight feet thick, varying 
in height from eighteen to thirty feet, having numerous 
flanking bastions armed as batteries, and was garrisoned 
by 11,000 men, commanded by a woman who possessed 
all the instincts, all the courage, all the resolution of a 
warrior of the type so well known in consular Rome. 

Satisfied by a reconnaissance that it would be neces- 
sary to take the city before thinking of the fortress, Sir 
Hugh, joined the same night and on the 24th by his first 
brigade, invested it on the night of the 22d. For the 
seventeen days which followed the defensive works rained 
without intermission shot and shell on the besiemnsr force. 
It was evident that the Rani had infused some of her lofty 
spirit into her compatriots. Women and children were seen 
assisting in the repair of the havoc made in the defences 



388 Tdntid Topi marches to relieve yiidnsi. 

by the fire of the besiegers, and in carrying food and water 
to the soldiers on duty. It seemed a contest between the 
two races, under conditions unusually favourable to the 
besieged. 

By the 29th a breach in the outer wall had been 
effected, though it was barely practicable. On the even- 
ing of the 31st information reached wSir Hugh that an army 
was advancing from the north, led by Tantia Topi, to the 
relief of the fortress. 

Since his defeat by Sir Colin Campbell at Kanhpur, 
in the preceding December, Tantia Topi had fallen back 
on Kalpi, had issued thence some time in February, with 
900 followers, to besiege Charkhari, had captured it, and, 
his force increased by the junction of five or six regi- 
ments of the Gwaliar contingent and some local levies to 
22,000 men and twenty-eight guns, was now responding 
to a request sent him by the Rani of Jhansi to march to 
her relief 

The situation in which the advance of Tantia placed 
Sir Hugh Rose, critical as it was, was a situation with 
which that bold and resolute leader was peculiarly qualified 
to grapple. He met it with the hand of a master. Recog- 
nising that to interrupt the siege operations would give the 
rebels a confidence sufficient to impel them to resolutions 
more perilous to himself than any which boldness would 
be likely to cause, he resolved still to press the siege, 
whilst, with the troops not on actual duty, amounting to 
1500 men, of whom only one-third were Europeans, he 
would march to intercept Tantia Topi. This plan he car- 
ried out. At four o'clock the following morning (April i) 
Tantia advanced towards the point where the 1500 men of 
Sir Hugh's force lay ready for action. When the rebels 
came within striking distance Sir Hugh opened fire, then 
simultaneously attacking their right and left, doubled both 



Sir Hugh defeats Tdntid. 389 

up on the centre, and then sent his infantry to charge it 
These three blows, delivered with the most perfect pre- 
cision, so surprised the rebels that their first line broke 
and fled. There still remained the second line, covered by 
a belt of jungle, and led by Tantid in person. Recognising 
his danger, and anxious to save his second line and guns 
J. antia fired the jungle and retreated. The men with him 
were the men of the Gwdlidr contingent, and these, drilled 
m olden days by British officers, were true to the teaching 
they had received. So orderly and well-conducted was 
the.r retreat that they succeeded in carrying their g,ms 
and some of the fugitives of the first line across the Betwa. 
But the Bnt.sh cavalry and horse-artillery, splendidly 
ed were not to be baffled. Dashing at a gallop through 

nor d.d they cease until they had captured every one o 
his twenty-eight guns. ^ 

The garrison at Jhansi' was proportionately depressed 
by the fai ure of Tdntia Topi' to relieve them, a' d sfr 

Storm Ttt 'r '''^ ^'^^"'^^^^ °^ ^"^^'^ depression to 
storm at the earliest possible date. This was the second 

day after his victory over Tantid. At three o'clock in the 

morning of the 3d of April the stormers marched on the 

positions assigned to them. The left attack, divided into 

two CO umns, the right led by Colonel Lowth, the ri^h" 

by Major Stuart, both of the 86th, and having i^ its ranks 

Brockman, Darby, and Jerome of the same regiment sue 

ceeded, after a desperate fight, in storming the wal and 

seizing the positions assigned to them. The right attack 

the left column of which was led by Colonel LiddeTthe' 

left by Captain Robinson, both of the 2d European had 

tremendous difficulties to overcome. The rampart t^ 

had to escalade was very high, and their scaling ladders 

were too short. Thanks, however, to the splendid gallantry 



390 y hdnsi is stormed. 

of three officers of the engineers, Dick, Meiklejohn, and 
Bonus, and of Fox of the Madras Sappers, they succeeded 
in gaining a footing there. Just then Brockman, from the 
left attack, made a timely charge on the flank and rear of 
the defenders. Their persistence immediately diminished, 
and the right attack made good its hold. The stormers 
now marched on the palace, gained it after a stubborn 
resistance, and drove the rebels helter-skelter from the 
town. There they were set upon by the 24th Bombay 
N. I. and dispersed. But desultory fighting continued all 
night. The Rani took advantage of the darkness and dis- 
order to ride with a small following for Kalpi, where she 
arrived safely. Early the next morning Sir Hugh occupied 
Jhansi. Its capture had cost him 343 killed and wounded, 
of whom thirty-six were officers. The rebels' loss he put 
down roughly at 5000. 

Leaving a small but sufficient garrison in Jhansi, Sir 
Hugh marched on the 25th of April for Kalpi, a place 
whence throughout the Mutiny the rebels had sallied to 
harass and destroy. On the 5th of May he stormed Kunch, 
defeating the rebels in its vicinity, but, owing to the heat 
of the day, he could not prevent their seizing the Kalpi 
road and marching along it. He sent, however, his 
cavalry in pursuit, and these, gallantly led by Prettijohn 
of the 14th Light Dragoons, pursued the enemy for miles. 
Pushing on, he established himself at Gulauli, near Kalpi, 
on the 15th. 

Sir Hugh had been strengthened, on the 5th, by the 
addition of the 71st Highlanders, and at Gulauli he came 
in touch with Colonel G. V. Maxwell, commanding a 
column composed of the 88th, the Camel Corps, and some 
Sikhs, on the left bank of the Jamnah. The rebels, too, 
had been considerably strengthened, and their position at 
Kalpf being very formidable, intersected by labyrinths of 



Sir Hvgh defeats the Rebels at Kalpi, 39 1 

ravines, impossible for artillery and cavalry, their con- 
fidence had returned. The natural advantages of their 
position they had improved by throwing up intrenchments 
at all the salient points. 

Sir Hugh spent the five days following his arrival at 
Gulauli in establishing his batteries, in effecting a junction 
with Maxwell, and in constant skirmishes with the rebels. 
On the 2 1st his batteries opened fire, and on the 22d he 
delivered his attack. The battle that ensued was one of 
the fiercest and most hotly contested of that terrible war. 
At one phase of it the rebels, strongest on the decisive 
point, gained an actual advantage. The thin red line 
began to waver. The rebels, animated by a confidence 
they had never felt before, pressed on with loud yells, the 
British falling back towards the field-guns and the mortar 
battery. Then Brigadier C. S. Stuart, dismounting, 
placed himself by the guns, and bade the gunners defend 
them with their lives. Just at the moment, when the 
British were well-nigh exhausted, 150 men of the Camel 
Corps came up and turned the tide. At the moment the 
rebels had advanced within twenty yards of the battery 
and of the outpost tents, the latter full of men struck down 
by the sun. Another quarter of an hour and there would 
have been a massacre. But the timely arrival of the 
Camel Corps saved the day, converted defeat into victory, 
and enabled Sir Hugh Rose to close with glory the first 
part of his dashing Central Indian campaign. 

For the defeat he inflicted on the rebels was decisive. 
They dispersed in all directions, broken and dispirited. 
In five months Sir Hugh had, under many difficulties, 
traversed Central India, crossed deep rivers, stormed 
strong fortresses, defeated the rebels in the field, and 
re-established British authority in an important region 
of India. It was impossible to have done this better 



392 



W hillock and Kirwi. 



than Sir Hugh Rose did it. As a campaign his was 
faultless. 

Meanwhile, the column under Whitlock had moved, on 
the 17th of February, from Jabalpur towards Bundelkhand. 
The movements of this officer were as slow as those of Sir 
Hugh had been rapid. On the 19th of April, however, he 
appeared before Bandah, and defeated the troops which 
the Nuwdb of that place had collected. From Bandah he 
intended to march to Kalpi, every step in the road hav- 
ing been cleared for him by Sir Hugh. But on his way 
thither he received instructions to turn from his course 
and march against Kirwi, the Rao of which, an irre- 
sponsible minor, a ward of the British, was charged with 
having rebelled. The little Rao, who had no idea of 
rebellion, displayed his confidence in his overlord by 
riding out to Whitlock's camp to welcome him. Whitlock 
then occupied Kirwi without the semblance of opposition, 
and declared all the enormous treasures it contained to be 
spoils of the victors. In this contention he was supported 
by the Government of India, and the spoil was subse- 
quently divided. But to the ordinary reader the decision 
will always remain a puzzle. 

Sir Hugh Rose, after his five months' campaign, had 
the right to hope that he might be allowed some rest, and 
he had applied for leave on medical certificate, accompany- 
ing his application with the formal resignation of his 
command. But, on the ist of June, there occurred, dose 
to Gwaliar, an event which upset all his calculations. The 
news of it reached him on the 4th. It was to the effect 
that Tantia Topi and the Rani of Jhansi, re-collecting 
their scattered followers, had marched on Morar ; that 
Sindhia, marching to meet him at the head of 6000 
infantry, 1500 cavalry, and his own bodyguard, 600 
strong, had had the mortification to be deserted by his 



Sir Htigh marches to Gzvdlidr. 393 

troops, and had fled, without drawing rein, to Agra. Sir 
Hugh had previously despatched a party, under Colonel 
Robertson, on the track of the rebels he had defeated at 
Kalpi7 On the ist that officer had notified to him that 
Tantia and his followers had taken the road to Gwaliar. 
Sir Hugh had at once sent forward the remainder of 
Brigadier Stuart's brigade. On the 5th he started himself, 
with a small force, to overtake Stuart. 

Sir Hugh overtook Stuart at Indurki on the 12th, and, 
pushing on, reached Bahadurpur, five miles to the east of 
Morar, on the i6th. There he was joined by General 
Robert Napier and by a portion of the Haidarabad con- 
tingent. The following morning he attacked and com- 
pletely defeated the rebels posted at Morar. General 
Smith's brigade of the Rajputana field force, which had 
been ordered to proceed to Gwaliar, attacked them the 
following m.orning on the hilly ground between Kotah-ki- 
sarai and Gwaliar, and after a severe contest forced them 
to retreat. In this action the famous Rani of Jhansi was 
killed, fighting boldly to the last. The rebels, however, 
though beaten, were still numerous, and the position 
taken up by Smith for the night left him exposed to the 
attack of their united force. Sir Hugh then resolved to 
finish with them. Accordingly, leaving Napier, with one 
column, at Morar, Sir Hugh, on the i8th, opened com- 
munications with Smith, and cutting off the rebels from 
Gwaliar, sent, on the 19th, Stuart to attack their left, 
whilst Raines should amuse them on the right. The 
action which followed was completely successful. In it 

1 During this expedition Major Gall, of the 14th Light Dragoons, an 
officer whose leading had been conspicuous throughout the campaign, was 
despatched with Brockman and two companies of the 86th to seize the guns 
in the palace and fort of Jalaun, This service Major Gall performed with 
his usual skill and daring. 



394 Napier s Victory at yaurd-Alipur. 

Brockman of the 86th again greatly distinguished himself. 
One consequence of it was the capture of the city of 
Gwaliar the same evening. The fort still defied the 
victors ; but by an extraordinary act of daring on the 
part of two British officers, Rose and Waller, with a 
small following, this apparently impregnable place fell 
into their hands in the grey dawn of the 20th. 

When, on the 19th, Sir Hugh had recognised that 
his attack on the rebels was succeeding, he had sent a 
despatch to Napier to pursue and follow them up as far 
and as closely as was possible. Napier set out at nine 
o'clock on the morning of the 20th, and the following 
morning came up with the enemy, about 12,000 strong, 
posted at the village of Jaurd-Alipur. He at once attacked 
and defeated them, taking from them twenty-five guns 
and all their ammunition, tents, carts, and baggage. This 
victory was, for the time, their death-blow. Apparently 
it finished the campaign. 

His work accomplished by the restoration of Sindhia, 
Sir Hugh Rose resigned his command, and proceeded, 
covered with laurels, to Bombay, to assume there the 
office of Commander-in-Chief of that Presidency. He 
was replaced in command of the Central India force by 
Robert Napier. This officer was soon to find that the 
security which had seemingly followed the victory of 
Jaura-Alipur was but temporary. 

Tantia Topi, escaping from that field, had fled in a 
north-westerly direction. Finding, however, that his escape 
would be difficult, he had turned and made for Jaipur. 
There were ranged round the area in which he would be 
likely to move Napier's force at, and in the vicinity of, 
Gwaliar itself, a smaller force at Jhansi, another at Sipri, 
a fourth at Gunah, a fifth at Nasirabad, and a sixth at 
Bhartpur. There were other forces round the outer ring 



Pursttit of Tdntici Topi. 395 

of this girdle. It seemed, therefore, that the chances of 
escape for Tantia were small indeed. 

Yet so extraordinary was the vitality of this remark- 
able man that for more than nine months he kept all the 
troops I have mentioned, and many others, in a state of 
perpetual movement against him. On the 28th of June 
1858 he and his small following were baffled by Brigadier 
Roberts in his attempt to gain Jaipur. Two days later 
Holmes foiled him in an attempted raid on Tonk ; on the 
7th of August Roberts caught and defeated him near 
Sanganir. This action was a type of all the actions fought 
by Tantia. It was his wont to occupy a strong position 
covered by skirmishers. These skirmishers held the 
position long enough to ensure the retreat of the main 
body. On this occasion Tantia escaped ; fought Roberts 
again, on the 14th, on the Banas, and again escaped. As 
he fled towards the Chambal the pursuit was taken up by 
Parkes, who, however, was misled by false information. 
Tantia then moved on Jhalra-Patan, of which he took 
possession. Levying there a heavy contribution, he made 
as though he would march on Indur, but finding two 
British columns at Nalkerah, he moved on Rajgarh. 
Thence, on the approach of Michel, who had succeeded 
Roberts, he fled into the jungles, was followed, caught, 
and defeated by Michel, again fled, and for a moment dis- 
appeared from view. Napier, meanwhile, had had troubles 
of his own to contend with. Man Singh, Raja of Nar- 
war, had rebelled against Sindhia, and Napier had de- 
spatched Smith to coerce him. Smith not being strong 
enough, Napier had followed, had compelled the evacua- 
tion of Narwar, and had despatched Robertson in pursuit 
of the rebels. Robertson had caught and defeated a 
division of them, commanded by Ajit Singh, on the 
Parbati river (September 4), and had then returned to 



39^ Pursuit of Tdntid Topi. 

Gunah. Some of the fugitives succeeded in joining 
Tantia. 

That chief, after a rest of eight days at Sironj, to 
which place he had made his way through the jungles, 
had marched against Isagarh, taken thence the supplies 
he wanted, and had attempted the strong place of 
Chanderi. The Maratha chief who held the fortress 
for Sindhia was deaf alike to his promises and his threats, 
so Tantia made for Migrauli. There he was encountered 
by Michel, completely defeated, and lost his guns. 
Then he fled to join Rao Sahib, nephew of Nand Sahib, 
at Lalitpur. The two chiefs met only to separate. Then 
Rao Sahib was caught and beaten by Michel. The two 
chiefs met once again and resolved to cross the Narbada. 
They conducted this operation with great skill, and though 
Tantia's right wing was annihilated by Michel at Kurai, 
he escaped across the river, and caused an alarm which 
spread even to Bombay. There, pursued by a column 
under Sutherland, he crossed and recrossed the river, and 
was caught and attacked at Kargun, only to escape with 
the loss of the guns, with which he had been mysteriously 
re-supplied. He then took the bold step of marching on 
Barodah, arrived within fifty miles of it, when finding the 
pursuit too hot, he turned, recrossed the Narbada, and 
reached Chota Udaipur. There Parkes caught him and 
beat him. Tantia then fled to the Banswara jungles. 
There his position was desperate, for the cordon around 
him was complete. But, bold as he was able, he broke 
out to march on Udaipur. Finding Rocke with a force in 
the way, he returned to the jungles ; suddenly emerging 
thence, he baffled Rocke, and took his way toward Man- 
desar. Caught at Zirapur, he fled to Barod ; was pursued 
thither by Somerset there and beaten ; then, when his for- 
tunes were desperate, was met by the rebel chief Man 



Tdntid Topi is betrayed and hanged. 397 

Singh, and another famous rebel, Prince Firsuzhah, re- 
cently completely defeated by Napier Ranod. 

Man Singh did not stay with Tantia, and the case of 
the latter, completely surrounded, again seemed hopeless. 
Attempting to creep out in a north-westerly direction, 
he was surprised by Showers at Dewasa, and again 
(January 21) by Holmes at Sikar. The surprise was 
so complete that the rebel force broke up, and Tantia, 
'tired of running away,' took refuge with Man Singh in 
the Paron jungles. There an attempt was made by the 
British authorities to persuade Man Singh to make his sub- 
mission. Man Singh not only submitted, but was induced 
by hopes of personal advantage to betray the hiding-place 
of his old comrade. At midnight, on the 7th of April, 
Tantia was surprised there as he slept, taken into Sipri, 
brought to a court-martial, charged with having waged war 
against the British Government, condemned, and sentenced 
to be hanged. The sentence was carried out on the i8th 
of April. 

Tantia Topi was a marvellous guerilla warrior. In 
pursuit of him. Brigadier Parke had marched, consecu- 
tively, 240 miles in nine days ; Brigadier Somerset, 230 in 
nine days, and, again, seventy miles in forty-eight hours ; 
Colonel Holmes, through a sandy desert, fifty-four miles 
in little over twenty-four hours ; Brigadier Honner, 
145 miles in four days. Yet he slipped through them 
all — through enemies watching every issue of the jungles 
in which he lay concealed, only to fall at last through the 
treachery of a trusted friend. His capture, and the sur- 
render of Man Singh, finished the war in Central India. 
Thenceforth his name only survived. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

THE LAST EMBERS OF THE REVOLT. 

In Haidarabad, throughout the Mutiny, the loyalty of 
the Nizam and of his able minister, Salar Jung, had been 
the surest guarantees of peace. In the early days of July 
1857 the turbulence of the foreign troops in the service 
of the Nizam had caused an attack upon the Residency. 
But the able representative of British- authority in that 
territory, Major Cuthbert Davidson, warned by Salar Jung, 
had time to make preparations which terminated not only 
in the discomfiture of the rebels, but in the capture and 
punishment of the leaders. Of the necessity of disarming 
one of the cavalry regiments at Aurangabad I have spoken 
in its place. But the aberration of the mutineers was but 
temporary. The men returned to their duty, and rendered, 
with their comrades in the contingent of the three arms, 
excellent service to the State. A little later, the Raja of 
Shorapur, a Hindu tributary of the Nizam, broke out into 
treacherous revolt. But Major Davidson, acting in concert 
with Lord Elphinstone, called up from the Southern 
Maratha country the column serving under Colonel 
Malcolm, whilst the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, 
despatched to the spot a force under Major Hughes. The 
troops of the Haidarabad contingent, under Captain 
Wyndham, proceeded likewise to aid in the coercion of 
the deluded prince. The latter, after a vain attempt to 
lure Wyndham to his destruction, surrendered himself as 



Sam Browne in Rohilkhand. 398 

a prisoner. There can be little doubt but that his mind 
was affected, for he committed suicide when it was 
announced to him that, after four years of detention, he 
would be allowed to resume his position.^ 

Meanwhile, Sir Hope Grant, under orders from Sir 
Colin Campbell, had proceeded in carrying out his plan 
for the pacification of Oudh. I last quitted him near 
Lakhnao, on the i6th of May. From that date to the 
end of August he continued his operations, beating the 
rebels in every encounter, and finally halting at Siiltanpur. 
There he thought it wise to suspend operations till the 
close of the rainy season. He resumed them in the middle 
of October. 

Meanwhile, there had been some fighting in Rohil- 
khand. At Philibhit it became known that the rebels 
were concentrated in force at Nuriah. Thence they were 
dislodged by a force commanded by Captain Sam Browne, 
under circumstances of great gallantry, which gained for 
that officer the coveted cross. In the turbulent district of 
Azamgarh, too, the rebels had again raised their heads. 
They were, however, cleared from the district by a force 
under Brigadier Berkeley, who, pushing his success, re- 
covered Eastern Oudh as far as Sultanpur, where he 
touched Hope Grant's force. Rowcroft, meanwhile, with 
his own troops and the sailors of the Pearl brigade, had 
defeated the rebels at Amorha and Harha ; Eveleigh had 
punished them between Husenganj and Mohan ; Dawson 
had captured Sandela. The British forces rested during 
two months of the rainy season, but that period was 
employed by sending Sikhs in steamers up the Ganges 
to clear the banks of that river. 

In October operations were resumed. The rebels 

^ Oi this episode Colonel Meadows Taylor has written a most interesting 
account : Stoiy of My Life. 



zj oo The Pacification of Oudh. 

began by attacking Sandal a. They were held in check 
by Dawson until, first, Major Maynard, then Brigadier 
Barker, arrived and inflicted upon them a crushing defeat. 
In the same month Eveleigh defeated them at Mianganj, 
and Seaton near Shahjahanpur, whilst the Raja of Powain 
repulsed an attack made upon his fortified town. Sir 
Colin Campbell, now become Lord Clyde, then resolved 
to clear the entire province of rebels by acting by columns 
in all its districts simultaneously. Whilst one column, 
drawn from Rohilkhand, should clear the north-west of 
Oudh, and, sweeping all before it, should establish itself 
at Sitapur, four columns should clear the Baiswara 
country, another column should guard the Duab, another 
the Kanhpur road, whilst smaller columns, radiating from 
Lakhnao, Nuwabganj, Daryabad, and Faizabad should 
clear the districts around them. 

This plan was acted upon with complete success. On 
the 3d of November, Wetherall, marching to join Hope 
Grant, stormed Rampur Kasia. Hope Grant, joining him 
there, moved against Amethi on one side, whilst Lord 
Clyde attacked it on another. The place surrendered on 
the 8th. The strong fort of Shankarpur was evacuated by 
Beni Madhu, a noted rebel, on the night of the loth, and 
occupied the next day. Eveleigh, following Beni Madhu, 
caught him two days later at Dundia Khera, and defeated 
him, taking three of his guns. On the 24th that rebel 
was again encountered, this time by Lord Clyde, and 
completely defeated. In the meanwhile the strong places 
in Eastern Oudh had fallen in succession, and by the end 
of November that part of the province was completely 
subdued. Nor had the columns sweeping the north- 
western districts been less successful. Troup had cleared 
the ground as far as Sitapur ; Gordon, Carmichael, and 
Horsford had done the same in the districts south of the 



The Closivg Act of ike Di-ama. 40, 

Gogra, whilst Hope Grant, catching the rebels beaten by 
Rowcroft at Tuls.pur, had swept them into Nipal. The^ 
Lord Clyde moving on Sikr6ra, and in touch with Gran" 
on the one s.de and Rowcroft covering Gordkhpur on the 

t^^t:TiL rrr' '''"' ^^■^■'^ berore'hi. "rl^ 
Mrd and thfr' '.f'"' ''" country between Nan- 

the Ni oil ro . ^''' " '""■■^'''■"^ °" B^nk.', close to 
the Nipal frontier, surprised and defeated the rebels and 
swept the survivors into Nipil. Jang Bahddur loya to 
the core, informed the rebels who crossed that th y must 
not look to him for protection. He even permitted BrTtish 
troops to come over and disarm any considerable body of 
rebels who might have sought refuge there 

Lord Clyde, rightly regarding the pacification of Oudh 
as completed, quitted the province, leaving it to Hope 
Gran to carry out such operations as might be necessary 

mtt''Sor srer'crtrer itV"- ~^ 

fheT fi^ P" '"^^^^cre, Grant himself pursued 

the terrified remnant across the hills into Nipal dTs od' 
ment alone was necessary, for they had neithe afms "or" 
money, nor food. Contenting himself with locating t oops 
to prevent their return, Grant reported (May 8,9 Zl 
Oudh was at ast at oearp Tho„i ^ .>. 'oiW tnat 

pursued hv T n.H r '° *'"' ^^"erous policy 

pursued by Lord Canning, in confiscating that he mic^ht 

TuTJarTofV-?; ""^' '"''' ""'' ^^- -- -S 
a Duiwark of British supremacy. 

The pacification of Oudh was the closing act of the 
drama the curtain of which had been raised in [g,, 
n the interval Sir John Lawrence had, wiU ch rfc 
tenstic energy, put down an attempted rising in the Gu. 
haira district, turbulent even in the time of Akbar hf 
brother. George Lawrence, had dispersed Lfe^ ma 



402 Oudh — the Beginninoandthe End of the Revolt. 

contents in Rajputana ; the rebels had been crushed, 
though after a tedious and desultory warfare, in the Chutid 
Nagpur districts ; whilst Western Bihar had, as related, 
been pacified by the dispersion of the last adherents of the 
family of Kunwar Singh. When Sir Hope Grant finally 
cleared Oudh of the last remnants of the rebels,^ in May 
1859, then, and then only, could it be said that the Mutiny 
had been absolutely stamped out. 

^ It is believed that amongst these was Nana S^hib, It was always a 
matter of regret that this man's fate was never certainly known. Many 
reports regarding him were circulated afterwards : that he had died in Nipal ; 
later, that he had been seen in Gwdhdr. But the uncertainty regarding his 
fate has remained to this day. 



CHAPTER XXVII I. 

CONCLUSION. 

On the 27th of January 1858 the King of Dehlf had been 
brought to trial in the Privy Council chamber of his 
palace, charged with making war against the British 
Government, with abetting rebellion, with proclaiming 
himself as reigning sovereign of India, with causing, or 
bemg accessory to, the deaths of forty-nine people of 
British blood or British descent; and with having subse- 
quently abetted others in murdering Europeans and 
others. After a patient trial, extending over forty days 
the King was declared to be guilty of the main points of 
the charges, and sentenced to be transported for life. 
Ultimately he was sent to Pegu, where he ended his days 
in peace. 

Meanwhile, in England, it had been found necessary 
as usual, to find a scapegoat for the disasters which had 
fallen upon India. With a singular agreement of opinion 
the scapegoat was declared to be the Company which had 
won for England that splendid appanage. In consequence 
It was decreed to transfer the administration of India 
from the Company to the Crown. An Act carrying out 
this transfer was signed by the Queen on the 2d of 
August 1858. 

Her Majesty thought it right, as soon as possible 
after the transfer had been thus effected, to issue to her 
Indian subjects a proclamation declaratory of the principles 



404 The Qiieens Proclmnation. 

under which she intended thenceforth to administer their 
country. To the native princes of India she announced then, 
in that proclamation, that all treaties in force with them 
would be accepted and scrupulously maintained ; that she 
would respect their rights, their dignity, and their honour 
as her own ; that she would sanction no encroachments 
on the rights of any one of them ; that the same obliga- 
tions of duty which bound her to her other subjects 
would bird her also to them. To the natives of India 
generally Her Majesty promised not only complete 
toleration in matters of religion, but admission to office, 
without question of religion, to all such persons as might 
be qualified for the same by their education, ability, and 
integrity. The Queen declared, further, that she would 
direct that, in administering the law, due attention should 
be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of 
India ; that clemency should be extended to all offenders 
(in the matter of the Mutiny) save to those who had been 
or should be convicted of having taken part in the murder 
of British subjects ; that full consideration should be given 
to men who had thrown off their allegiance, or who had 
been moved to action by a too credulous acceptance of the 
false reports circulated by designing men ; that to all 
others who would submit before the ist of January 1859 
unconditional pardon should be granted. 

This proclamation virtually conceded the right the 
denial of which had so greatly unsettled the minds of 
native princes, the right of adoption. It was hailed every- 
where as a binding charter. In the large centres of India 
natives of every religion and creed, Hindus, Muham- 
madans, and Parsis, met in numbers to draw up loyal 
addresses expressive of theirdeep sense of the beneficent 
feelings which had prompted the proclamation, of their 
gratitude for its contents, and of their loyalty to the person 



T/ie Punishments inflicted during the MtUiny. 405 

of the illustrious lady to whose direct rule they had been 
transferred. 

Published on the ist of November 1858, this proclama- 
tion immediately followed the complete collapse of the 
Mutiny. Practically there remained only the capture of 
Tantia Topi and the expulsion of the remnant of the rebels 
from Oudh. How these ends were accomplished I have 
told in the two chapters immediately preceding. In both 
these cases the conclusion was foregone. It was but a ques- 
tion of a brief time. The rebels in Central India and in 
Oudh, as well as those i^w still remaining in Western Bihar 
and in Chutia Nagpur, represented the dying embers of a 
fire which had been extinguished. It now remains for 
me to sum up in a few words the moral of the Mutiny, 
the lessons which it taught us, and its warnings. 

But before I proceed to this summing up, I am 
anxious to say a word or two to disabuse the minds of 
those who may have been influenced by rumours current 
at the period as to the nature of the 'retaliation dealt out 
to the rebels by the British soldiers in the hour of their 
triumph. I have examined all those rumours — I have 
searched out the details attending the storming of Dehli, 
of Lakhnao, and of Jhansi — -and I can emphatically de- 
clare that, not only was the retaliation not excessive, it 
did not exceed the bounds necessary to ensure the safety 
of the conquerors. Unfortunately war is war. It is the 
meeting in contact of two bodies of men exasperated 
against each other, alike convinced that victory can only 
be gained by the destruction of the opponent. Under 
such circumstances it is impossible to give quarter. The 
granting of quarter would mean, as was proved over and 
over and over again, the placing in the hands of an enemy 
the power to take life treacherously. It was well under- 
stood, then, by both sides at the storming of the cities I 



4o6 The Pzcnishnient not excessive. 

have mentioned, that no quarter would be granted. It 
was a necessity of war. But beyond the deaths he in- 
flicted in fair fight, the British soldier perpetrated no un- 
necessary slaughter. He merited to' the full the character 
given to his predecessor in the Peninsular War by Sir 
William Napier. He proved by his conduct that, ' whilst 
no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount 
of honour was still full and fresh within him.' 

It has been said that, in certain cases, a new kind of 
death was invented for convicted rebels, and that the 
punishment of blowing away from guns was intended to 
deprive the victim of those rites, the want of which doomed 
him, according to his view, to eternal perdition. Again, I 
assert that there is absolutely no foundation for this 
statement. The punishment itself was no new one in 
India. It was authorised by courts-martial, the members 
of which were native officers. Its infliction did not neces- 
sarily deprive the victim of all hope of happiness in a 
future life. The fact, moreover, that the Government of 
India, jealously careful never to interfere with the religious 
beliefs of the natives, sanctioned it, is quite sufficient to 
dispel the notion I have mentioned. The blowing away 
of criminals from guns was a punishment which was re- 
sorted to only when it was necessary to strike a terror 
which should act as a deterrent. It was in this sense that 
Colonel Sherer had recourse to it at Jalpaigiiri ; ^ and it 
is indisputable that he thus saved thousands of lives, and, 
possibly, staved off a great catastrophe. 

Whilst on the question of punishments, I am desirous 
to disprove an assertion so often repeated that it has 
been accepted as true — that the term ' Clemency Canning ' 
was invented in Calcutta by the men who opposed the 
policy of the Government of India. The term ' Clemency 

^ Page 348. 



The Lessons of the MtUiny. 467 

Canning' had its origin in a phrase, 'the Clemency of 
Canning/ applied by the Times newspaper of October 17, 
1 857, to a circular issued by the Government of India, dated 
the 31st July of that year, and intended to restrain, pre- 
maturely, as the Times considered, the hands of its officers. 
The phrase was not intended to denounce clemency in the 
abstract, but the offer of clemency to men who believed 
they were triumphing, who had still possession of the 
North-west Provinces, and of Oudh. In that sense, and 
in no other, was it applied. The argument of those who, 
alike in India and in England, denounced the circular 
may be expressed in these words : ' Put down the Mutiny 
first, that you may exercise clemency afterwards.' 

I proceed now to deal with the two questions I have 
indicated in a preceding page — ^The lessons which the 
Mutiny has taught us, and its warnings. 

The gradual conquest of India by a company of 
merchants inhabiting a small island in the Atlantic has 
ever been regarded as one of the most marvellous achieve- 
ments of which history makes mention. The dream of 
Dupleix was realised by the very islanders who prevented 
its fulfilment by his countrymen. But great, marvellous 
even, as was that achievement, it sinks into insignificance 
when compared with the reconquest, with small means, of 
that magnificent empire in 1857-8. In 1857 the English 
garrison in India was surprised. There were not a dozen 
men in the country who, on the ist of May of that year, 
believed that a catastrophe was impending which would 
shake British rule to its foundations. The explosion 
which took place at Mirath ten days later was followed, 
within five weeks, by similar explosions all over the 
North-west Provinces and in Oudh, not only on the part 
of the sipahis, but likewise on the part of the people. The 
rebel sipahis were strong in the possession of many 



4o8 The Lessons of the Mutiny, 

fortified places, of a numerous artillery, of several arsenals 
and magazines. In trained soldiers they preponderated 
over the island garrison in the proportion of at least 
five to one. They inaugurated their revolt by successes 
which appealed to the imagination of an impulsive 
people. At Dehli, at Kanhpur, at Jhansi, in many parts 
of Oudh, and in the districts around Agra, they proved 
to them the possibility of expelling the foreign master. 
Then, too, the majority of the population in those dis- 
tricts, landowners and cultivators alike, displayed a marked 
sympathy with the revolted sipahis. For the English, 
in those first five weeks, the situation was bristling 
with danger. A false move might have temporarily 
lost India. In a strictly military sense they were too 
few in numbers, and too scattered, to attempt an offensive 
defence. It is to their glory that, disregarding the strictly 
scientific view, they did attempt it. The men who ad- 
ministered British India recognised at a glance that a 
merely passive defence would ruin them. They displayed, 
then, the truest forecast when they insisted that the re- 
sources still available in the North-west and in the Panjab 
should be employed in an offensive movement against 
Dehli. That offensive movement saved them. Though 
Dehli offered a resistance spreading over four months, yet 
the penning within her walls of the main army of the 
rebels gave to the surprised English the time necessary 
to improvise resources, to receive reinforcements, to 
straighten matters in other portions of the empire. 

The secret of the success of the British in the stupen- 
dous conflict Vv'hich was ushered in by the Mutiny at Mirath 
and the surprise of Dehli, lay in the fact that they never, 
even in the darkest hour, despaired. When the news of the 
massacre of Kanhpur reached Calcutta, early in July, and 
the chatterins: Bengalis, who would have fainted at the 



The ' Race ' the Main Factor ijt Sticcess. 409 

sight of a sword drawn in anger, were discussing which man 
amongst them was the fittest to be Chancellor of the 
Exchequer under the King of DehliV there was not an 
Englishman in that city who did not feel the most 
absolute confidence that the cruel deed would be avenged. 
There was not one cry of despair — not one voice to 
declare that the star of Great Britain was about to set. 
In the deepest distress there was confidence that the sons 
of Britain would triumph. The same spirit was apparent 
in every corner of India where dwelt an English man or 
an English woman. It lived in the camp before Dehli, 
it was strong in the Residency of Lakhnao, it prevailed 
in every isolated station where the few Europeans were 
in hourly dangers of attack from rebels who gave no 
quarter. Nowhere did one of them shrink from the 
seemingly unequal struggle. As occasion demanded, 
they held out, they persevered, they pressed forward, 
and, with enormous odds against them, they wore down 
their enemies, and they won. The spirit which had sus- 
tained Great Britain in her long contest against Napoleon 
was a living force in India in 1857-8, and produced 
similiar results. 

How did they accomplish the impossible ? The 
answer must spring at once to the lips of those who 
have witnessed the action of our countrymen in every 
part of the world. The energy and resolution which 
gave the Britain which Caesar had conquered to the 
Anglian race ; which almost immediately brought that 
Britain to a preponderant position in Europe ; which, on 
the discovery of a new world, sent forth its sons to 
conquer and to colonise ; which, in the course of a brief 
time, gained North America, the islands of the Pacific, 
and Australasia ; which, entering only as third on the 

^ I can personally testify to this fact. 



4 1 o The ' Race ' the Main Factor in Success. 

field, expelled its European rivals from India ; that 
energy and that resolution, far from giving evidence of 
deterioration in 1857, never appeared more conspicuously. 
It was a question of race. This race of ours has been 
gifted by Providence with the qualities of manliness, of 
endurance, of a resolution which never flags. It has 
been its destiny to conquer and to maintain. It never 
willingly lets go. Its presence in England is a justifica- 
tion of its action all over the world. Wherever it has 
conquered, it has planted principles of order, of justice, 
of good government. And the Providence which inspired 
the race to plant these great principles, endowed it with 
the qualities necessary to maintain them wherever they 
had been planted. Those principles stood them in good 
stead in 1857. It was the sense of the justice of England 
which, in the most terrible crisis of her history in India, 
brought her the support of the Sikhs, conquered but eight 
years before ; of the princes and people of Rajputana, 
rescued from oppression but twenty-nine years before ; of 
that Sindhia, whose great ancestor was England's deadliest 
enemy ; of the Nizam, our ally since the time of Clive ; of 
Maisur, restored by Marquess Wellesley to its ancient ruler; 
of Nipal, our nearest independent neighbour. But for 
the consequences of that sense of the justice of England, 
we might have been temporarily overwhelmed. Sup- 
ported by it, the race did the rest. It showed itself equal 
to difficulties which, I believe, no other created race would 
have successfully encountered. 

So much for the moral of the story. Mistakes doubt- 
less were made, especially in certain details at the outset 
of the rebellion. Some injustices were committed, mainly 
by the men who made the mistakes. But, taking it as a 
whole, there is no epoch in the history of Great Britain in 
which the men and women of these islands shone with 



The Warnings conveyed by the Mutiny. 4 1 1 

greater lustre than throughout this period of 1857-9. 
From the moment he quitted the pernicious air of 
Calcutta Lord Canning stood in the van, the far-seeing, 
courageous, resolute Englishman. Lords Elphinstone and 
Harris, at Bombay and Madras, were in all respects worthy 
of their chief. The three Lawrences in the Panjab, at 
Lakhnao, and in Rajputana, upheld the glory of that sister 
island irrevocably united to Great Britain. Scotland 
contributed Sir Colin Campbell, Sir Robert Napier, Adrian 
Hope, Lumsden, killed at the Sikandarabagh, Charles 
MacGregor, and hosts of kindred warriors. Frere in 
Sind, William Tayler at Patna, Wynyard at Gorakhpur, 
Spankie and Dunlop in the Mirath districts, showed what 
great things Englishmen, untrained to arms, left to their 
own resources, could accomplish. Their action prevailed 
all over India. There was scarcely one exception to it. 
To name every man and his achievements would require 
a volume exceeding in bulk the present record. 

So much, I repeat, for the moral of the Mutiny. One 
word now regarding its lessons and its warnings. The 
determining cause of the Mutiny of 1857 was the attempt 
to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people. This was 
especially the case in the North-western Provinces, where 
the introduction of the Thomasonian system unsettled the 
minds of noble and peasant. It was the case in Oudh, 
where the same system suddenly superseded the con- 
genial rule of the ex-King. Nowhere else in India was 
the rebellion more rampant and more persistent than in 
those provinces. Three hundred years previously the 
great Akbar had attempted to interfere with the village 
system, but, after a short experience, he had recoiled. He 
recognised in good time that custom is nowhere so strong 
as in India, and that interference with that system would 
uproot customs as dear as their lives to the children of the 



4 1 2 The Warnings conveyed by the Mutiny. 

soil. The English, rushing in where Akbar had feared to 
tread, met their reward in a general uprising. It is 
scarcely too much to assert that in the provinces I have 
mentioned the hand of almost every man was against us. 

More than thirty years have elapsed since the Mutiny 
was crushed, and again we witness a persistent attempt 
to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people. The 
demands made by the new-fangled congresses for the 
introduction into India of representative institutions is a 
demand coming from the noisy and unwarlike races which 
hope to profit by the general corruption which such a 
system would engender. To the manly races of India, to 
the forty millions of Muhammadans, to the Sikhs of the 
Panjab, to the warlike tribes on the frontier, to the Rohilas 
of Rohilkhand, to the Rajputs and Jats of Rajputana and 
Central India, such a system is utterly abhorrent. It 
is advocated by the adventurers and crochet-mongers 
of the two peoples. Started by the noisy Bengalis, a 
race which, under Muhammadan rule, was content to 
crouch and serve, it is encouraged by a class in this 
country, ignorant for the most part of the real people of 
India, whilst professing to be in their absolute confidence. 
The agitation would be worthy of contempt but for the 
element of danger which it contains. I would impress 
upon the rulers of India the necessity, whilst there is 
yet time, of profiting by the experience of the Mutiny. 
I would implore them to decline to yield to an agitation 
which is not countenanced by the real people of India. 
I entreat them to realise that the Western system of repre- 
sentation is hateful to the Eastern races which inhabit the 
continent of India ; that it is foreign to their traditions, 
their habits, their modes of thought. The people of India 
arc content with the system which Akbar founded, and on 
the principles of which the English have hitherto mainly 



■ The Warnings conveyed by the Mntiny. 413 

governed. Our Western institutions, not an absolute 
success in Europe, are based upon principles with which 
they have no sympathy. The millions of Hindustan 
desire a master who will carry out the principles of the 
Queen's proclamation of 1858. Sovereigns and nobles, 
merchants and traders, landlords and tenants prefer the 
tried, even-handed justice of their European overlord to a 
ustice which would te the outcome of popular elections. 
India is inhabited not by one race alone, but by many 
races. Those races are subdivided into many castes, 
completely separated from each other in the inner social 
life. If the higher castes are the more influential, the lower 
are the more numerous. The attempt to give representa- 
tion to mere numbers would then, before long, provoke re- 
ligious jealousies and antipathies which would inevitably 
find a solution in blood. A rising caused by such an 
innovation on prevailing customs would be infinitely more 
dangerous than the Mutiny of 1857. Concession to noisy 
agitation on the part of the ruling power would place the 
lives, the fortunes, the interests of the loyal classes of India 
at the mercy of the noisiest, most corrupt and most de- 
spised race in India. Against such concession — the inevit- 
able forerunner of another rising — and equally against 
fussy interference with the Hindu marriage-law — I, inti- 
mately associated on the most friendly terms, for thirty- 
five years, with the manlier races of India, make here, 
on their behalf, my earnest protest. 



THE END. 



INDEX. 



Agra, earlier events at, 105-11 ; events at, to 
the defeat at Sassiah, 246-53 : events at, to 
and including the surprise of Greathed, 314-18. 

AiKMAN, Lieutenant, secures the Salimgarh, 
308 ; gains the Victoria Cross, 354. 

Ali'garh, mutiny at, loo-i. 

AllahAbAd, sketch description of, 145 ; mutinj' 
at, 147-9 ! fort of, saved by Brasyer, 149 ; 
atrocities of the rebels at, 149-50 ; Neill re- 
stores order at and about, 185-7. 

Anderson, gallantry of Captain, and his 
comrades, 144, and note. 

Annesley, at the storming of the Kaisarbagh, 

363-4- 

Anson, General, Commander-in-Chief, con- 
firms a too lenient sentence for mutiny, 61 ; 
action of, towards the sipahis at Ambalah, 
112-14; hears of the mutiny, 115 ; prepara- 
tions made by. 1 16-19 ; marches from Am- 
balah 119 ; dies at Karnal, 120. 

Aoung, battle of, 192-3. 

Arah, story of the siege and relief of, 223-8. 

Ashe, Lieutenant, reaches Kanhpur, 160 ; 
gallantry of, 166-77. 

Augad, the spy, 208, 233. 

AzAMGARH, events at, 184, 350-2, 370-2. 

Azim-ullah-KhAn, proceeds to Europe as 
Nana Sahib's agent, 30 ; the instrument of 
the Nana for inveigling the English, 172-3. 



B. 



BADLf-Ki-SARAi, battle of, 124-6. 
Baird-Smith, first mention of, 121 ; influence 

of, in determining the storming of Dehli, 285, 

288, 290 ; presses upon the Commander the 

necessity of persevering, 305. 
Bakht KhAn, takes the Bareli brigade to 

Dehli, 268 ; advice of, to the King of Dehli, 

309- 

BanAras, short description of, 178 ; story of 
the events at, prior to the mutiny, 179 ; after 
the mutiny at Mirath, 180-1 ; story of the 
disarming of the 37th N. L at, 180-3 ; good 
conduct of the Raja of, 183. 

Bandah, action of the Nuwab of, 259. 

Bankes. Captain, gallantry of, at Lakhnao, 367. 

Banks, Major, succeeds to chief civil authority 
at Lakhnao, 205 ; death of, 208. 



Barnard, Sir Henry, succeeds General Anson 

in command of the Dehli force, 120 ; defeats 

the rebels at Badli-ki-sarai, 124-6; takes a 
position on the ridge, 126 ; death of, 285. 
Barrackpur, disarming of the sipahis at, 

155-6. 
Barrow, efficiency of the volunteers of, 190-2, 

195-6, 200. 
Battye, Quintin, death of, 126-7. 
Baugh, Lieutenant, is cut down by Manghal 

Pandi, 53-4. 
Beadon, Mr Cecil, Home Secretary, insults the 

European citizens of Calcutta and declines 

their offers, 94-6 ; the famous line of, 320. 
Beatson, Stuart, Havelock's assistant Ad- 
jutant-General, 188, 191 ; gallantry and 

death of, 200. 
Bengal Army, vide SipAhis. 
Bengal, Eastern, events in, 347-8. 
BerhAmpor, story of the mutiny of the 19th 

at, 37-42, 50. 
Bhopal, story of the Begum of, 263-4. 
BihAr, Western, events in, 215-29 ; suffers by 

the removal of Mr Tayler, 348-9 ; final 

campaign in, 378-80. 
Bingham, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 296. 
Blunt, Captain, readiness and gallantry of, at 

Lakhnao, 330. 
Bonus, Lieutenant, 390. 
Bourchier, Captain, joins Nicholson's force 

with his battery, 275 ; gallant conduct of, 

304 ; excellent book of, 315, note ; 316, note ; 

gallantry of, 317 ; at Lakhnao, 328-9 ; at 

Kanhpur, 341-2, 
Boyd, Captain, before Dehli, 296. 
Boyle, Vicars, splendid foresight of, justified, 

223-8. 
Brasyer, Captain, gallantry and ready- 

mindedness of, at Allahabad, 149 ; at the 

Alambagh, 357 ; at the storming of the 

Kaisarbagh, 362-5. 
Brind, Major James, 'a real hero of the siege,' 

292 ; captures the Jansi Masjid, 307 ; and 

the palace, 307-8. 
Brockman, Captain, 389-90, 393-4. 
Browne, Sam, gallant action of, at Nuriah, 399. 
Burgess, Corporal, gallantry of, 297-9. 
Burn, Colonel, appointed Governor of Dehli, 

310. 
Burroughs, Lieutenant, at the Sikandarabagh, 

331- 
BuTLKR, Lieutenant, gallantry of, 302-3. 



4t6 



Index. 



c. 

Calci'TTA, results of the King of Oudh's 
abode near, 35 ; account of disasters re- 
ceived at, 151-2 ; ' Panic Sunday' at, 154-6. 
Calvin, Mr John, character of 105 ; action of at 
Agra, 105-11 ; action of, 246-8 ; death of, 252. 
Campbell, Colonel, before TDehli, 296 ; action 

of, at the storming of Dehlf, 299, 300-3. 
Campbell, Colonel, of the Bays, defective 
action of, at Lakhnao, 367-8, and note ; im- 
proved action of, 368. 
Campbell, Sir Colin, arrives in Calcutta, 320; 
proceeds to Kanhpur, 321 ; immediate plans 
of, 322 ; marches into Oudh, and receives 
Kavanaeh. 327 ; relieves the Residenrv, and 
returns to Kanhpur. 327-37 ; retrieves Wind- 
ham's defeat at Kanhpur, 340-3 ; forces the 
Kali Nadi, 343-4 ; prepares to reconquer 
Oudh. 344 ; storms Lnkhnao, 359-69 ; sends 
Lueard against Kunwar Singh, 372 ; enters 
Rohilkhand, 373 ; drives the rebels from 
Bare'i, 374 ; marches to rescue Jones and 
Hale, 376-7 ; pacifies Oudh, 390. 
Canning, Lord, arrives in India, 21 ; coun- 
cillors hf found there, 22 ; finds Oudh his 
only difficulty, 24 ; supersedes Mr Jackson bv 
Sir Henry Lawrence, 24 ; makes all sipahi 
regiments liable to fore'gn service. 26; dis- 
bands the TQth N. L, 50; and the 34th N. L, 
58 ; is misled by his councillors as to the 
severity entailed by disbandment, 61 ; learns 
of the events at Mirath and Dehli, 89-90 ; 
takes the promptest measures possible, 90-1 ; 
the prospect immediately before him not re- 
assurinsT, 91-3 ; external policy of, splendid, 
93; internal policy, feeble, 04-6; difficulty 
of, to grasp the complete situation, 97 : sends 
for Sir Patrick Grant, 152; at last authorises 
raising of volunteers, 153 ; gags the press, 
153-4; li2S the Barrackpur brigade disarmed, 
155 ; hears of mutinies in all directions, 157 ; 
takes active measures, 158 ; raises a corps of 
yeomanry cavalry, 213 ; refuses to disarm 
the sipahis at Danapur, 214-20 ; insists on 
the reconouest of Oudh before touching 
Rohilkhand, 344; makes his presence felt at 
Allahabad, 352 ; sends Lord Mark Kerr 
against Kunwar Singh, 370-1 ; summary of 
conduct of, 405-7. 
Carthew, Brigadier, fights well at Kanhpur, 

337-9; clears the districts, 362. 
Carmichael, Sergeant, gallantry of, 297-9. 
Cattlfield, Major, gallantry of. 303 ; succeeds 
Gerrard in command of a Narniil column, 
320. 
Cavenagh, Major Orfeur, insight andprudence 
of, preface and 34 ; reports the action of the 
mutineers to Lord Canning, 36 ; probably 
saves Calcutta from an outbreak, 49. 
Chamberlain, Neville, joins camp before 
Dehli, 284 ; is wounded, 287-8 ; urges Wilson 
to persevere. 305. 
ChArbAgh bridge, glorious conduct of young 

Havelock and Jakes at the, 239-43. 
Chesney, Captain, before Dehli, 282. 
Chester, Colonel, killed before Dehli, 126. 
Chester. Mr, good conduct of, at Allahabad, 
146-7, 187. 



Chinhat, action of, 142-4. 

ChitragAon. mutiny at, 347. 

ChutiA NAgpuk, sketch of events in, 346-7. 

Clemency Canning, origin of nickname of, 
explained, 406. 

CoKK, Colonel, splendid service of, in Rohil- 
khand, 373. 

Conspirators, policy of the, 33 ; are taken 
aback by the premature outbreak at Mirath, 
88, and note. 

Cooper, Richard, splendid feat o*", 331. 

Cotton, Colonel, takes command from Great- 
hed and pursues the rebels, 317-18. 

CoL'KT. Mr M,, energetic and wise action of, 
at Allahabad, 146-7, 187. 



D. 

Dalhousie, the Marquess of, orders a sipahi 
regiment to Burma, and has to recall his 
order, 14; character of, 22; minute of, re- 
garding the sipahi army, 23-4 ; decision of, 
reearding Nana Sahib, 20 ; and the Rani of 
Jhansi. 32 ; comments of, on the action of 
Sir Patrick Grant, 21Q. 
Daly, Major H., at Dehli, 126, 284. 
DAn.^pur, position of, and fatal events at, 215- 

229. 
Daniell, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at Kanh- 
pur, 166. 
Darby, Captain, 389. 
Davidson, Major Cuthbert, prudent conduct 

of 398. 
De Kantzow, splendid conduct of, T02-3. 
Deacon, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Dehli. 297. 
Dehli, circumference of", and description of 
the palace of, 72-3 : storv of the negotiations 
of the King of, with Lords Dalhousie and 
Canning, 73-5 ; massacre of English officers 
attached to the King of, 76-7 ; in the canton- 
ments of, 78-9, 82-4 ; the blowing up of the 
mngazine of. 79-81: the King of. Is proclaimed 
lord of India, 85 ; effect of the seizure of, 
throughout India, 87 ; General Barnard takes 
position on the ridge of, 126 ; how, became 
the central and decisive point, 253-4 ! ^^ 
siege and storming of, 279-312 ; capture of 
the King of, 309 ; heroes of the siege of, 312 ; 
trial of the King of, 403. 
Delafosse, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at Kanh- 
pur, 166, 171 ; escape of, 174-7. 
DevnArAin, Singh, splendid conduct of, at 

Banaras, 180-3. 
DhAkA, the mutineers of, 347-8. 
Dick, Lieutenant, 390. 
DiLHi^Ri, Raja of, the case of the, 255-7. 
Disbandment, the fallacy of calling, a punish- 
ment exposed, 61, 89. 
DoDGSON, Major, the type of a brave and 
modest soldier, 180-2 ; brave conduct of, 

3-4-5- 
Douglas, Brigadier, pursuit of Kunwar .Singh 

bv, 377-8o- 
D'Oyley, ijallantry and death of, 249-51. 
Dumas, develops the resources of French 

India, 2. 
Dunbar, Captain, surprise and defeat of, 224. 
DuNLOP, Wallace, energy of, 266. |j 



Index. 



417 



Dunn," Mr, 'cast in the heroic type,' 184. 
DuPLEix, how, came to conceive the idea of 

establishing a French empire in India, 3-7. 
DuRAND, Colonel, action of, at Indur, 261-3.' 
DuRNSFORD, Colonel, before Dehli, 297. 



E. 



Early European settlers in India, i. 

Edwards, Mr R. M., successful efforts of, at 
Muzaffarnagar, 267. 

Elphinstone, Lord, foresight and prompt 
action of, 93, 381 ; despatches a column to 
Central India, 383 ; orders troops to Shorapur, 
398 ; summary of the conduct of, 405. 

Ewart, Major, at the Sikandarabagh , 331. 

Eyre, Vincent, splendid relief of rah by, 
225-9; action^of, on the way to and in Oudh, 
236 ; at the Alambagh, 357, 366. 



F. 



Farquhar, Lieutenant-Colonel, before Dehli, 
297. 

Fathpur, mutiny at, 189; battle of, 190-1^ 

Firuzpur, mutiny at, 99-100. 

Franks, Ijrigadier-General, action of, between 
Azamgarh and Lakhnao, 353-4 ; at the storm- 
ing of Lakhnao, 361-8. 

Eraser, Colonel, is invested temporarily with 
authoritj' at Agra, 252. 

FoRjETT, Mr, great services rendered by, 383. 

Fox, Lieutenant, 390. 



Gall, Major, splendid services of, 393, note. 

Gerrard, Colonel, defeats the rebels at Nar- 
nul, 319 ; is killed, 320. 

Glanville, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at 
Kanhpur, 166-77. 

GorAkhpur, events at, 184. 

Grant, Hope, draws to himself the guns of 
the rebels before Dehli, 304 ; takes command 
of Greathed's column, and marches into 
Oudh, 318 ; at Lakhnao, 328 ; retrieves 
Mansfield's error at Kanhpur, 343 ; at the 
storming of Lakhnao, 355-69 ; pursuit of the 
rebels by, 372 ; completes the pacification of 
Oudh, 399-402. 

Grant, Sir Patrick, arrives in Calcutta, 152 ; 
the presence of, there, useless, 156 ; conduct of, 
218 ; commented on by Lord Dalhousie, 219. 

Graves, Brigadier, 282. 

Greased cartridge, the, what it was, 19 ; the 
Maulavi resolves to use it as a means to 
his end, 19-33 ; contradictory action of the 
authorities regarding, 44-5- 

Greathed, Harvey, escape of, 69 ; counsels 
o*, 282. 

Greathed, Lieutenant-Colonel, before Dehli, 
296 ; fails to take the Burn bastion, 306 ; 
leads a column to Agra, 313-16; surprise of, 
316-18; is superseded by Hope Grant, 318; 
action of, at Kanhpur, 341-2. 

Greathed, Mr H., before Dehli, 282-3, 295-6. 



Green, Captain, before Dehli, 296. 
Greville, Captain, gallantry of, 302-3. 
Gubbins, Frederick, splendid conduct of, at 

Banaras, 178-83. 
Guides, corps of, arrive before Dehli, 126. 
Gurkhas, the 2d, join the Mirath force, 124 ; 

gallantry of, 293. 
GwAliAr, mutiny at, ni. 

H. 

Hagart, gallantry of, at Lakhnao, 367. 

HaidarAbAd, events in, 398. 

Hale, Colonel, is left at Saharanpur, 374 ; is 
all but surprised by the Maulavi, 375 ; is 
rescued, 376-7. 

Halliday, Mr, shameful treatment by, of Mr 
William Tayler, 229 ; obtains the sanction of 
the Government to the enrolment of sailors, 
347- 

Hamilton, Sir Robert, splendid ex-ercise of 
authority by, 386-7. 

Harris, Lord, furnishes troops for Shorapur, 
398 ; summary of the action of, 405. 

Havelock, Sir Henry, is ordered to Alla- 
habad, 158 ; reaches that place, 187 ; marches 
for Kanhpur, 188 ; defeats the rebels at Fath- 
pur, 190-1 ; and at Aoung, 192-3 ; and at 
Pandu Nadi, 193-4 ; and at Kanhpur, 196- 
200 ; position of, at Kanhpur, 201-2 ; crosses 
into Oudh, 209 ; beats the rebels at Unao, 
210 ; and at Bashiratganj, 210 ; returns to 
Kanhpur, 211 ; warns Neill, 211 ; recrosses 
and again returns, 211-12 ; relations of, and 
Outram, 235 ; reUef of the Residency by, 
237-45 j defence of the new posts by, 323 ; 
meets Sir Colin Campbell, 334-5 ; death of, 
336. 

Havelock, young, splendid conduct of, at 
Kdnhpur, 199 ; at the Charbagh bridge, 
240-2 ; at Lakhnao, 334-5, 363-8 ; splendid 
result of the brain working of, 379-80. 

Hawthorne, Bugler, gallantry of, 297-9. 

Hearsey, General, harangues the sipahis at 
Barrackpur, 46 ; reasons why he failed to 
impress them, 47 ; again harangues them, 52 ; 
and again fails, 53 ; action of, in the Manghal 
Pandi case, 55-7 ; disbands the 19th N. I., 
57 ; is reprimanded for promoting a loyal 
sipahi, 57 ; disarms the Barrackpur brigade, 
155-6. 

Heberuen, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at 
Kanhpur, 166-77. 

Herbert, Lieutenant-Colonel, before Dehli, 
296. 

Hewitt, General, brings the mutinous troopers 
at Mirath to a court-martial, and carries out 
the sentence of imprisonment, 63 ; dilatory 
conduct of, at Mirath, 68-71 ; subsequent 
conduct of, 121-2. 

Hillersden, Mr, negotiations of, with Nana 
Sahib, 131-2 ; is killed, 168. 

Hills, James, gallantry of, 286-7. 

Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, 282 ; captures 
the King of Dehli, 309 ; and shoots his sons, 
310. 

HoLKAR, position and action of, 260-2. 

Holmes, Colonel, pursuit of Tantia Topi by, 
397- 



2 D 



4i8 



Index. 



Home, before Dehli, 295-7 ; gallantry of, 299 ; 

death of, 313. 
Hoi'E, Adrian, at Lakhnao, 328 ; vigilance of, 

329 ; splendid action of, at the Shah Najaf, 

332-3 ; gallant leading of, at Kanhpur, 341-2 ; 

at the storming of Lakhnao, 361-8 ; the life 

of, sacrificed at Ruyia, 372. 
Hopkins, Captain, carries the mess-house, and 

hoists the Union Jack, 334. 
HovENDEN, before Dehli, 296. 
Hughes, Major, marches to Shorapur, 398. 



I. 



ItAwah, mutiny at, 103-4. 



J. 

Jacob, Colonel Le-Grand, pacifies the Southern 

RIaratha countrj^, 383. 
Jacob, Major, before Dehli, 296 ; gallantry and 

death of, 303. 
Jakes, Corporal, vide Charbagh bridge. 
Jang Bahadur agrees to assist the British 

Government, 349 ; leads troops into the field, 

350-2 ; to Lakhnao, 353-4 ; at the storming of 

Lakhnao, 365-8. 
Jenkins, Captain, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 

166-77. 
Jenkinson, Mr, renders good service at 

Banaras, 180. 
Jerome, Captain, 389. 
Jervis, Captain, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 

166-77. 
Jhansi, grievances and character of the Rani 

of) 32-3, 257-9 > siege of the town and fortress 

of, 387-9 ; storniing of, 389-90 ; successful 

march of the Rani of, against Sindhia, 392-3 ; 

death of the Rani of, 393. 
Jones, Brigadier William, before Dehli, 296 ; 

clears t.ie ramparts as far as the Kabul gate, 

298, atid note ; carries the Labor gate, 307 ; 

and Ajmir gate, 307. 
Jones, Lieutenant-Colonel John, before Dehli, 

297 ; in Rohiikhand, 373 ; is sent to relieve 

Hale, 376. 
JuANPUR, events at, 184. 



K. 

KaisarbAgh, the storming of the, 362-4. 

Kalpi, sanguinary battle at, 391. 

KAnhfur, position and garrison of, 128 ; events 
of the mutiny at, 160-77 '■> Havelock beats the 
rebels at, 196-200 ; massacre of the prisoners at, 
200-1 ; position ot Havelock at, 201-2 ; defeat 
of Windham at, 337-9 ; victory of Sir Colin 
Campbell at, 340-3. 

Kavanagh, Thomas Henry, daring achieve- 
ment of, 326-7. 

Kaye, Major, at the storming of Dehli, 292-4. 

Keene, Mr H. G., successful efforts of, at 
Dehra Dian, 267. 

Kennedy, splendid leading of, 319. 

Kerr, Lord JNIark, splendid achievement of, 

371- 
KhAki RisAlA, the, 266-7. 



Ki'rwi, the Rao of, position of, 260 ; is defrauded 
of his property, 392. 

KuNWAR Singh, assists the revolted sipahis of 
Danapur, 221 ; the fortress of, stormed by 
Eyre, 228 ; the removal of Mr Tayler makes 
the way easy for, 349 ; drives Milman before 
him, 371 ; entices Lord Mark Kerr into an 
ambush, but is deleated, 371 ; campaign of, 
in Azamgarh and Western Bihar, 377-9 ; dies 
379- 



Lakhnao, sketch description of, 135-6; only 
Residency of, held by the British, 204 ; (jiide 
Residency) storming of, 355-69. 

Lang, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 295-6. 

Laughnan, Andrew, plants the column flag 
on the summit of the Kabul gate, 298. 

Lawrence, Captain Richard, before Dehli, 
296 ; assumes command of the fourth column 
on Reid being wounded, 301 ; withdraws, 
301. 

Lawrence, George St Patrick, splendid ser- 
vice of, 265-6. 

Lawrence, Sir Henry, appointed Commis- 
sioner of Oudh, 24 ; arrives after the mischief 
has been done, 59 ; suppresses the mutiny 
of the 7th Irregulars, 60; holds a Darbar 
at Lakhnao, 134 ; is appointed Brigadier- 
General, 135; draws in his forces, 137; pur- 
sues the mutineers, 138 ; invites the pensioners 
to come to Lakhnao, 140 ; moves to attack 
the rebels at Chinhat, 141 ; is defeated, and 
holds only the Residency, 142-5 ; position of, 
at the Residency, 203 ; death of, 205. 

Lawrence, Sir John, arranges a cordial alli- 
ance with the Amir of Kabul, 26 ; urges 
General Anson to march on Dehli, 1 17-19 ; 
position of, in the Panjab, 269-71 ; feels he 
has been over-sanguine, 272 ; notions of, re- 
garding retention of Pashawar, 273-4 ; sends 
Nicholson to Dehli, 274. 

Lessons of the Mutiny, 408-10. 

LiDDELL, Colonel, 389. 

Lind, Mr, splendid conduct of, 180. 

Lloyd, General, the half-measure of, at 
Danapur, 219-21 ; despatches Dunbar after 
the sipahis, 222 ; panic of, 222-4. 

Lockhart, gallantry of Lieutenant, 293-4. 

LoNGDEN, Colonel, action ol", in the Azamgarh 
district, 350. 

LoNGFiELD, Lieutenant-Colonel, commands re- 
serve column of assault at Dehli, 296; action 

of, 305- 
LowTH, Colonel, 389. 
LuGARD, General, at the storming of Lakhnao, 

362 ; is sent against Kunwar Singh, 371 ; 

pursuit of Kunwar Singh by, 377-8. 
LuMSDEN, John, at the bikandarabagh, 331. 



M. 



Mackillop, Mr, splendid conduct of, at 

Kanhpur, 166, 168. 
Mainpuri, mutiny at, 102-3. 
MalAun, mutiny at, 139. 



Index. 



419 



Malcolm, Colonel, aids In pacifying the 
Southern Maratha country, 383 ; proceeds to 
Shorapur, 398. 

Manghal Panui, the case of, 53-8. 

Mansfield, General, inaction of, at Kanhpur, 

342-3- 

Manson, Mr, murder of, 382. 

MakAthA country, effect of the Inam Com- 
mission on the people of the southern, 17 ; 
occurrences In the, 381-3. 

Maude uses his guns splendidly, 190, 193-4, 
237. 235-41, 357. 

Maulavi, the, account of, 17 ; conspiracy of, 
18-19 ; at Lakhnao, 356-8, 368-9 ; strategic 
movement of, 375 ; its consequences, 376 ; 
death of, 377. 

Maunsell, Lieutenant, at Dehli, 282-96. 

Maxwell, Colonel G. V., joins Sir Hugh 
Rose and Lights at Kalpi, 390-1. 

McIntyre, Major, at the ..lambagh, 323-27. 

Medley, Captain, at Dehli, 294-6. 

Meiklejohn, Lieutenant, 390. 

Michel, General, pursuit of Tantia Topi by, 

395-6- 

MiDDLETON, Captain, at Lakhnao, 328-32. 

Milman, Colonel, retreats before Kunwar 
Singh, 370. 

MiRATH, discontent at, 62 ; story of the tra- 
gedy of the loth and nth May at, 63-71 ; 
the authorities at, take time to recover from 
their panic, 121 ; Influence brought to bear 
on the authorities at, 122 ; late occurrences 
at, 266. 

MoNCRiEFF, the chaplain, devotion of, at 
Kanhpur, 166. 

]\IoNEY, Alonzo, theatrical display of, 229; 
futile action of, 349.' 

Montgomery, Robert, disarms the sipahis at 
Mian Mir, 271-2. 

Moore, Captain, daring and devotion of, at 
Kanhpur, 166-77. 

Moore, Mrs, noble conduct of, 166-7. 

MooRSOM, Captain, death of, 361. 

Mutiny, lessons of the, 408-10 ; warnings of 
the, 410. 



N. 



NAnA SAhib, grievances of, 27-30 ; Intrigues 
of, at Lakhnao, 31 ; negotiations of, with Mr 
Hlllersden, at Kanhpur, 131-2 ; persuades 
the rebel sipahis to attack Wheeler at Kanh- 
pur, 162-3 > assumes the dignities of a sove- 
reign prince, 164 ; vents his fury on batches 
'of English captives, 169 ; urges his generals 
to renewed exertions, 170 ; sends a message 
to the garrison, 172 ; promises safety to those 
who will agree to his terms, 173 ; foul 
treachery of, 173-7 ; beaten at Kanhpur, 
195-9 ; massacres the prisoners, 200 ; disap- 
pearance of, 402, note. 

NAogAng, events at, 259-60. 

Napier, Robert, at the first relief of the Resi- 
dency, 244 ; at the storming of Lakhnao, 
361-8 ; joins Sir Hugh Rose, 393 ; defeats 
Tantia Topi, 394 ; further action of, in Central 
India, 394-7. 

NasirAbAd, mutiny at, 265. 



Neill, General, Is despatched to Banaras, 
158, 178 ; decides the action at that place, 
181 ; takes command, 183 ; pushes on to 
Allahabad, 184 ; restores order there, 185-6 ; 
despatches Renaud towards Kanhpur, 187 ; 
is superseded by Havelock, 187-8; joins 
Havelock, 209 ; writes an intemperate letter 
to Havelock, 211 ; at the Charbagh bridge, 
240-2 ; is shot dead, 243. 

Nicholson, John, appointed to command a 
force to march to Dehli, 274 ; action of, in 
the Panjab, 274-6 ; reaches i)ehli, 277 ; beats 
the rebels at Najafgarh, 289 ; commands first 
column of assault, 296 ; gives the order to 
advance, 297 ; wins the breach, 298 ; pushes 
for the I^ahor gate, 301 ; Is mortally wounded, 
303 ; death of, 310 ; author's estimate of, 310, 
and note. 

Nicholson, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 296. 

NiMACH, action at, 264. 

NipAl troops, action of the, 350-2. 

North-west Provinces, effect of the Intro- 
duction of Mr Thomason's land system on the 
population of the, 16, 31 ; events in the, 105- 
II, 246-53, 266-9. 

O. 

Olpherts, William, ready presence of mind 
of, 182, and note ; in Oudh, 238, 356-7, 366. 

Osborne, Willoughby, good service rendered 
by, 259. 

Oudh, effect of the annexation of, on the 
sipahis, 15-16 ; on the population of, 16 ; the 
King of, confined to Fort William, 156 ; 
events In, 59-60, 134-45, 203-8, 231-5, 237-45, 
323-36. 

OuTRAM, Sir James, commands in the war 
with Persia, 26 ; Is sent to command in 
Kanhpur, 230 ; declines to deprive Havelock 
of the honours he deserved, 235-6 ; accom- 
panies Havelock in command of the cavalry, 
237-45 ; resumes command, 244 ; wise con- 
clusion of, 245 ; defence of the Residency by, 
323-6 ; sends Kavanagh to communicate with 
Sir Colin, 326 ; meets Sir Colin, 334-5 ; at 
the Alambagh, 355-7 ; action of, at the 
storming of Lakhnao, 359-68. 

OuvRY, readiness and gallantry of, 317. 



PAndu Nadi, battle of, 193-4. 

Parke, Brigadier, pursuit of Tantia Topi by, 

396-7- 
PatnA, position of, and story of events in the 

division of which was the capital, 215-29. • 
Paton, Sergeant, prescient vigilance of, at the 

Shah Najaf, 322-3. 
Pearl Brigade, formation of the, 321 ; action 

of, at Lakhnao, 328-9 ; In Azamgarh district, 

351-2, 399. 
Pearson, Captain Alfred, splendid conduct of, 

at Sassiah, 250 ; and at Agra, 317-18. 
Peel, Captain William, organises the Shannon 

brigade, 321 ; at Kajwa, 322 ; at Lakhnao, 

327-36 ; at Kanhpur, 341-2. 
Penny, General, march and death of, 373. 



420 



Index. 



Persia, sketch of causes of the last war with, 

25 ; close of war with, 26. 
Pollock, Mr Archibald, renders good service 

at Banaras, 180. 
PoLWHELE, Brigadier, defeat of at Sassiah, 

249-52. 
Probyn, Major, splendid conduct of, 317. 
Punishment, question of the, awarded to the 

rebels considered, 406. 

Q- 

Queen's Proclamation, the, 403-5. 

R. 

Raikes, Judge, testimony of, as to affairs at 

Agra, 107, 246. 
RAjputAna, events in, 264-6. 
Ramsay, Captain, before Dehli, 29^6. 
Rattray, Major, the men of, at Arab, 223-8 ; 

in Chutia Nagpur, 346 ; in Western Bihar, 

349- 

Reade, Mr E. a., position and character of, 
at Agra, 247, 252. 

Reed, General, at Dehli, 282, 286 ; makes over 
command to Arcbdale Wilson. 288. 

Reid, Charles, joins Wilson's force, 124 ; gal- 
lantry of, 283-4 ; commands fourth column of 
assault, 296 ; is delayed by the absence of 
gunners, 300 ; is badly wounded, 300-1. 

Remmington, Captain, at Lakhnao, 328-9 ; 
at Kanhpur, 341. 

Renaud, Major, is despatched by Neill to- 
wards Kanhpur, 187 ; is joined by Havelock 
and fights at Fathpur, 89-91 ; death of, 193. 

Residency, the, of Lakhnao, Sir H. Lawrence 
moves into the, 142-5 ; posts at the, 204 ; 
causalties at, 206 ; events of defence of, 207 ; 
the garrison of, receive a message from 
Havelock, 208 ; further events of the defence 
of, 231-5 ; relief of, by Havelock and Outram, 
237-45 ; second relief of, 323-37. 

Retribution, question of, considered, 406. 

R6\vA, loyalty of the Ra;a of, 259. 

Richardson, Major, appointed to command 
the yeomanry cavalry, 213, 349. 

Ricketts, George, gallantry of, 257. 

Roberts, action of, against Tantia Topi, 395-6. 

Robertson, Colonel, follows Tantia Topi, 393, 

395- 

Robertson, Dundas, devotion of, 121, 267. 

Robinson, Captain, 389. 

RocKE, Major, pursuit of Tantia Topi by, 396. 

ROHILKHAND, affairs in, 268-9, 373-77- 

Rose, Sir Hugh, takes command of the central 
Indian column, 384 ; victorious march of, to 
Sagar, 385 ; is hindered in his march by an 
order from the Commander-in-Chief, 386 ; 
how, overcame the difficulty, 387 ; besieges 
Jhansi, 387 ; is roused by an attempt of 
Tantia Topi to relieve it, 388 ; defeats him, 
388-9; storms Jhansi, 389-90 ; storms Kunch, 
and marches to Gulauli, 390 ; defeats the 
rebels at Kalpi, 391 ; when on the point of 
leaving hears of the march of Tantia Topi on 
Gwaliar, 392 ; hastens to the scene of action 
and defeats Tantia, 393 ; and hands over com- 
mand to Sir R. Napier, 394. 



Rosser, Captain, offers to lead a reconnais- 
sance but is refused, 63 ; death of, 304. 

RoTHNEY, Captain, before Dehli, 296. 

RowcROFT, Brigadier, useful action of, and his 
troops, 350-3, 399. 

Russell, Brigadier, at Lakhnao, 328-9 ; carries 
the barracks, 334. 



SAgar AND NarbadA territories, action in 

the, 254-7. 
SAgar, condition of, during 1857, 254-5 ! ^'^^ 

lieved by Sir Hugh Rose, 385. 
SahArani'UR, energy of officials at, 121, 267. 
Salkeld before Dehli, 296-7 ; gallantry and 

death of, 299, and note. 
Satte, Brand, energy of, 266-7. 
Sassiah, battle of, 249-52. 
Scott's field-battery, renders splendid service 

at Dehli, 304. 
Seaton, Brigadier-General, takes command of 

a force at Dehli, 320; action of, in the Duab, 

343. 372-3- 

Seton-Karr, George Berkeley, splendid ser- 
vice rendered by, 382. 

ShAh Najaf, terrible struggle at the, 332-3. 

' Shannon ' brigade, the formation of, 321 ; 
action of, 322, 328-37, 341-2. 

Sherer, Captain, gallant action of, 347. 

Sherer, Colonel, gallant liearing of, 348. 

ShorApur, episode of the Raja of, 398-9. 

Showers, General, clears the country to the 
west and south-west of Dehli, 319; defeats 
Tantia Topi, 396. 

SikandarAbagh, storming of the, 329-32. 

SindhiA, Maharaja, visits Calcutta, 48 ; happy 
consequences of the postponement oi \.h.e/ete 
given b}', 49 ; sagacious warnings and action 
of, 107-9 ' i'' deserted by his troops when 
attacked by Tantia I'opi, 393. 

SipAhis, the Bengal, origin of, 4-7 ; develop- 
ment of, as an army, 7-9 ; effects of the first 
Afghan war upon, 9-10 ; effects of the latter 
restrictions upon, lo-ii ; effects of the intro- 
duction of the Horse Guards system among, 
11-13 ; effects of Lord Dalhousie's action 
upon, 14 ; effect of the annexation of Oudh 
upon, 15-16 ; the greased cartridge suggested 
to, by conspirators, 19 ; reasoning of, 20 ; 
reasons why General Hearsey's arguments 
failed to impress, 47, 53 ; conduct of the, in 
the Manghal Pandi case, 53-6 ; did not re- 
gard disband ment as a punishment, 61-89 5 
discontent of, at Mirath, 62 ; mutiny there, 
68-71 ; enter and take possession of Dehli, 
72-86 ; at Barrackpur, disarmed, 155-6 ; 
mutinies of, at Aligarh, loo-i ; at Itawah, 
Eulandshahr, and Mainpuri, 103-5 '■> ^^ Alla- 
habad, 147-9 ' ^^ Kanhpur, 160-77 > ''^ Oudh, 
137-205 ; at Nimach and Nasirabad, 264-5 ; 
about Agra, 246-53 ; at Mardan, 272 ; at 
Jhelam, 274 ; at Sialkdt, 274. 

SitApur, mutiny at, 138-9. 

Slade, Captain, gallantry of, at Lakhnao, 367. 

Smith, Brigadier, action of, against Tantia 
Topi, 393-4. 

Smith, Sergeant, gallantry of, 297-9. 



Index. 



42 



Somerset, Brigadier, pursuit of Tantia Topi 

by, 396-7- 

SoTHEBY, Captain, organises the jP^-ar/ brigade, 
321 ; useful action of, 351-2. 

Spankie, Robert, devotion of, 121, 267. 

Speke, gallantry of, before Dehli, 303. 

Spurgin, Captain, is sent on by steamer to- 
wards Kanhpur, 187-8. 

Sterling, Captain, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 
166-77. 

Stewart, Captain, of the 93d, 332. 

Stuart, General, commands the column sent 
to Central India from Puna, 384 ; joins Sir 
Hugh Rose, 384-5 ; marches against Chan- 
d^ri and takes it, 386 ; splendid conduct of, 
at Kalpi, 391 ; is despatched after Tantia 
Topi, 393. 

Stuart, Major, 389. 

Surat Singh, splendid conduct of, at Banaras, 
180-3. 

Sutherland, Capta'n, pursuit of Tantia Topi 
by, 396. 



T. 

Tandy, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 296. 

Tantia Topi superintends the massacre at 
Kanhpur, 174; defeats Windham, 337-9; is 
defeated by Sir Colin Campbell, 340-3 ; 
marches to relieve Jhansi, 388 ; is defeated 
by Sir Hugh Rose, 388-9 ; marches against 
Sindhia, and drives him from his capital, 
393 ; is defeated by Sir Hugh Rose, 393 ; 
and by Napier, 394 ; subsequent pursuit of, 
394-7 ; is betrayed and hanged, 397. 

Tayler, Mr William, energy of, 215 ; advises 
disarming of sipahis at Danapur, 216 ; rouses 
the general to action, 222 ; order issued by, 
to his subordinates, 224-5 ; disgraceful treat- 
ment of, 229. 

Taylor, Captain Alexander, draws up the 
plans of assault on Dehli, 291 ; splendid ser- 
vice of, 307. 

Tennant, before Dehli, 296. 

Tern an, Major, foresight of, 255 ; action of, 
with respect to native landowners, 255-7. 

Thackeray, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 297. 

Thomason, Mr, effect of the land system of, 
17, 24, 31, 184. 

Thomson, Mowbraj^, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 
166, 169 ; escape of, 174-7. 

Tombs, Captain Henry, gallantry of, 287, 
289-304. 

Tr avers. Captain, at Lakhnao, 328-30. 

Tucker, Henry Carre, reference to, 179. 

Turner, Major, energetic conduct of, 317. 

Tytler, Fraser, Havelock's Quartermaster- 
General, 188-9, i93j 201, 20S. 



V. 



Van Cortlandt clears the ground to the 

north-west of Dehli, 319. 
Vibart, Major, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 

166-77. 
Vigors, Major, before Dehli, 296. 



Venables, Mr, ' cast ni the heroic type,' il 
Volunteers, the, of Calcutta, 153. 



W. 

Wake, Herwald, splendid conduct of, 223-8. 

Walpole, General, at Kanhpur, 338-9, 341 ; I3 
sent on separate command, 343 ; unsoldier- 
like attack on Ruyia, 372 ; joins Sir CoHn, 
373- 

Ward, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 297. 

Wardlaw, Major, splendid leading of, 319. 

Warnings of the mutiny, 408-10. 

Watson, Captain, good conduct of, 317. 

Wemyss, Captain, gallantry of, at the storming 
of Eehli, 303. 

Weston, Captain Gould, services of, 137, 357. 

Wheeler, General Sir H. M., endeavours to 
save the lives of the English at Kanhpur, 
128-33 ; is informed that the revolt is about 
to break out, 160 ; prompt measures taken by, 
161 ; the son of, is killed, 168 ; opposes the 
idea of negotiation with the Nana, but ulti- 
mately agrees, 172-3 ; is murdered with the 
rest, 174-7. 

Whiting, Captain, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 
166-77. 

Whitlock, General, proceedings of the column 
of, 392. 

Widdowson, Bridget, resolute conduct of, at 
Kanhpur, 167. 

Wilde, Colonel, before Dehli, 297. 

Wilkin, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at Lakhnao, 
367- 

Williams, Lieutenant, gallantry of, 257. 

WiLLOUGHBY, Lieutenant, devoted conduct of, 
and companions, in the magazine at Dehli, 
79-81. 

Wilson, Captain, at the Residency, 144, 
205. 

Wilson, General Archdale, dilatory action of, 
at Mirath, 68-71 ; answer of, to Mr Colvin, 
122; marches from Mirath, 122; defeats the 
rebels, 123-4 \ joins General Barnard, 124 ; 
assumes command before Dehli, 288 ; influ- 
enced by Baird-Smith, 288 ; is persuaded by 
Eaird-Smith to attempt an assault, 290 ; 
directs the cavalry to support the stormers, 
304 ; discouragement of, 305 ; is urged to 
persevere by Baird-Smith and Chamberlain, 
305- 

Windham, General, at Kanhpur, 337-9, 
341- 

Wolseley, Captain Garnet, carries the Moti 
Mahal], 334. 

Woodcock, Lieutenant, gallantry of, 303. 

Wyndham, Captain, energetic conduct o'", at 
Shorapur, 398-9. 

Wynyakd, William, daring and cool judgment 
of, 184, 350. 



Yeomanry Cavalry, the, raised by Lord 

Canning, 213, 349. 
Yule, George, in Eastern Bihar, 345-6. 



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